



Title of Document: (RE)PLACING AMERICA: COLD WAR 
MAPPING AND THE MEDIATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL SPACE 
 
 Timothy Barney 
 Doctor of Philosophy, 2011 
 
Directed By: Professor Trevor Parry-Giles 
 Department of Communication 
 
The United States emerged from World War II as an undeniably global power, 
and as the Cold War unfolded, America faced decisions about where to place and display 
its power on the globe. The Cold War was a battle between two ideologies and competing 
world systems, both of which were vying for space and had the tools and technologies to 
control those spaces. Maps became a central vehicle for the testing of these new 
boundaries. Mapping projects and programs emerged from a variety of popular 
cartographers, foreign policy strategists, defense leaders, Congressional representatives, 
scientists, oppositional movements, labor unions, educational publishers, even everyday 
citizens. As each of these sources confirms, the scope of American commitments had 
expanded considerably; to account for this expansion, a cartographic impulse underwrote 
the continually evolving Cold War, and the tensions of art and science, realism and 
idealism, and space and place inherent in this impulse helped form the fault lines of the 
conflict. 
 (Re)Placing America looks largely at the ways that cartography adapted to such 
changes and tensions in the second half of the twentieth century, and how the United 
States marshaled the practice of mapping in a variety of ways to account for the shift to 
	  
internationalism. This dissertation explores how cartography mediated visions of space, 
and particularly, how it defined America’s place within those spaces. 
 Treating cartography as a complex rhetorical process of production, display, and 
circulation, the five chapters cover major geopolitical thematics, and the responding 
evolution of maps, from World War II until the Cold War’s end in the early 1990s. Some 
of these driving themes include the “air-age” expansion of visual perspectives and 
strategic potential in journalistic maps; the appropriation of cartography as a medium for 
intelligence and national security objectives; the marshaling of maps as evidential 
weapons against the Soviet Union in diplomatic exchanges, Congressional reports, and 
government-sponsored propaganda; the shifts from East/West antagonisms to 
North/South ones as cartography was drafted into the modernization efforts of the U.S. in 
mapping the Third World; and the Defense Department’s use of maps to argue for 
nuclear deterrence, while protest groups made radical cartographic challenges to these 
practices of state power. (Re)Placing America reads closely the maps of the forty-years-
plus conflict and considers the complexity of their internal codes (in colors, shapes, icons, 
etc.), while also reaching out externally to the intersecting interests and visions of the 
cartographic producers and the Cold War contexts in which they emerged. The project 
seeks out and explores particular nodal points and thematics where maps consolidated 
and shaped changing shifts in perception, where cartographic fragments cohered around 
the defining moments, but also sometimes in the everyday politics of the Cold War. 
 Ultimately, this project offers four conclusions about and conduct and operation 
of American mapping during the complex, ideologically charged time of the Cold War. 
First, the function of the map to both “fix” and “unfix” particular perceptions of the world 
	  
is relevant to assessing how America sought to stabilize its place in a rapidly changing 
world. Second, the internationalism of the Cold War was bound up in the capacities for 
cartography to document and adapt to it. Third, the humanistic notion of a geographical 
imagination is central to understanding why particular Cold War agents and institutions 
continually drew on cartography to represent their interests. Finally, combining an 
ideological approach to reading maps as articulators of contextual tensions and historical 
ideas with an instrumental approach to maps as material, strategic documents can best 





















































Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 














 Professor Trevor Parry-Giles, Chair 
 Professor Julie Greene 
 Professor James F. Klumpp 
 Professor Kristy Maddux 





































































































Befitting a project where I was knee-deep in maps for a number of years, I was 
fortunate to surround myself with colleagues, friends, mentors, and family who always 
seemed to have an impeccable sense of direction, especially at those times when I didn’t. 
I would like to first thank the Department of Communication at the University of 
Maryland for their support—our chair, Elizabeth Toth, Leah Waks, Robert Gaines, Lillie 
Sullivan, Ray Chang, Diana White, and Mary Bell. Not least, I would like to thank 
Shawn J. Parry-Giles in her capacity as Graduate Director, as well as the Graduate 
Studies Committee, for their generosity in awarding me a Dissertation Completion 
Fellowship. Without this support, I could not have completed this project expeditiously. 
My friends and colleagues at UMD have also been invaluable for great ideas, personal 
pep talks, and pure sanity; these eminent scholars and all-around good people include 
Terri Donofrio, Alyssa Samek, Ioana Cionea, Heather Brook Adams, Ben Krueger, 
Stephen Underhill, Jill Underhill, Elizabeth Gardner, Abbe Depretis, Adam & Sarah 
McDaniel, Sanja Sipek, Sejal Patel, Tiffany Lewis, Lindsey Fox, M. Karen Walker, 
Adam Richards, and James Gilmore. Special thanks to Bjørn Stillion-Southard, Martha 
Kelly Carr, and Lisa Corrigan for sage wisdom from “the other side”; and an extra special 
thanks to Belinda Stillion-Southard for being a good friend and a thoughtful confidante 
during a year of new transitions.  
Throughout my work on this dissertation, I have been beyond lucky to share in 
some conversations both in the field of rhetorical studies and outside of it that provoked 
many insightful questions and offered much encouragement about the intersections 




editorial board at the Quarterly Journal of Speech for their excellent edits and their belief 
in this project at an early stage. The same goes for Martin J. Medhurst and the reviewers 
(and staff) of Rhetoric & Public Affairs, and I especially thank them for providing ideas 
on an earlier piece of this dissertation that allowed me to shift my thinking for the larger 
project—and decidedly for the better. At various conferences over the years, I have also 
received insightful responses on earlier drafts of some of these chapters, from, among 
others, Angela Ray, A. Susan Owen, James Kimble, Vanessa Beasley, and James Hay. 
Also, in the process of publicly sharing my dissertation research at various stages, I 
received scholarly encouragement and ideas from Mitchell McKinney at the University 
of Missouri, David Kaufer at Carnegie Mellon University, Barbara Biesecker, Roger 
Stahl, Kelly Happe, Thomas Lessl, Ed Panetta, and Celeste Condit at the University of 
Georgia, and Josh Boyd, Robin Clair, Samuel McCormack, Robin Jensen, Howard 
Sypher, and Sorin Matei at Purdue University (not to mention great conversations with 
students at each of these universities). At various points, Susan Schulten, Matthew Farish, 
and Anne Knowles all provided advice from outside my rhetorical bubble, and I was 
grateful for their help. I would also like to thank Martha Geores in the Department of 
Geography at the University of Maryland for her support and suggestions on this project 
during its formative stages. And Greg Payne may not know it, but I would not have even 
entered this academic pursuit if it were not for his mentorship during my earlier, more 
disorganized days at Emerson College. In addition, I would like to thank my smart and 
thoughtful colleagues at the University of Richmond, who not only welcomed me to a 
new home, but supported this research with enthusiasm; these include Mari Lee Mifsud, 




Mundle, and Nell Massee. An extra special thanks goes to Mari Boor Tonn for providing 
much-needed moral support. Ed Ayers has also provided great conversation and ideas on 
“mapping time,” and I was grateful for his time and encouragement. 
The treachery of archival research can only be managed with the careful 
assistance of seasoned professionals, and I would especially like to thank the staff of the 
Geography & Map Division at the Library of Congress for their patience, friendliness, 
and diligence; in particular, Stephen Paczolt provided some integral early consultation 
that resulted in finding some of the foundational material for the project, and Ed 
Redmond helped me navigate the labyrinthine world of copyright permissions. Dale 
Herbeck at Boston College offered sage advice on copyright issues as well. Sarah 
Springer and Lynda DeLoach provided excellent assistance at the George Meany 
Memorial Archives in Silver Spring, Maryland, and the attentive staff of the Cartographic 
and Architectural Records Branch at the National Archives in College Park offered 
invaluable help; a special thanks to archivist Richard Smith for some early consultation 
that guided my thinking on this project. Lara Otis gave me extremely helpful tips and 
direction at the University of Maryland’s McKeldin Library in the Government 
Documents and Maps Department. Niels Sampath also provided a great assist overseas at 
the Oxford Union Library by sending some key material on the legendary 
Weinberger/Thompson Debate in 1984. I am also indebted to the family of Richard Edes 
Harrison for their gracious permission to use Harrison’s beautiful maps (and their kind 
encouragement of my research), after a long and frightful search for copyright clues. This 
research also was aided greatly by an Eastern Communication Association Centennial 




Shirlington Library in Arlington should be thanked for letting me have a quiet place to 
work in their facilities every day for weeks at a time. 
My family has also provided enduring emotional support, laughs, and valiant 
attempts at trying to get in touch with me through various media: Mom (thanks for the 
ledge talks), Dad, Sean & Sam, Meghan & Paige, Bryan, Molly, Grace, my brother Daryl, 
and my other brother Daryl; Sean, in particular, has been a continual and unconditional 
source of support. I miss being up there with you all, and I appreciate your patience with 
this quixotic quest. In addition, Carolyn Frisa & Garet McIntyre have also been great 
friends over these years; Randy Rydell has offered inspiring mentorship and great talks 
about politics and rhetoric, and Beth Frisa has especially been both a friend and a 
surrogate mom for me, welcoming me as part of the family from the day I moved down 
South. Ed & Jane Frisa have also provided typically selfless help, support, and pound 
cake. Jane, in particular, proved a crack editor, thoroughly and insightfully copy-editing 
the lion’s share of this manuscript, and also giving great moral support as a fellow teacher. 
Finally, I was fortunate to have an excellent dissertation committee in the 
Department of Communication at the University of Maryland, who agreed to read the 
manuscript when they all have such great projects of their own to work on. James 
Klumpp has supported this mapping stuff for a long time, and asked the kind of big-
picture questions that provided some welcome sinus-clearing. Kristy Maddux also 
offered thoughtful advice on the notion of audiences for this work, and her ability to draw 
on her own dissertation experiences not long ago were a continual source of help to me. 
Julie Greene selflessly stepped in from UMD’s History Department, and showed great 




this work required. I looked up to Shawn J. Parry-Giles’ excellent Cold War scholarship 
continually during my graduate career, but more importantly, she has been a tireless 
editor on this project from the beginning, adding depth to my attempts at critical insight, 
while helping me flesh out a lot of its essential vision. She has also been a strong 
advocate for graduate students, and I benefitted time and time again from her investment 
and faith in me. And, lastly, there is my mentor and close friend, Trevor Parry-Giles, 
continually giving and sacrificing for the good of the project, generous with time and 
ideas, an intuitively excellent editor, a model of scholarship and collegiality for me, and 
quite simply, the ultimate advisor and collaborator. His office was our War Room. 
Of course, despite Professor Bones’s spurious academic credentials and 
questionable work ethic, he was the most consulted scholar on this entire project. I’m 
happy we decided to give him tenure. 
Oh yes, and there’s Elinor Frisa, too—the smartest editor, the funniest and funnest 
companion, the best person I know, and a consistently impressive spotter of forests 


























Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………....viii 
 
List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………....xi 
 
Introduction 
Space, Place, and the Cartographic Scope of America’s Vision in the Cold War…...1 
 The Contours of (Re)Placing America………………………………………………..7 
Rhetoric and Cartography: Crossing Borders………………………………………..18 
 Textualizing Maps: The Art and Science of Cartographic Space………………..18 
 The Movement Towards a Critical Cartography………………………………...21 
 Contestation and Visuality: Merging Maps With the Postmodern………………24 
Real and Ideal Worlds: The Tensions of Cold War Geopolitics…………………….29 
 Cold War Geopolitical Assumptions and Imaginaries…………………………..30 
 The Scope of Cold War Cartography: Mapping the Study………………………37 
 
Chapter One 
The Bird’s Eye View of Air-Age Globalism: New Perspectives and  
Projections of American Internationalism……………………………………………80 
The Tenets and Tensions of the Air-Age Shift to Global Internationalism………….85 
 Iron Albatross: Richard Edes Harrison and the Bird’s Eye View of Modern  
Internationalism……………………………………………………….……………95 
 Analyzing the Perspective and Projection of Harrison’s Maps………………….99 
            Situating “Vision” in Harrisonian Maps………..………………………………104 
Situating Strategy in Harrisonian Maps……………………...…………………113 




 One World or Two?: Foreign Policy and the Cartographic Tensions Between  
Art and Science in the Transition to Cold War…………………………………..…153 
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Implications of Air-Age Geography in the Early  
Cold War……………………………………………………………………………157 
American Projector: S.W. Boggs’ Cartographic Vision for the State Department  
in the Early Cold War…………………………………………………….………...167 
 The Office of the Geographer of the United States, Department of State…...…171 
The Form of Roundness: New Projections and Perspectives in Boggs’  
Cartographic Discourse…………………………………………………………175 











The Place of Ideology: Maps as Evidentiary Weapons in the Visual Construction  
of the Soviet Union.........................................................................................................241 
Cartographic Constructions of the Cold War: Mapping the Bi-Polar 1950s……….246 
Images of Commitment: Journalistic Maps and Cold War Internationalism…..247 
Cartography as Evidence: Maps and the Depiction of Cold War Capacities…..256 
 “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.”: The Power of Place and the Rhetorical Life of a  
Cold War Map.……………………………………………………………………..267 
The Origins and Production of “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.”………………………..272 
 Power and Placement: Reading “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.”……………………….282 




Placing the Third World: American Visions of “The South” and the  
Cartography of Development and Modernization…………….…………………….338  
The Politics of Long Underwear: The Peters Projection and the Iconization  
of Development……………………………………………………………………..340 
Sketching the Contours of the Third World: Origins and Approaches….………….348 
Bringing Up the South: Maps, Scientific Internationalism, 
and U.S. Global Interests………………..…………......….….…………………….353  
Diagnosing the Third World: America’s Mapping of World Health  
in the Cold War…………………………………..……………………………..363 
Developing and Decolonizing the Map: The U.S., the United Nations,  




Nuclear Weapons and the “End of Geography”: Cartographic Change  
and Control During the Second Cold War…………………………………………..427 
“Battle of the Booklets:” Nuclear Armaments and (Late) Cold War State Power…437 
Nuclear Geopolitics in the Second Cold War…………………..………..……..441 
Scale and Speed: The Hyper-Internationalism of Defense Cartography……….445 
Weapons of Perception: Affirming the Superpower in the Second Cold War....456 
“Missiles as Missives”: William Bunge and the Radical Cartographic  
Challenge to the Second Cold War…………………………………………………462 
The Emergence of Radical Cartography and the Origins of the NWA................466 
 Bringing Nuclear War Home: Radical Proximity in the NWA…………………481  
All is Red: The Challenge to Cold-War Binaries in the Nuclear War Atlas...…487 
Days After: The Use of Rhetorical Vision in the Nuclear War Atlas………….490 







From Globalism to Globalization: State Power, Cartography, and the  
Politics of (Inter)National Identity………………………………………………...…527 
Mapping a New World Order: The Pluto Press Atlases  
and the End of the Cold War………………………………………………………..529 
Which Way is East? Challenging Cold War Dichotomies  
in Pluto Project Maps…………………………………………………...………531 
Running From the Border: Nationalism and Ethnic Identity  
in the Pluto Project’s New Europe………..…………………………………….537 
The Third Worlding of the Second World: Economic Development  
in Pluto Maps…………………………………………………………………...541 
Placing (Re)Placing America: Reflections on Cartography and U.S. Cold War 
Power……………………………………………………………………………….545 
 Fixing and Unfixing: Maps as the “Immutable Mobile”……………………….550 
 Cold War America and the “Form” of Internationalism………………………..553  
 Imagining and Re-Imagining: Humanistic Projection and the Question of  
Cartographic Agency……………………………………………………...……555 
Vision and Strategy: Bringing Ideological and  
Instrumental Approaches Together……………………………………………..559 

















LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Chapter One 
1.1. Richard Edes Harrison, Preliminary Draft of "Czechoslovakia,"  
for Fortune, 1938.................................................................................................101  
1.2.  Richard Edes Harrison, “Europe From the East,” Look at the World: 
The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy, 1944.......................................................102 
1.3.  Richard Edes Harrison, “Eight Views of the World,” Look at the World: 
The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy, 1944.......................................................105  
1.4.  Richard Edes Harrison, “Southeast to Armageddon,” Fortune, 1942.................107  
1.5.  Richard Edes Harrison, “The Not-So-Soft Underside,” Fortune, 1943..............108  
1.6.  Richard Edes Harrison, “Great Circle Airways,” Look at the World: 
The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy, 1944………………………………...…111  
1.7.  Richard Edes Harrison, “One World, One War,” Look at the World:  
The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy, 1944.......................................................114  
1.8.  Richard Edes Harrison, “The World Divided,” Fortune, 1942...........................115  
1.9.  Richard Edes Harrison, “Three Approaches to the U.S.,” Fortune, 1940……...117  
1.10.  Richard Edes Harrison, “Great Lakes to Greenland,” Fortune, 1940……….....119 
1.11.  Richard Edes Harrison, “Puget Sound to Siberia,” Fortune, 1940……………..120 
1.12.  Richard Edes Harrison, “Europe,” Fortune, 1940………………………….......122 
1.13.  Richard Edes Harrison, “The World According to Standard (N.J.),”  
Fortune, 1940…………………………………………………………………...124 
1.14.  Richard Edes Harrison, “U.S. Air Industry,” Fortune, 1941…………...……....125  
1.15.  Richard Edes Harrison, “Pan Am World Airways,” 1946……………………...126  
1.16.  Richard Edes Harrison, “U.S.S.R.'s First Atom Bomb,” Life, 1949…………....130 
1.17.  Richard Edes Harrison, “The Communist Fastness,” Fortune, 1950……….….131 
1.18.  Richard Edes Harrison, “The Fatherland Is Again Divided,” Life, 1954….…...131 
 
Chapter Two 
2.1.  “Haushofer’s Latest Theory: Imperialist Expansion Along the Meridians,”  
in State Department Memorandum, Evaluation of German  
Geopolitics, 1944……………………………………………………………….161  
2.2.  S.W. Boggs, “Eumorphic Projection,” Geographical Journal, 1929.…….....…177 
2.3.  S.W. Boggs, Adequacy of Population Data, 1952…………………………..….177 
2.4.  S.W. Boggs, “The World National Claims in Adjacent Seas,”  
Geographical Review, 1952……………………..……………………………...179 
2.5.  S.W. Boggs, “Western Hemisphere,” Journal of Geography/ 
Department of State Bulletin, 1945……………………………………………..183 
2.6.  S.W. Boggs, “Sum of All Hemispheres Containing All of the  
United States,” Journal of Geography/Department of State Bulletin, 1945……183 
2.7.  Richard Edes Harrison, “4 Ways of Indicating Scale,” U.S. Department  
of State, 1946…………………………………………………………………...187  
2.8.  Boris Artzybasheff for S.W. Boggs, “Human Head on Geographical  
Globe and Human Head on Seven Well-Known Map Projections,”   





2.9.  S.W. Boggs, “The World: Transport-Cost Per Ton-Mile,” Annals of the  
Association of American Geographers, 1941…………………………….…….192 
2.10.  S.W. Boggs, “Transport By Different Means At Equal Cost,” Department  
of State Bulletin, 1945…………………………………………………………..193 
2.11.  U.S. Army Map Service, “Index Map: Carte Du Monde  
De Millionieme,” 1936…………………………………………………………198  
2.12.  United States Department of Interior Geological Survey, “International  
Map of the World: Arrangement of Sheets for the United States,” June 1947....199 
2.13.  U.S. Army Map Service, Volgograd: Series 1301, 1956…………………..…...201  
2.14.  S.W. Boggs, “Adequacy of Existing Soil Maps for Agricultural  
Interpretation,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 1949……202 
 
Chapter Three 
3.1.  Robert L. Bostick, “United States Collective Defense Arrangements,”  
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Studies on Review of United  
Nations Charter, 1954…………………….……………………………………259 
3.2.  House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Cost Per Soldier 1960,” Mutual  
Security Act of 1961, 1961……………………………………………………...260 
3.3.  Research Institute of America, “How Communists Menace Vital Materials,”  
House Committee on Un-American Activities, Soviet Total War, 1956…….…261 
3.4.  U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, “USSR Electromagnetic  
Reconnaissance Flights,” 1960…………………………………………………265  
3.5.  AFL Free Trade Union Committee, “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.,” 1951…………....268 
3.6.  AFL Free Trade Union Committee, “Location of Forced-Labor Camps in 
the Soviet Union,” Slave Labor in the Soviet Union, 1951……………….……290 
3.7.  AFL Free Trade Union Committee, Carte De L'Esclavage  
En U.R.S.S., 1951……………………………………………………………….301  
3.8.  U.S. Department of State, “Soviet Union Forced Labor Camps and Selected  
Pipelines,” 1982………………………………………………….……………..306  
3.9.  U.S. Department of State, “Typical Forced Labor Camp,” 1982………….…...306 
 
Chapter Four 
4.1.  Reverend James Gall, “Gall's Orthographic Projection,” Scottish  
Geographical Magazine, 1885………………………………………….……...339         
4.2.  Arno Peters, “World Map,” New Internationalist, 1989………………….……339 
4.3.  U.S. Department of State, Newly Independent States of the World, 1965……...355  
4.4.  U.S. Department of State, Index to International Boundary Series, 1974……...356  
4.5.  U.S. Department of State, Technical Cooperation Administration,  
“Point 4 Around the World,” 1953…………………………………….……….360  
4.6.  American Geographical Society, “World Distribution of  
Spirochetal Diseases: 1. Yaws, Pinta, Bejel,” Atlas of Disease, 1955………….367  
4.7.  Senate Committee on Government Operations, “Smallpox Endemicity,”  
Status of World Health, 1959…………………………………….……………..372 
4.8.  Senate Committee on Government Operations, “Life Expectancy at  





4.9.  Senate Committee on Government Operations, “Disease in the World,”  
Status of World Health, 1959…………………………………………………...374  
4.10.  U.S. Peace Corps, “Peace Corps Around the World,” 1966….………………...385  
4.11.  Central Intelligence Agency, “Changing Face of Europe and  
Colonial Tension, Late 1945,” 1968…………………………………………....386  
4.12.  Central Intelligence Agency, “Collapse of Colonial System, 1953-68,” 1968....386  
 
Chapter Five 
5.1.  U.S. Department of Defense, “Soviet Global Power Projection,” in  
Soviet Military Power, 1981…………………………………………………....431 
5.2.  U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defense, “Reinforcement of US Forward-Based  
Armed Forces,” in Whence the Threat to Peace, 1982……………………..…..431 
5.3.  U.S. Department of Defense, “Soviet Military Forces,” in Soviet Military  
Power, 1981…………………………………………………………….………446 
5.4.  U.S. Department of Defense, “Area of Tagil Tank Plant Over Plan of  
Washington, DC,” in Soviet Military Power, 1981……………………….……448 
5.5.  U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defense, “Detroit Industrial Complex Over Plan  
of Washington, DC,” in Whence the Threat to Peace, 1982…………….……..449 
5.6.  NATO, “Target Coverage of Soviet SS-20 and Target Coverage of NATO  
Pershing II and GLCM,” in NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons,  
1984……………………………………………..………………………………453 
5.7.  NATO, “Coverage of Europe From SS-20 Bases East of the Urals,” in NATO 
  and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons, 1984……………………….……..453 
5.8.  U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defense, “NATO Medium-Range Nuclear Weapons  
Coverage,” in Disarmament: Who's Against?, 1983…………………….……..454 
5.9.  U.S. Department of Defense, “Soviet SS-20 Range,” in Soviet Military  
Power, 1981………………………………………………………….…………455 
5.10.  U.S. Department of Defense, “Coverage of Ballistic Missile Detection and  
Tracking Systems,” in Soviet Military Power, 1983……………………………456 
5.11.  William Bunge, Ban the Bomb: The Nuclear War Atlas, broadsheet,  
Society for Human Exploration, 1982……………………….…………………462 
 
Conclusion 
6.1.  William McNulty, "The Pentagon's New Map," in Thomas P.M. Barnett's The  















SPACE, PLACE, AND THE CARTOGRAPHIC  
SCOPE OF AMERICA’S VISION IN THE COLD WAR 
 
In the leading machine the head of the Air Force was sitting beside the 
pilot. He had a world atlas on his knees and he kept staring first at the atlas, then 
at the ground below, trying to figure out where they were going. Frantically he 
turned the pages of the atlas…In the seat behind him sat the Head of the Army 
who was even more terrified. 
“You don’t mean to tell me we’ve gone right out of the atlas?” he cried, 
leaning forward to look. 
“That’s exactly what I’m telling you!” cried the Air Force man. “Look for 
yourself. Here’s the very last map in the whole flaming atlas! We went off that 
over an hour ago!” He turned the page. As in all atlases, there were two 
completely blank pages at the very end. “So now we must be somewhere here,” he 
said, putting a finger on one of the blank pages. 
“Where’s here?” cried the Head of the Army. 
The young pilot was grinning broadly. He said to them, “That’s why they 
always put two blank pages at the back of the atlas. They’re for new countries. 
You’re meant to fill them in yourself.”  
            – Roald Dahl, The BFG1 
 
 Katherine Harmon fittingly closes her book on art maps, You Are Here, with the 
above passage from Roald Dahl’s classic children’s book.2 More than simply a clever 
send-off about maps, Dahl’s vignette expresses a cartographic conundrum that goes a bit 
deeper into the anxieties and opportunities of charting political space. On the one hand, 
the Army and Air Force experts are anxious that their trusted map no longer reflects the 
space below—the uncharted space on the ground is empty white blankness on the atlas. 
At the same time, the pilot smiles with the acknowledgement that the space below is 
something that is not a given, but has to be actively written. In a sense, then, Dahl reveals 
the essential tensions around the legibility of space through maps: the map is often taken 
for granted as a representation of what is, but once its function as a constructed image is 
acknowledged, a nervous loss of control is created; a feeling of “flying off the atlas.”3 





momentous opportunity of writing the world according to their particular perspective 
(and interests). Like the airplane crisscrossing over wide expanses of territory, the 
perspective of the cartographer is often framed from a vantage point outside of the space 
itself, thus giving them (and their users and readers) a powerful positionality and 
placement; an encouragement to see terrain as abstract, able to be shaped, flattened, and 
simplified.4  
 When the Head of the Army asks “Where’s here?” in The BFG, he may as well be 
articulating the United States’ grappling with its own “placement” throughout the 
twentieth century. During that time, world space had in many respects become closed—
most of the nooks and crannies across the globe were accounted for, organized and 
classified with lines and borders.5 Simultaneously, American power underwent massive 
spatial transformations, enjoying an increasingly higher bird’s eye view of international 
space, while perceiving that it had the immense responsibility of being the writer of that 
space.6 Moving from a worldview marked by traditional balances of power and 
hemispheric boundaries toward a more fluid, abstract, and above all modern 
internationalism, the United States faced a world that seemed both tantalizingly and 
alarmingly closer.7 Cultural critic John Berger once wrote that: “Our vision is continually 
active, continually moving, continually holding things in a circle around itself, 
constituting what is present to us as we are…Every image embodies a way of seeing.”8 
The very materials (like maps), then, through which Americans envisioned themselves as 
a nation, helped constitute a sense of national identity and served as a visual guide for 





 In 1943, well before victory for the Allies in Europe and the Pacific was assured, 
Walt Disney released a film that spoke directly to momentous geopolitical changes across 
the globe. Entitled Victory Through Air Power, the half-animated, half-live action film 
was based on the bestselling 1942 book of the same name by Major Alexander De 
Seversky, a Russian émigré, pilot, aviation engineer, and military strategist.9 In between 
narrated animation segments, De Seversky lectured to the camera that the only way for 
America to prevail was to fully embrace the revolution of the air, arguing that no spot on 
earth was immune from overhead attack and that the entire globe, including its skies, was 
a battlefield. For De Seversky, the answer for America was to put an end to the “surface 
thinking” of sea and ground forces, and increase the commitment to long-range bombing 
from the air—the one way to penetrate the massive geopolitical reach of German and 
Japanese forces.10  
While De Seversky’s arguments may not have seemed especially novel, the 
medium for his message most decidedly was. In his lecture segments, De Seversky 
moved back and forth between giant wall maps displaying his war strategies, and a 
massive globe in the middle of the room, which he could spin in all directions to argue 
for his new approach to World War II space. The maps were dynamic, colorful, and 
unconventional—some used powerful metaphors of arrows and icons of flags to show 
infiltration of boundaries and the intense nationalization of war; others centered on the 
North Pole rather than using traditional layouts, in order to show the new proximities of 
countries and the new routes by which to wage warfare across long distances. The 
animated sequences themselves continually drew upon maps to demonstrate Axis 





of sending tanks, ships, planes, and bombs to remote locales. At one point, a large clock 
is drawn in front of a background of a world map, counting down to show the 
compression of time and distance in this new world—a persuasive graphic for 
transmitting a sense of geopolitical urgency. In many of the maps, the viewer sees the 
world beneath, rolling in front of them from an airplane’s perspective. Cartography, in 
short, was the unsung star of the film. Through striking visual metaphors and odd 
perspectives, what De Seversky and Disney displayed overall was a shrinking world, 
continually agitating and redefining its geography in consonance with increasingly 
sophisticated science and military technology. What was also on display was the 
importance of vision itself—the opening placard set the tone by declaring: “Our country 
in the past, has struggled through many storms of anguish, difficulty and doubt. But we 
have always been saved by men of vision and courage, who opened our minds and 
showed us the way out of confusion.”11 Thus, having control over space, on land and in 
the skies, was more than just a question of a technological and economic race for 
superiority, it was a race for perception, a task for which maps were becoming more and 
more important.  
Altogether, viewers witnessed a cartographic argument for a powerful 
internationalism that demanded not just American firepower and dollars, but moral 
leadership as well. De Seversky makes the point during his map lecture, for example, that 
the dividing line between soldier and civilian had disappeared—that the business of 
strategy had broadened to include all Americans. Such an argument was, not 
coincidentally, accompanied in this era by a heightened demand for cartography from a 





Defense advisor, popular author, and scientist; his very appropriation in a Disney film 
showed the newly fluid roles that mapmakers, map users, and cartographic strategists 
were taking on. In instances like this, maps were fast becoming part of a larger movement 
to bring public opinion into the realm of national strategy and foreign policy. Not only 
were there significant changes in the ways maps looked, but also in the ways they were 
being produced, appropriated, and circulated as compelling arguments for the direction of 
American influence. Maps, thus, took on a performative dimension, mediating America’s 
role in the world and dramatizing the stakes of international conflict.  
Beyond offering a mere curio of World War II propaganda, then, Victory Through 
Air Power foretold something larger about America’s future. The film ends with an 
animated sequence where a giant eagle descends from the sky and attacks a map of Japan 
that has morphed into a black octopus flailing all over the Pacific Ocean. After defeating 
the octopus, the eagle flies off and lands nobly on top of a globe. That globe gradually 
bronzes into the top of a flagpole, which holds an American flag flapping in the wind. As 
World War II shifted into Cold War by the end of the 1940s, maintaining the eagle’s grip 
on the globe became more difficult and contentious. As the Cold War unfolded, for 
example, America found itself in Roald Dahl’s pilot seat, facing decisions about where to 
place and display its power on the globe, with both the anxiety and opportunity of 
defining the new international space. It was no wonder, then, that maps became a central 
vehicle for the testing of these new boundaries. The Soviet Union was not simply a new 
octopus to be destroyed by military power (although that motif would certainly surface 
prominently in the era’s maps); this was a global battle between two ideologies and 





technologies to control those spaces. And in this time, mapping projects and programs 
emerged from a variety of popular cartographers, foreign policy strategists, defense 
leaders, Congressional representatives, scientists, oppositional movements, labor unions, 
educational publishers, even everyday citizens. As each of these sources confirms, the 
scope of American commitments had expanded considerably; to account for this 
expansion, a cartographic impulse underwrote the continually evolving Cold War, and 
the tensions of art and science, realism and idealism, and space and place inherent in this 
impulse helped form the fault lines of the conflict.  
(Re)Placing America looks largely at the ways that cartography adapted to such 
changes and tensions in the second half of the twentieth century, and how the United 
States marshaled the practice of mapping in a variety of ways to account for the shift to 
internationalism. The Cold War was an inescapably spatial conflict, where America often 
attempted to contain its Soviet enemy, while consolidating pacts and international 
commitments to build imposing boundaries for itself. In the era of domino theories and 
containment, as Paul Chilton writes, “the political came to be imagined in spatialized 
terms, and specifically, through the spatial gestalt of the container which grounds the 
notions (and feelings) of identity and difference, of self and other, sovereign state and 
anarchic non-state, clearly and distinctly separated by a bounding limit.”12 More than a 
simple balance of military forces, and political agreements, the Cold War represented a 
strong ideological volley; space was not simply about military security, it was also about 
security of ideas and a way of life. This project explores how cartography mediated these 






The Contours of (Re)Placing America 
As critical geographers and cartographers have noted, maps spatialize the 
language of politics—a melding of signs and symbols that both reflect and create colorful 
and charged worldviews.13 Like politics, maps converge art and science. As Alan 
Henrikson writes, “Cartography is a combination of science and art, of the objective and 
the subjective in human thought and activity…Maps thus may be embedded in the 
discourse of politics and of art, just as political symbols can be embedded in the language 
of maps.”14 The lines, the shapes, and the colors that map historical and contemporary 
geopolitical struggles can simultaneously provide a sense of order and/or disorder, 
depending on the political particularities. Maps, thus, function to classify wide expanses 
of space, providing a perception of security that we can know the world.15 Behind this 
rational, scientific “knowing,” of course, lies the art and the artifice of mapmaking, a 
much more contentious, rhetorical process. 
With this, I make the assumption that maps themselves are unique, visual political 
grammars, creating and reflecting charged discourses about ideology and power. I also 
take seriously the notion, prevalent amongst geographers and historians, of a “geographic 
imagination” where cultures obtain and circulate geographic knowledge.16 In addition, I 
situate cartography as a rhetoric of display, caught in a dynamic of revealing and 
concealing—a reductive, selective, and partial process where what is not mapped often 
becomes just as salient as what is lined and bounded on the page.17 In this way, maps are 
vehicles for perception that provide ways of seeing the world; as Christian Jacob has 
written, maps are a “grammar of the gaze” and an “interaction of eye and memory.”18 Not 





world, but the very form of the map etches the user’s positionality in space.19 The 
importance of acknowledging the synergy between form and content is thus key to the 
study; Kenneth Burke wrote that form is “the psychology of the audience. Or, seen from 
another angle, form is the creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the 
adequate satisfying of that appetite.” This so-called “breach between form and subject-
matter, between technique and psychology,” Burke offered, “is the result…of scientific 
criteria being unconsciously introduced into matters of purely aesthetic judgment.”20 
Because of its explosive mixture of science and aesthetics, cartography offers a 
productive way to discuss how form and content dissolve into each other. The perspective 
and projection of the map, in large part, becomes the subject of the map itself.21 
Therefore maps, I argue, are ideological blueprints, and they help perpetuate powerful 
cultural narratives.  
Cartography is also a particularly appropriate subject for Cold War study, 
precisely because maps represent, in simplified images, the kinds of discursive historical 
tensions that Cold War strategists, academics, and citizens negotiated throughout the 
whole of the conflict. As John Pickles writes, “If cartography is a form of 
discourse…then the cartographer and the map are at the center of debates over 
technocracy and power in the modern world, and must be brought within the compass of 
social criticism and assessed from the perspective of social theory.”22 There has never 
been, perhaps, a more contentious, rancorous, and epic debate around modern 
technocracy and power than the one in which the United States found itself during the 
Cold War. Robert Scott has written that ambivalence is built into the very concept of the 





essential to the meaning of cold war; it is a state of being and can’t be discussed as a 
stable condition.”23 The notion of tension becomes central, since the Cold War cannot be 
defined as any kind of static entity, but more as a continually contracting and expanding 
force over the course of forty-plus years.24  
One of the reasons, then, that this project is built on space and place is because it 
is, I believe, in the push and pull between these concepts that the Cold War’s special kind 
of ambivalence can be explored. The idea of placement often connotes stability; this 
project does not assume stability, but instead attempts to characterize the cartography of 
the Cold War as a search for stability. If maps are conceptualized as a process, then the 
development of Cold War maps can be seen as a series of attempts at stabilizations.25 
Humanist geographer Yi-Fu Tuan has defined some of the essential space/place 
distinctions, positing that “spaces are marked off and defended against intruders” while 
“places are centers of felt value.” 26 In a passage that speaks almost eerily well to the 
American Cold War, Tuan writes, “The ideas ‘space’ and ‘place’ require each other for 
definition. From the security and stability of place we are aware of the openness, freedom, 
and threat of space, and vice versa. Furthermore, if we think of space as that which 
allows movement, then place is pause; each pause in movement makes it possible for 
location to be transformed into place.”27 Maps offer the pauses in the Cold War’s abstract 
definitions of space, positing placements for the viewer, and by extension a placement for 
American values.28 As Kevin DeLuca has written,  
Strategy requires a center of power from which to control space. Place implies a 
particular locality of which a person has an intimate knowledge derived from 





impersonal geometrical region known through the rationalized, objective methods 
of science.29  
Maps are part of the impersonal rationality of modern science and the intense locality of 
felt value and knowledge—both of which constrain the perceptions of modern American 
interests and power.  
With this intertwined conception of space and place, this project is built on a 
series of questions—inquiries that attempt to critically interrogate both cartography and 
the Cold War itself. One set of these questions revolves around contextual considerations 
of American state power and its international commitments. For example: how did the 
United States conceive of its “place” within a globalizing, international landscape? In an 
ideological conflict like the Cold War, how was “space” part of America’s self-definition, 
and how was it used to define other states (like the Soviet Union) and geopolitical 
regions and areas? Finally, how was American internationalism constrained by the 
visual medium of cartography and by the rhetorical choices of mapping institutions and 
cartographic actors? I am interested, ultimately, in how the scope of American state 
power on the international stage was envisioned and framed by particular visual artifacts, 
and the processes that created and circulated these artifacts. Maps are not the only way of 
answering such questions about space and place, but I argue that they are a significant 
one. Powerful binaries of East/West and (later) North/South affected American 
conceptions of the Cold War, and maps orientated both their makers and their users in 
these directions, offering a mode of vision by which to locate American national interests 





While such questions situate America’s construction of the Cold War, the other 
major line of research questions revolves around understanding the practice of 
cartography itself. For one, how did the practice of mapping adapt and evolve over the 
forty-plus years of Cold War conflict? Relatedly, how were maps produced and 
circulated in this era, and how did the requirements of the Cold War shape both the 
products and processes of cartography? Geography and cartography as disciplines were 
themselves undergoing major technological and ideological changes in this time, 
continually contested by new theories and oppositional movements, and often maintained 
through government and corporate sponsorship; even more importantly, these disciplines’ 
aspirations to contribute to both hard and social sciences complicated the practice of 
mapping. Geographer David N. Livingstone’s inquiries into “geographical tradition” are 
particularly salient here, as he asks, “What role…did geography play in past society? 
Was it used for political, or religious, or economic purposes by particular groups? Who 
benefited from the latest theory, and who lost out?...For accepting or rejecting any 
scientific theory is always and irreducibly a social act, by a specific social group, in 
particular circumstances.”31 In this spirit, I also ask: how did the political interests of 
popular, government, and academic actors and institutions complicate and shape both 
the internal design of the map and its external movement through U.S. political culture? 
How were maps themselves rhetorically constructed as viable evidence and knowledge 
producers for these differing interests? In other words, not only do the content of the 
maps themselves become of interest, the ways in which they were seen and conceived as 
arguments and tools for various powers become central to the cases and themes of this 





maps themselves, thus leading to an important last question: how do the perspectives, 
projections, and internal codes of maps reflect the visions and strategies of their makers 
and sponsors? The map is a rich network, layered and crisscrossed with a host of 
different meanings, interpretations, and contradictions—the colors, icons, shapes, and 
captions, however small, have larger ramifications for how world space is drawn and 
acted upon. 
In summary, this study critically examines Cold War visual history by analyzing 
the rhetorical choices in the framing of cartographic form and content.32 What makes the 
Cold War cartographic context so striking is how the rhetorical function of maps was 
foregrounded—in the new internationalism of this period the very flexibility and variety 
of map usage and construction articulated the discursive nature of Cold War space, where 
foreign policy elites, popular opinion makers, and academics saw the world as a site for 
interpretation—not as a geographical set of natural givens.33 Such a premium on 
interpretation involved a modern focus on symbolic images and the credibility of world 
opinion, and maps were seen as more than simply a set of points and lines depicting 
political realities.34 As Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari point out: 
 The map is open and connectable in all its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible,  
susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind 
of mounting, re-worked by an individual, group, or social formation. It can be 
drawn on the wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a political action 
or as a meditation.35 
In its malleability and usability, then, the map is open and amenable to the needs of its 





ephemeral by time. Embedded in reports to Congress, passed around State Department 
halls, accompanying stories in Reader’s Digest, gripped by helicopter pilots over 
Vietnam—maps’ very ubiquity in the Cold War speaks to their instrumentality to a host 
of competing voices. Maps continually argued the Cold War into perpetuation, offering 
the acceptable borders by which the war could be conceived and fought. This type of 
vision gave maps the kind of abstract qualities that could allow American interests to be 
seen on a global scale, and in more universal terms; interests spread not just with 
weaponry, but with information technology, capital, and ideas.36 Such abstractions also 
gave way to notions for foreign policy elites, military planners, and academics that space 
was a commodity that could be known and classified. Maps gave Cold War leaders a 
strong power of global surveillance, and encouraged the type of constant vigilance and 
fear of proximity that sustained policies of containment and liberation.37   
 In addition, since the notion of place, particularly, is bound up in human value, 
this project understands the internationalism of Cold War maps as having deep roots in 
American culture, embedded in a larger history of American discourses around national 
space. This necessitates an engagement with what Mikhail Bakhtin has called “the 
intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships,” as history and geography 
collide in America’s global expansion throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries and its 
culmination in the Cold War.38 As Isaiah Bowman, FDR’s principal geographer and a 
famous architect of the new American global space in the 20th century, once said: 
“Empire builders must think in terms of space as well as time; to a revolutionary degree 
man changes his geography as he goes along.”39 The production of spaces in America is 





often intervening to create tidy, sequential narratives of American destiny and progress.40 
For example, Jacob sees the history of cartography as marked by a power of seduction 
with mythic overtones, a representation that would “seem to constitute a privileged space 
of projection for the viewer’s desires, aspirations, and affective and cultural memories.”41  
So, part of the value of this project lies, I hope, in exploring how maps can 
provide reductions of external realities for both producers and consumers of geographic 
knowledge, with maps projecting “an order of reason onto the world and forc[ing] it to 
conform to a graphic rationale, a cultural grid, a conceptual geometry.”42 Such a grid was 
constructed over the course of American history, from the hemisphere-bound conceptions 
of police powers in the Monroe Doctrine, to the missionary zeal of Manifest Destiny; the 
closing of American space as ideological opportunity in Frederick Jackson Turner’s 
Frontier Thesis, to the argument for geopolitical sea supremacy by Alfred Mahan; from 
T.R.’s integral rhetorical expansion of American might in the Roosevelt Corollary, to the 
skyrocketing popularity of National Geographic after it published photographs of the 
exotic Philippine “other”; from Wilsonian-style internationalism and the principles of 
self-determination at Paris in 1919, to the self-conscious return to isolationism in the 
interwar, and then on to the explosion of popular globally-focused mapmaking during 
World War II.43 Powerfully and completely, America had been engaged in a dynamic 
dialogue about its placement within world space by the time a breach with the Soviet 
Union took place at the onset of the Cold War. A distinctly modern internationalism had 
been taking root for decades, the implications of which found their way into the very 
visualization of American power and global strategy. Cara Finnegan has defined visual 





audiences’ practices of looking.”44 Understanding the historical situatedness, then, of 
how maps were created and used in a conflict as wide and complex as the Cold War, I 
believe, is an important part of the rhetorical history of the United States, and an 
opportunity to accentuate its core spatial values. 
I also enter this project into the critical conversation in rhetorical studies around 
the Cold War, answering the calls, by scholars such as Bryan C. Taylor and Stephen 
Hartnett, to expand the texts by which we examine the conflict.45 But more than merely 
expanding and opening up the texture of critical Cold War studies, (Re)Placing America 
seeks to contextualize a medium (cartography) that is often analyzed as if it stood outside 
of its context and the processes of its own production. Thus, I seek a specifically 
rhetorical critique of mapping in the Cold War that neither privileges text nor context, but 
instead holds them in suspension.46 A hallmark example is found in the multi-authored 
Cold War Rhetoric collection, wherein the discourse of the conflict is viewed through a 
series of lenses pertaining to strategy, metaphor, and ideology.47 Martin Medhurst uses a 
strategic approach to demonstrate the contingencies of realist assumptions in the goals of 
Cold War statecraft, and urges critics to take an “equally strategic view of language as 
symbolic action.”48 Robert Ivie, by contrast, looks at ways in which Cold War motives, 
and their accompanying images, constrain the way the war was fought; through 
metaphors, he seeks to show the importance of values in the critical inquiry of the Cold 
War, aiming to “deliteralize the conventional imagery that holds sway over our political 
imaginations.”49 Finally, Philip Wander finds the “grounding of meaning” to be a key 
concern of Cold War study, tracing how our definitions of Cold War audiences and 





appear.”50 Both the prophet and the technocrat become Wander’s ideological touchstones, 
the zeal of the missionary and the expertise of the scientist cohering into arguments that 
“share a view of the world, literally ‘the world,’ so deep and fundamental as to be called 
the ‘ground’ on which foreign policy is debated in this country.”51 Part of this study’s 
function is to find these approaches’ crossroads, and bring them together.52  
Studying maps in this period certainly calls for Wander’s brand of ideological 
criticism, where the map can be seen to line and bound competing ideologies rooted in 
American discourse; yet, as Lawrence Prelli has shown, maps are metaphorical by nature, 
serving often to literalize the abstract spaces they purport to display, and they thus 
provide a gauge of the kinds of values that constitute a map’s symbolic enactment.53 
Given that maps were created for particular Cold War purposes, passed around in halls of 
foreign policy, Medhurst’s calls for an engagement with strategy must also be heeded 
here. My research questions require the fusion of traditional rhetorical approaches to the 
Cold War, in order to gauge the strategic employment of maps by different institutions 
and audiences, probe how maps become metaphors for space itself, and discuss how 
powerful interests vie for political space on the blank page and perpetuate ideologies of 
foreign policy.54   
At the same time as I enter a conversation in rhetorical studies, I also hope for 
interdisciplinary dialogue from this project, in order to expand the ways we can talk 
about and debate complex issues of politics and identity. If the global reach of the United 
States in the Cold War is indelibly stamped by intersections between art and science, 
space and place, centers and peripheries, then the cartographic conceptions of American 





already generated rich lines of interdisciplinary work in this area, but these lines are often 
running parallel to each other, rather than intersecting and entangling. The work of 
historians, geographers, social theorists, international relations scholars, and rhetoricians 
are not always sharing the task of interrogating these notions of geography and power 
together—and, this project offers ways their disparate projects could be joined into 
fruitful partnerships. 
Finally, this project takes advantage of the rich archival resources of maps 
produced during the Cold War. Maps are both accompaniments to other Cold War 
discourses and are interesting visual languages in their own right, and thus I access 
archives from the U.S. government, private institutions, and individual cartographers to 
evidence the broader contextual connections of maps in this period.55 This, of course, 
necessitates a wide survey of maps, and this study deliberately covers the temporal Cold 
War as a whole, rather than focusing on a specific set of maps during a particular Cold 
War conflict or the mapping practices of one particular institution. The stereotype of Cold 
War cartography is, of course, found in the old textbook or magazine maps of the late 
1940s and early 1950s where a red-tentacled Soviet Union (like Disney’s Japanese 
octopus) spreads its menace all over the map. Much writing on Cold War cartography, in 
fact, has been focused on “unmasking” the persuasive messages behind maps as 
propaganda.56 These texts are important, and are certainly engaged in this study. But a 
more productive approach eschews simply labeling maps as propaganda, and instead 
accentuates the intertextual relationships between the various maps and their producers. I 
find it instructive, then, to see so-called propaganda maps in dialogue with the maps 





Department of State. All were informed by Cold War constructions of space and place, 
and all were engaged by mechanisms of state power and technologies.  
Rhetoric and Cartography: Crossing Borders 
Maps are embedded in the processes of everyday symbolic communication 
without much effort to contest or challenge that embeddedness. As Peter Vujakovic 
explains, “Maps are no longer special, the property of privileged elites or institutions.”57 
Much of the mapping digested today comes from a wide variety of sources, with 
completely different interests and often, competing worldviews (e.g., commercial or 
government cartographers, statistical surveys, educational systems, tourism industries).58 
The function of maps as social constructions of space and place often goes unrealized—
almost as if maps were naturally called into being by the space itself.59 The relatively new 
movement of critical cartography questions these assumptions and punctuates how maps 
are texts, which are part of a larger political and social discourse, rather than objective 
mirrors of reality—and I enter this study into such a conversation.60  
Textualizing Maps: The Art and Science of Cartographic Space 
A large part of the critical cartography movement charts how the ornamentation 
of art and the functionality of science are found in a map’s lines and shapes—the map 
simultaneously decorates and archives data.61 Before this critical turn, historians had 
typically framed cartography more in terms of its instrumentality—as “Surveys of 
Reason” that chart the virtues of progress and accuracy.62 At least since the 
Enlightenment, where such virtues became almost sacred, science has been expected 
from maps—anything less was perceived as unethical.63 In many ways, the history of 





focus on the science of the map, as a seeming display of “what is,” as many critical 
geographers point out, creates the foundation of an enduring myth about cartography—
the idea that mapping constitutes geographical truths.65 This myth of the map as mirror of 
nature reveals the map’s immense power, as it can mystify political realities for those in 
power.66 A line representing a border on a map can determine the identity of the peoples 
living on either side of that line—the graphics on the page can naturalize such divisions.67 
Space can be seen as quantity and surface, something that can exist outside of subjective 
meaning and experience.68 In this way, the map is often perceived to transform space into 
something completely new, showing “something no one could ever see.”69 Consequently, 
the world is constituted by its flattening on a page.70 This abstract, modernist, and above 
all, reasonable reduction of the earth is meant to widen a rational understanding of it; 
looking at a map positions the viewer to stand outside the world and become objective 
about one’s placement within it.71   
Interdisciplinary theorists in critical cartography have sought, then, to accentuate 
the contested terrain of mapmaking. As Stephen Hartnett explains,  
Indeed, the explicitly functional nature of maps . . . is based predominantly on the 
fact that maps strive to achieve a transparent, nonrhetorical status in which they 
are read, not as agenda-setting and metaphor-based representations, but as 
impartial, metonymic-based presentation.72 
Like all processes of textual representation, maps are situated and partial, especially in 
their attempts at impartiality.73 J.B. Harley argued that “the steps in making a map—
selection, omission, simplification, classification, the creation of hierarchies, and 





much tied to ideology as they are to landscape.75 And as rhetorical texts, maps cannot 
exist as isolated objects—the graphic image of a map is usually fixed inside a written text 
(a paper, a book, an atlas), and can rarely be understood outside of the discursive goals of 
its larger project or its historical context.76 The map becomes a coded image, then, with 
linguistic and graphic elements that promote a variety of intertextual meanings dependent 
on the perspective of the society within which those meanings are created and read.77  
Part of situating these intertextual meanings involves one of the other major 
historical interventions of critical cartographers: foregrounding the map’s relationship 
with nation-state power. To examine most world political maps is to see a wall of states. 
Each state has a distinct, lined boundary, with its own color and shape that separates it 
from the neighboring states around it. In a sense, the state is like a jigsaw piece that could 
be pulled out of the larger puzzle as its own functioning entity, thus simplifying space as 
a set of bounded territories.78 A map can match a state’s territory with an array of abstract 
characteristics—soil, crime rates, area codes, tax statistics.79 In the case of the state, maps 
help connote who has ownership and power; the philosophy of the leadership of a 
particular state subsumes the full space of its boundaries, smoothing out all nuances in 
between the borders that may complicate the map.80 Maps are one contributor to this 
individualization and personification of states—the states themselves are our “neighbors,” 
“enemies,” and “partners”—not the people who inhabit the states, or even those who lead 
them. Once personified in this way, the state’s territory becomes a home that must be 
guarded.81 The map, then, mirrors state power in its ability to “colonize space.”82 As 





The map, a totalizing stage on which elements of diverse origin are brought 
together to form the tableau of a “state” of geographical knowledge, pushes away 
into its prehistory or into its posterity, as if into the wings, the operations of which 
it is the result or the necessary condition. It remains alone on the stage.83 
The map masks the processes of its creation, and thus allows the state to claim itself as 
natural.84 
The Movement Towards a Critical Cartography 
The cartographic movement that self-consciously set out to debunk myths of 
objectivity to critique state power did not suddenly spring out of the tumult of the 1960s. 
Certainly, the German tradition of geopolitik accepted that maps themselves could be 
made into persuasive weapons.85 In America, popular, more amateur journalistic 
cartographers in the 1930s such as Richard Edes Harrison drew maps that were 
unabashed in their positionality as strategic arguments—in his own writings, Harrison 
even foregrounded the importance of cartography as a kind of discursive exchange 
between mapper and user.86 The conundrum of the modernist perspective on mapping, 
however, was that geographers and cartographers were haunted by the idea of their work 
as propaganda (especially since their work was arguably being appropriated as such in 
World War II). And so, there were continual attempts to create a sense of distance 
between “proper mapping” and mapping that was deemed an arm of the state.87 Famous 
geographers like Isaiah Bowman were making distinctions between “geography,” as a 
worthy discipline built on spatial facts, and “geopolitics,” a pernicious pseudo-science 
used by those bent on world power.88 These discourses were based on a key bifurcation 





other nations’ maps are prone to distortion, but as long as our science remains clean and 
objective and mapping is left to the expert, then our maps could simply present space as 
“is.” In other words, not all maps were rhetorical, just those that made their interests overt 
to the user; and with the correct map-reading expertise, the map reader could discern 
which maps were arguing and which ones were not.89 And since many of the geographers 
who were marshaled by the OSS in World War II for wartime work were ambivalent 
about their experience gathering spatial facts for power, they fashioned a self-conscious 
move toward geography as a harder, more quantitative science, much removed from the 
“geography-as-exploration” of old.90  
It was not until the university upheaval of the 1960s when more united voices 
began to question the tidy historical narrative of the map. Scholars were grappling with a 
contested disciplinary history, caught between being an arm of expansive institutional 
power, and being an objective, non-ideological, scientific enterprise that could somehow 
accurately reflect humans’ relationships to their surroundings.91 With this, maps were 
increasingly seen as bound up in competing tensions of science, art, and political power.92 
This development was concurrent with a movement towards “radical geography,” where 
the scholar became activist, and space became something to be reclaimed for its 
inhabitants, rather than as a tool of expansion by the state. David Harvey’s Social Justice 
and the City (1973), for example, attempted to unite Marxism with spatial analysis, 
decrying urban blight and chiding geographers to become more immersed in their locales 
and advocate for the poor and oppressed, actions that radical geographers like William 
Bunge were taking in slum neighborhoods of Detroit.93 One of Harvey’s major 





capitalism for “undermin[ing] the quality of places,” and Henri Lefebvre, whose “social 
production of space” theories would become bedrock foundations for the new 
geography.94 Building on these conceptions, scholars such as Yi-Fu Tuan used humanism 
to question cartography’s rational, Enlightenment tradition, and maintained that 
geographers must accentuate feelings and values in the map.95 As Donald W. Meinig 
wrote in this tradition: “the key to the kind of humanistic geography we need…requires 
an ‘immersion in the meaning of place’ and ‘in the end this can only be a personal 
response.’”96 
While these geographers were developing comprehensive theories about the 
political production of space by invoking Continental philosophy and Marxist theory, 
Benedict Anderson re-theorized nationalism and Edward Said brought forth a 
comprehensive critical space for postcolonialism.97 Anderson’s work proposed the map-
as-logo wherein the territory of nation-state power used the map as its flag, with the 
abstract shapes of borders on the page standing in for the nation itself.98 Such notions 
propelled fuller critiques by geographers and historians around the concept of a 
geographic imagination, where national communities project themselves and their 
ideologies, and write themselves cartographically onto expanding space.99 Concurrently, 
Said tied these geographic narratives into the languages of Western cultural domination, 
writing that imperialism is “an act of geographical violence through which virtually every 
space in the world is explored, charted, and finally brought under control,” and that, 
“none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography.”100 Said’s conflation of 





space and national identity, represented the kinds of theoretical challenges that fueled the 
interdisciplinary movement in critical geography.101  
Contestation and Visuality: Merging Maps with the Postmodern 
The outgrowth of these humanistic projects is found in, of course, the postmodern 
turn. This turn owes much to Foucault’s work on space, power, and discursive 
formations—in fact, his interview by editors of the radical French geography journal 
Herodote in 1976 has become a touchstone for radical geographers, where Foucault 
admits that geographies “lie at the heart of my concerns.”102 Arguably one of the more 
influential voices in merging Foucaultian theories of power with progressive 
examinations of cartographic history was geographer J. Brian Harley, whose string of 
essays beginning in the mid-1980s called for an epistemological shift in understanding 
geographic knowledge, Harley wrote that: 
Deconstruction urges us to read between the lines of the map—‘in the margins of 
the text’—and through its tropes to discover the silences and contradictions that 
challenge the apparent honesty of the image. We begin to learn that cartographic 
facts are only facts within a specific cultural perspective. We start to understand 
how maps, like art, far from being a ‘transparent opening to the world,’ are but ‘a 
particular human way…of looking at the world.’103  
It is this simple shift towards the study of what is not on the map, of what is silent, that 
best characterizes the current strand of critical scholars of cartography.104  
Harley’s notions of map deconstruction are integral to (Re)Placing America 
because they allow for an interrogation of American cartographic narratives of spatial 





knowledge of America’s place in world space, and what was left out of Cold War 
maps.105 A sense of deconstruction as liberation characterizes Harley’s writings:  
If the moral contours of the shape of the world have already been drawn by 
others—usually those in positions of power—then the danger is that the 
cartographer is relegated to becoming a robotic arm of an institutional or 
commercial patron. Map makers have to ask themselves how, if they so desire, 
they can recapture control over the morality of the map, so that the cartographic 
author is able to exercise ethical judgment. Otherwise we may create a design 
masterpiece but it will merely be a projection of an unethical landscape in whose 
making we have no part and for whose social consequences we have abrogated 
responsibility.106 
When Harley wondered aloud if “cartography is too important to be left entirely to 
cartographers,” he was asking if mapmakers are too implicated in their reliance on 
organized, classified, and controlled space to be significant change agents.107  
Harley’s characterization of the dialectic of change and control in maps is critical 
to my Cold War study, since the conflict housed a series of clashing, never fixed 
worldviews, with state power looking for a stable place on the map, while radical 
academics, protest groups, and others sought to destabilize such power.108 Underlying the 
historiography of mapping is the tense relationship of the entire enterprise of mapping 
itself with the forward thrust of modernity and progress ideologies. According to these 
histories, the flow of American ideas is inherently spatial and the drive of exploration and 
a predilection toward the geographic gaze has been following America since its 





Harley before his death and now led by David Woodward, is the ultimate example of the 
new critical historiography of world maps: marshaling a collection of historical 
geographers to re-enter the historical record and see the processes of cartography bearing 
on the changing worldviews of history spanning five centuries.110  
 One crucial disciplinary part of this (re)intervention into the historical record, is a 
kind of reappropriation of the damaged word “geopolitics” into the study of foreign 
policy and international relations, termed critical geopolitics. The proponents of critical 
geopolitics were making a specific, pointed response to what they saw as the rigid, binary 
conception of space in the Cold War.111 Out of the Reagan-era rekindling of the Cold 
War, international relations theorist Simon Dalby posited all political discourse as 
geopolitical in nature, setting divisions, and partitioning identities in spatially profound 
ways.112 Following Dalby, scholars such as Timothy Luke, John Agnew, and especially 
Gearóid Ó Tuathail wrote reinterventions into recent American Cold War history. Their 
critiques of foreign policy realism are especially instructive to the assumptions of 
(Re)Placing America because they conceptualize geopolitical thought as a “problematic” 
rather than a given and they seek to trace how the U.S. has become a “rule-writer for the 
international community.” 113 As Ó Tuathail and Agnew have noted in a joint work, 
“geopolitics should be critically re-conceptualized as a discursive practice by which 
intellectuals of statecraft spatialize international politics in such a way as to represent a 
world characterized by particular types of places, people, and dramas.”114 This kind of 
work is also seen in calls for “post-realism,” where critics characterize Cold War foreign 
policy realism not as a static paradigm but as a powerful, absorbent narrative that 





example of post-realist criticism comes in David J. Sylvan’s and Stephen Majeski’s 
arguments about how American Cold War foreign policy culture allowed places to 
become essentialized as “knowable,” relatively fixed, and “commonsensical”; this 
allowed a place like Vietnam to be seen as having certain unchangeable characteristics 
that help create rigid conceptions of problems and solutions in foreign policy.116 
The rhetorical dimensions of foreign policy and geopolitics, and how state 
strategists read the world, are also intimately related to scholars who study the visual 
dimensions of space, and the processes by which cultures envision their geographies. In 
terms of rhetorical theory, for example, Raymie McKerrow defined space in more 
postmodern terms, as he suggested moving toward a full realization of “the openness of 
space and a more inclusive sense of the alternative styles of lived time experienced within 
cultures.”117 Critical interventions by Greg Dickinson, Brian Ott, and Eric Aoki have 
exemplified the openness of McKerrow’s approach by conceiving of space in more 
concrete terms: as textualized on films, in the very practices of “seeing” landscapes, and 
through the experiential vision of even walking through museums and historic 
neighborhoods.118 Greg Dickinson writes that “space…does not disappear behind the vale 
of mediatic representation. Instead, spaces become the nodes where images and 
imaginations come together. Spaces and images become constitutive of each other and of 
the possibilities of spatialized experience itself.” Dickinson maintains that immersion in 
images does not necessarily dislocate us in postmodern excess, but rather that “audiences 
engage spatial narratives and images as strategies for mapping and remapping their 
‘location’ in time and space.”119 Specifically, in terms of maps, Lawrence Prelli has 





their uses in forensic argument, in how visual displays impose narratives and temporal 
relationships and he points out how symbols on the map are fixed into categorical 
relationships.120  
Following this line of inquiry are scholars who have made more systematic 
engagements with the “visual turn,” occasioned by semiotic and rhetorical readings of 
cartographic and geographic discourse, wherein maps are eyed close-textually for their 
symbolization, iconography, color, projection, temporality, and use of language.121 An 
important advance by this more acute focus on visuality is how scholars critiqued their 
forebrears for over-emphasizing the map-as-text, often relying too much on linguistic 
interpretations of a distinctly visual medium.122 The “text,” warned pioneering media 
geographer Jacquelin Burgess, works as a symbolic metaphor, but can constrain analysis 
by prescribing particular ways of reading; thus cartographers such as Alan MacEachren 
have emphasized a lexical approach where the layers of visual meaning in maps are 
interrogated and historical geographers like R.A. Rundstrom move beyond the text and 
into the processes of visual production. In addition, theorists of graphic design like 
Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen contend that visual perspective itself is a political 
choice in maps and graphics that creates complex positionalities for the map user.123 
All of these strands of thought are instructive to this project because they display 
the need to stay grounded in the concrete cultural experiences, values, and identities of 
the cultures being mapped, as well as the ways in which visual design practices 
themselves order such experiences. As Stephen Hartnett writes, “claiming that maps may 
be read rhetorically enables the transition from ‘what is to what could be,’ and is nothing 





instead, to delve more deeply into both the practical implications and the utopian 
possibilities of engaging in a rhetorically and philosophically informed turn to concrete 
historical studies.”124 Much of the literature on postmodernity and space looks toward the 
future—the techniques of surveillance and geographic information systems, media 
geographies, geographies of gender, the role of the nation-state as mapped into 
globalization.125 This project, however, pauses to take a look into our recent past and 
seeks to find how much of our future conceptions of space are informed by the discursive 
constructs of the Cold War. The advantage of the rhetorical tradition is that it foregrounds 
these concrete situations; this project’s approach to Cold War space is part of this legacy, 
true as it is to Said’s admonition that we are never free from “the struggle over 
geography.” In summary, (Re)Placing America is a part of all these sometimes congruent, 
sometimes divergent critical traditions in history, geography, and rhetoric, and also, 
hopefully, a meaningful extension of them. Rather than simply deconstructing maps, this 
project examines the contextual processes by which maps are produced and circulated, 
specifically within the critical perspective of Cold War geopolitics. 
Real and Ideal Worlds: The Tensions of Cold War Geopolitics 
As geographer Jouni Hakli notes, “cartography offers a productive momentum to 
political practices”; in other words, the relevance of maps is based on the “immutability 
in the relationships that maps establish between cartographic representation and the world 
of practice within which they emerge.”126 This project, then, necessitates a nuanced 
understanding of how Cold War values and mapping institutions, technologies, and 
practices were continually engaging one another. Neil Smith and Anne Godlewska have 





what needs to be explored.”127 So, when dealing with the Cold War context, I seek to 
balance both the history of Cold War geography with the geography of Cold War history. 
This purpose requires exploring the literature around the particular geopolitical visions 
that marked America’s place in the Cold War, and how maps were appropriated to frame 
such visions.  
Cold War Geopolitical Assumptions and Imaginaries 
One of the central contributions of critical geopolitics revolves around the crucial 
point that the spatial reasoning and assumptions of the Cold War era had deep roots. The 
Cold War’s brand of modernist, international space goes back at least as far as the 
1880s.128 It was in the last decades of the 19th century where America faced the prospect 
of a truly closed geography, where the ends of exploration were finally reached, and 
frontiers transformed from physical ones into intellectual ones, thus paving the way for a 
more relational, global outlook. It was by no means coincidental that these developments 
in American space were accompanied both by the development of geography as a science, 
the explosion of a popular geographic imagination in both the press and in school 
curricula, and substantial changes in mapping production practices.  
Susan Schulten contends that 1898 was an especially watershed moment; up until 
this point, American cartography was largely a reactive medium, but America’s tentative 
steps toward world power status in the Spanish-American War and later the occupation of 
the Philippines were now being charted (and argued into being) by rising commercial 
map institutions such as Rand McNally. The world (according to an American 
perspective) was reconceptualized on the flat page as a commodity, accessible to the 





ascendance of National Geographic, which evolved from a specialist’s technical journal 
into a popular powerhouse; most importantly, the magazine’s popularity united science 
with national interest, and geography became increasingly tied to national narratives of 
identity and “making geography both a tool of expansion and a medium of middlebrow 
culture.”129 At the same time, the formal/academic reasoning of geography slowly turned 
from environmental determinism to a more fluid approach that mapped human needs into 
the landscape; concurrently, early modern geopolitical thinkers like Halford Mackinder 
and Friedrich Ratzel began the move towards interpretation as the business of political 
geography—that strategists could “read” global space in terms of relationships between 
places. School geography textbooks and their maps also began to reflect this humanistic 
and interpretive turn, but specifically in how America creates economic progress through 
its manipulation of natural resources, rather than through territorial domination. 
 Soon after, the internationalism that arrived contentiously out of World War I 
was projected into maps and geographical texts as visual arguments for interventionism 
and economic expansionism. Such arguments were based around the pursuit of 
incontrovertible spatial facts—or as Michael Heffernan has called, “the fantasy of 
information,” a myth that the best route to world power was through the acquisition of 
pure objective knowledge.130 Part of this development was an implicit defensiveness that 
America was placing itself not as an imperialist in world space, but as trustee of that 
space.131 Meanwhile, as these changes took place gradually right up to the mid-twentieth 
century, the processes of mapping production were transforming, moving from craft to 
automation and standardization, and relying more on sophisticated photogrammetric and 





cartographic science; for example, academics like John Paul Goode and Erwin Raisz 
were influential in their early work by popularizing projections that went beyond 
accepted standards like the Mercator.  
According to scholars in critical geography, the advent of air-age mapping 
technology, coupled with America’s move to the geographic center in World War II, 
most contributed to the contextual origins of Cold War space. Cartographers out of this 
new tradition, particularly popular journalists and public figures like De Seversky, would 
tinker with both perspective and projection in the form of the map—many maps, for 
example, would use unorthodox projections like the use of a polar center to show new 
proximities, or novel angles would be used to position the perspective of the reader as 
hovering over a spherical earth, rather than a flat map.133 The expansion of the 
cartographic perspective into the air buttressed the increasingly abstract views of world 
space, and accompanied the modernist brand of internationalism: America could be the 
steward of the world and help to develop the globe in its own image, while still protecting 
its own national interests. As Roderick P. Hart and Kathleen E. Kendall have written, 
modernist rhetoric is “both restless and relentless,” acknowledges that “perception and 
reality are phenomenally interlocked in politics” and shows a “keen eye for the 
symbolic.”134  The symbolic importance of America’s role on the map, then, was seen as 
directly related to the nation’s self-perception as a world power.  
Despite this explosion of the importance of cartography, many theorists writing 
about Cold War geography have noted the tendency for foreign policy strategists and 
technocrats to assume a kind of transcendence over geography in the Cold War.135 For 





War II, assumed geography was permanent—that certain principles were unchanging, 
thus giving way to a pervasive determinism that physical features and facts of the land 
prescribed the outcomes of foreign policy.136 In the Cold War, many of these attitudes 
were adopted in practice; if geography was considered permanent, then it could be seen 
as a non-issue, and could be reduced to simple locating and topography.137 Maps, then, 
could be seen simply as evidence, rather than as shapers of national interests in the Cold 
War. But as Neil Smith has most forcefully argued, despite the belief that geography had 
somehow become obsolete, the Cold War was actually fought on intensely geographical 
terms.138 The denial of geography in the Cold War, in many ways, allowed for the 
essentializing of space and place.139 As Stanley Brunn has argued, “there are underlying 
spatial and political processes operating to produce what is often depicted as a static 
pattern and considered a state of equilibrium.”140 Thus, a project such as (Re)Placing 
America explores how Cold War spaces become etched into binary images of us/them, 
and gives texture to the processes by which politically motivated spatial frameworks are 
solidified into what seem like natural divisions. Scholars like Ó Tuathail, for example, 
argue that since geography and cartography are all about situatedness, even Cold 
Warriors who tried to situate themselves above space were in fact choosing that 
positionality, which itself is a rhetorical process.141 As John Agnew relatedly points out, 
the space-less globalism of the Cold War is marked by an “ideological geopolitics” in 
which values and myths drawn from the experiences of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. came to 
define the terms of the geographical imagination of the period.142  
This imagination was marked by a host of different spatial assumptions that 





these were, obviously, the central conflict over political-economic organization, a 
“Three-World” spatial configuration where U.S. and Soviet spheres vied for expansion, a 
homogenization of the globe into blocs in which “universal models of capitalism-liberal 
democracy and communism reigned free of geographical contingency,” and the 
naturalization of the War through spatial concepts such as containment, domino effects, 
and liberation.143  The Cold War was especially marked by big-picture approaches to 
spaces, where geographical details in discourses like maps were used as strategic fodder 
for larger, more abstract world visions. These strategic visions were part of large-scale 
academic and state collaborations on mapping programs in what John Cloud calls the 
“great geo-spatial convergence of the Cold War,” implicating universities, the State 
Department, and various defense institutions.144 As a postwar U.S. Air Force manual puts 
it, new panoramic perspectives allowed map users to achieve “automatic 
visualization.”145 Thus, the government’s approach to map production accentuated the 
role of a map in providing an immediate ordering of the space below. Not only did this 
allow the U.S. government to define its own spatial priorities, it allowed it to infiltrate the 
Soviet Union with sophisticated mapping technology and techniques and produce 
cartography that could place exactly what the enemy was doing and where. In short, 
mapping was redefined as essential to national security and intelligence.146 
These assumptions are closely related to a rise in both the importance of technical 
expertise and the intensity of ideology during this shift to internationalism. Both 
geographers and rhetoricians have commented on these relationships between technology, 
vision, and ideology. For example, geographer Saul Cohen posited that the reshaping of 





and ideological ferment” where advances in map technology allow for states to anchor 
their positions from higher vantage points, and ideologically in terms of advancing 
liberalism and anti-colonialism.147 Philip Wander’s rhetorical theories of the Cold War’s 
technocratic realism and prophetic dualism have noted this as well. Prophetic dualism is 
the ideology that characterizes the United States not simply as a geographical designation, 
but as the absolute in Truth, Justice, and Freedom; technocratic realism, on the other hand, 
is rooted in Progressivism and New Deal liberalism, and requires the precision of the 
expert and the managing of facts.148 Here, Cold War competition is more economic than 
moral, and thus negotiation and compromise become more visible. Recently, Ned 
O’Gorman has updated these concepts by juxtaposing the rational, pragmatic approaches 
of containment against the fusion of the religious and secular in approaches of liberation. 
In the process, O’Gorman finds strategic tensions between a realist balance of powers 
that could be managed by experts and a more contingent approach that must involve 
moral values of fear, hope, and an engagement with an often non-rational world opinion. 
Postwar administrations and their discourses often trafficked in the seeming 
contradictions of both approaches, as other rhetorical scholars have noted.149 Tensions of 
idealism and realism, then, were drawn right into the lines of Cold War maps.150 
Such developments were marked by what Dalby has called the “hegemony of 
security discourse” where the move to globalism encompassed a greater degree of 
loneliness and a requirement of a hyper-vigilance of space.151 Smith has characterized 
this as the strange pull of isolationism and internationalism that haunted the Cold War, 
where the war was certainly fought on more global terms than any conflict before it, but 





with what David Harvey has termed a “distinctively US-based cosmopolitanism” in the 
Cold War where “geographical knowledge, organized from the standpoint of the 
geopolitical survival of the United States, is oriented to military, economic, and cultural 
control of the world” and is accompanied by a “brutal ignorance of local traditions, 
meanings, and commitments.”153 In other words, it was the complex clashes of U.S. 
nationalism and internationalism, and localism and globalism, that defined America’s 
sense of itself and its interests as a new world center.154 In (Re)Placing America, I 
contextualize these assumptions in what geographers have called the “shrinking world” 
concept in the Cold War, where technologies of transportation, information, and 
communication dramatically reshape the way proximity is viewed—and where maps give 
new meaning (and create new anxieties) around conceptions of closeness and 
interdependence.155 
Finally, the last integral point about Cold War geopolitical tensions is to 
understand their varied discursive sources. Geographer Klaus Dodds, for example, sets 
out to show that Cold War representations of space are not simply restricted to policy-
making circles—the geopolitics of the period was a broader cultural phenomenon. He 
offers three inter-linking levels of Cold War geopolitical discourse: practical, which 
encompasses the often pragmatic and strategic rationales produced by the government, its 
armed forces, and foreign policy bureaucracies; formal, which represents the 
academic/theoretical approach to geopolitics; and popular, which assesses geo-
representations in mass media such as magazines, school books, popular atlases, 
newspapers, and film/TV.156 (Re)Placing America operates not at any one level of these 





internationalism/isolationism, fact/value, and idealism/realism at play in maps produced 
by a diversity of technocrats, strategists, academics, journalists, and commercial map 
companies.157 Joanne Sharp’s study on the influence of Reader’s Digest in the 1950s on 
the Cold War geographical imagination, for example, discusses the use of “geographs” in 
the Cold War, or “scripts between elites and masses for spatial interpretation of the 
political world.”158 Indeed, the interdisciplinary scholars of Cold War geopolitics have 
been moving in this direction, theorizing on how these collisions between American 
statecraft, geo-science, and popular culture appropriated the new globalism into 
overlapping “scripts.” My goal, in the spirit of these works, is to investigate these 
collisions in how maps both expand and constrain U.S. perceptions of the Cold War 
political landscape. 
The Scope of Cold War Cartography: Mapping the Study 
The scope of this dissertation is purposefully wide—in order to evidence these 
macro-changes in spatial orientations, I have chosen to cover a broad range of 
cartographic sources and activities in order to show the dynamic nature of the Cold War 
over time. However, I have sought to balance this wide scope with close explorations of 
particular maps, cartographers, and institutions. To reach this balance, I have designed 
each chapter around larger spatial and Cold War thematics, exploring the broader 
contexts of these themes before culminating in very specific critical analyses of 
representative cases. Organized in a rough temporal way, the particular cases chosen for 
this project provide nodal points for demonstrating the placement of American values 
during the Cold War, and they focus on key overlapping, intertextual cartographic 





mapping, but the project does offer a general sense of the trajectory of political maps 
from an American standpoint—beginning in World War II and up through the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Most importantly, though, the maps themselves are the key characters, 
brought on display here and engaged with in-depth as primary documents in their own 
right.  
 Chapter One situates (Re)Placing America in terms of the “air-age globalism” that 
marked the popular journalistic cartography of World War II. The chapter begins by 
exploring the “tensions and tenets” of this globalism, and how wartime air technology 
sparked a cartographic movement featuring new perspectives and projections. These 
discourses were especially stamped by a pre-occupation with both the opportunity and 
fear of a rapidly shrinking world. The airplane had revolutionized notions of distance and 
proximity, and maps accounted for this and displayed such changes in profound ways—
ways that would manifest themselves in even more stark terms during the Cold War. This 
discussion climaxes with an in-depth look at Richard Edes Harrison, the quintessential 
air-age magazine cartographer in the 1940s and 1950s. The chapter mines his bestselling 
atlases and maps for Fortune and other publications, and also draws on his collections in 
the archival holdings of the Library of Congress to add texture to the arguments, using his 
writings about cartographic strategies and theories of map audiences. An analysis of 
some key Harrisonian maps, and their stylistic innovations in terms of projections and 
strategic perspectives, is used to show how “vision” and “strategy” became two key 
ideologies for cartography in this era. This chapter is also sensitive to the notion that the 
spatial shift into a new modern internationalism is accompanied by a Cold War focus on 





of the globe as a whole during the conflict’s beginnings constitute the chapter’s major 
contributions. Often, Harrison’s maps have been classified as propaganda, but this 
chapter allows such classification to become a point of departure for a discussion on the 
expectations of map form and content in a burgeoning Cold War context. Thus, Chapter 
One digs at the roots—from a popular standpoint—of the spatial shifts that accompanied 
America’s rise to international superpower status.  
Chapter Two follows these popular air-age assumptions into the post-World War 
II realm of foreign policy and U.S. government cartography. The major thematic tension 
in this chapter revolves around how maps provided both artistic imagination and 
scientific authority for U.S. leaders, constrained by the new flexibilities that the shrinking 
air-age world offered but also complicated by the need to produce a vast amount of 
spatial facts about the world in order to protect American interests. The larger question, 
in a sense, revolves around: “what did the United States want to be after World War II?” 
as the period was marked by a sense of idealism that America’s power could be used to 
unite the world, coupled with a geopolitical realism that acknowledged the coming 
threats of a smaller global landscape. The beginning of the chapter broadly outlines how 
maps were increasingly hailed into the spaces of national security, as academic and 
popular cartographers built the architecture of a postwar spatial framework. The driving 
case of the chapter, though, revolves around S.W. Boggs, the Department of State’s 
official geographer from 1927–1954. Boggs oversaw the expansion of the State 
Department’s geography division from humble origins as a map archive for the Paris 
Peace Conference of World War I into a bustling center for geographic intelligence. But 





career marks the mundane everyday, behind-the-scenes work of an academically trained 
geographer negotiating U.S. objectives. He was notable for bringing in artists like 
Richard Edes Harrison and others to make U.S. maps more accessible and dynamic, yet 
he faced the very real institutional constraints of space as guarded knowledge. Boggs’ 
constant attempts to expand the scope of government mapping and international 
cartographic collaboration were often stifled and complicated by Cold War dictates. 
Chapter Two mines both his academic work and public treatises on maps that circulated 
in the State Department, but also uses the Records of the Geographer of the Department 
of State at the National Archives to evidence his inter-agency collaborations and his 
department’s mapping initiatives. In general, this chapter works in the uneasy transition 
from the promise of the air-age to the more complex public/institutional rapprochement 
that met government representatives involved in placing America during a tumultuous 
time. 
Chapter Three finally arrives at the Cold War proper, bringing in these popular 
and institutional strands from the opening chapters and projecting how they created an 
East/West binary between the United States and the Soviet Union. This powerful binary, 
I argue, was created, in part, by two important functions of Cold War maps, particularly 
in the 1950s: maps as images of commitment and maps as evidentiary weapons. As 
images of commitment, maps spatialized America’s extension into a host of military, 
political, and economic agreements; these maps were marshaled to both argue for 
America’s leadership across the globe and to question the nation’s ability to protect its 
own interests in the process. As evidentiary weapons, maps were hailed by a host of 





spaces and were used as provocative arguments in actual diplomatic exchanges with the 
Soviet Union. This function of Cold War mapping especially involved the map’s 
historical power of precision and authority, as well as its compression of technological 
expertise into a persuasive, usable visual package. Through both these functions, 
American strategists, leaders, and popular institutions placed America in stark terms 
against its Soviet counterparts, erecting borders and projections on the page that doubled 
as ideological barriers as well. The chapter draws on a wide array of maps, bringing in 
journalistic constructions of America on the Cold War map from Time, Life, Fortune, 
even the Associated Press, but also showing the embeddedness of maps into 
Congressional reports (through the archives of the Congressional Serial Set) like the 
Mutual Security Act and the House Un-American Activities Committee reports on Soviet 
power. The chapter’s central case involves the origins, display, and use of the American 
Federation of Labor’s “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” map, which innovatively used cartography 
as a rhetorical force and a tool of knowledge production against the Soviet Union’s prison 
system. The AFL’s production of the map was underwritten by the State Department and 
the Central Intelligence Agency, thus evidencing the fluidity of map production in this 
time. Even more importantly, the complex circulation of the Gulag map, as it flowed 
across international labor movements, newspapers, and government reports, accentuates 
the intertextuality that brought meaning to maps beyond the mere display of what was on 
the actual page. Investigations into the George Meany Memorial Archives of the 
American Federation of Labor reveal the Gulag project as a complex Cold War network, 
where cartography was drawn directly into the informational weaponry of America’s 





America attempted to stabilize its own identity in the Cold War by ordering and 
classifying cartographic knowledge of its ideological enemy. 
Chapter Four assesses the rhetorical function of maps in advancing contentious 
perspectives of the “Third World,” a key part of the cartographic expansion of the Cold 
War.159 The tension between America’s drive to be a benevolent developer of democratic 
ideals and economic modernization on one hand, and an international enforcer of its own 
interests on the other, is most poignantly displayed on these maps. This chapter opens 
with a brief discussion of the Arno Peters projection controversy of the early 1970s, a 
mapping project that radically challenged U.S. and Euro-centric mapping perspectives 
and instead argued for the so-called “South” as an incendiary political force. This 
discussion leads to a broader exploration of the Third World as a spatial concept, and 
how the ideologies of development and modernization throughout the 1950s and 1960s 
constrained the practice of cartography, incorporating North/South orientations into the 
firmly entrenched East/West cartographic frameworks.160 Chapter Four culminates in an 
analysis of a variety of U.S. mapping projects related to Third World development: 
archivally-driven assessments of the State Department’s response to the rapid pace of 
decolonization, the American Geographic Society’s government and military-sponsored 
medical cartography project that sought to track Third World disease as part of the U.S. 
mutual security initiatives, and America’s leadership role in the United Nations 
cartography program, where U.S. scientists and government representatives used 
cartography as a practice to teach other nations self-sufficiency and democratic ideals. In 
general, this chapter works in the context of worldwide upheaval and challenges to the 





widening the perspective around its commitments and entanglements in a host of Third 
World fronts, and maps were instrumental in providing a new sense of scope for America 
in the Cold War.161 At the same time, the Third World could also be drawn on the map as 
a site of resistance and contention—as a challenge against attempts to fix America as a 
center on the map. Altogether, Chapter Four notes that the strong cartographic pull of 
modernism and its encomiums to progress and liberation was also marked by a powerful 
uneasiness around America’s vision of its place in a time when the nation’s power was 
seen as vulnerable. 
Chapter Five arrives at the “Second Cold War” and its large-scale rekindling of 
the U.S./Soviet arms race in the early 1980s. I first recount a notorious 1984 Oxford 
Union Debate between Reagan’s Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and radical 
socialist professor E.P. Thompson, where U.S. defense cartography (from a series of 
public pamphlets between America and the Soviet Union) came under fire as arguments 
that America had become a morally-bankrupt technocracy built on deathly weapons 
systems.162 Particularly, cartography was a contentious vehicle for accounting for nuclear 
armaments in this era, quantifying and displaying the escalation of sophisticated missile 
technologies, while also extending the shrinking air-age 1940s globalism of the airplane 
into the hyper-internationalism of the missile (where traditional notions of distance were 
almost completely dissolved).163 Here, maps were both well-suited and limited in their 
abilities to depict nuclear capacities: the defense cartography of the era was mitigated by 
a movement of academics and activists that used maps to argue for disarmament. These 
radical maps depicted a horrific nuclear future of destruction, death, and fallout that had 





juxtaposes two central cases and puts them in conversation with one another. The 
analysis begins with a focus on the propaganda volley of maps in “Battle of the Booklets” 
between Weinberger’s Department of Defense and the Soviet Ministry of Defense, and 
how each projected nuclear capacity and vulnerability against their rival. This exploration 
is followed by a critical analysis of the maps of William Bunge, arguably the antithesis of 
the technologized defense cartography of Weinberger and company. Bunge was a 
pioneering quantitative geographer who became increasingly radicalized by the Vietnam 
War and the Civil Rights movement; by the 1980s, his Nuclear War Atlas project 
cartographically represented the nuclear disarmament movement, with a crude but fiery 
set of maps that railed against the powerful weapons of the Cold War.164 Both cases show 
different perspectives on the “nuclear geopolitics” that foretold the end of the Cold War 
in compelling ways—particularly in how maps negotiated rhetorics of change and control 
in the relationships between superpower technologies and oppositional movements.165  
Finally, I conclude the study with a series of reflections on how geographers and 
cartographers began to envision the breakdown of the Cold War spatial system. The 
popularly published State of the World atlases frame, as an opening case, the challenges 
to state power binaries that constrained a new and uncertain sense of American placement 
when familiar spatial constructs were in flux. Atlases like the State of the World made 
radical challenges to Cold War state perspectives, but were also complicated by the 
map’s historical use as an arm of state power; thus, such maps provide an interesting 
snapshot of the complexities of “transition.” The Cold War’s brand of air-age globalism 
was giving way to globalization, and this shift in mapping discourse provides an 





America’s geographic imagination even into the 21st century. New American visions of 
world space (and the maps that account for them) are inescapably rooted in the anxieties 
of Cold War place, and I attempt to pull these threads together to close the study. 
Ultimately, (Re)Placing America operates under Susan Schulten’s wise 
assumption that “We can never, of course, reach beyond geography, for it is impossible 
to imagine the world outside of its interpretive conventions. But we can ask how 
geography has mediated the world, and how it has concretized the abstract.”166 It is also 
essential to keep in mind what Denis Wood and John Fels have written—that a 
“map…transforms the world into ideology.”167 What I attempt to do in the following 
chapters is interrogate the ideologies of the map itself (and its uses), during a period 
where a war was waged on the basis of ideologies rooted in particular values of space and 
place, and marked by expanding visions of the world and its relationships. (Re)Placing 
America takes the stance that the study of Cold War internationalism, and of America’s 
place on the globe, is best approached by looking for the deeper discursive connections 
that underwrite the mapping of world space. 














	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Notes: Introduction 
1 Roald Dahl, The BFG (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1982), 193–96. 
2 Katherine Harmon, You Are Here: Personal Geographies and Other Maps of the 
Imagination (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2004), back flap. 
3 This notion of space and legibility is perhaps best theorized by anthropologist 
James C. Scott in his excellent Seeing Like a State. In this work, he posits legibility as a 
central problem of modern statecraft, with the goal of creating a synoptic view of land. In 
particular, his discussions of early cadastral maps (tax collection maps) evidence the 
complexity of a state attempting to catalogue its landscapes and people for the sake of 
national interest. See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to 
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1998). 
4 The amount of contested definitions of “space” cannot scarcely be recounted in 
this essay, but I essentially follow roughly the judgment of spatial theorist and pioneering 
urban geographer David Harvey who wrote in Social Justice and the City that, “If we 
regard space as absolute it becomes a ‘thing in itself’ with an existence independent of 
matter. It then possesses a structure which we can use to pigeon-hole or to individuate 
phenomena. The view of relative space proposes that it be understood as a relationship 
between objects which exists only because objects exist and relate to each other. There is 
another sense in which space can be viewed as relative and I choose to call this relational 
space—space regarded, in the fashion of Leibniz, as being contained in objects in the 
sense that an object can be said to exist only insofar as it contains and represents within 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
process of analysis rather than prior to it. Further, space is neither absolute, relative, or 
relational in itself, but it can become one or all simultaneously depending on the 
circumstances…In other words, there are no philosophical questions that arise over the 
nature of space—the answers lie in human practice. The question ‘what is space?’ is 
therefore replaced by the question ‘how is that different human practices create and make 
use of distinctive conceptualizations of space?” This notion of actively constructed, 
contextual space is also furthered by Henri Lefebvre: “Space is not a scientific object 
removed from ideology and politics; it has always been political and strategic. If space 
has an air of neutrality and indifference with regard to its contents and thus seems to be 
‘purely’ formal, the epitome of rational abstraction, it is precisely because it has been 
occupied and used, and has already been the focus of past processes whose traces are not 
always evident on the landscape.” I would also include Edward Soja’s notions here as 
well, as he writes: “Space in itself may be primordially given, but the organization, and 
meaning of space is a product of social translation, transformation, and experience.” Soja 
actually fashions the term “spatiality” as a way to detangle space from its usually 
physicalist connotations. He believes space has wrongly been seen as “something 
external to the social context and to social action, a part of the ‘environment’, a part of 
the setting for society—its naively given container—rather than a formative structure 
created by society.” See David Harvey, Social Justice and the City (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 13–14; Henri Lefebvre, “Reflections on the 
Politics of Space,” Antipode 8 (1976): 31; and Edward Soja, “The Socio-spatial Dialectic 
(1989),” in Reading Human Geography, eds. Trevor Barnes and Derek Gregory (London: 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 A discussion on the shifts from an open space to a closed space, particularly in a 
Cold War context, can be found in Alan K. Henrikson, “Maps, Globes, and the ‘Cold 
War’,” Special Libraries 65 (1974): 445–46. Gearóid Ó Tuathail goes even further into 
the roots of America’s closed spaces in his discussion of the development of 20th century 
geopolitics. See Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global 
Space (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 15–16.  
6 Harley discusses the importance of signification in bird’s eye views of the earth. 
See J.B. Harley, The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography, edited 
by Paul Laxton (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 45. 
7 See Frank Ninkovich’s thesis in his introduction to Modernity and Power: A 
History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994), xi–xv. 
8 John Berger et al, Ways of Seeing (New York: Penguin Books, 1972), 10. 
9 Alexander P. De Seversky, Victory Through Air Power (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1942). See also Alexander P. De Seversky, Air Power: Key to Survival 
(London: Herbert Jenkins, 1952). 
10 Walt Disney, Victory Through Air Power, YouTube video, 70 min. (10 parts), 
Walt Disney Pictures, 1943, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=paY6y87rrpE. 
11 This specific scene can be found in “Part 1” of the scenes offered on YouTube. 
12 Paul A. Chilton, “The Meaning of Security,” in Post-Realism: The Rhetorical 
Turn in International Relations, edited by Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 210.  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Henrikson, “The Power and Politics of Maps,” 64, 51.  
15 As Jeremy Black has written, mapping is constrained by our desire to “explain, 
classify, and organize,” entailing a significant relationship between the cartographic 
impulse and control itself. See Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997), 95. 
16 Derek Gregory has given the most full theoretical treatment of this “geographic 
imagination” concept. See Derek Gregory, Geographical Imaginations (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1994). Yet, perhaps the fullest historical application of these notions can be 
found in Susan Schulten, The Geographical Imagination in America, 1880-1950 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). See also Holleran’s review of Schulten for 
more discussion of this concept in Michael Holleran, “America’s Place in the World,” 
Reviews in American History 30 (2002): 419–24. Other instructive treatments of the 
concept can be found in the following: Joan M. Schwartz and James R. Ryan, eds. 
Picturing Place: Photography and the Geographical Imagination (New York: I.B. Tauris, 
2003); and Denis E. Cosgrove, Apollo’s Eye: A Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in 
the Western Imagination (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
17 On “rhetorics of display,” see Lawrence J. Prelli, ed., Rhetorics of Display 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2006). On maps as selective and 
reductive, see Judith A. Tyner, “Persuasive Cartography,” Journal of Geography (July-
August 1982): 141–44. 
18 Christian Jacob, The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 To evidence America’s shift into Cold War space, I focus on the contestable 
functions of maps as representations—because perhaps, above all, maps are entangled in 
the problems of representing “what is,” while making visual arguments about “what 
should be.” Michael Shapiro’s work offers an introduction to the overall complexities of 
space and representation. See, as a representative example, Michael J. Shapiro, The 
Politics of Representation (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988). For the 
problems of representation and maps specifically, see Peter Vujakovic, “‘A New Map is 
Unrolling Before Us’: Cartography in News Media Representations of Post-Cold War 
Europe,” The Cartographic Journal 36 (1999): 43–57; Denis Wood, The Power of Maps 
(New York: Guilford, 1992), 4–26; Trevor J. Barnes, “Obituaries, War, ‘Corporeal 
Remains,’ and Life: History and Philosophy of Geography, 2007-2008,” Progress in 
Human Geography 33 (2009): 693–701; and John Pickles, “Texts, Hermeneutics and 
Propaganda Maps,” in Writing Worlds, 194–229. 
20 Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1968), 31. 
21 In an article on “Ideology in Geography” for the radical geographical journal 
Antipode in the early 1970s, James Anderson warned about ignoring the dialectical 
relations of content and form, and that “one cannot choose between the spatial and social, 
one must have both.” James Anderson, “Ideology in Geography: An Introduction,” 
Antipode 5 (1973): 1–6. 
22 Pickles, “Texts, Hermeneutics and Propaganda Maps,” 194. 
23 Robert L. Scott, “Cold War and Rhetoric: Conceptually and Critically,” in Cold 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Philip Wander, and Robert L. Scott (New York: Greenwood, 1990), 4. A second edition 
of this book was released in 1997.Robert L. Scott, “Introduction,” in Cold War Rhetoric: 
Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology, eds. Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, 
and Robert L. Scott (New York: Greenwood, 1990), 4. A second edition of this book was 
released in 1997. 
24 The field of rhetorical studies has been particularly active in arguing the Cold 
War as a rhetorical worldview. See especially Stuckey’s discussion of the Cold War as 
powerful interprettive schema in Mary Stuckey, “Competing Foreign Policy Visions: 
Rhetorical Hybrids After the Cold War,” Western Journal of Communication 59 (1995): 
214–27; also note Kane’s discussion of the Cold War as a kind of commanding lens by 
which to view the world in Thomas Kane, “Foreign Policy Suppositions and 
Commanding Ideas,” Argumentation and Advocacy 28 (1991): 80–91. 
25 Ben and Marthalee Barton, in their advocacy for postmodern visual design 
practices, have written, “Although the map as a concrete graphic text is an act of 
enunciation with ideological dimensions, such an act of production and an act of 
reception. The map, in other words, may be considered as process rather than product, 
and strategies of repression take the form of the repression of process in map discourse.” 
See Ben F. Barton and Marthalee S. Barton, “Ideology and the Map: Toward a 
Postmodern Visual Design Practice,” in Professional Communication: The Social 
Perspective, eds. Nancy Roundy Blyler and Charlotte Thralls (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 
1993), 62. 
26 Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis: 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Tuan, Space and Place, 6. 
28 In terms of the relationships between space and place, the work of Doreen 
Massey has been particularly influential. As representative examples, see Doreen B. 
Massey, For Space (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005); and Doreen B. Massey, Space, 
Place, and Gender (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). 
29 See Kevin Michael DeLuca, Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of 
Environmental Activism (New York: Guilford, 1999), 76–77.  
30 The Medhurst and Brands edited collection, Critical Reflections on the Cold 
War, explores the relationship between rhetoric and materiality throughout, but see 
Graebner’s opening essay specifically on this notion of the Cold War as an ideological 
conflict in Norman J. Graebner, “Myth and Reality: America’s Rhetorical Cold War,” in 
Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History, eds. Martin 
Medhurst and H.W. Brands (College Station: Texas A&M, 2000), 22–35. 
31 David N. Livingstone, The Geographical Tradition (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 
1992), 2. 
32 A good source on this geopolitical construction of the Soviet “other” can be 
found in Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics 
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1990). 
33 An interesting discussion of this interpretive turn during the Cold War takes 
place in Richard K. Ashley, “The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical 
Social Theory of International Politics,” Alternatives 12 (1987): 403–4. 
34 For a historian’s take on these shifts, see Ninkovich, Modernity and Power, 
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THE BIRD’S EYE VIEW OF AIR-AGE GLOBALISM: NEW PERSPECTIVES 
AND PROJECTIONS OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONALISM 
 
In April 1941, almost eight months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 
the Saint Paul Institute’s Science Museum in Minnesota premiered an exhibition entitled, 
“Can America Be Bombed?” Using a series of massive spherical maps, the display 
visually explored the geography of North America and its relation to the Pacific and 
Europe in terms of bombing ranges and their strategic functions. As Louis H. Powell, the 
director of the exhibit, later wrote: “In those far-off days when America was being rudely 
forced into an awareness of its proximity to Europe and Asia, a new unit for measuring 
distance was born—the distance to which a bomber could fly with a paying load of 
bombs and, with reasonable certainty, return to its base.”1      
Despite the exhibit’s implications for America’s burgeoning international 
relationships in the new World War context, most striking about the exhibit was both the 
maps’ dramatic form and the ways in which they circulated. The show spread nationwide, 
to the Buhl Planetarium in Pittsburgh, the New York Museum of Science and Industry, 
and the art museums of Toledo, Minneapolis, and Albany. Powell was particularly proud 
that the exhibit “made museum history by surmounting the traditional barriers that 
separate art and science museums and appearing in leading museums of both kinds.”2 
Reproductions of several of the units reached the office rotundas of House and Senate 
buildings in Washington and some of the cartographic experiments used at the Institute 
produced 40-inch blackboard surfaced globes for tracing international routes in the 




“Can America Be Bombed?” was an example of the wide usage of new mapping 
forms during the World War II period. The exhibit illustrated, particularly, the move from 
a flat-map conception of the world to a more flexible, active engagement with world 
space emerging at the time. A restlessness of vision marked this period in the 1940s—
brought about by the concurrence of expanding world commitments with the military and 
commercial possibilities of air travel. Indeed, the emphasis on the entire globe as a field 
of strategy helped form the basis of a spatially conscious popular culture, imaginatively 
enhanced by the new cartographic technologies of what came to be known as “air-age 
globalism.”  
American isolationism was a dying ideology, but the planes that reached the 
stagnant ships in Pearl Harbor finally put the nails in its coffin for good, and maps would 
come to textualize the new global scope for a wide array of audiences.4 Moreover, maps 
were employed as a lens of vision in the highest halls of leadership. In his fireside chat of 
February 23, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt referenced the momentous political 
implications of this new perspective in geopolitics: 
Those Americans who believed that we could live under the illusion of 
isolationism wanted the American eagle to imitate the tactics of the ostrich. Now, 
many of those same people, afraid that we may be sticking our necks out, want 
our national bird to be turned into a turtle. But we prefer to retain the eagle as it 
is—flying high and striking hard.5 
Underscoring this rhetorical move, FDR’s press secretary Stephen T. Early dispatched 
statements to national newspapers a week prior to the chat. He requested that Americans 




update “so that they might clearly and, in that way, much better understand him as he 
talks with them.”6 Appealing directly to armchair cartographers, FDR demanded, “Look 
at your map…This war is a new kind of war. It is different from all other wars of the past, 
not only in its methods and weapons, but also in its geography.”7  
 The new geopolitics dictated that the oceans no longer protected the United States 
from its moral duty; the new cartographic measurement would become minutes, not miles. 
As head of the Library of Congress’s Map Division, Walter Ristow, wrote in 1944, “All 
geography becomes home geography when the most distant point on earth is less than 
sixty hours from your local airport.”8 This discourse of the air was reflected in both the 
move toward popular, journalistic cartography during World War II as well as in the 
rapid growth of the U.S. government’s already sizable cartographic apparatus—novel 
types of maps and globes covered the walls and desks of academics and defense 
bureaucrats, but also found their way into American homes in new and compelling ways. 
More important, though, for this discussion are the ways in which these new 
discursive formations, born of World War II strategy and technologies, began to shape 
and support a larger liberal, modern internationalism that would come to mark the 
character of post-war conceptions of America’s “place” in the global community. Alan 
Henrikson’s crucial work on maps as “ideas” concludes that “this mental transformation 
and shrinkage of the earth during World War II was…a major cause of the ‘Cold War,’ a 
factor of no less significance than the well-known military, political, economic, and 
ideological causes.”9 While avoiding the causalism that marks Henrikson’s conclusions, I 
suggest in this chapter how the novel air-age cartographic perspectives of this era helped 




mapping mediates a historic shift in American foreign policy and spatial worldview from 
classic principles of political realism (and its emphasis on geopolitically defined states 
and concrete balances of power) towards a more fluid, abstract, and image-based 
internationalism.10 In this sense, the map served as both a mode of artistically envisioning 
a new internationalism and a powerful instrument of scientific precision in the protection 
of American interests. As Frank Ninkovich writes, “Interests, formerly ‘hard,’ material, 
and national, became by this new standard soft, symbolic, and international.”11 Thus, in 
Ninkovich’s estimation, “interpretation” became the central focus, with both popular 
audiences and leaders coming to “‘read’ the international environment as if it was a text,” 
and the global order imagined and argued into being, not simply achieved through a 
“mastery of objective details.”12 
The birds-eye view from the airplane’s vantage point was replicated in the formal 
conventions of maps, as cartographers attempted to encompass sweeping movement on 
the static page.13 From journalists to academics to government technicians, there was a 
rising consensus that the hemispheric world of traditional boundaries and power 
relationships was no longer viable. The sheer amount of competing ways to project this 
shift, however, shows that there was little agreement about the forms this new 
internationalism would take. This chapter, then, makes the rhetorical dimensions of form 
and content critical. On the one hand, the content of air-age maps present particular 
spatial problems that can be used to frame solutions—the map itself being used for a 
strategic objective (i.e., “seeing” World War II correctly will help wage successful war). 
At the same time, the form of the map is dramatically emphasized, with the novelty of 




strategic means is brought to the forefront. Every new perceptual angle and strange 
projection spatially revealed a new strategic relationship, and thus notions of constantly 
shifting visual perception, adaptation, and vigilance are intrinsic to strategy. 
A key rhetorical tension emerged between seeing America’s place on the globe as 
indicative of the promise of an idealistic global community versus the frightening 
prospect of a world that was too close and that needed to be ordered and secured. This 
tension complicated the new premium on cartographic perception and the relationship 
between rigidity and openness would find its way into the lines of the maps themselves, 
part of the revealing and concealing process that Lawrence Prelli attributes to maps as 
forms of display.14 While a wide range of cartographic discourses during World War II 
and the early Cold War evidenced these tensions, this chapter highlights one compelling 
case to represent the complex and contested role of new cartographies in the visual 
displays of America’s rise to internationalism. The popular geographies in newspapers 
and magazines galvanized air-age rhetoric in particularly profound ways, involving 
American audiences as consenting participants in global strategy. A close look at the 
work of Fortune magazine’s longtime artist Richard Edes Harrison, the leading 
journalistic cartographer (and prolific map critic) during World War II, provides a 
particularly instructive example of this phenomenon. Harrison was responsible for the 
employment of provocative new projections that challenged conceptions of east/west, 
north/south, and he created maps that placed readers in the perspective of a pilot flying 
over strategic areas of international conflict.15 His work was collected in best-selling 




wrote extensively in both popular and academic outlets about the need for flexibility in 
the use of maps.16   
In Harrison’s case, I consider his maps with specific attention to the formal visual 
and discursive characteristics of his mapping philosophy. At the same, I also 
contextualize Harrison’s contributions to air-age culture as part of a larger American 
development towards internationalism, while accounting for the constraints of the 
journalistic, popular medium in which he worked. Harrison’s global worldviews 
implicitly accept cartography as a constructed, contingent, and contestable discourse, able 
to shape perception rather than simply reflect spatial relationships. At the same time, his 
cartographic contributions offer particular parameters for the ways in which the postwar 
landscape would be seen as a field of global strategy. It is in this nexus between the 
ideological and the strategic that this chapter unfolds. Air-age vision and cartographic 
perspectives from popular sources like Harrison helped draw the lines on which Cold 
War space was bounded, and placed where American interests would find their 
geographical expression. By examining a case preliminary to the Cold War, I can explore 
how Cold War internationalism did not arrive fully formed following World War II, but 
was born from preexisting systems and patterns of discourse, including cartography. 
Before discussing Harrison, however, I offer a contextual sketch of air-age ideologies and 
their relationship to the visual culture of the period, in order to situate the potency of 
spatial discourse during World War II and its aftermath.  
The Tenets and Tensions of the Air-Age Shift to Global Internationalism 
“Air-age globalism” was a complex phenomenon that constrained the geographic 




1930s into the Cold War.17 Its roots obviously reach back to the famous flight at Kitty 
Hawk (and some would argue, even further) and it gathered steam in the globalizing 
rhetoric of Wilsonianism.18 But air-age globalism’s primary expression revolved around 
the build-up and execution of America’s involvement in World War II—air-age theorists 
like Ristow continually invoked Pearl Harbor as its point of origin. The international 
implications of the newfound air flexibility were conflated with national interest and 
wartime security on multiple discursive levels. As I have noted, pilot and aviation 
executive Alexander De Seversky, for instance, marketed his treatise Victory Through Air 
Power (1942) into a bestselling sensation.19 The Walt Disney-produced film adaptation of 
the book, complete with De Seversky’s lectures arguing for the supremacy of American 
air technology in front of wall-sized interactive maps, interspersed with colorful 
animation sequences showing the influence of airplane power across the globe, displayed 
just how much the air visually conditioned 1940s discourse.20 High school textbooks such 
as Our Air-Age World advanced the notion of a miniaturized globe that students could 
synthesize as one whole.21 Elsewhere, military figures like General H.H. “Hap” Arnold, 
an early Air Force pioneer, became popular icons for symbolizing American ingenuity 
and superiority in the air. As Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce said in a speech to 
Congress in 1943:  
It is a picture that has deeply entered the imagination of almost everyone in this 
country under 30 years of age…Grammar school boys can tell you today that the 
best way to get to [Bombay and Singapore] is to fly north from Chicago, across 
the polar ice cap—in 40 flying hours. Incidentally, they never think in land miles, 




Lt. Gen. Hap Arnold flew from Australia to San Francisco in 7 minutes under 36 
hours.22 
Mass media profiles, as in a 1946 National Geographic spread on Hap Arnold’s demand 
for a strong postwar air program and his dire warnings of an atomic Pearl Harbor, 
perpetuated such legends. The article even included photographs of test explosions 
alongside polar-centered maps showing the strategic avenues for American air 
technology.23  
The fascination with new and transcendent polar air routes was also found in 
tracts such as The Right to Fly (1947) by John Cobb Cooper, which included 12 polar-
azimuthal maps to supplement text arguing for the “indivisibility of air space” and 
indicting postwar complacency in strategic planning.24 Cooper was especially influential 
because of his multiple roles as director of Pan Am Airways, as a member of President 
Harry Truman’s Air Policy Commission, and later as a consultant drafted by President 
Dwight Eisenhower to lend legal opinion on the flyover of Sputnik. Similarly, figures 
such as G. Etzel Pearcy would helm Trans World Airlines, publish in the popular and 
academic literature about America’s political responsibility as a steward of the air, and go 
on to serve as Official Geographer of the State Department.25 As these examples indicate, 
the practitioners of air-age globalism tended to move fluidly from roles as corporate 
executives, government representatives, popular critics, academic researchers, and 
educators—and the functions of the air as an economic, military, and political vehicle 
blended in equally complex ways. Thus the geography of the age was highly intertextual, 
with numerous overlapping texts addressed to multiple audiences and incorporating 




These air-age practitioners often shared similar assumptions. In 1944, Walter 
Ristow formulated such assumptions into eight basic principles that characterized the 
new geography. Most important is the first tenet that air age geography is global 
geography.26 With long-range aircraft and the multitude of state interests involved in the 
war, the traditional focus on regional geography had to be supplemented with world-
minded surveys of the globe.27 The second is that geography is not a static science, 
which reflects the view that perspectives and worldviews need to be changed and 
continually questioned. 28  Third, air age distance is measured by time rather than space, 
where “there are no longer any far corners of the earth” and space is measured in minutes 
and hours rather than miles.29 A fourth tenet is that transport by air discounts 
geographical barriers as borders become more irrelevant in terms of movement and 
occupation of space.30 Many air-age maps, for example, eschew borders, sticking to the 
topography of rolling mountains and basins, leaving out political boundaries and 
highlighting the fluidity of continental land.31 Fifth is the idea that the world is not 
divided into hemispheres.32 Air-age geography makes hemispheres obsolete—America 
was now seen as closer in proximity to the “Eastern hemisphere” of Eurasia than to Latin 
America, questioning conceptions central to U.S. foreign policy since the Monroe 
Doctrine. Relatedly, the sixth tenet is that world transportation routes are no longer 
restricted to east-west lines—the seafaring mind of the Mercator projection accentuated 
geographical imaginaries of east and west, but in the air, travel from a given place was 
possible in all directions on a spherical earth.33 Finally, Ristow’s seventh and eighth 
tenets are also interrelated, positing that ocean basin geography is out of date and that 




ocean basins like the Mediterranean or the Caribbean were thus challenged here, while 
the barriers of desert and ice no longer sealed off access to important parts of the world.35  
Cartography provided an essential projection for this new air powered globalism, 
as it also altered the visualization of American political space in profound ways. 
Fundamentally, the sheer accessibility of maps as a popular form dramatically expanded. 
Sociologist (and later propagandist for the State Department) Hans Speier wrote of maps’ 
ubiquity around the outbreak of America’s involvement in World War II in the journal 
Social Research: “today, maps are distributed on posters and slides, in books as 
propaganda atlases, on post cards, in magazines, newspapers and leaflets, in moving 
pictures and on postage stamps…They may give information, but they may also plead.”36 
John K. Wright, the American Geographic Society’s president throughout the 1940s, not 
only noted the wide array of map outlets, but also reminded readers of how diverse and 
contingent they were in how they were made. As Wright noted, many maps “are not 
drawn from nature but are compiled from such documentary sources as other maps, 
surveyors; notes and sketches, photographs, travelers’ reports, statistics and the like. As 
these sources are themselves man-made, the subjective elements they contain are carried 
over into the maps based on them.”37 This characteristic of cartography, Wright believed, 
allowed maps to “form public opinion and build public morale.”38 In accounts like 
Speier’s and Wright’s, the notion of cartography as a contingent discourse is fully 
emergent. While theories of map subjectivity were by no means new, the extent to which 
the map was slowly seen as a cultural dialogue between cartographer and audience was a 
novel contribution. This necessarily involved popular map users as much as it did the 




As De Seversky put it, in the air age “tactics are the province of specialists, while strategy 
is the province of the people.”39 
An increased focus on the quality of perception marked this new inclusive 
strategy as a central theme. The traditional notion of political maps as simply tools of 
state officials for partitioning the world was being challenged. A new global outlook, 
which supplanted a focus on fixed borders and lines with fluidity and a synthetic gaze 
that captured the world as one, held important implications for American power and 
values. For example, air-age authors like Heinz Soffner, writing in a 1942 issue of the 
American Scholar, were advancing World War II as one inclusive visual text that could 
be read, dependent on a kind of totality of perception. Referencing maps, for example, 
Soffner noted: “pictures of this kind reduce the mental process of reading words one after 
another and of transforming their content into images and ideas, to a simple matter of 
perceiving, directly and as a whole, one more or less complex message.”40 It was notable, 
for example, that FDR’s large, specially fashioned office globe during World War II did 
not even have axes; it simply sat in a giant glass bowl to facilitate easy gazing from any 
direction, without limits.41  
The ease of gaze in the use of maps and globes was integrally bound up in the 
idea of the map as a potential tool of citizenship in this era. FDR placed an emphasis on 
“looking” at a map as a form of popular participation in the achievement of wartime 
objectives. His new emphasis on mapping and maps as part of popular citizen action 
validates Susan Schulten’s thesis that the era of air-age globalism was especially marked 
by the common acceptance that geography itself could be equated with power.42 As 




date with simplified, digestible arguments in a world where time (in war) was 
dramatically speeding up.”43 It was no coincidence that one of Richard Edes Harrison’s 
most popular set of maps was collected under the title of “Atlas for the U.S. Citizen”; the 
lay audience became a participant (or at least a consenting witness) in the cartographic 
process to a greater extent than had been seen before.  
Constantly updating the “state of the world” for American audiences meant that 
air-age globalism (and its maps) also connoted a sense of constant movement and a 
reconfiguration of the relationship between time and space. Geographer Louis Quam’s 
1943 critique of cartographic propaganda in Germany offered that “maps designed to 
illustrate the lightning speed of modern war must suggest movement.”44 In commenting 
on the increased use of “maps as weapons,” Hans Weigert wrote in 1941 for the famed 
early social research journal Survey Graphic that “the static map reflects a fixed state and 
conditions, while the dynamic map shows action, intentions, influences, developments, 
the growth and downfall of civilizations and their ideologies” and that “only the dynamic 
map can do justice to the vital fact that the world of today is constantly shrinking and can 
stress the power lines on which deadly or peaceful messages are conveyed from air base 
to air base.”45 During the final days of World War II, influential geographers such as 
Derwent Whittlesey, president of the Association of American Geographers, were wary 
of the map’s heritage as a static rendering of political borders, and had to now account for 
its new space/time dialectics. In 1945, Whittlesey theorized in his presidential address to 
the AAG that there was a “new horizon” in geography that required an acceptance of a 
new vertical dimension: “Every advance in the vertical plane alters the potential capacity 




The simultaneous closure of the era of surface expansion and opening of unmeasured 
potentialities latent in a three-dimensional world are setting new values upon every part 
of the earth.”46 This multiplied range, in turn, necessitated an acceptance of time as a key 
condition—Whittlesey also pointed out that geography’s new horizon emphasized 
velocity more overtly, or the speed by which an area is covered, and pace, the rate at 
which human life moves.47   
These functions of compressed and accelerated time also emphasized a new kind 
of mobility in maps that was not just about the transport of military might, but also about 
the transmission of commercial goods and communication as well. As historian James C. 
Malin wrote in 1944, “The air age is a new world opening to man through the medium of 
air communications—radio, television, and aircraft…The air age must be thought of as 
more than the age of flight because flight, like discovery, is only one form of mobility. 
The air-age trilogy is sound, sight, and flight.”48 Thus, air-age globalism could not simply 
be reduced to maps of military strategy—it was marked by a new premium on speed that 
employed the air as a conduit for ideas and money. Henrikson later captured these 
complexities by characterizing the air-age as an all-enveloping space/time shift that 
signaled a death of surface-thinking: “Surveying the earth from the sky did not simply 
make it appear more holistic and uniform; the experience (real or imagined) converted a 
two-dimensional surface into a three-dimensional environment; the atmosphere as a new 
geographic element had to be considered, revolutionizing communication and 
transportation.”49 The flat map now confronted a third dimension, thus altering the angle 
and perspective by which maps were used, and dramatically changed the way surfaces 




In addition, the traditional realist dichotomy between domestic life and 
international relations was breaking down; the values of everyday life at home were 
becoming more synonymous with the values of international community.50 Henry Luce is 
an exemplar of this complex movement to liberal internationalism.51 In his famous 
articulation of the American Century in 1940, for example, Luce articulated globalism as 
a pursuit both of economic interests and “world opinion,” which publications like Time 
and Fortune would cultivate.52 With pronouncements like “our world…is one world, 
fundamentally indivisible,” Luce saw America as the responsible steward for maintaining 
such a rolling, unified space.53 The isolationism of American cant was still seen as having 
a hold on the culture, even if it had been eroding at least since the turn of the century, and 
Luce and his cartographers-for-hire like Richard Edes Harrison were making clear 
attempts to break through its ideological hold on U.S. geopolitics. Air transportation itself 
became the new dividing border, then, pitting those who would use the new power for its 
supposed beneficial potential (for free trade, free movement, free government etc.) 
against those who would use it for “evil” (the empire-mad armies of Germany, Italy, 
etc.).54 The air-age’s image-based values marked moral choices between a path of good 
and a path of evil, with air power now “considered essential not only to the security of the 
United States but to world peace.”55 As De Seversky characteristically (and bluntly) put it 
during the heart of the Cold War: “The manifest destiny of the United States is in the 
skies.”56 
In this way, the unfolding international space of the air-age was both a site of 
idealist liberal hopes for modern progress and immense anxiety at the new proximities 




air-age discourse could embody the hopeful, humanistic internationalism of a Wendell 
Willkie, the 1940 Republican nominee for President who gained acclaim for his book 
One World. Willkie’s book used his crisscrossing experience around the globe in an ATC 
aircraft as evidence that the world was ready to transcend “narrow nationalism” and work 
toward global peace, complete with maps that used the new global projections 
popularized by cartographers like Richard Edes Harrison.58 The discourse of the early 
United Nations also was built on this kind of transcendent internationalism—its famous 
logo, in fact, features a polar-centered globe (a projection made famous by Harrison) 
surrounded by branches symbolizing peace.59 On the other hand, the air-age also 
encompassed a sense of the air as a frightening constraint on global security. The opening 
minutes, for example, of Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, offer the viewer a 
Fuhrer’s-eye view from a plane descending through the clouds over Germany.60 In large 
part, America’s air-age cartographic techniques were a conscious contextual response to 
what was perceived as Axis propaganda through the “message maps” of Hitler’s 
geographic consultant Karl Haushofer and his theories of German geopolitik.61 Isaiah 
Bowman, in particular, excoriated geopolitics as a sham science borne out of fascist 
academic journals and instead upheld “political geography” as a more acceptable (and 
accurate) American standard.62  
Altogether, the new discourse of air-age globalism housed a complex rhetoric of 
tense, spatial contradictions that spoke to the truly global. And maps would come to chart 
these contradictions in latitude and longitude. Thus, the relationships between the map’s 
function as a strategic argument and a symbol of scientific presentation are bound up in a 




perspective. This contextual maelstrom of academic, popular, and institutional discourses 
provides the critical atmosphere for this chapter’s discussion of one of the leading 
popular, journalistic purveyors of fresh, international perspectives, Richard Edes Harrison, 
who sketched his maps amidst the uncertain spaces of this new interpretive 
internationalism and problematized the way mid-twentieth century cartography was used 
and how it circulated.  
Iron Albatross:  
Richard Edes Harrison and the Bird’s Eye View of Modern Internationalism 
 
 The society page of the July 9, 1960, issue of The New Yorker published a vivid 
account of a recent bird-watching expedition by the Linnaean Society of New York—a 
group of amateur ornithologists. The trip was notable for a rare sighting of a particularly 
special bird. As one of the participants recounted: 
The bird took off, and as it dipped its head I caught the bright orange yellow on 
top of its bill. It spreads its wings—seven feet—and we saw what it was: 
Diomedea chlororynchos, the yellow-nosed albatross, the last bird you would 
expect to find in the North Atlantic!...The albatross was wonderfully cooperative: 
he’d fly a short distance, sometimes within fifty feet of our boat, then land and let 
the gulls dive-bomb him for a while, all within a very short compass…An adult 
bird in full plumage—a picture-book exposition. You couldn’t ask for anything 
better.63 
The witness to this ornithological wonder happened to be an esteemed resident of East 
51st Street in New York City, one Richard Edes Harrison. Mr. Harrison was a minor New 
York celebrity, as president of the Linnaeans.64 But this albatross chaser and well-to-do 




professional cartographer. His 1994 obituary in the New York Times, begins with the 
headline, “Richard Harrison, Avid Bird-Watcher and Map Maker, 92,” with the “and 
Map Maker” reading like an afterthought.65  
 Harrison’s two life pursuits were not necessarily mutually exclusive, however. 
Throughout the course of the 1930s and into the global and catastrophic conflict of the 
Second World War, cartography, like the business of war itself, took to the air. As fighter 
planes traversed the Earth and spread their wingspans and weaponry, mapmakers were 
devising a birds-eye view of the world, actively changing our view of the globe and our 
placement in it. Like the albatross soaring to unexpected heights, Americans became 
enamored with a new air-age global perspective. From this vantage point, the world was 
now closer—an exciting and frightening prospect. Like FDR’s “striking eagle” in his 
1942 fireside chat, the spatial dynamics of this new viewpoint were bound up in the 
awesome capacities of American power. 
 As house cartographer for Fortune and consultant for Life magazine, for almost 
two decades, Richard Edes Harrison certainly permeated the “geographic imagination” of 
World War II and post-war culture.66 Cartographic perspective and projection were his 
two innovations.67 His most famous maps revived long-forgotten modes of projection that 
anchored maps around the Arctic instead of establishing Europe as the center of the world, 
changing the entire spatial perception of proximity. Other maps dispensed with the 
“North on top, South on bottom” viewpoint, placing his readers instead, like his albatross, 
“from a vantage point high above the earth so that the distances draw together in 
perspective, as they might to an incredibly farsighted man poised at an altitude of many 




Recent scholarly interest in Harrison has put the “mapmaker” before the 
“birdwatcher”—in particular, Schulten’s work positions Harrison as a central player in 
the debates during the second half of the twentieth century that discuss geography and 
cartography as discursive phenomena.69 Harrison seemed acutely aware of this discursive 
function of his trade, chiding his field for being rigid and precise, and calling for an 
acceptance of “art as a full partner of technology in the design and drafting of maps.”70 
Harrison’s dogged amateurism evidenced his realization that maps were part of a cultural 
dialogue, rather than simply a top-down presentation of elite, scientist objectives. In 
defining cartography as “the difficult art of trying to represent the impossible,” Harrison 
accentuated the role of rhetoric in cartographically advancing political agendas.71 
 I examine here the crossroads between the Harrisonian frame of “maps as 
discourse” and the spatial changes that faced American rhetoric in the mid-twentieth 
century air-age. I argue that Harrison’s air-age aesthetic is an important part of this new 
interpretive paradigm, eschewing the “truths” of the classical power politics and balance 
of interests, and positing new relationships and proximities. Particularly in their 
transformation of perspective and projection, his maps project on flat pages the anxieties 
and opportunities that are part of a modern internationalism. Thus, a critical reading of 
Harrison’s actual maps is necessary to understand the new, high vantage points that they 
offered.72 Yet, Harrison’s work specifically as a system of visual rhetoric deserves further 
examination because not only do his maps reflect global changes in this period, but also 
the very act of mapping new perspectives and experimenting with cartographic 
perception helps create the interpretive ground by which the globe could be read and 




to rhetorical scholars not simply because he helped broaden the geographic imagination 
and allowed America to “look at the world” in a new way, but because he called attention 
to the discursive nature of space itself at a historical moment that foregrounded the 
world’s textuality during global war. Harrison’s arguments for flexibility in perspective 
and projection accentuated cartography’s malleability and contributed to the powerful 
ideology that the world can be molded through the symbolic image. In the process, 
Harrison’s rhetoric buttressed the new narrative of international space and encouraged the 
type of visual abstraction necessary for American national interests to be cast as universal. 
To advance these arguments, I analyze a series of representative Harrisonian maps, 
particularly those seen in his “Atlas for U.S. Citizen” supplement in the September 1940 
issue of Fortune and those published in his best-selling Look at the World: The Fortune 
Atlas for World Strategy (1944), among others found in his archive. The critique of these 
maps focuses on Harrison’s approach to perspective and projection and its bearing on two 
major themes: 1) the notions of seeing and vision at play on the cartographic page, with a 
focus on how the maps simultaneously conceal and reveal the alternative possibilities 
inherent in a “rhetoric of display”; and 2) how the maps both uphold and challenge 
notions of what strategy means in a new air-age context, re-envisioning borders and 
proximities and reflecting an uneasy globalism where goods, information, and peoples 
are continually in flux. Throughout, the rhetorical tensions of form and content illuminate 
Harrison’s emphasis on the rhetorical flexibility of cartography itself and its connection 






Analyzing the Perspective and Projection of Harrison’s Maps 
Maps have always served to take the observer out of space and place them above 
the world “as it is.”74 Richard Edes Harrison’s cartography, in particular, represents an 
explosive example of how form and content in maps fuse together, complicating that 
sense of detachment above the earth, and evidencing how air-age perspectives can house 
the kind of new abstractions that supported emerging, midcentury internationalist values.  
Harrison hailed from turn-of-the century Baltimore. Traveling often with his 
family, and led by his prominent Yale biologist father, he had a talent for field sketching 
and was a quick study in architecture, for which he would attend Yale in 1926. During 
the Depression, he found work in the art department for a products company, designing 
an assortment of oddities such as matchbook covers, record jackets, liquor labels, 
ashtrays, and lighting fixtures.75 Schulten remarks of Harrison that “his style owes more 
to the persuasive look of advertising than to cartography,” and certainly his time toiling 
away at ephemeral design contributed in some part to his sleek, streamlined, and above 
all, marketable cartographic style.76 
 Mark Monmonier dedicated his 1989 book Maps With the News to Harrison 
“whose unplanned career in journalistic cartography enhanced public awareness of the 
potential of news maps.”77 Indeed, Richard Edes Harrison was an accidental mapmaker—
essentially a substitute cartographer, called by a friend at Time in 1932 to etch out a quick 
map when the regular draftsman could not be found. His fill-in job became a fairly 
regular assignment until, by 1935, he joined the full-time staff of Fortune.78 In that year, 
Harrison made his mark by introducing the international perspective map for the first 




with the southwest at the top of the page.79 As the European war escalated, Harrison 
became a Fortune fixture and remained affiliated there for the next ten years-plus. The 
ubiquity of news maps today is taken largely for granted; during Harrison’s ascent to 
popular prominence, news maps were just starting to circulate, and without a significant 
history of news cartography in American culture, cartographers like Harrison had a wide 
range of freedom in their design and iconography.80 The map’s ability to support and 
complement the story it accompanied was more important than complete scientific 
accuracy. To reach a mass audience, Harrison and other up-and-coming news 
cartographers sought to simplify spatial information and unburden it from the yoke of 
academic and elite control.81  Such work brought home a sense of the globe so that 
“Americans imagine and comprehend a world that most [did] not experience firsthand.”82 
Harrison himself reflected, “It is among the weekly and monthly magazines…that the 
greatest assault on tradition has been made…they have borne the burden of making the 
public conscious of global geography.”83 Despite his success, though, he did find that his 
“assaults” were not always necessarily welcome. Harrison’s archive at the Library of 
Congress reveals a note he wrote to accompany the archiving of his 1938 map of 
Czechoslovakia (fig. 1.1), detailing how he was fired as an official staff member from 
Fortune because his editor found the map “confusing.” Of course, he would continue to 
be associated with Fortune, to great acclaim, but not as a permanent staff. So, Harrison 
was constantly navigating between his philosophy of flexible, strategic mapping and what 
he thought his editors (and the general public) would be able to accept.84 
Harrison’s meticulous production techniques subverted mapmaking tradition 




              
Figure 1.1. Richard Edes Harrison, Preliminary Draft of "Czechoslovakia," for Fortune, 1938 (Geography & 
Map Division, Richard Edes Harrison Collection, Library of Congress) 
that place the map user in the role of pilot, and a deliberate crusade to supplant the 
enduring Mercator projection with other, more novel projections.85 Life’s profile of the 
Fortune atlas provides a fascinating account of Harrison’s process behind the 
“perspective map,” which plays with dimension to make the globe appear as if it is 
coming off the page.86 He begins with a small freehand sketch of the portion of the globe 
to be included, and then photographs the globe from a distance of six feet (placing the 
mapmaker at a theoretical altitude of almost 40,000 miles over the Atlantic Ocean).87 
Harrison then chooses a greatly enlarged, close-up of the area produced from the 
photograph, which provides the basis of his vividly detailed sketches, out of which he 
produces his trademark three-dimensional sense of the reader flying over mountainous 
terrain.88 These techniques in and of themselves were not innovative—yet, it was the 




help “redevelop a native freshness of perception.”89 In terms of projection, I am referring 
to the choice of focus or center of the map. In more technical terms, according to 
Monmonier, projections “transform the curved, three-dimensional surface of the planet 
into a flat, two-dimensional plane” and anchors the focus of the reader’s eye.90 In 
choosing polar centers, for example, or by showing a round globe on the flat page, these 
projections become a salient rhetorical choice—the selection of a particular center on a 
map has political ramifications in the message disseminated to readers and users of the 
atlas; all other points and lines on the map flow from that origin point.91  
A representative map by Harrison from his Look at the World atlas evidences 
these themes of projection and perspective. “Europe from the East” (fig. 1.2) is one of 
Harrison’s most striking and simple maps in the atlas and covers a full two-page spread,  
 
Figure 1.2. Richard Edes Harrison, “Europe From the East,” Look at the World: The Fortune Atlas for World 




unadorned by any legends or captions save its title. The image is typical of Harrison’s 
“perspective maps,” showing the reader a rolling, rounded sliver of the globe, with three-
dimensional accents to connote flying over the topography of Europe. What is 
remarkable about this perspective, though, is that it centers on Eastern Europe from the 
viewpoint of an imposing Soviet Union.92 The very center of the map rests in Poland; 
Moscow is dotted at the bottom center of the map, and the entire European continent 
appears to flow out of it. At the top of the map is Spain, with the Atlantic Ocean on the 
horizon, and in the northeast is a glimpse of North Africa. Harrison’s framing foretells 
some important Cold War ramifications: it is easy to assume a Soviet-eye view of an 
Eastern Europe for the taking, unfolding almost naturally before a great expanding power 
all the way to the Atlantic. In the corner above the perspective map, in the margins of the 
white space, is an inset of an orthographic projection depicting the whole globe, 
highlighting in red the slice of Europe and North Africa that are the subject of the larger 
map. These Cold War implications were borne out when Harrison refashioned his 
“Europe From the East” to present it as “Satellites in Arms,” in Leland Stowe’s 1951 Life 
article of the same name, which details the extent of Soviet influence through railroads 
and waterways for transporting weapons and mobilizing forces throughout Eastern 
Europe.93 Vein-like red lines wind their way all over the continent, using the Soviet-eye 
perspective to show the anxiety of the Soviet Union’s vantage point of Cold War power.  
A cartographic reorientation such as this one suggests how brittle the perception 
of World War II alliances with the Soviet Union may have been, and how a simple 
change in spatial perspective could reveal new relationships. At the same time, the very 




strategy necessitates a flexibility of vision, and Harrison’s map promotes the value of 
perceptual adaptation, bringing to the forefront the discursive nature of world space. In 
this light, the lack of captions or any linguistic description (aside from place names) 
challenges the viewer to see the inevitability of this novel perspective, as a kind of 
common-sense geographical depiction that requires no explanation for the discerning 
viewer.94 In addition, having the global inset in the corner reminds the viewer of the 
connection of the region to the larger globe—that what takes place in one sliver of the 
world is just a piece of bigger, broader strategic spatial relationships and proximities that 
Americans face in the new air-age era. Harrison’s map, then, represents the contours of 
the air-age’s material contributions to the evolving modern internationalism—the turn to 
the symbolic and interpretive in world affairs that globalized security and charted 
national interests on an international scale.  
Situating Vision in Harrisonian Maps 
The very title of Harrison’s most famous and bestselling collection indicates the 
air-age era’s new premium on the value of vision and visibility. Look at the World is an 
imperative for clearheaded perception of new supposed realities. This plea to readers is 
not insignificant to a rhetorical reading of the maps contained inside: maps are bound up 
in complex rhetorics of truth and transparency, as vehicles of both art and science, fact 
and value. Lawrence Prelli notes that “displays manifest through…specific, situated, 
rhetorical resolutions of the dynamic between revealing and concealing. And such 
rhetorical resolutions exhibit partial perspectives—an orientation, a point of view, a way 
of seeing—that both open and restrict possibilities for meaning for those who become 




seeing transfers a set of values and images that are “always situated in complex 
circumstances of viewing, interpreting, and consuming.”96  
Harrison’s subversion of cartographic form manifests an engagement with the 
rhetorical dimensions of visual mediation, but also contends with the historic role of 
maps as unmediated frames for reality. The map “Eight Views of the World” (fig. 1.3) 
puts these dimensions on visual display.97 Harrison often uses the orthographic projection 
throughout Look at the World. Air-age globalism appeared truly global on the 
orthographic maps, as this type of map represented in two dimensions the benefits of the 
average desk globe.98 Unlike the perspective maps, which tried to represent the sphericity 
of the earth in regional fragments, orthographic views portrayed the totality of a freely 
rotating globe. Yet, the novelty of “Eight Views” is that there are indeed eight different 
projections over the two-page spread; the reader contends with eight globes, all centering  
       
 





and highlighting different areas of the world. The first globe features a centered United 
States, with the tagline, “The U.S.: its geographical isolation is more seeming than real,” 
as Harrison’s view is situated so that all continents can be seen on the globe in  
relation to America.99 The United States is highlighted in bright red on each of the eight 
maps, amplifying its connection to the other continents of the world. Another one of the 
eight maps shows Antarctica at the north of the globe, with a sharp, orange Argentina 
protruding toward it (complete with a caption reading, “Argentina: a dagger pointed at 
the heart of Antarctica”).100 Europe’s orthographic projection shows the tiny peninsula 
dwarfed and sandwiched by Asia to its left and Africa to its right, with a caption stating 
the visually obvious, “Europe: more close neighbors than any other continent.”101  
Prelli’s work on maps emphasizes the immediacy of a map’s rhetorical taxis, in 
that it provides a particular and constraining arrangement of space.102 In “Eight Views,” 
the total arrangement of these eight maps connotes an active, rotating, and often 
vulnerable earth, as if the relative worth of all parts of the world simply depends on the 
perspective (and interests) of the map user. Harrison could have provided the reader with 
one world map highlighting all of these relationships, but by choosing to place eight 
different views in succession, the rhetorical nature of space becomes integral to the 
presentational form. Like the desk globe at home, Harrison allows the user to flip around 
and choose a focus in “Eight Views.” Visually, this choice connotes that no matter which 
way you look at it, the “one world” is entangled with relationships in all directions, and 
isolationism is easily disputed by the “spin” of the globe.103 Harrison’s choice to use the 
globe itself inside the conventions of a flat map are key: as Denis Cosgrove writes on the 




can be extended to the very edges of representational space, leaving implicit the question 
of what lies beyond the frame; on the globe the ‘ends of the earth’ cannot be ignored.”104 
Thus, what were former peripheries become potential centers, shifting the very idea of 
vision in the Harrisonian approach. 
This notion of visual arrangement, of course, recalls Harrison’s particular focus 
on audience. His emphasis on flexibility puts the audience in charge of, and implicated in, 
the reading, placing the user right into the pilot’s seat. But the reader also can assume a 
variety of personas in these perspectives. In a 1942 issue of Fortune, for example, 
Harrison contributed a map entitled, “Southeast to Armageddon” (fig 1.4), in which the 
viewer is given a “Hitler’s-eye view” of the Middle East and beyond from a point high 
above Berchtesgaden.105 The map’s content offers a sense of the geographical difficulty  
   
 
Figure 1.4. Richard Edes Harrison, “Southeast to Armageddon,” Fortune, 1942 (Geography & Map Division, 




facing the Nazis in an attack on Asia Minor; but in highlighting form at the same time, 
the map’s user is invited to inhabit the “enemy’s”spatial worldview through the function 
of the map itself.  
Similarly, a 1943 Fortune map entitled “The Not-So-Soft Underside” (fig. 1.5) 
places the viewer in perspective from a point over North Africa looking at the 
“underbelly” of Europe from the Mediterranean.106 A small note accompanying this map 
in Harrison’s archive at the Library of Congress reveals the mapmaker saying, “The view 
was selected to undermine Churchill’s insistence that Europe had to be attacked in its 
‘soft underbelly.’ My working title for this map was ‘How soft is the Belly?’ The weasel-
worded printed title was the selection of the editors.”107 So, in taking on Churchill’s 
claims of strength in attacking Germany from North Africa and accusing the Allies of 
 
 
Figure 1.5. Richard Edes Harrison, “The Not-So-Soft Underside,” Fortune, 1943 (Geography & Map Division, 




misunderstanding basic geography, Harrison makes the case that the angle of vision 
given to the user can be used to dispute the truths of powerful strategists; cartographic 
perspective becomes a kind of evidence itself for strategic argument.  
Both “Southeast to Armageddon” and “The Not-So-Soft Underside” position their 
audience in the role of both enemy and ally from the air. In the process, each map 
pointedly argues about strategy’s spatial content, while evidencing the malleability of 
form in a notably rigid medium. As Harrison admits in Look at the World, most maps are 
seen as architects’ blueprints, and give the reader an infinite viewpoint where “one is not 
over a particular point on the map, one is over all points simultaneously.”108 Harrison’s 
perspective maps, however, foreground selectivity and partiality; in the same introduction, 
he mentions talking with pilots of the Eighth Air Force in Europe about their experiences: 
“A conventional map, they complained, only looks right when you are directly above the 
objective, i.e., some time after release of the bombs. The problem was solved by making 
maps with a finite viewpoint that shows the objective from the normal angle and height of 
approach. The new maps coincided with a true view of the target.”109 Harrison, then, 
immersed popular audiences within partial worldviews, and his fixation on audience 
engagement reflects the new internationalism’s focus on world opinion and flexible, 
global communication that opinion-shapers like Luce were boldly calling for. His 
perspectives place the audience into dialogue with the cartographer and manifest an 
awareness of space’s social constitution. 
Of course, Harrison’s quotation about the “true view of the target” speaks to his 
complex engagement with truth and transparency in maps. This complexity stems in part 




culture that designed maps to order, illustrating war problems that were unfolding by the 
day. Such maps were thus judged by their ability to provide a window into a particular 
strategic issue, rather than their illumination of fact. For example, an editor instructed 
Harrison, writing directly on one of the tracing sheets for his July 1941 Fortune map of 
the Soviet Union: “don’t be too mathematical about centering it.”110 At the same time this 
journalistic paradigm was firmly in place, many of Harrison’s colleagues in the 
disciplines of geography and cartography were drafted by the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) to produce a monumental amount of spatial data in what would eventually become 
a quantitative revolution in geography.111 The leaders of this revolution sought to produce 
clear, reliable spatial facts for America’s strategy, and in many ways were reacting to the 
perceived distortion of geography by the Third Reich.112   
Harrison’s use of distortion in his maps represents these tensions between 
cartography as an argument, and cartography as transparent mirror of the world. For 
example, Look at the World maps such as “Great Circle Airways” (fig. 1.6) feature a 
north polar gnomonic projection, with Harrison centering on the North Pole at the 
expense of dramatically distorting the shapes and areas of lands lying on the outer 
reaches of the map. Mexico, for example, looks particularly unrecognizable.113 Another 
of the atlas’s polar-centered maps, “Arctic Arena,” uses the full globe orthographic 
projection, distorting the familiar shapes of continents and placing the Soviet Union and 
Europe north of the United States in order to illustrate the new proximities that air routes 
over the North Pole bring to life.114 These novelty maps are certainly not the types of 
sketches that would be found in the halls of the State Department during the war. But 






Figure 1.6. Richard Edes Harrison, “Great Circle Airways,” Look at the World: The Fortune Atlas for World 
Strategy, 1944  
East-West minded Mercator map; maps that Harrison believed were a misleading “truth” 
about the way the world was supposed to be viewed.115 In Harrison’s introduction to the 
atlas, for example, he attacks Nazi Germany’s leading geographer, Karl Haushofer, for 
his almost exclusive reliance on Mercator.116 Interestingly enough, Harrison was not 
attacking German maps for their lack of accuracy or for promoting a propagandistic 
viewpoint, but for their lack of flexibility, and this is a key distinction. For Richard 
Harrison, Germany’s cartographic crime was not the manipulation of geographic truths, 
but a failure of vision itself. 
 Harrison was concerned about what S.W. Boggs, the State Department 
geographer of the 1940s and early 1950s, called “cartohypnosis,” where the audience 
“exhibits a high degree of suggestibility in respect to stimuli aroused by the map.”117 




each of his own novel perspectives just one in a series of possible views. As he wrote in 
The Saturday Review,  “American geography and cartography are exhibiting growing 
pains. They are emerging not from infancy but from a static condition bordering on 
senility.”118 And later in Surveying & Mapping, Harrison wrote that “in the military 
agencies, I keep hearing the words ‘user requirements’ over and over again. There is only 
one over-riding user requirement and that is: can the poor fellow understand the map?”119 
Harrison’s flexible amateurism, in this way, tweaked the classic American tenet of 
common sense philosophy, a self-consciously unpretentious construct where truths are 
made self-evident.120 “Geographical sense” meant, for Harrison, that all maps distort and 
that mapmakers are human and that each kind of unique distortion could actually be 
useful.121  
Harrison’s conceptions of vision and perspective are innovative, but also very 
much products of their time. Certainly, Harrison’s notion of deliberate distortions 
benefiting the world of cartography did not exactly catch on, but the notion of a fluid, 
relational space did, and Harrison provides a complex mediation of the move towards 
relative space.122 In accentuating flexibility of perspective, the map itself loses some of 
its power as a control mechanism, yet the audience is still constrained by the limited 
choice of perspectives provided to them by the cartographers.123 Harrison still remains 
instructive here, because he elevated the power of the user, and thus implicitly questioned 
the natural equilibriums of the balances of power that maps traditionally highlight. 
Relational space depends on the act of how one looks at the world and the search for a 




maps do not necessarily show the world as is, but more as it could be—a very liberal 
notion of modern progress at work.  
Situating Strategy in Harrison Maps 
Richard Edes Harrison’s promotion of flexible internationalism on the 
cartographic page shifted the focus from whose maps were more accurate in a war to 
whose maps were the more dynamic communicators. Highlighting the techniques by 
which audiences gained new perspectives becomes a key part of the display. In these new 
globalist perspectives, strategy itself became a lens by which to view the entire world. As 
Ninkovich concluded, “The perception of the globe’s unity in space and time was crucial, 
for it obliterated the geographical, cultural, and temporal distinctions that gave life to the 
historical myth of old and new worlds,” and thus there came a need to conceptualize 
national interest from the standpoint of unity of global processes rather than from the 
particularist frame of traditional statecraft.124 American liberal strategists during World 
War II and into the early Cold War found space malleable and more universal, but that 
new flexibility of perspective ushered in a reductive worldview. 
One of Harrison’s most celebrated maps provides a sense of how conceptions of 
strategy were changing in this time. For his opening world map in Look at the World, 
entitled “One World, One War” (fig. 1.7), Harrison chose to use the polar azimuthal 
equidistant projection, which he referred to as “the darling of the proponents of the ‘air-
age’.”125 The use of the polar center places North America in close quarters with North 
Asia and the Soviet Union, with the world shown in one unbroken piece. In the 
description next to the map, Harrison entertains the idea that “if the continents were 




           
Figure 1.7. Richard Edes Harrison, ”One World, One War,” Look at the World: The Fortune Atlas for World 
Strategy, 1944  
value.”126 Though a great distortion (Australia on the edges of the map is stretched 
beyond recognition), the visual of the polar center has important ideological connotations. 
World power is equalized and the globe is brought into a tightly wound collection of 
landmasses. As Harrison notes, it maps “the problems and the opportunities of fighting 
all over the world at once.”127 Thus, strategy itself becomes an ideology of managing 
complicated interdependences and being flexible in response to aggression in a much 
closer world.  
A similar map, using a polar azimuthal projection, from Fortune 1941, illustrates 
the new continuities of space and proximities in even bolder relief: the fascinating 
“World Divided” (fig. 1.8) looks almost the same as “One World, One War.”128 Here, 
however, the large expanse of the Soviet Union is actually colored in pitch black as an 




      
 
 
Figure 1.8. Richard Edes Harrison, “The World Divided,” Fortune, 1942 (Geography & Map Division, Richard 
Edes Harrison Collection, Library of Congress) 
small caption, noting for the reader to “count this black if Nazis win a quick and 
complete victory.”129 The projection not only connotes a sense of dangerous closeness 
that changes perceptions of strategy, but Harrison also uses color as a bold tool that 
realizes the situation’s immediacy to the reader.130 Coloring in one of the largest Allies as 
a potential Axis conquest suggests that maps could go outside their conventions of 
showing world space “as is” and connote future projections and strategic relationships 
that play with both space and temporality. Without the contextualizing of the caption, 
though, the reader simply sees the landmass of the Soviet Union as a black mass, a 
threatening pall to be cast on a multi-colored world. Captions can certainly constrain the 
reading of any map, as Denis Wood and John Fels have pointed out, but they often cannot 




possibility that the Nazis might conquer the Soviet Union becomes a character in the 
presentation.131 That essential tension between word and image is a constantly mitigating 
factor in Harrison’s maps, and in popular cartography in general.  Perhaps more 
importantly, though, the map places the notion that an entire world can be divided into 
two camps through the cartographic use of color, foreshadowing the Cold War 
architecture of maps to come.  
America’s shift to an image-based internationalism, though, is best seen in maps 
that specifically frame America’s interests in terms of the rest of the world. Harrison’s 
works capture this shift by simultaneously highlighting the anxieties and opportunities 
inherent in the perspectives. An air-age world created interdependences that could mean 
both strengths and vulnerabilities for American power. In terms of the dangers, a map 
like “Three Approaches to the U.S.” (fig. 1.9) in Harrison’s “Atlas for the U.S. Citizen” 
shows three perspectives of the United States from Berlin, Tokyo, and Caracas.132 These 
maps attempt to show drastically how vulnerable the United States is from all three 
locations. While the Berlin and Tokyo maps have obvious strategic implications for 
World War II, the inclusion of Caracas highlights that we are vulnerable even in our own 
hemisphere. Once again, the totality of the presentation is key—rather than show each of 
these perspectives in their own separate maps, Harrison puts each perspective from Berlin, 
Tokyo, and Caracas on the same page, on top of one another as if to lay out an argument. 
Geography is reduced to strategy, and vulnerability becomes an integral part of such a 
strategy—trust no one from any geographical perspective. While many other Harrison 
maps offer a more pro-active vision of America, putting the American reader inside the 





                                    
 
Figure 1.9. Richard Edes Harrison, “Three Approaches to the U.S.,” Fortune, 1940  
the sense of juxtaposition offers the American audience feelings of vulnerability, lack of 
control over their place, and at the mercy of potential enemies from all directions.  
Such a perspective recalls the realist’s fear of international anarchy that 
necessitates a balance of power perspective. For example, Harrison’s maps adorn the 
pages of early realist geographer Nicholas Spykman’s famous treatise, America’s 
Strategy in World Politics, which offers a power-politics plea for world strategy.133 
Spykman, with his air-age principles, indicted American isolationism and disseminated 
the idea that even in peace, the United States is unsafe and vulnerable. “A balance of 
power” Spykman wrote, “is an absolute prerequisite for the independence of the New 




this side of the oceans. Hemisphere defense is no defense at all.”134 Arguably, the choice 
of the polar center in many of Harrison’s maps highlights this kind of realism and the 
historiography of polar geography has tracked how the Arctic became a key piece of 
“cold war psychosis.”135 Through the influence of polar maps that connected the fortunes 
of the United States and the Soviet Union, the icy wasteland skyrocketed to political 
significance—and the potential for international cooperation in the polar world’s new 
proximities was stifled by the culture of Cold War national security.136 In the rush to 
defend American interests, this newly realized geographic proximity helped to create the 
conditions for an ever-widening ideological distance. 
Despite these possible readings and appropriations of his maps, Harrison’s work 
cannot be simply reduced to the ideologies of realism. His approach involves a much 
more global appreciation of how American interests could be synonymous with world 
interests. Perspective maps such as “Great Lakes to Greenland,” for example, visualize 
the air-age perspective of the Great Lakes and the Northeast United States (fig. 1.10).137 
Just over the horizon, over what looks like a truncated Atlantic Ocean, Harrison has 
drawn in the coasts of Norway, Scotland, Ireland, France, and Spain, bringing Europe 
into the normally western hemispheric point of view. Also contributing to this change is 
that Harrison downplays the rigidity of borders. While there is a line separating Canada 
from the United States on the “Great Lakes to Greenland” map, the eye focuses more on 
the continuity of the three-dimensional style landscape, and thus the two countries appear 
as one mass. Air route lines on the map track the trajectory from New York through Nova 
Scotia, Newfoundland, and onto Ireland, connecting the continents’ interests and 




             
Figure 1.10. Richard Edes Harrison, "Great Lakes to Greenland," Fortune, 1940 
perspectives place Canada in the forefront of American interests, as a kind of gateway to 
other parts of the world, and hence, the conception of manifest destiny becomes much 
more global in scope on the page. Similarly, the map “Puget Sound to Siberia” (fig. 1.11) 
focuses on the proximity between Alaska and the Soviet Union. From Harrison’s air-age 
vantage point, Siberia and hence the burgeoning world superpower of the Soviet Union 
seems almost completely connected to (and encroaching upon) American territory.138 
Accompanying this map is a telling note about strategy: 
It is…unlikely that Soviet Russia or Japan, indifferently equipped and operating 
from far distant sources of supply, should attempt to take the Pacific Northwest as 
the Germans took Norway. It is far more likely that the U.S. having taken steps to 
secure its defense, should one day find that it had in its Aleutian bases a strongly 




      
Figure 1.11. Richard Edes Harrison, "Puget Sound to Siberia," Fortune, 1940 
Such captions match the visual with both a fear of proximity, in hinting at Soviet and 
Japanese presence in our sphere of influence, with an active sense of duty to spread U.S. 
might. The old classical realists traditionally saw the world in terms of nation-state power, 
but maps like Harrison’s challenge such ideas with their lack of borders—all is connected.  
The introduction to Harrison’s Atlas for the U.S. Citizen, entitled “The U.S. and 
the World” and written by the Fortune editors, is a telling description of how air-age 
perspectives marked a multi-faceted internationalism. Predating America’s entry into 
World War II, the article equates the new perspective of a shrinking world as a kind of 
call to arms. A quote here at length shows the way in which Harrison’s perspectives were 
situated: 
At last, however, the great awakening may be upon us, and we may be prepared to 




the larger spheres where our fate will be determined. Such realism may show us 
that we are as unique in the world and as alone as we were in 1840. But realism 
cannot end there. For realism does not fulfill itself in mere recognition of facts. 
After recognition, realism leads to action, to a true change; and when the change 
has occurred, then the realistic view is different from what it was before. If, for 
instance, recognizing our weakness, we proceed to make ourselves strong, then a 
realistic view of the world may lead us to foreign policies that we cannot now 
consider…And so, facing our loneliness, we may also recapture our old 
aggressive spirit…For the atlas, which these maps make up, is so designed that 
the citizen of the U.S. may here, with the whole world before him, begin to make 
manifest to himself the outlines of his nation’s destiny.140 
Thus, while the word realism is used here, its implications are much broader than only 
maintaining a balance of power: the modern internationalism brings forth a new manifest 
destiny that prizes a relational, interpretive vision of world space. The strategist can 
remake the world. The classic realist operated out of an acceptance of weakness and 
aloneness as a natural condition; here are hints that this loneliness is a construct that can 
be disputed by using the right perspective. 
 In much of Harrison’s World War II work, this new internationalism visually 
projects interdependence and cooperation as a possible goal. The aerial view of Europe in 
the “Atlas for the U.S. Citizen” (fig. 1.12) makes this call for internationalism most 
poignantly. The map uses Newfoundland as its vantage point at the center bottom of the 
map, with England serving as a center-point (the equator becoming a vertical arc, rather 





Figure 1.12. Richard Edes Harrison, "Europe," Fortune, 1940 
Germany with the gigantic expanse of the U.S.S.R. immediately to the left, its girth 
stretched all the way off the map’s frame. Turkey, Syria, and Palestine sit at the top of the 
sphere, making the Middle East a strategic location on the horizon. At the bottom, 
Harrison also lists strategically specific American cities such as Botwood (N.H.), New 
York, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, and Mobile next to an arrow pointing off 
the map, again bringing the affairs of the Old World into American sights. The inclusion 
of Botwood and Mobile indicates that Harrison was interested in bringing the universal 
into the American home. Small cities and towns were just as strategic in disseminating 
the new air-age geographic information as were conventional points like New York and 
Washington, D.C., suggesting that Americans share cultural geographic similarities and 
an inherent unity with other places in the world. As the caption points out, “Since the 




alliances with these foreign countries, and to live in isolation behind the Atlantic. Yet 
Europe has been somehow involved in every major war of the U.S., and 30,000 
Americans lie buried in Flanders.”142 The caption supplements the immediacy drawn into 
the lines of the map and adds an emotional element to the calls for abandoning 
isolationism. These ideas reiterate the internationalist view that Europe is really a central 
American concern, and that our influence in the European arena must be a function of a 
common sense perspective. 
Finally, Harrison re-visualizes global transformation via his maps’ ability to 
highlight how strategy now involves the spread of communication, economics, and 
culture, and not simply political and military assets. For example, the gnomonic style of 
projection exhibits some of the greatest distortions of any type of cartographic projection. 
But Harrison praises it as “probably the most accurate map…of the communication lines 
of the modern world, for its weird stretchings of familiar shore lines are present to 
achieve one objective, true great-circle direction. Any straight line on the map is a great 
circle and therefore the shortest route between any two points.”143 In his “Great Circle 
Airways” map (refer back to fig. 1.6), Harrison’s gnomonic projection with a north polar 
center encompassed and visually displayed all of the world’s “great” powers and 
represented a large proportion of the world’s strategic routes of communication.144 The 
north polar gnomonic thus captures the interconnectedness (and interdependence) of 
nation-states in a wartime context, giving the feeling of mutuality and prizing 
communication as a new fulcrum of strategy.145 
Other maps in Harrison’s archive illustrate the importance of both industrial and 




simply a function of traditional state power. For example, the striking, elaborate “World 
According to Standard (N.J.),” from Fortune in 1940 (fig. 1.13), argues about the 
complex embroilment of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey in World War II.146 A 
tangled flow of thick, colored lines and directional arrows connect an icon of Standard’s 
oil fields in Texas to factories in New Jersey and Illinois, and then to strategic points all 
over the earth, from Canada to Venezuela, Great Britain, Romania, and then far East to 
Indonesia. The more important the region is to oil production and profit, the larger it is 
projected on the map, thus making for a distorted world as seen through the eyes of an oil 
company executive. An accompanying chart shows a collection of national flags made 
proportional to the size of that country’s Standard tanker fleet tonnage, with the U.S. 
dwarfing the others. Another Fortune map takes a similar approach, except this time to 
demonstrate the importance of commercial air interests: “U.S. Air Industry” (fig. 1.14)  
       
 
 






Figure 1.14. Richard Edes Harrison, “U.S. Air Industry,” Fortune, 1941 (Geography & Map Division, Richard 
Edes Harrison Collection, Library of Congress) 
shows a freehand sketch of the United States distorted almost beyond recognition in 
terms of area and shape.147 Harrison shrinks or enlarges the size of each state according to 
the air power that state has in terms of commercial plants, planes, engines, and propellers. 
The bloated looking shapes of states like Maryland, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Massachusetts, 
Texas, California and others suggest an industry almost ballooning and expanding right 
on the flat page in front of the reader and connote that individual states are implicated in 
a global war effort. Thus in this map, the very technology central to the new air-age 
perspective is offered as the subject of the map, and frames America as leading the 
charge in commercial reign over the skies. It is also telling that Harrison was hired to 
create a world map for Pan Am in 1946 (fig. 1.15): a Harrison-style globe is rendered in 




             
Figure 1.15. Richard Edes Harrison, "Pan Am World Airways," 1946 (Geography & Map Division, Richard 
Edes Harrison Collection, Library of Congress) 
airline’s routes across the entire globe.148 In a postwar map such as this one, the 
American global transport of air weaponry is replaced by the transport of American 
capital.149 Such a point is a poignant demonstration of the complexities of the burgeoning 
air-age internationalism, as visualized in cartography: the spread of soft power, carried by 
technologies like oil tankers, airplanes, and later satellites, is infused into conceptions of 
global space. The form of the maps’ aerial perspectives and choices of projection and 
distortion connote a sense of rolling, inevitable movement above space, and that visually 
mediates the new movement of capital, technologies, and “ideas” that came out of the 
shift to liberal American globalism at mid-century. 
Harrison’s Legacy 
The entire corpus of Harrison’s World War II maps acknowledges that a world of 




but answers that it is the transcendent power of American perspective that can transform 
world space. There is a certain irony in the fact that Harrison bemoaned the “too-long 
forgotten realities of world geography,” even as his novel cartographic perspectives were 
part of the kind of abstraction that modern internationalism needed—the air-age 
detachment of seeing the earth unfold in front of you, from the standpoint of one’s own 
particular interests.150 The realities of world geography were shapeable, according to the 
sheer variety of perspectives and relationships that Harrison offered.  
Despite Harrison’s pursuit of a realistic picture of the world, he was more than 
aware of the ironic conundrums cartographers face in making necessary distortions. For 
example, his archive contains a diary with sketches and notes for an unfinished book he 
was writing in the early 1940s called “The World is Round-O!,” and it speaks to his 
recognition of the discursive nature of cartography. Harrison writes:  
This book is subtitled a treatise on maps, but it is really about the skin of a 
spherical object and man’s painful efforts to take the hide off the sphere and 
spread it flat so that the pattern of it still remains recognizable…When the attempt 
is made to show the entire surface of the globe on one sheet of paper, the 
cartographer’s dilemma is completely revealed. It is like trying to wrap a 
grapefruit without wrinkling the paper, or like commissioning a portrait painter to 
do a head showing not only the face but the sides, back and top simultaneously.151  
The potential problem, though, is that, in the process of abstraction, maps become 
metaphors for the space itself. As Lawrence Prelli has demonstrated in his study of 
scientific maps as forensic evidence, while metaphors are often visually literalized on the 




discursivity of maps through his dramatic emphasis on form, Harrison takes the map out 
of its traditional role as an impartial display of states and geographic information, in a 
sense “de-literalizing” the old classic metaphor that the “map is the territory.” Harrison 
reifies the power of the new map in the sense that all is now strategic and malleable, with 
his cartographic perspectives and projections displaying new vulnerabilities, strengths, 
and proximities. Eschewing the traditional borders and orientations expected from maps, 
Harrison simplifies the globe in a new way with a reductionism that encourages a 
common sense interpretation of American interests as commensurate with all points on 
the map. Harrison is caught in the tension between textualizing the world and revealing 
its artifice, caught between concealing the map’s construction and making it a naturalized 
instrument of liberal foreign policy and strategy. 
A poignant example of the ideological contradictions of Harrison’s brand of air-
age globalism comes out of his works’ contentious relationship with the principle of 
manifest destiny. As noted, the 1940 introduction to “Atlas for the U.S. Citizen” called 
for Americans to use Harrison’s geography to rekindle a sense of their manifest destiny, 
to enter World War II and spread principles of freedom and democracy (by force) around 
the globe.153 Seven years later, in the same year that President Harry S. Truman spoke 
doctrinally of a new manifest destiny in the fight against Communism, the second edition 
of the New Compass of the World appeared, with Richard Edes Harrison listed as a co-
editor. The introduction to the classic geopolitics text, credited to Harrison, Weigert, and 
Vilhjalmur Stefansson, reads as follows: 
We are aware of the “dangerous beginnings of an American geopolitics, with 




described its aims as “disillusioned balance-of-power solution on the basis of 
regional groupings, in preparation for what the sponsors of such ‘realistic’ plans 
consider inevitable: the Third World War.” We feel the same way today, four 
years after. In fact, we realize more strongly than before the challenge to a 
geography which may have to teach both some science and some history, to raise 
its calm voice and to warn against the false values of a new Manifest Destiny 
based on geographical truths.154 
America’s ideological expansion during the 1940s, as seen in these differing conceptions 
of modern manifest destiny, saw Richard Edes Harrison caught in an air-age ambivalence 
around America’s global power. In Harrison’s wake, the politicization of air space 
continued. The very contestability of the air’s supposed potential for international 
transcendence is best evidenced by the Soviet Union’s famous downing of Francis Gary 
Powers’ U2 spy plane in May of 1960; the “perspectives” from air space were thus highly 
charged and far from simply abstract. John Cloud’s historical work on Cold War 
geography, for example, has noted the increasing sophistication of air technologies to 
provide maps for the highest levels of Cold War classification; the pilot’s human eye (and 
thus the cartographer’s as well) was replaced by the mechanical eye of the satellite in 
determining the spaces for national interest.155 In addition, as geographer William 
Bunge’s radical appropriations of Harrison-style perspectives during the 1980s Cold War 
resurgence made clear, the airplane’s small world was made infinitely smaller by the 
programmable nuclear missile.156 Thus, the art of the amateur journalist-cartographer 




Harrison’s output precipitously declined after World War II, and his status as a 
celebrity cartographer slowly faded away. His infrequent Cold War work, however, did 
continue to evidence his trademark perspective and projections of old in a new strategic 
context: his map of the U.S.S.R.’s first atom bomb for Life in 1949 (fig. 1.16), for 
example, took the global orthographic projection and showed a series of concentric 
circles around a small mushroom cloud radiating destruction across the globe.157 
“Communist Fastness” (fig. 1.17), from Fortune in 1950, repurposed the polar 
perspective of World War II to show the menacing proximity of the new world force. His 
“Fatherland is Again Divided” map for Life in 1954 (fig. 1.18) revived his classic 
perspective approach in a large-scale rendering of a split Germany as seen from an 
imagined height over the Mediterranean.158 The State Department would continue to 
consult with Harrison after World War II ended, and the fact that he was drafted to  
                                        




       
                         
Figure 1.17. Richard Edes Harrison, "The Communist Fastness," Fortune, 1950 
 




produce maps for General George Marshall’s report to the Secretary of War on the 
victory in 1945 does indicate that his perspectives were being appropriated at high levels 
of policymaking crucial to early Cold War strategy.159 But his most influential work was 
tied to World War II, and thereafter, he retired to become more of a friendly and 
respected elder statesman for his fellow cartographers, and a noted chaser of birds. Of 
course, his captivating yarn about his pursuit of an elusive albatross in the society pages 
of the New Yorker appeared almost exactly one year before Khrushchev erected the 
symbolic manifestation of the iron curtain through the center of Berlin. Now, in a post-
Cold War landscape, a world where globalism has transformed into globalization, and 
money and information technology change the very definition of transportation, 
Harrison’s compelling accentuation of proximities and calls for fresh perspectives remain 
important (and still eye-catching).  
Conclusion 
Recalling Harrison’s role in articulating a new cartographic perspective 
demonstrates how cartography during World War II and the immediate postwar period 
highlighted the perspective of vision, the means of the map, as being just as important as 
the content of the map itself. In the process, Harrison revealed that perception and 
interpretation are a key part of how global space is transformed, and influenced, in 
Finnegan’s terms, “audiences’ practices of looking.”160  
Mining the rhetoric of cartography during this period uniquely interrogates the 
abstract visualizations of the air-age’s interpretive paradigm. The entire field of American 
“placement” in the world was (re)imagined from a host of different academic, popular, 




others. Such perspectives support Dodds’ theory that the intertwining of practical, formal, 
and popular geopolitical reasoning in the Cold War created interpretive dispositions in 
how the world was read and how the globe was rendered as a platform for action.161 
While Harrison was primarily a figure in World War II popular culture, the development 
of postwar foreign policy reflects the complex solidification of the new air-age 
globalism’s spatial tenets. As John Lewis Gaddis has hinted, any serious student of policy 
could hardly see every point on the earth as equally strategic; yet, the new ideology of 
requiring a constantly shifting perspective would dramatically enlarge the field of what 
would be considered part of strategy. Postwar administrations had all accepted in some 
form a world of diversity, and a future where America remakes the world in its image 
was not considered realistic or even ideal.162 The problem, though, was that another view 
prevailed during this period—the view that America was the only power to enforce such 
diversity; thus all threats became more threatening and all interests became even more 
vital. Gaddis writes, then, that the “the effect had been to push the United States into 
universalism by the back door: the defense of diversity in what seemed to be a dangerous 
world had produced most of the costs, strains, and self-defeating consequences of 
indiscriminate globalism.”163 For example, the notion of “flexible response” encouraged a 
theatre like Vietnam to become, for liberal policymakers, a symbol of American power 
and credibility. Thus, perception equaled reality, and the entire traditional idea of strategy 
being a “calculated relationship of ends and means” was transformed into a paradigm 
where means and process were of greater importance than ends and objectives.164 This 
post-World War II internationalism moved away from the classical realist acceptance of 




Harrison) attempted to transcend this, and with threats and opportunities present from any 
angle on the globe, a cycle of American overextension was set in place.  
The flexibility of air-age visual rhetoric like Harrison’s mediated a move toward a 
fairly fixed worldview that would come to mark at least the early days of the Cold War 
conflict. The next chapter looks specifically at a representative case through the 
Department of State, to project how the very tensions of realism and idealism, truth and 
value, art and science, means and ends, were also bound up in the way American foreign 
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ONE WORLD OR TWO?: FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CARTOGRAPHIC 
TENSIONS BETWEEN ART AND SCIENCE IN THE TRANSITION TO  
COLD WAR 
 
 In April 1945, the war on the Western Front was at its end, and Floyd Hough was 
sent looking for maps. Post-war planning was in full effect; Allied forces were 
scrounging all over Europe for highly sensitive intelligence that would facilitate such 
planning. Hough was an Army geodesist, leading a special unit for the Military 
Intelligence Division of the Office of Chief Engineers. Geodesy, an earth science 
concerning the accurate measurement of the shape and roundness of the earth, had 
fascinated scientists for centuries, but the air-age military context made the accurate 
shape of the earth (particularly for bomber routes and the delivery of missiles) a more 
urgent concern. Hough’s team was moving through Germany in “cloak and dagger 
fashion,” according to Life, directed to steal maps and geodetic survey information from a 
host of abandoned German university archives and institutes, when Hough received 
intelligence about a massive cache of military maps captured from the Russians by 
Germany.1 They located the stash in an old warehouse in the village of Saalfeld, and 
found a rich haul of military data that was well beyond their expectations. But Saalfeld 
was scheduled for transfer to the Russian zone; the legend is that Hough quickly 
commandeered a group of U.S. artillery trucks and filled them with the contents of the 
archives, with the last truck just loaded on one side of the village as Soviet tanks rolled in 
on the other side. 
The Hough Team’s findings “would change the course of the Cold War.”2 




kind of heroic, geographic “explorer” narrative for the increasingly technologized and 
abstract charting of Soviet territory. Hough’s story was often featured in public coverage 
of Cold War cartography: a Life article from 1956, on “the missile-era race to chart the 
earth,” lionizes Hough for using clandestine knowledge of the earth to advance Cold War 
objectives. Life reported a later incident at a conference in Russia where Hough was 
speaking: “a Russian delegate eyed the American with cold politeness. ‘We have heard a 
lot about you, Mr. Hough,’ he said.”3 America’s ability to penetrate Soviet and Eastern 
bloc space, with reliable accuracy, was Hough’s enduring Cold War legacy, and the U.S. 
government would come to use this knowledge itself as a weapon. The findings 
themselves produced foundational data for geodesy, photogrammetry, and cartography 
for the next 25 years. Over the course of the Cold War, military cartographers and earth 
scientists converted the information into a standardized set of coordinates for points all 
over the heart of the Eurasian landmass, which aided the development of satellite 
reconnaissance technologies sponsored by the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, and was 
used for intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State.4 
This work also led to a coordinated effort by the U.S. government to standardize 
international cartographic policies so that Cold War strategic allies could benefit from the 
same spatial information about the Soviet Union.5 On the one hand, Hough represented 
the last vestiges of the traditional geographic explorer, the pioneer who risks his safety in 
order to triumphantly chart new spaces. On the other hand, his mission posed a new role 
for cartography that would increase during the postwar era—the “hailing” of geography 
as a basis for state intelligence in international conflicts, and a site for crucial integrations 




 My concern, though, is not about Hough or his findings, but rather about the kinds 
of transitional spaces in which government cartographic policies were conceived and 
executed—the kind of context in which an actor like Hough could achieve notoriety. The 
strategic use of maps had dramatically increased during World War II, and the world was 
fast becoming a field of strategy that could be read as a whole text. These popular air-age 
perspectives were filtered through the U.S. government’s institutional lens, with profound 
implications for the ways particular agencies converged geo-spatial data into new 
ideologies of how to place American power around the globe. John Cloud writes of these 
essential shifts for mapping in the Cold War, noting the “massive…expansion in the 
scope and activities of federal cartographic and intelligence agencies,” driven especially 
by new technologies that could closely monitor the threat of nuclear war.7 World regions 
became “part of geopolitical Cold War imperatives,” and thus cartographic science was 
forged by interactions through scientists, military, industry, and the state in order to meet 
common strategic problems.8 Fighting the Soviet Union required the power to construct 
spatial knowledge of the entire earth with the utmost precision.  
Maps are not simply images—they are abstractions, refiguring material spaces 
into bounded symbols of colors and lines, and creating a unique world apart from the 
space they supposedly depict. Between those lines is, of course, an array of power 
relations between mapmaker and map interpreter.9 As Henri Lefebvre remarks, spaces are 
not natural givens that we inhabit, but are produced by cultural forces in a continuous 
process of creation.10 Often, it is the elites or experts of a society that produce what 
Lefebvre called “representations of spaces,” or the politicized practices that construct and 




representation, as visualizations made by powerful forces that argue space into being. The 
development of modern internationalism in American culture is one such “representation 
of space.” The case of Richard Edes Harrison manifests the premium placed on the value 
of new perception, through rhetorical recastings of vision and strategy in popular maps. 
This development in perception had substantial foreign policy repercussions on the 
character of America’s new internationalism during World War II and into the Cold War. 
John Lewis Gaddis noted that the tension between means/ends would require constant 
negotiation for post-war strategists, and it was often the perception of power and strength 
that determined strategy, rather than what could actually be measured.12 Thus, I argue in 
this chapter that particular constructions of the world, or representations of space, by 
certain government elites, are constrained by the form of perception in maps.  
I begin by discussing the contextual implications of the new air-age globalism on 
the development of government cartography and its technologies. The bulk of the 
discussion, however, focuses on a specific case that illustrates the Department of State’s 
use of cartography in postwar policy design by highlighting the wartime and postwar 
work of S.W. Boggs, the Department’s Official Geographer from 1923-1954. Like 
Harrison, Boggs often idealistically absorbed his time’s geographic imagination as 
manifested in new flexibilities of global mapping. But as a representative of the U.S. 
government, Boggs’ cartography was also beholden to the shifting institutional 
necessities of a foreign policy apparatus that sought a blueprint for a postwar world. This 
chapter notes that while Boggs, like Harrison promoted the new air-age flexibilities and 
formulated spatial ideologies for the emerging modern internationalism, he was also 




institutional necessities of a foreign policy culture that sough a blueprint for a postwar 
world. Government cartographers were especially caught between the idealism of the 
one-world and the chance for international scientific cooperation to map the earth, and 
the reality of the U.S. government’s need for maps to help strategically “contain” hostile 
spaces. Thus, I hold that Boggs’ cartographic output as both academic and government 
policy shaper navigates these essential tensions, and sheds a revealing light on the spatial 
transition of the U.S. government during the postwar and Cold War eras.  
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Implications 
of Air-Age Geography in the Early Cold War 
 
The air-age approach in the development of America’s spatial values, operating as 
it did in such a charged context as world war, hinted at a kind of idealism, as if with the 
new premium on fluidity and “atmosphere” Americans could somehow fly away from 
borders, nationalism, and war machines. In practice, however, the shift to globalism was 
less about transcending such concerns and more about re-envisioning them. Geographer 
Neil Smith points to a crucial reconception of space, concurrent with the new 
perspectives from the air, where absolute geography (seeing spaces as a pre-existing 
identity with the common sense notion that space “is”) shifted to a relational geography 
where distance is relative, and space is constituted socially.13 The act itself of seeing 
global space was critical here, opening up the world to new interdependences that 
required constant, vigilant management.14 For example, Paul Smith, writing for the 
American Congress on Surveying & Mapping in 1954, championed legibility as the 
defining need of aviation-related maps, with the dramatic expansion of scale “controlling 
the amount of legible material that can be shown.”15 During that same Congress, Albert 




is an Army without eyes,” thus noting the importance of a map’s ocular function in the 
exercise of U.S. power.16  
New, interdependent spatial relationships meant that transportation fluidly 
connected capital and communication networks, and the realist power politics that 
bounded the nation state as the key political unit was challenged.17 In geopolitical terms, 
realism posited that, rather than human agency and will, “it was the natural environment 
and the geographical setting of a state which exercised the greatest influence on its 
destiny.”18 But air-age perspectives signaled a key change: geographers no longer had to 
travel the land in order to describe its contours; the power of the airplane challenged such 
expertise, privileging the technological means by which the perspective was obtained. 
The Hough narrative, for example, was largely about the act of amassing forbidden data 
and using it in the service of sophisticated (and increasingly classified) technologies. 
Thus, the perspective of those with access to such technologies was also privileged, 
giving a new power to liberal government strategists’ reading of the world. FDR’s 
principal geographic consultant (and advisor to Woodrow Wilson at Versailles) Isaiah 
Bowman was a clear representative of the appropriation of relational power politics into a 
modern, liberal framework.19 Bowman upheld a kind of “interpretive turn” in 
understanding world space, writing that: “It is often said that geography does not change. 
In truth geography changes as rapidly as ideas and technologies change; that is, the 
meaning of geographical conditions changes.”20  
For Bowman, and many air-age political geographers, there was no natural 
balance of power in the world, but rather a contestable field of space constituted by ideas. 




better understand ‘power’…” and “if we are wise we shall focus our attention on the 
unending process of readjustment among the many, rather than on a temporary condition 
of balance among the few.”21 To Bowman, that process revolved around the idea of 
“liberty,” making geography part of an ideological and moral strategy.22 This air-age 
vision suggests, then, that power came from the ability to get a better perspective, and 
hinted that the way to command the world was to see that world clearly (and in 
Bowman’s terms, “freely”)—with maps being the vehicle for that visualization.23 On the 
whole, because of the institutional and academic reach of figures like Bowman, 
geography was advancing beyond the thorough regional description prized by titans of 
the field such as Richard Hartshorne, and became much more globally politicized in the 
halls of the Departments of State and Defense.24  
As Frank Ninkovich has noted, during this shift to an interpretive kind of 
internationalism, American policymakers suffered from a condition “which was the 
opposite of dyslexia: incoherence inhered in the text rather than in the minds of the 
readers.”25 The rhetorical world of air-age globalism fit this condition. It did not mean 
changing the liberal modernist approach to progress; it meant finding new ways to 
perceive where that incoherence was, in this case from a vantage point high above the 
earth. If the globe was seen textually rather than as some fixed entity, it could be molded 
and approached from different angles. Neglecting the balance of ends and means in the 
old geopolitical realism for a sharper focus on “credibility” meant that there would be 
constant attempts to get a more credible perception of world events.26 As Alan Henrikson 




officials navigate the world? For them, the problem of faithful representation of the world 
has always been an acute one.”27 
Realism was not abandoned by any means, as the development of high-level Cold 
War strategy and military science showed. Balancing power politics against raw, rational 
calculation still was integral to reading the landscape; as Richard Ashley has pointed out, 
realist power politics does not have to be antithetical to the liberal modern narrative, and 
can even serve as a supplement to it.28 But realism was indeed transformed and made 
much more nuanced: in Gaddis’ terms, a new universalism of American interests vied 
against the particularism of past foreign policy, forming an essential tension of post-
World War II strategy.29 Geographers Trevor Barnes and Matthew Farish point out that 
“during the Second World War and the early Cold War, the entire Earth became a 
generalized space of American military strategy,” but in practice, this notion of strategy 
was discursively broadened well beyond its mere military applications and into the realm 
of international relations.30 
With this new focus on flexibility, and the power of strategic perception in 
reading the earth, came the inevitable anxieties about having the right expertise and 
technologies to make such judgments. For example, Leonard Wilson reflected on his 
experiences in the Map Division of the Office of Strategic Services during the War, and 
was haunted by what he saw as inadequate cartographic training and methods, especially 
against the sophistication of European geographers.31 Certainly, air-age global era 
theorists frequently critiqued German “message maps” and often prescribed map literacy 
for government officials and “discerning” publics. A 1944 State Department report 




analyst Herbert Block, excoriated the “geo-mania” of Hitler’s influential geographer Karl 
Haushofer and declared that “German geopolitics is not a science; it is a slimy cluster of 
wishful thinking, political scheming and mendacious propaganda, interspersed with 
scientific facts.”32 A map is included with the report (fig. 2.1) that sketches Haushofer’s 
theory that the United States and the Soviet Union are imperialists looking to expand to 
South America and Southeast Asia.33 While, of course, this theory foreshadows the 
bipolarities of the coming Cold War, Block strongly dismisses such a prediction as 
distorted geography and “wishful as well as dreadful thinking.” Thus, the research and 
analysis for post-war planning at institutions like the State Department were constructed 
in conscious response to the use of German geopolitics, and were constrained by 
anxieties that America would reproduce Germany’s pernicious use of spatial realities.  
            
Figure 2.1. “Haushofer’s Latest Theory: Imperialist Expansion Along the Meridians,” in State Department 
Memorandum, Evaluation of German Geopolitics, 1944 (Department of State, Cartographic & Architectural 




Such government discourse, then, often ran on an implicit fear of misappropriation and a 
sense of the world’s possible explosiveness that could emerge from mistaken 
interpretation.  
As popular forums appropriated maps more than ever before, academic and 
government discourse around maps debated the matter of expert and elite interpretation: 
often, the debate was about who had the best reading and who had the tools to fashion the 
most clear-headed perception of world realities. Director of the American Geographic 
Society in 1951, George Kimble, reported to the American Congress on Surveying and 
Mapping, 
I am far from saying that all we need to give us better times and more stable  
 economies is better maps or more surveys. What we need even more, I submit, is  
 better map users—better men in fact. The best maps in the world and the most  
 ambitious surveys may help us to diagnose the troubles of humanity, but it will  
 take all the sympathy, understanding, and unselfishness of all the good men in all  
 the parties to solve them.34  
Kimble’s example of internationalism encompasses both an idealistic faith in the abilities 
of “good men” to interpret the world in ways that will benefit the world, but conversely a 
fear that maps themselves are not up to the task of presenting the globe clearly enough, 
especially if they end up in the wrong hands. Government geographers like S.W. Boggs 
would come to embody, in cartographic terms, both of these inclusive and exclusive 
strains of the new internationalism, serving as a reminder of the complexity of America’s 




From at least a government standpoint, then, maps in many ways became 
emblems of knowledge production, used to compress and arrange strategic information 
about global spaces in legible forms for experts. To perform this knowledge-producing 
function, maps required more flexibility in their capacities to converge technologies 
across a host of government institutions. Members of postwar military and academic 
circles worried that not only did American maps need superior accuracy, but they needed 
to better account for powerful advances in technology. At the American Congress on 
Surveying and Mapping in 1950, for example, a defense expert pointed out that, 
“Electronic navigation, strategic bombing, amphibious operations, anti-marine warfare; 
and the use of radar, radio-ranging devices, and supersonic aircraft inject complex 
requirements for maps and charts that scarcely a decade ago would have been considered 
for a ‘Buck Rogers’ character.”35 The U.S. government would have to adapt to these new 
requirements in order to construct a consistent, strategic vision of the Soviet Union that 
could be managed and contained. They thus required cross-collaboration between groups 
like the Army Map Service, the Air Force, the State Department, and international 
institutions like the United Nations Economic and Social Council.36 To make these 
collaborations effective, the business of mapping required redefinition as central to broad 
values of national security.37 The new global landscape required maps to be part of a 
more collaborative and fluid national security apparatus, and go beyond merely serving 
the individual requirements of its producing agencies. As Herbert Loper, a special 
weapons expert and Brigadier General pointed out, “Mapping…as an instrument of 
national defense cannot be circumscribed by definitions which would place it in a distinct 




contrary, its role is as broad and all inclusive as is our total capacity to maintain our 
national integrity.”38 
While the prospect of international and inter-agency collaborations was hopeful, 
the high stakes of national security complicated the U.S. government’s ability to truly 
share cartographic information. In particular, continuing advancements in the theoretical 
world of mapping built on the Hough findings redefined the very notion of distance, and 
made it much more of a contestable, guarded concept.39 In 1956, for example, the Army 
Map Service reported an astonishing finding that the world was actually smaller than 
what was previously thought. Using new high precision techniques, Army geodesists 
amassed enough information about a strategic line of points from Finland to South Africa 
affirming that the world was about 128 meters shorter than previously thought.40 While 
this may seem like a small, scientific curio, its implications were much larger. Scientific 
American pointed out that this development “should theoretically increase the accuracy 
of maps four-fold,” and more importantly, as Time offered, “improved knowledge of the 
earth’s size and shape will also be useful to dispatchers of long-range guided missiles.”41 
Maps could no longer simply tell us the where, but had to tell us with certainty about 
relationships between targets. In National Geographic’s terms, “the exact distance from, 
say, Tallahassee to Timbuktu may suddenly become crucially important.”42 Almost exact 
was not good enough. The introduction to an Air Force manual on geodesy expressed this 
starkly: “Somewhere in an Air Force control center, alert for a warning of aggression, a 
man is prepared to ‘push the button’ which will launch powerful retaliatory weapons to 




reliable weapon systems, we must answer the questions: Where? How far? In which 
direction?”43  
Producing knowledge of the earth’s surface and its curvature, then, could mean 
the potential difference between triumph and defeat in a nuclear conflict. The “shrinking 
world” of Richard Edes Harrison and others in World War II had taken on new dramatic 
meaning. The entire historical function of cartography and geography was changing 
because of such developments—we could know the important strategic points in the 
Soviet Union without having to actually invade their borders. That kind of abstract spatial 
management continued to mark the duration of the conflict.44 As Life put it, “the most 
surprising solution which the geodesists have found to the problem of mapping the earth 
is simply to ignore the earth as it is. They have learned to distrust its outward physical 
look and to devise a theoretical world of their own devoid of all natural wonders.”45 In a 
sense, the world could more easily be flattened to a series of “inanimate platforms” for 
strategy.46  
To properly place America in relationship to the Soviet Union required continuing 
advances in reconnaissance and surveillance from far above the earth. Aerial photography 
for cartography and the increasing use of satellites to do such work provides an important 
example here. Stephen Bocking argued that shifts in observational technology from the 
air defined the Cold War in the late 1940s and 1950s: interpretation of aerial data was 
taken out of the subjectivity of the field and into the laboratory, and mapping became less 
about local knowledge and more about interpretation of data.47 In addition, a premium on 
secrecy and controls on access to the air began to constrain these developments. President 




Warsaw Pact nations should be able to conduct mutual, bi-lateral aerial reconnaissance of 
each other to protect from surprise attack and prepare defenses against the other’s 
weapon systems.48 Once Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev rejected this proposal, efforts 
to develop undetectable satellite technologies for mapping and reconnaissance 
accelerated. These efforts resulted in initiatives like the highly classified CORONA 
project in 1958, which provided the first photographs of Soviet nuclear bases from an 
unmanned satellite orbiting the earth. Dino Brugioni’s historical look at the “eye in the 
sky” of these Cold War satellite technologies noted the redefinition of the traditional 
military concept of the “high ground”: “each increase in altitude has given an ever-
widening view, until humans can now envision the ultimate prospect of achieving an 
unlimited perspective of the universe.”49 But this expansiveness and abstraction of vision 
had its consequences: as General W.Y. Smith, a member of President John F. Kennedy’s 
National Security Staff pointed out: “sometimes we relied on CORONA’s data too 
much…we mistakenly believed that, if we could see enemy targets and count them, we 
understood their strength and our objective. Nevertheless, we found out that wasn’t the 
case at all.”50 Or to put it in Cloud’s terms, “once the figure of the earth is ubiquitous, it 
becomes invisible.”51 
 Such developments reveal how cartography became a key mode of knowledge 
production during the Cold War. The ways in which the United States depicted itself, the 
Soviet Union, and the rest of the world on the map were constrained by new strategic 
objectives for national security, new perspectives gained through both public and private 
advances in technology, and an abstract vision of international space as something to be 




precision took on implications for America’s own vision of itself as a world power, and 
maps provided mediations of these complexities.  
 The U.S. State Department was one key agency that was marshaling an immense 
amount of spatial intelligence through increasingly sophisticated technologies, and 
playing an integral role in designing international space (and America’s placement within 
that space) for the volatile post-World War II landscape. At the State Department, S.W. 
Boggs, was one among a host of government representatives that were navigating the 
tensions of air-age cartography and its uses in producing knowledge for international 
relations and the maintenance of national security.  
American Projector:  
S.W. Boggs’ Cartographic Vision for the State Department in the Early Cold War 
 
On January 21, 1947, the Department of State’s official geographer, Samuel 
Whittemore Boggs, sent over a state-of-the-art air route globe and his own patented 
geometrical plastic hemisphere to his new boss’s office. Secretary of State George 
Marshall (who started his tenure on that very day), received the globe with a memo 
attached that read, “I hope that you will find them very useful in studying ‘global 
relations,’ some of which cannot be perceived from maps.” He even offered to “replace 
the large Mercator map” currently in Marshall’s office with either a Miller cylindrical 
projection world map (“with much less exaggeration in polar regions than the Mercator”) 
or two hemisphere maps centered on France and the Pacific Ocean.52 To Boggs, this was 
not merely a diplomatic welcome gesture of geographic wall and desk art—the 
perception of a full, accurate earth was a matter of necessity for the responsible conduct 
of international relations.53 The following was his oft-used maxim: 




He who would understand world problems must visualize them; and 
He who would visualize world problems should study them on the spherical 
surface of a globe.54 
S.W. Boggs was indeed a product of the air-age generation, where conceptions of 
distance and perspective were revolutionized by planes spreading bombs, money, and 
ideas across the earth—thus he acutely appreciated how maps do not simply reflect 
relationships, but can sustain, shape, and challenge them.55 He worked in a transitional 
era where the traditional balance-of-power politics of flat, rectangular maps like the 
Mercator were left behind for more nuanced appreciations of fluid changes in 
communication and internationalism that came about during World War II and its 
aftermath. Boggs’ tireless proselytizing for policymakers and academics to absorb a truly 
round and world-wide view suggests, then, the postwar premium on the quality of global 
perception. 
 What makes Boggs worth exploring is the cartographic conundrum resulting from 
the interplay between his institutional responsibility to serve the government and his role 
as a popular academic. This conundrum manifested itself in his work, his publications, 
and even his private correspondence. While he promoted the map’s possibility of 
expressing flexible and novel connections in a better world, he was haunted at the same 
time by what he called “cartohypnosis” and maps’ suggestibility in a dangerous, 
explosive postwar landscape, informed by the pseudo-science of World War II 
geopolitics.56 For example, as Boggs writes in a 1946 State Department memo, “Peace 
requires orderly development, which in turn necessitates a vast knowledge of the earth, 




He thus prized the culture of the geographic, scientific expert in being able to teach and 
disseminate the “best” ways to read this changing world, and how to aptly map a sense of 
ordered and (often) classified knowledge.58  
 Boggs also seemed to understand the importance of artistic form in ordering that 
knowledge. For example, in a letter to Richard Edes Harrison about consulting work for 
an animated film about maps, Boggs wrote: “I very much desire that, while the whole 
presentation shall be completely factual, those facts which are of extraordinary 
significance and striking quality will hit the audience with their full significance. We 
want no Hollywood stuff for good effects, unless the facts themselves call for such 
effects in order to be truthful.”59 In other words, cartographic realities sometimes needed 
extra emphasis to connect with an audience, and required an engagement with the nature 
of rhetorical display.60  
These examples reveal Boggs as a constant negotiator of the rhetorical tensions 
between reality and representation, fact and values. He faced a unique bind between 
appreciating the shifting, malleable, discursive nature of maps while still seeing the 
primacy of unimpeachable scientific, geographic facts that were not inherently 
argumentative. Maps endure a long, contentious relationship with notions of “truth,” and 
have historically served as mediators of state power.61 Unlike Harrison and other 
commercial cartographers who might wish to make a pointed argument about war 
strategy, Boggs faced the added representational problem of producing maps and 
marshaling geographic facts for official diplomacy, and thus he confronted a heightened 
emphasis on accuracy and authenticity of the picture of the globe and its expanding 




and clearcut appearance that a well drawn map presents lends it an air of scientific 
authenticity that may or may not be deserved.”62  
S.W. Boggs, in both his academic discourse and in his official governmental 
capacity, articulated the centrality of cartographic vision in the early Cold War, and 
conceived maps as having a discursive function for popular and government audiences. 
But because he realized the complexities of air-age maps, Boggs was embroiled in the 
contradictions between the immense opportunity of a smaller world and the potentially 
crippling fear of it. Boggs and his cartographic discourse embody the rhetorical tensions 
in American postwar space, and function as a discursive bridge between the amateur, 
artistic, and flexible perspectives exemplified by Harrison, and the worldview of the 
disciplinary expert who helped the science of geographical facts become an indispensable 
tool of the military-government-academic complex during the Cold War. Boggs’ 
geography, then, considers the larger ramifications of how representatives of the federal 
government conceived of the postwar landscape, and how the accumulation of 
cartographic knowledge informed the rhetorical worldview of those representatives. 
I primarily focus on Boggs’ cartographic activities, both academic and 
institutional, during the immediate postwar period (until his death in 1954). Specifically, 
I analyze his mapping projects and the inventional processes that created them. Boggs’ 
career and geographical contributions extended well beyond this narrow period of time. 
But by focusing on his shifting role in the emerging Cold War, I provide a snapshot of the 
strategic functions and priorities and the ideological commitments of the State 
Department’s geographic practice, and Boggs’ unique place within these often competing 




postwar anxieties around the expansion of international space and American 
commitments, as seen through his campaigns to expand the scope of mapping projections 
and advance new cartographic perspectives; 2) his complex rhetorical management of 
both the artistic, imaginative form of maps and the scientific expectations that constrain 
them, evidenced especially through his correspondence with commercial cartographers 
and his own experimental work; and 3) his embodiment of the formal, structural struggle 
of an academic serving government objectives, seen especially in the tensions between 
his idealist calls for international cartographic cooperation and his role in serving the 
realist objectives of American intelligence interests in the early Cold War. Altogether, I 
maintain that the evolving and changing expectations of both mapping form and content 
during the early Cold War is evidenced by Boggs’ work in the complex context of the 
modern internationalism pervading mid-century American discourse.64  
The Office of the Geographer of the United States, Department of State 
 The Office of the Geographer at the State Department was commissioned in 1921, 
a direct result of the Paris Peace conferences. In the heady days of post-World War I 
global reorganization and its new geographical partitions and boundaries, a substantial 
number of maps were produced. The Department of State established an office 
responsible for cataloguing and providing access to these maps for foreign policy makers 
and their staffers. Colonel Lawrence Martin, an expert in physiography and an integral 
part of the Military Intelligence Division during World War I, was chosen as a member of 
President Wilson’s retinue in Paris. Because of his central role in drafting treaty maps, he 
was assigned to lead the new division at State, not only to classify and log the maps, but 




has noted, “from its inception the Office served as a central point…for the handling of 
material relating to political control of territory throughout the world.”66   
When Martin transferred to the Map Division at the Library of Congress, Boggs 
was chosen for the job at the State Department. He was influenced by Martin’s idealism, 
and the wave of geographic leaders that were part of the Paris generation—men like the 
American Geographical Society’s Isaiah Bowman and Columbia University’s Douglas 
Johnson. Boggs had done some map research and editing for the American Book 
Company before reaching the State Department, and he channeled some of that 
commercial experience into his work.67 He would become most noteworthy as one of the 
government’s foremost boundary experts—an early pioneer in the academic discipline of 
political geography.68  
 At the height of the Division’s influence toward the end of World War II, the staff 
was close to 90 strong. This number did not include the increased number of people 
working under contracts on State Department geographic projects through the American 
Geographical Society in New York, the Office of Population Research at Princeton 
University, and the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations in the Department of 
Agriculture.69 The Division housed a research branch containing sections in population, 
agriculture, minerals, power/industry, transportation and a cartographic branch with 
sections in planning/editing, program maps, and special maps.70 Part of Boggs’ 
responsibility was to establish constant rapport with the various other cartographic 
branches of the government, particularly in the War Department. Specifically, one of 
Boggs’ main functions was in “future geography,” anticipating the world of states after 




vision was central to his leadership over the Division. As he wrote in a 1943 
memorandum:  
In order to see world problems in global relationships, the emphasis, throughout, 
is on seeing things whole, in perspective. The distribution of peoples and 
resources is being considered…impartially…formulated to achieve optimum 
development of every portion of the earth, for the benefit of all people everywhere. 
Any qualifying assumptions would add confusion by introducing artificial and 
temporary factors into the picture.72 
The importance of vision seemed in direct relation to Boggs’ emphasis on the usability of 
maps produced under his direction—if his job was, as he put it, “intended to be of 
maximum practical assistance to the principal policy-making officers of the Department 
of State,” then his mapping program needed to constantly adapt to the rhetorical needs 
and values of his audience.73 
Boggs was aware of the challenges he faced in leading such an office during an 
era of great geographic upheaval. In a 1943 progress report from his Division, Boggs 
spoke of the problems of trying to meet requests for “spot research” while still executing 
long-term research and analysis of geographic data, writing that “it should be recognized 
that many individual maps and research studies can not be executed in less time than 
several months.”74 In a time when boundaries and partitions were in constant flux, this 
became a constraint (and frustration) on Boggs’ ethic of thorough, well-researched 
mapping. As seen in Harrison’s case, World War II and the ensuing postwar years were 
marked by a new journalistic paradigm where maps were continually drafted to make 




contributed to) this new rapid-fire style of “keeping up” with world problems through 
maps. At the same time, Boggs was part of an older guard, a culture of the “gentleman 
geographer” where the expectation was that smart, reasonable men looking at the facts of 
a round earth had the capability of making the best possible decisions. He emerged from 
a tradition of geography as a kind of semi-hard science related to geology, a discipline 
that Terry Eagleton once referred to as “maps and chaps.”75 At the same time, he 
accompanied his contemporaries like Bowman into a greater engagement with geography 
as a social phenomenon. The fact that there was even an “official geographer of the 
United States” connotes that there was an institution in the federal government where 
spatial issues were deliberated and solutions worked out—and that spatial issues could be 
compartmentalized. Boggs was both, then, part of the new geographical vanguard to 
expand the visualization of the world through new patterns and relationships, but also 
part of an attempt by state power to place America through the constant amassing of 
geographic facts about the world.  
After World War II, there was a significant restructuring of Boggs’ division at the 
Department of State. Staff was cut, and the division’s function morphed into a more 
advisory capacity as it was moved to the intelligence sections of the State Department 
(from its original place in the Division of Public Affairs).76 Government cartography was 
spread across an array of institutions, some open, some closed, and State Department 
cartographers and geographers, for example, primarily became researchers and 
intelligence gatherers, rather than direct shapers of foreign policy. At the same time, 
academic geography was on the wane, as pioneering departments of geography, like 




biography of presidential geographer Isaiah Bowman, this was a time when geographic 
thinking was at its most influential, yet also paradoxically at its most denied. In other 
words, the more important geography became and the more access to its maps became 
widespread, the more people thought they could somehow transcend geography.78 
Institutional/academic tensions were both at play in the shaping of Boggs’ worldview, 
symbolizing the architecture of postwar American spatial perspectives in the immense 
transitional period from World War II to the Cold War. 
The Form of Roundness:  
New Projections and Perspectives in Boggs’ Cartographic Discourse 
 
As in Harrison’s case, “projection” itself was a highly charged term during this 
period, as it obviously carried geographic connotations of the need for technical accuracy 
in devising a vision of the world. Projection also in some ways spoke to the translation of 
new power relationships on a global scale—that in a sense, the right projection was of 
paramount importance because it predicted what future geographical problems and 
solutions might need solving. The map needed to contain these relationships and manage 
them, and the choice of projection set such parameters. Thus, the form of the map was 
fused with the content of the map itself—and Boggs was part of a movement, then, in 
which cartographic form was widely accepted as a conscious rhetorical choice, and 
audience played a more important role.  
Boggs believed that his job required emphasizing the weight of such choices in 
how we marked America’s new role in the world—in fact, he was no latecomer to the air-
age interest in devising ways to project new relationships.79 Early on in his tenure as State 
Department geographer, Boggs presented a paper to Britain’s Royal Geographical 




equal-area “eumorphic” projection, Boggs’ innovation makes for a rounder earth on the 
flat page, and is an explicit corrective on the how the shape of the Northern hemisphere is 
enlarged by the Mercator.80 As he points out, “with man’s growing desire to ‘see the 
world whole’, the use of maps of the entire globe is increasing. The properties most 
desired in world maps…are the representation of the shape of large areas as accurately as 
possible, and areas in their true proportions.”81 Boggs presents a world map in this piece 
(fig. 2.2) to demonstrate the utility of the projection: the map shows the full earth in one 
sphere with an elongated equator, with the plainest difference from traditional maps 
being the enlarged size of Africa, centered and prominent, and a sprawling Southeast 
Asia that is stretched in unfamiliar ways. As he says in the notes to the map,  
It will be noticed that the more densely populated regions of the northern half of 
the eastern hemisphere (Eurasia and Northern Africa) have a peculiar relationship 
to latitude. The fact is that greater human importance attaches to the parts of 
Eastern Asia which lie below 40° north latitude, whereas in the west, practically 
all of Europe lies above 40°. Approximately half of the world’s population lives 
in Asia between latitudes 10° and 40°, and it would therefore appear highly 
desirable to preserve the shape of the land areas of China, Japan, and India as 
accurately as possible.82  
Thus, through his restructuring of the relationships between land and population of maps, 
Boggs hints that we ignore the importance of the so-called developing areas at our peril 
(fig. 2.3, for example, shows a later use by Boggs of his eumorphic projection to 





Figure 2.2. S.W. Boggs, “Eumorphic Projection,” Geographical Journal, 1929 
 
 
Figure 2.3. S.W. Boggs, Adequacy of Population Data, 1952 (Department of State, Cartographic & Architectural 




Boggs’ attempt to strike a balance between area and shape distortion represents an 
increasingly idealist expectation of maps to be both scientifically accurate and socially 
responsible. In a subtle way, the intertwined notions of proportionality, shape, and power 
are put on display—notions that came to mark the global geopolitics of World War II and 
its aftermath in the development of the Cold War.83 His later work at the State 
Department in postwar planning, for example, during World War II bore this out—he 
was consulted by the Division of Cultural Relations at the State Department to advise on 
a high-level post-war planning program called “The Permanent Cultural Relations 
Program as a Basic Instrumentality of American Foreign Policy.”84 Boggs then initiated a 
cultural mapping program in his department, commenting to the head of Cultural 
Relations that “the emphasis of non-western viewpoints seems to me very fortunate. We 
shall expect the half of the world’s population that lives in eastern and southern Asia to 
take a much more important place in world affairs in the near future.”85 Projects such as 
these acknowledged the role of maps in depicting new cultural relationships as shaped for 
strategic ends, a characteristic that grew in importance during the Cold War. 
His eumorphic projection itself appeared periodically in State Department maps in 
the early Cold War, perhaps most notably in maps for Boggs’ 1951 treatise on national 
claims in adjacent seas (fig. 2.4).86 A eumorphic projection in the sea claims article 
shows the full world with an accurate balance of shape and area. Each continent is 
outlined in various lines of red, designed to show the width of zones for waters over 
which sovereignty is claimed by the coastal state. In a Cold War world, the global 
projection was used to show the complexity of boundaries and sovereignties 





Figure 2.4. S.W. Boggs, “The World National Claims in Adjacent Seas,” Geographical Review, 1952 
beds and air space, and worrying about the “chaos from which to create a viable world of 
order.”87 In addition, the focus of the map becomes control over oceans rather than the 
land, making the point once again that it is the entirety of the earth that was moldable and 
shapeable in the air-age. This, of course, represents the increasing Cold War abstraction 
where natural features such as ocean and land blend together into items that become part 
of a total world political strategy. The content of sea jurisdiction relationships was not 
new, but the novel projections now posited these relationships on a much larger and more 
momentous stage. 
Boggs’ eumorphic projection was never widely used (although it was distributed 
commercially by the A.J. Nystrom Company for use in classrooms88), but it clearly 
represents an important transitional bridge between other more popular projections such 
as the Miller cylindrical projection.89 Geographer Edward J. Baar, writing in 1947, noted 
Boggs’ direct influence in inspiring O.M. Miller of the American Geographical Society to 




take on the Mercator that advanced Boggs’ earlier theories. As Miller wrote in 1942, he 
attempted to find an acceptable balance “which to the uncritical eye does not obviously 
depart from the familiar shapes of the land areas depicted by the Mercator projection but 
which reduces areal distortion as far as possible under these conditions.”91 The Miller 
projection finds its way into many different Cold War-era media, such as the United 
Nations’ 1953 “Student Map of the United Nations,” the 1965 map of the world produced 
by Civic Education Inc. (publishers of such educational periodicals such as the Young 
Citizen), and Scholastic Magazine’s “Economic Map of the World” from 1966.92 These 
are political maps depicting simple Cold War-era alliances, so that students in schools 
could “place” America’s commitments in a global world. Their circulation highlights the 
wide popular impact of scientific projections from a few elite geographers during the air-
age. Moreover, they provide texture and form to the way many saw the postwar 
landscape on classroom walls and in popular magazines. 
Boggs’ excitement about the new Miller projection would mark his work on the 
institutional level, a kind of missionary zeal that Alexander attributed to him.93 Boggs 
circulated messages around the State Department about the evils of the old-school 
Mercator to anyone who would listen, attempting to change the vision expressed by what 
was in the hands and on the walls of policy makers and military strategists.94 For example, 
he was in frequent contact with the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1947 to furnish 
their committee rooms with new air-route globes and Miller maps, and was also 
continually attempting to supply various branches of the military with Mercator 
replacements.95 In an almost humorous exchange between Boggs and Lt. Colonel 




with Boggs’ suggestion that the Miller cylindrical map is a better one to use, but he 
cannot do it because they had already spent too much money printing copies of the 
Mercator.96 Thus, there were economic constraints to the circulation and usage of 
government maps in this period, and the Mercator often prevailed due to its ubiquity and 
ease of access.  
Boggs’ mission to expand U.S. global perceptions can also be found in his project 
to challenge hemispheric perspectives, specifically in relation to how they constrained 
American strategic thinking in a postwar environment—an idea which was endemic to 
the air-age movement.97 Hemispheres, of course, are a staple of American spatial thought, 
pervading the discourses of politics and foreign policy since at least the Monroe Doctrine, 
and later by the Roosevelt Corollary appearing after the Spanish-American War and 
America’s occupation of the Philippines. Hemispheric lines and boundaries provided 
formal shape to the conduct of both peace and war in the 19th and 20th centuries. Boggs 
sought to complicate this. Like other air-age geographers, he was stepping away from the 
notion that placement on a globe had some sort of natural division to it; to him, 
hemispheres were constructs, slices of perspectives that made for political shorthand.  
Once again, his maps’ subversion of perspective and projection certainly bear this 
out, and can be found in both Boggs’ published work and his duties as a policy advisor. 
For example, in an April 1944 memorandum sent to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 
Boggs suggests a “de-europeanization” of the government’s geographical nomenclature, 
proposing to get rid of terms such as “western hemisphere” altogether, as well as other 
terminologies that use names based on the direction and distance of regions from Europe, 




neighborliness and insensitive diplomacy to “misconceptions derived from uncritical use 
of maps.”98  
In one of his most influential pieces, distributed to the State Department and 
appearing in The Journal of Geography in 1945, Boggs asked the provocative question, 
“When a person speaks of ‘this hemisphere’ as the one in which the United States of 
America is located, one may well inquire, ‘Which hemisphere?’” Boggs also included a 
series of diagram maps that accompanied the text’s arguments about hemispheres as often 
arbitrary political choices. Each diagram framed a flat, rectangular Miller projection 
showing the entire world next to a rounded azimuthal projection that highlights a 
particular hemispheric perspective from that world map. This contrast between 
rectangular map and global sphere uses form to make an argument for the partiality of 
perspective in using maps for foreign policy. For example, in his maps of the “so-called 
Western hemisphere” (fig. 2.5), he uses the rounded globe to show that the Americas are 
located in a hemisphere that is mostly constituted by ocean. By placing this map 
alongside maps of “the northern hemisphere” centered on the North Pole, Boggs plays 
with traditional notions of distance, as he shows U.S. proximity to Europe with a focus on 
the North Atlantic. Boggs notes in the text below the maps that “Dakar, Moscow, and 
Northern Manchuria are nearer to the center of the United States than is Buenos Aires,” 
thus foreshadowing some of the postwar architecture of international relations.99  
In 1954, as the Cold War was well underway, Boggs wrote in an update of his 
hemisphere article for the State Department: “Thus there is no human being anywhere on 
earth who does not live in some hemisphere that includes all of the United States” (in fig. 





Figure 2.5. S.W. Boggs, “Western Hemisphere,” Journal of Geography/Department of State Bulletin, 1945 
 
Figure 2.6. S.W. Boggs, “Sum of All Hemispheres Containing All of the United States,” Journal of 




hemisphere).100 In an emerging Cold War that was purportedly a battle between East and 
West, Boggs’ placement of America into multi-directional relationships was a reminder 
of the full global reach of American responsibility—the early Cold War was marked by 
the division of blocs and pacts, treaties and security alliances that were no longer 
partitioned according to traditional hemispheres and deterministic geopolitics, but by 
more fluid strategic “interests.” 101 As seen here, hemisphere itself is a function of 
rhetorical display, engaged in the constant reveal/conceal dynamic of the cartographic 
process.102 The necessary abstraction from round earth to flat page creates a cartographic 
anxiety over how best to show a fuller world within limitations that are always revealing 
themselves. Altogether, then, Boggs’ interplay of perspective, projection, and hemisphere, 
speaks to the rhetoric of air-age globalism that complicated the foreign policy decisions 
of the early Cold War.  
Boggs and the Role of Geographic Imagination in State Department Cartography 
In March 1947, the same month that President Harry Truman articulated the 
framework of the early Cold War with his doctrine of fighting communism wherever it 
expands, it is fitting that John K. Wright published his presidential address to the 
American Geographical Society with the title, “Terrae Incognitae: The Place of the 
Imagination in Geography.”103 At a time when the familiar alliances of World War II had 
collapsed, and colonial empires were nearing exhaustion, the new postwar globe had to 
be re-thought and re-strategized; as Walter Lippmann wrote, “The world we have to deal 
with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind. It has to be explored, reported, 




Cartography and geography were at a crossroads, with practitioners challenged by 
the fact that they were part of a massive O.S.S. intelligence operation advancing 
American war interests, yet incensed by what they perceived as the assault of German 
geopolitical pseudo-science on the reputation of the two disciplines during World War II. 
Wright’s response to these developments provocatively proposed that geography and its 
visualization in maps must embrace at least a degree of subjectivity and an appreciation 
of what he called “aesthetic imagining,” notably during an era of extraordinary distrust of 
any overlap between art and politics.105 Because “geography deals in large measure with 
human beings, and the study of human affairs and motives has not yet reached a stage in 
which more than a small part of it can be developed as a precise science,” Wright termed 
his new conception, “geosophy,” or “the study of geographical knowledge from any or all 
points of view,” thus widening the importance of a humanistic perspective.106 
 Boggs’ work and writings embodied the humanistic/scientific tensions of a 
“geosophic” outlook. His position is a unique one as a mediator/translator between the 
new artistic flexibility of cartographic media in World War II and postwar journalism, 
and the requirements of the geographic expert to visually frame scientific facts for policy 
purposes. While geographer Denis Cosgrove referenced Boggs as a representation of “the 
postwar move to recapture the map for professional cartography,” this simplifies too 
much Boggs’ nuanced appreciation of map audiences and the role of subjective 
imagination in cartographic presentation.107 Recall Luce’s famous 1940 re-imagining of 
the globe in air-age discourse through the “American Century” that posited globalism as 
a pursuit of American economic interests and a cultivation of world opinion, a 




Interestingly enough, two of the Luce’s empire’s most prominent artistic articulators of 
these notions, Harrison at Fortune, and Boris Artzybasheff, the Time cover portraitist and 
graphic artist, corresponded extensively with Boggs and the State Department during 
World War II and its aftermath. Artzybasheff was a Ukrainian-born illustrator who drew 
215 covers (amongst countless other designs) for Time from the mid-1930s up to his 
death in 1965. His art was marked by a realist style of portraiture, but also influenced by 
surrealism’s grotesquery, as seen in his anthropomorphic drawings of planes with human 
faces, and in his graphic cartoon work depicting international politics.109 Boggs was 
responsible for initiating partnerships between artists such as Artzybasheff and the State 
Department for technical cartographic advice and map production, but in the process 
absorbed an appreciation of these artists’ global visualization and their sense of the larger 
American public.  
 Boggs’ interaction with Harrison reveals his pro-active role advancing a new 
flexibility in the government’s appreciation of spatial problems. Boggs recruited Harrison 
on wartime projects such as map construction for the O.S.S., the State Department’s 
contribution to the Army Training Atlas, and developed new techniques based on 
Harrison’s innovation of using the nomograph in drafting maps, a device which 
eliminated time-consuming mathematical work and allowed the mapper to easily draw 
great-circle routes (fig. 2.7 shows a take on how to use “scale,” drawn by Harrison for 
Boggs in 1946).110 Harrison’s skilled amateur background and his unorthodox methods 
were noteworthy to technicians like Boggs because of their efficiency in creating maps 
faster.111 Harrison advanced cartography as a communication process between mapmaker 




     
 
Figure 2.7. Richard Edes Harrison, "4 Ways of Indicating Scale," U.S. Department of State, 1946 (Department 
of State, Cartographic & Architectural Records, National Archives II, College Park) 
cartographic projects, the notion of “audience” stands out. Working together on a new 
system of shading and iconography for a Boggs map, for example, the two explored how 
novel contrasts in cartographic symbols can reveal new realities, with Boggs commenting 
to Harrison that,  
I would be delighted to have your criticism of the ideas, and perhaps a few simple 
little sketches of possible conventional physiographic symbols…In making maps 
which really get across to the man on the street, and to the busy statesman or 
executive, perhaps these radically different shadings would result in making maps 
so characteristic that they would attract attention and be easily distinguishable 
from the run-of-the-mill products of the present.112  
Both Harrison and Boggs also shared distaste for what Harrison termed “the air-




when he drew a map for a 1942 Collier’s article that predicted a postwar world divided 
into cultural zones that would replace traditional national boundaries.113 Renner’s critics 
were incensed that he would use the new internationalism to advance a crude cultural 
determinism.114 Harrison and Boggs certainly accepted the air-age changes to 
cartographic practice, but they saw such changes as creating open-minded flexibility 
based around strategic purposes, rather than as a political pseudo-science. Thus, Harrison 
and Boggs saw cartographers like Renner as “spreading geographic misinformation 
accelerando.”115  
At the same time, Boggs’ acceptance of Harrison’s flexibility was constrained by 
his status as a geographic professional. For example, when Harrison asked Boggs for 
expert advice on his forthcoming Look at the World atlas, Boggs replied:  
I believe it would be well if you were to tone down your criticisms of the 
geographers with reference to maps a bit. I believe the geographers have 
understood the world more as one does by using a globe better than you give them 
credit for. Their sin has been largely that they fail to see to it that the non-
professional had available to him the kinds of maps that the uninitiated need in 
order to grasp some of the concepts that many of us want to get across…You are 
fortunate in being associated with publishers who are not content unless they do 
something rather new and different.116 
Boggs, then, acknowledges the different constraints in his perspective as a government 
geographer against the requirements of Harrison’s journalistic paradigm: he believes that 
professional geographers may understand the new internationalism, but they cannot 




represents an implicit conception of cartography as a contingent discourse, needing 
experts to translate for the uninitiated but also requiring an engagement with constructive 
imagination to connect with multiple audiences.  
 Relatedly, Boggs’ friendship with Boris Artzybasheff was responsible for putting 
a literal human face on the new cartographic perspectives of the air-age.117 In a 1942 
letter to Artzybasheff, Boggs asks if the artist could potentially draw the head of a man 
on a white billiard ball, in hopes of designing a model that could show how projecting 
global features creates significant distortions on a flat map—in other words, flattening the 
nations and populations of the world is much like flattening a person’s face beyond all 
recognition. As he points out to Artzybasheff, “What I would like to get across to the 
‘flat-mappers’ is that when we are looking at a flat map which includes the whole world, 
we are looking at a caricature which is analogous to representing the face, both sides of 
the head, back and top of the head, and beneath the chin all on one flat surface.”118 
Artzybasheff’s bizarre creation makes its way into Boggs’ 1954 report (fig. 2.8) to the 
State Department on global foreign relations as a diagram where the globe with the 
human head is shown split into seven different popular map projections, such as the 
Mercator, the Miller, and the azimuthal hemispheric projections. In each case, a distorted 
face shows the limits of choosing particular world projections—none of the seven 
projections look like a real human face.119 There is a humanistic strain in Boggs’ calls for 
flexibility—by taking maps out of staid, academic partitions and meridians and using 
human features, he was interrogating, by way of Artzybasheff’s artistic outlook, the very 
process of vision by which we see a whole earth.120 




              
Figure 2.8. Boris Artzybasheff for S.W. Boggs, “Human Head on Geographical Globe and Human Head on 
Seven Well-Known Map Projections,” Department of State Bulletin, 1954 
was in his work for an animated educational film, for which he served as consultant and 
for which he also recruited Artzybasheff.121 The 1947 film, entitled Expanding World 
Relationships, was produced through Springer Pictures, and was later distributed 
internationally through the United States Information Agency.122 The picture is a 
fascinating mid-century textual artifact designed to grapple with the new global relations 
of the United States in a changed post-war landscape, and emphasizing the role of 
perspective itself. In one production memorandum to Artzybasheff, for example, Boggs 
expresses his thought process in designing an appropriate air-age global perspective for 




scenes where aliens approach the earth from a rocket ship, gaining a “bird’s eye view” of 
the earth as they descend toward it. What the aliens find when they explore earth is a 
“strong indication that man may not have sense enough to organize his affairs” and “they 
end up with a very factual, realistic picture of the world as it is, especially as the relations 
between peoples in different parts of the world…have changed very unequally.” Boggs 
goes on to talk about the benefits of using this alien perspective to “attract the interest of 
anybody” and to show how humans must gain a better bird’s-eye view and knowledge of 
the earth before they commit “racial suicide.”123 Here we see the brand of idealism 
behind Boggs’ approach—that better spatial knowledge can somehow “save” us.  
 Interestingly, Boggs uses the detached-outsider perspective to demonstrate these 
principles, hinting that Americans have to step outside their placement within a 
contentious world, and look at the world though a lens that transcends traditional 
boundaries. More importantly, though, in considering Expanding World Relationships is 
the very fact of Boggs’ investment in a lay audience’s ability to conceive of what he saw 
as both the opportunity and danger of the internationalism that constituted the postwar 
world. As a technical scientist working in the government, he was sensitive to the 
importance of public opinion in achieving both scientific and institutional objectives 
through artistic means. This work on what was essentially a propaganda film for 
advancing U.S. interest in world affairs is, of course, in tension with his own anxieties 
during that same time, expressed in his writing, of a “cartohypnosis” that was lulling the 
populace into submission.  
 Finally, articulating the new air-age perspectives in form was directly related to 




of American involvement in World War II, one of Boggs’ roles at the State Department 
was to anticipate U.S. mapping needs in a peacetime international environment. An early 
example can be found in Boggs’ 1941 piece for the Association of American 
Geographers, produced after consultation with Richard Edes Harrison. In this piece, he 
proposes a new mapping program that depicts the economic and social effects of 
increases in the speed of travel and communication, which are matched by a decrease in 
transport costs. As he noted “it is as if a quiet game of croquet had been transformed into 
a stirring contest of polo, with its mounted players covering a greatly enlarged field at 
high speed, while the game was yet in progress.”124  
 In a 1941 map that Boggs called an experimental depiction of transport-cost per 
ton-mile, he casts a projection of the world that compares, through a variety of shading 
and gradients, this new sense of expanded movement (fig. 2.9).125 The map eschews  
         





boundaries for a complex fluidity that accentuates world interconnectedness. Four years 
later, Boggs produced a diagram for the State Department that extended this argument, 
using a “cartogram” to confound expectations of form (fig. 2.10).126 Instead of making 
territory on a map proportional to its area, a cartogram represents territory as proportional 
to some other chosen trait.127 Boggs’ cartogram has five world maps—one for steamship, 
motor truck, railroad, airplane, and primitive transport, and each map is proportioned in 
size so that the same linear interval spans approximately equal transport-cost on all of the 
maps. With steamships being the cheapest transport, the world map showing those costs 
is tiny in comparison to the much larger map of motor truck costs. Finally, the primitive  
                           




transport map is not a world map at all—it is a scale regional map representing about 100 
miles of a stretch in Southeast Asia. Thus, the cost to send a steamship completely around 
the world is roughly equivalent to the cost by primitive transport of mere miles. 
Ultimately, in maps like these, Boggs substitutes the traditional ways of showing travel 
speeds and communication changes (like arrows and directional icons emanating from 
given centers or as a series of maps showing the changes over a period of time), and uses 
a single world map of comparisons and degrees of development that can be synthesized 
by the reader in one gaze.  
Boggs’ internationalized, relational focus was part of an air-age effort to make 
circulation itself a subject of the map. Boggs himself would say, “Man has a fondness for  
circulating, which accounts for some of his problems of relationships. Circulation is the 
rule in nature, of the air itself, of the sea, of many birds, and of some animals. Man’s new 
facility of movement enables him to circulate with freedom equal to nature’s in its freest 
moods.”128 He goes on to warn against the futility of putting walls in the way of the 
airplane and the marketplace—the pitfalls of a “crustacean psychosis in an avian age.”129 
For Boggs, then, the right maps provide the right way to avoid such pitfalls, as 
cartography becomes an experimental vehicle by which to posit novel relationships and 
put humanity into the lines and boundaries of an often staid medium. Like Wright’s 
notion of “geosophy,” Boggs understood that the air-age’s ever-shrinking globe brought 
maps into an inescapably social realm. 
Boggs’ association with a new crop of cartographers and geographers mixing 
artistic and scientific perspectives, from both popular and institutional perspectives, is 




“fresh perception,” as Harrison would call it, and their recruiting by Boggs for 
collaboration on a number of State Department projects reveals the interest of the 
government in classifying and controlling the shape of a turbulent postwar world. In an 
era of closed geographic space, there was still room for an American geographic 
imaginary, a new kind of manifest destiny of capital and communications that could be 
spread throughout the earth—and Boggs’ mapping programs show the shift towards 
capturing this global view on the flat page. His air-age arguments that mapped the new 
speeds of transportation and the world economy found their way into the development 
theories and Cold War social science of liberation advanced later by Walt Rostow during 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.130 Boggs recognized that not only was there 
was an artistic element in designing the postwar American world through intertextual 
relationships between government and journalistic mapping, but that the audience, as 
bearer of public opinion, became central to the production of space.  
Boggs’ Cartographic Dualities of Idealism and Vigilance in the Early Cold War 
Boggs’ calls for new types of peacetime cartographic planning in the postwar 
landscape took him in two different, complex directions: a pursuit of global scientific 
cooperation for the benefit of humanity, and the vigilant guarding of geographic 
intelligence to advance national interests. Boggs managed both simultaneously. 
Throughout his work, Boggs clung to a heroically idealized vision of science. In an 
impassioned essay written for the American Political Science Association in 1948, he 
says: 
To scientists, a majority vote would mean nothing…They shun confusion over 




as “ideologies” have no place in their deliberations. Scientists do not withhold 
from one another their knowledge, techniques, and equipment…Why should they, 
when there is only one universe, one earth-world, one human race, to study?131 
To Boggs, then, science could transcend the partitions (and inherent ideologies) of 
political boundaries. Several of his cartographic projects that sought this transcendence 
are worth discussing here. 
First, Boggs was a central advocate for U.S. participation in the International Map 
of the World project. The I.M.W. was a transnational project that began in 1891 at the 
Fifth Geographical Congress in Germany. It proposed one series of maps on a uniform 
scale and standardized projections to cover the entire world.132 A U.S. proposal was 
finally accepted, after a series of summits in 1909, that the scale of 1:1,000,000 be 
adopted.133 Each participating nation would marshal their geographic resources to 
produce sheets of their territories to the particular specification, willingly cataloguing 
their entire geographic mass of information into standardized units that would be shared 
amongst each other with an unprecedented level of detail. As historical geographer 
Michael Heffernan has pointed out, this project was meant to challenge the “imperial and 
national” foundations of cartography and use geographic fact as a basis for connecting 
humanity, rather than merely marking divisions.134  
The I.M.W. project was hampered by constant difficulties due to World War 
antagonisms, the lack of consensus over specifications, and the slow responses of 
individual cartographic agencies in each of the participating nations. Participation was 
inconsistent and intermittent—the U.S. essentially abandoned the project shortly before 




by international agreements. In short, there was an American reluctance to fully embrace 
the internationalism of a project that could affect its power in its own hemisphere.135 For 
many years, the U.S. government did not even pay its dues to the I.M.W. organization; 
the funding was raised by private organizations like the American Geographical Society, 
and only four sheets out of a needed 40 were produced of America by the 1920s. By 1926, 
though, the federal government took up participation again in the project and a proposal 
was adopted in 1935 for the State Department to take over the project from the 
Geological Survey and the Department of Interior because it was now seen as an 
international obligation.136 
In the mid-1930s, Boggs embraced the project in earnest, and he fought a losing 
battle to produce the I.M.W. maps until his death in 1954. In 1936, he requested that the 
Bureau of the Budget secure an appropriation of $250,000 from Congress, a sum that was 
never granted. His rhetoric regarding the I.M.W. was often sharp. In one memorandum 
that synopsized the project, Boggs noted that,  
The U.S. has lagged lamentably in making the map of the United States and its 
territories. It will require approximately 42 sheets to cover the U.S. proper...It is a 
matter of embarrassment that the United States has done only one sheet in the last 
20 years, and that it is making no progress now. The delinquency of the United 
States is a matter of comment at international conferences and in important 
literature…International comity calls for active participation by the United States 
in this project.137  
Accompanying these rebukes were “update” maps of I.M.W. progress in the 




had been produced across the globe—black squares with red shading were used to 
indicate what parts of each continent had been mapped according to the international 
specifications. Hundreds of black squares cover Asia and Europe, but only four squares 
mark the United States. Projecting the U.S. as mostly a blank space on the map, Boggs 
indicts a sense of isolationist disengagement with the world (fig. 2.11 shows a 1936 
version of these periodic update maps produced by the Army Map Service at Boggs’ 
request, while fig. 2.12 displays a 1947 update of U.S. progress in the I.M.W. project 
commissioned by Boggs and designed by the U.S. Geological Survey).138 Yet, despite 
Boggs’ critique of the U.S. lack of involvement, “international comity” could not triumph 
over other national objectives. World War II stalled the international cooperation needed 
to sustain the I.M.W. initiatives; the increasing postwar specialization of geography in the 
government, and the increasing primacy of intelligence and security magnified the sheer  
              
Figure 2.11. United States Army Map Service, "Index Map: Carte Du Monde De Millionieme," for S.W. Boggs, 




       
Figure 2.12. United States Geological Survey, Department of Interior, "International Map of the World: 
Arrangement of Sheets for the United States," June 1947 (Department of State, Cartographic & Architectural 
Records, National Archives II, College Park) 
administrative difficulty of getting both funding and actual maps produced. Eventually, 
by 1951, the formerly independent I.M.W. was transferred to a new division on 
cartography at the United Nations; Boggs would continue to be the U.S. advisor on the 
project, but aside from occasional updates, the project fell apart.139 There would be 
notable attempts right up to the late 1960s by international geographers, including some 
in the United States, who saw value in the project, but as Pearson et al. point out, “A 
number of commentators doubted whether a single global map made any sense in a 
divided world where opposing superpowers controlled the cartographic agenda.”140 In 
1960, geographer Richard Gardiner argued that one of the I.M.W.’s problems was that 
the range after World War II of what could be globally covered topographically had 




creating maps essentially anywhere, the project was bedeviled by an “excess of detail” 
and could never cover the world substantively from such ambitious specifications.141 
Ironically, it was the innovations of the air-age itself that may have accelerated the 
project’s demise and lessened its utility. The potential idealism of the air-age bringing 
“one-world” together was hamstrung by the sheer amount of knowledge produced 
through new technologies that could not be centralized under an international 
organization. Boggs and his colleagues were caught in the middle of these constraints. 
The I.M.W. was never more than a minor blip on the U.S. government’s radar, but 
from a rhetorical standpoint, the circulation of its form lived on. For example, the 
technical specifications of the I.M.W.’s scales and projections were adopted by the Army 
Map Service after 1945 in the extensive Map Series 1301, a staple of Cold War foreign 
mapping (see fig. 2.13 for an example).142 Thus, it was the U.S. Army, dedicated to 
advancing American objectives, that became the most successful user of the 1:1,000,000 
style. In amassing intelligence for the postwar world, the I.M.W.’s techniques, then, were 
appropriated, but not its values; the form of the I.M.W.’s project was viable in mapping 
the globalizing relationships, but its underlying ethic of internationalism could not be 
sustained. Also, the I.M.W. found itself competing with millionth scale maps produced 
by the International Civil Aviation Organization, whose charts were designed solely for 
air travel. Due to aviation’s huge commercial value, nation-states (including the U.S.) 
were more active in this organization than they were in the I.M.W. Commercial and 
military objectives thus triumphed over the lofty ideals of the I.M.W.’s idea of a 
scientific consortium.143 Such objectives often required a guardedness that the I.M.W. 




                           
Figure 2.13. United States Army Map Service, Volgograd: Series 1301, 1956 (University of Texas at Austin, 
Perry Castañeda Library Map Collection)  
in the shrinking air-age world actually helped ensure the fragmentation of mapping across 
nations and agencies. 
A related, ill-fated mapping project of Boggs was his call for An Atlas of 
Ignorance, a comprehensive program of maps that required international cooperation, in 
one compendium—in other words, maps of what was currently unknown in the world and 
what problems needed to be addressed by the international community. The Atlas of 
Ignorance manifested Boggs’ theory that even in the new globally-connected world, there 
were still blank spaces on the map that needed filling in—because as he plainly put it, 




international cartographic community come together to reveal the most challenging and 
underdeveloped areas of study through a full atlas of about a hundred maps in areas as 
diverse as geology, tides, diseases, folklore, personality types, and cultural values.145  
In a published article about the Atlas, Boggs includes a world map of ignorance in  
existing soil maps as his example (fig. 2.14). Over a Miller projection, Boggs shows a 
world divided into different shades based on the degree to which there are world maps 
adequate for agricultural interpretation.146 While the subject is ostensibly about soil, the 
map fluidly frames knowledge, or lack thereof, as the key content here, and every 
continent is indicted for having pockets of cartographic ignorance. To Boggs, the world is 
brought closer through its shared gaps:  
          
 
Figure 2.14. S.W. Boggs, “Adequacy of Existing Soil Maps for Agricultural Interpretation,” Proceedings of the 




he then accompanies his seemingly apolitical soil map with calls for “orchestrated 
heterogeneity” and the warning that “if peace is to be conceived dynamically, on a scale 
commensurate with the emerging realities of the present age, we need to develop a 
society in which all whose minds and hearts are big enough can find their best expression 
as citizens of the world.”147 Together, map and text argue for a kind of “airing out” of 
what goes unknown in a time when global space was generally thought to be well-
ordered and classified. 
Projects like the Atlas of Ignorance are rich early Cold War artifacts because they 
express a hope that the postwar world could be drawn together through knowledge, and 
that the silences of maps could be filled in by international alliances and scientific 
cooperation. Yet at the same time, Boggs believed those silences and pockets of 
ignorance could only be addressed by the trained specialist. Boggs was clear that the 
Atlas of Ignorance required a kind of elitism, pointing out that “erudition is required of 
those who compile these maps of ignorance. Only those mature specialists who, 
individually or collectively, know the present coverage of the aggregate of human 
knowledge in one subject, or a selected aspect thereof, can compile one of these 
maps.”148 It is difficult not to see in these abandoned projects the missionary spatial zeal 
articulated by Luce and others of the hope that American-led ingenuity could win over 
the world, and that U.S. national interest was in fact synonymous with the world’s 
interests. Boggs’ work was cognizant of Cold War realities and their constraints, 
acknowledging that there was a fine line between ignorance and secrecy. “If in any 
region an ‘iron curtain’ were to hide from the world the knowledge of its able specialists,” 




shrouded knowledge.”149 Arguably, it was this acknowledgment that ultimately destroyed 
the Atlas of Ignorance. The prospect of a collaborative atlas demonstrating a lack of 
knowledge during the beginning of a Cold War era when guarded knowledge was at a 
premium doomed it from the start. It did gain some interest through Boggs’ ties to 
UNESCO, and as late as 1952, he was drafting legends for a series of ten maps to be 
included in the project, but like the International Map of the World project, the new 
priority of nationalistic geographic intelligence over collaboration, prevailed.150  In Boggs’ 
articulation of the Ignorance project, he indicted “the misplaced emphasis upon static 
concepts of ideologies” and insisted upon the ideal that “when we can hold a globe in our 
hands and visualize the interrelationships of complete world patterns of physical and 
social phenomena, we can handle world problems much more intelligently. The increased 
assurance may help to overcome the ‘tragedy of the timidity of statesmanship.’”151 This 
timidity of statesmanship, though, was replaced by an increasingly harder line in U.S. 
foreign relations that constrained Boggs’ idealism.  
Boggs’ sense of cooperative internationalism, for example, was not always 
matched by his colleagues. In a precursor to his Atlas of Ignorance project, he sent 
inquiries to other mapping agencies in the U.S. government in hopes of establishing a 
new postwar program to coordinate the foreign mapping needs of the various agencies. 
As Boggs noted,  
[P]rior to the war, the interest of most of the Government departments with 
reference to foreign maps and charts had been confined chiefly to nautical 
charts…It seems that we should consider now what will be the needs of the 




developments that may be anticipated under the various international 
arrangements which have been made, or which are in prospect, in relation to 
economic and social development, food and agriculture problems.”152  
With this memorandum, he included a blank world map (on a Miller projection) so that 
each recipient could “draw in” where they foresaw needs for postwar foreign mapping. 
Included were entreaties to Walter Kotschnig, one of the State Department’s main 
liaisons to the United Nations, to encourage the UN to cover areas “which ought to be 
mapped within the next few years in the interest of an ‘expanding world economy’,” offer 
technical mapping assistance to any nation in need, and to begin bilateral arrangements 
for cartographic cooperation.153 Kotschnig’s ensuing negative response to Boggs’ appeals 
evidenced the fears of international cooperation: “It may be assumed that several state 
members of the United Nations would not be willing to have any of their territories 
surveyed which might make it difficult to trust the United Nations with any surveying 
project which would have to be confined to some limited territories” and that “any help 
this country may be able to offer might be given on the basis of special agreements with 
specific other countries.”154 This denial shows that foreign policy officials conceived of 
cartography as part of a national strategy, and that mapping agreements could only be 
entered into by the U.S. in specific cases that would benefit its interests.155 Boggs’ 
impulse to globalize mapping, then, was tempered by disciplinary boundaries within the 
U.S. government as well as diplomatic power relations between the U.S. government and 
structures like the UN. 
Despite his idealism, Boggs’ professional role as an intelligence gatherer for the 




During the fateful days of 1946, a banner year in the buildup of Cold War tensions, State 
Department special assistant Alfred McCormack circulated a memorandum that called for 
an establishment of an interdepartmental Planning Group to coordinate all government 
cartographic intelligence under one roof.156 The memorandum pronounced geographical 
intelligence as “the most fundamental of all intelligence” and extensively quoted Boggs 
about the need for more maps to help solve economic and social problems “in order that 
civilization may survive and that the human race may prosper.”157 At the same time, 
McCormack’s final recommendations indicate that the ultimate goal was to promote and 
facilitate foreign cartographic and geographic intelligence and to encourage “cooperation 
between Government departments and agencies, on the one hand, and private institutions 
in the United States and Governments and private agencies in foreign countries on the 
other, as may be advantageous to the Government.”158 In a sense, then, Boggs’ own 
conceptions of “one-world” cartographies bringing nations closer together were being 
directly appropriated during the very design of the Cold War intelligence apparatus that 
would protect American interests and security above all else.  
Around this same time, this new intelligence program was recruiting Boggs in 
other operations that were informing the character of postwar foreign policy. In August of 
1945, Boggs was consulted by the State Department’s Public Affairs office to provide 
cartographic objectives for the Special Interrogation Mission to Germany, led by DeWitt 
Poole, an officer in the State Department who was an expert in anticommunist 
propaganda and would later head the CIA-funded National Committee for a Free 
Europe.159 Boggs requested that Poole’s mission bring back maps containing information 




regarding the colonial occupation of foreign territories. Most importantly, though, Boggs 
sought evidence regarding the extent of General Haushofer’s influence (the notorious 
German geopolitical theorist and mapmaker) in Germany’s military and diplomatic 
conduct, mentioning that “copies of maps of a geopolitical nature should be sought.”160 
Such exchanges indicate Boggs’ concern about the effects of propaganda maps during the 
re-organization of Europe, and demonstrate that these geopolitical maps were in the 
government’s interests to analyze and catalogue.  
Finally, Boggs’ cartographic intelligence work contributed to classified research 
operations that served early Cold War objectives. In 1946-1947, Boggs would 
commission “map evaluation” studies of Germany, Greece, Turkey, as well as a 
comprehensive study of the Hungarian-Czech borderlands.161 These studies were 
essentially detailed and exhaustive reviews and critiques of existing map series and 
atlases that covered each locale, including reviews of maps produced by cartographic 
agencies in each of the countries. Most of the reviews related to the degree of 
functionality and reliability of maps, both topographic and thematic, highlighting those 
maps that provide quick and readable evidence of the strategic problem for the user. For 
example, shortly after the March 1947 declaration of the Truman Doctrine, the map 
studies on Greece and Turkey were completed, attempting to assess, through maps, the 
quality of the reconstruction of these nations. Such projects show that the State 
Department strategy for “reading the world” and its international problems was to amass 
and catalog as much cartographic data as possible, and to make informed decisions on 
international relations in a global world being partitioned by the Cold War. In the 




being closely guarded and cultivated. Knowledge of the world and its peoples was a high 
priority, but that knowledge required vigilance, a hallmark of the foreign policy that 
informed much of the Cold War. 
Conclusion 
In the end, it was that difficult relationship between open and closed knowledge in 
the cartographic construction of the world that most marked Boggs’ work. It is fitting that 
despite his ambitions for international mapping summits and his tireless efforts for new 
perspectives, Boggs is perhaps best known for his 1947 Scientific Monthly article, entitled, 
“Cartohypnosis,” which warned Americans of their high degree of suggestibility in 
consuming maps.162 In this piece, Boggs takes the famous 1904 map of British theorist 
Sir Halford Mackinder, influential to both German and American geopolitics during 
World War II and the early Cold War, and proceeds to show how its Mercator-based 
assumptions look completely different when viewed through other projections.163 Thus, 
Boggs believed the map exerted “hypnotic influence…with perversions of the author’s 
original intent.”164 Typically, “Cartohypnosis” is cited as one of the main postwar salvos 
in a growing literature excoriating maps as propaganda, where writers and theorists 
worried about how simplified journalistic and even academic maps (like Mackinder’s) 
had gained power over the geographic imagination, during a time when the specter of 
communist propaganda haunted American discourse.165  
But understanding Boggs in his proper context reveals his appeals as more 
complex. Rather than simply black and white prescriptions on good and bad maps, he 
was articulating the important notion that critical interpretation of the world through 




part of U.S. political culture. The idealist overtones are apparent here—that people can be 
de-hypnotized through better maps that offer a greater sense of humanity’s 
interdependency throughout the world, whether through more useful projections or maps 
that truly account for the revolution in transport and communication. In this same vein is 
Boggs’ strong presence in the development of powerful positivist geographies during the 
Cold War that prized the role of scientific knowledge, and in particular, America’s power 
to marshal spatial knowledge to make the world in its image. Thus, whether seen through 
his scientific idealism or the realist “realities” of his official role in the State Department, 
Boggs was one producer of space who recognized the discursive power of maps and the 
importance of the very process of imagining them. Altogether, Boggs’ articulation of 
cartohypnosis is a symbolic encapsulation of the rhetorical complexities of maps in a new 
contextual world framework, and the precarious balance between idealism and realism 
that he represented in a host of projects throughout his professional life. 
S.W. Boggs has been employed here as a representative nexus of intertextual 
discourses—a highly trained academic technician working within a policy apparatus built 
to define and guard American interests in the world, but also engaged in the ideologies of 
air-age globalism that reformed and expanded world relationships in popular media. 
Boggs’ influence during this time should not be overstated. He managed a department 
that saw dwindling influence after the war, and he was essentially a mid-level bureaucrat 
who marshaled geographic intelligence for his superiors and provided expert advice on 
political boundaries throughout the world. Yet, it is precisely for these reasons that Boggs’ 
work deserves further critical attention. In both the mundane mapping responsibilities of 




various academic associations, Boggs was one architect among many of postwar 
American spatial perspectives. His output becomes particularly interesting as a snapshot 
of how the global conceptions of the State Department were both reflectors and shapers 
of an emerging postwar visual culture, informed by the contentious disciplinary histories 
of geography as well as the complex role of maps as both scientific evidence and artistic 
projections of human relationships. 
Assessing Boggs’ role in the postwar geographic imaginary reveals, in a larger 
sense, how the spatial aspects of World War II and early Cold War rhetoric provide 
potential insights into the strategic design and knowledge production of globalized power. 
As Bocking has written, “vision” during the Cold War era became more “synoptic and 
managerial,” and air-age science created a space where “geographical knowledge 
becomes national authority.”166 Boggs’ work, in particular, appeared during a period of 
both cartographic fragmentation across many government agencies, and attempts at 
consolidation to contain maps as arbiters for national objectives. To know the world was 
to have a degree of control over it, and thus the potential ideal of internationalism was 
complicated by the necessities for putting boundaries around knowledge and guarding it 
with vigilance. As Cold War commitments grew, and the Second and Third Worlds 
constrained the geographic imagination, the prospect of containing maps would become 
increasingly unwieldy, as the very flexibility in perspective argued by Boggs would turn 
into a possible liability for policymakers attempting to maintain one consistent image of 
the world.167 By 1988, then-Geographer of the Department of State, George Demko, 




the geographic discipline for hiding behind an ivory tower and theorizing toward 
irrelevancy. He noted,  
My own experience in Washington with members of Congress, State Department 
officials, and many other high-ranking members of the nation’s decision-making 
hierarchy confirms my sense of the problem. I have been stunned at the near-total 
lack of an image, or, at best a hurtful and simplistic image, held of geography by 
these powerful people. My first reaction now is to give them something to read—
geographic analyses and maps produced by my office—the Office of the 
Geographer. These applications of the geographical perspective to such problems 
as AIDS, terrorism, environmental issues and more, usually evoke surprise and 
requests for more….Our problems are not traceable to the art and science of 
geography, but to its practitioners. The solutions to our problems and our future 
are also in the hands of its practitioners—all of us.168 
Even at the end of the Cold War, then, geographers were still facing the conundrums of 
the academic/practitioner divide, as well as the challenges of translating geographic 
visions for government policy-making that S.W. Boggs faced in his time. 
My initial discussions, of course, are largely based around the transitions to Cold 
War space in popular and U.S. government contexts, and the tensions found in both the 
maps themselves as well as their production processes and accompanying policies. I now 
want to build on the discursive foundations of air-age globalism, knowledge production, 
and the anxious brand of internationalism found in U.S. cartographic policies, in order to 
look deeper at how maps helped to fashion a bipolar international landscape—how the 




evidence for both popular and government institutions, maps became an important 
medium for the waging of public opinion battles against the Soviet Union. Once the Cold 
War was fully formed, maps took on even more interesting roles in both the ways they 
“placed” American power against the Soviet Union and partitioned the world, but also in 
how they were “placed” into circulation for a variety of different strategic and ideological 
purposes. Moving forward, the actual circulation of maps as material forces in Cold War 
visual culture becomes even more important, as maps are situated into various contexts 
and produced for diverse audiences as weapons in the struggle between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. 
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THE PLACE OF IDEOLOGY: MAPS AS EVIDENTIARY  
WEAPONS IN THE VISUAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET UNION 
 
 On December 18, 1950, the New York Times featured a curious collection of 
front-page headlines. Most of the headlines announced the unfolding Cold War’s 
increasingly global reach: “Red Chinese Punch at U.S. Beachhead”; “U.S. Will Speed 
Forces to Europe”; “Russia Fails to Jar Atlantic Allies”; “U.S. F-86 Jet in First Fight 
Fells Enemy Plane in Korea.” Another nearby headline, almost as prominent as these 
telegraphs of foreign war and high-stakes diplomacy, read: “Geography Almost Ignored 
in Colleges, Survey Shows.”1 The accompanying article decried both the lack and poor 
quality of geography education in both colleges and secondary schools across America. 
The text also connected geography to the question of “good citizenship.” Experts quoted 
in the article concluded that a geographic understanding of the globe, along with an 
appreciation of American history “should go hand-in-hand as a foundation for 
citizenship.” “The position of the United States as world leader and protector of 
democracy,” the article claimed, “can only be effective if the American citizen, especially 
if he has a college education, has some geographical knowledge of the rest of the 
world.”2 The survey mentioned in the article asked educators why geography should be 
taken more seriously by students, and the statement the majority of respondents chose 
was “A better knowledge of the world and its people will lead to a better appreciation of 
foreign policy and will help the United States in its efforts to retain the leadership so 
suddenly thrust upon us.”3 
 Why is this anxiety about geography’s plummeting status front-page news? Why 




intensely geographical nature of the Cold War conflict? The Times geography survey 
compellingly symbolized the new connections between international political space and 
public opinion in America. To know the world involved consenting to (and participating 
in) America’s new power as world leader, and this new power was also accompanied by 
an anxiety about how to shape, classify, and border such space. In other words, there was 
an emerging concern in Cold War popular and institutional discourse that if the U.S. lost 
the security of its “place” on the map, it may lose its place as a world power against the 
Soviet Union.  
  The emergence of an air-age globalism brought a newfound flexibility in ways of 
viewing the world and a sometimes idealistic hope that the shrinking world would bring 
the world powers into clearer focus on similar goals.4 As the ideological conflict with the 
U.S.S.R. took shape, geography (and its expression in maps) took on the role of an 
abstract manager of spatial facts. It is noteworthy that the Times chose to say that the 
United States was working to “retain the leadership so suddenly thrust upon us,” as if the 
speed of America’s post–World War II rise to international power was something that 
geographic knowledge could (and must) help manage.5 Maps visually represented this 
management process, the ways these anxieties and tensions were drawn out. The 
immense apparatus of knowledge production in foreign policy, military, academic, and 
popular discourse was often articulated through cartography both as a medium and as a 
technology.  
 In 1951, the same year that the New York Times released its survey results, the 
National Geographic put out its first world map since the Cold War began.6 Since 1909, 




ninth. The map is a massive display on the Van der Grinten projection, which the 
National Geographic Society (NGS) had been using since 1922 (and would drop in 1988 
as the Cold War waned). The Van der Grinten projection is similar to the Mercator 
projection in that it chooses the accuracy of shape over area, but it uses curved meridians 
and parallels in order to create the more appropriately air-aged aura of roundness.7 The 
Van der Grinten greatly exaggerates size toward the poles, making Canada, Greenland, 
and particularly the Soviet Union much bigger—as much as 223% larger than its actual 
size.8 Insets on the top left and right use a polar projection to accurately portray those 
parts of the map that are too distorted on the larger map. Moreover, in the left corner sits 
a political map of all UN nations, NATO nations, and Warsaw Pact/Soviet satellite 
countries. 
 The NGS map is in some ways the archetypal representation of American Cold 
War cartography. There is no overt kind of ideological message (there are no Soviet 
tentacles or bears), as the map disinterestedly displays world relationships with an 
immense amount of geographic information. At the same time, it offers a self-evident 
kind of simplicity. The map cleanly contains the world in a frame centering on the United 
States, and its spatial relationships with the world appear to flow out of the country. In an 
accompanying introductory article to the map, the editors justify the choice of America as 
the center because it is the “source of so much of the leadership and aid, so many of the 
men, machines, and raw materials needed for the preservation of freedom in older 
lands.”9 Like the Times’ arguments about the waning of geographic education, the 
connection is made between space, nationhood, and citizenship. As the NGS editors put it, 




today knowing and understanding the many diverse countries of the world has become 
urgent and vital for our national survival…what happens in Moscow or Peiping today, or 
in Korea or divided Berlin, can affect the lives and fortunes of Americans more quickly 
than the firing on Fort Sumter in South Carolina did 90 years ago.”10 Thus, in a sense, the 
map asks its readers to participate and give consent to America’s world leadership. Once 
again, cartography supported the new internationalism; to know where the Cold War was 
being waged, and on what fronts, was to be part of a contributing citizenry. 
 In addition, the inset of a political map displaying the standoff between UN forces, 
NATO nations, and Soviet-influenced nations shows how the popular spatial metaphors 
of the Cold War were concretized on the flat page. The editors write of this inset, “On it 
one can trace the iron curtain, Communism’s 2,000 mile long barrier against free 
information, travel—and escape.” The color contrasts and deep shading on this border 
fuse a geographic line with an ideological one—the iron curtain is now a traceable barrier 
and a rigid one that is long enough to partition the world into bipolar camps, actualized as 
an accurate boundary in the geographic imagination of the Cold War. 
 The 1951 NGS map is noteworthy not just for what it presents on the page, but 
the modes of production by which it was compiled. In combination with its text, the 
entire map is a celebration of Cold War technologies, making the sophistication of its 
methods part of the actual display. The map itself may appear to hide its origins, but the 
editors complicate this process, writing that, “although little larger than an opened 
newspaper, the 41-by-26½ inch map compresses shelves of geographic knowledge. It 
represents the ripe fruit of some 23 centuries of restless man’s investigation of his 




in the early Cold War.12 The editors also laud the explorers, the oceanographers, and the 
“aerial camera explorations by the United States and Canadian Air Forces” that “have 
greatly altered the mapped outlines of lands in the Arctic since the war.”13 In the Cold 
War, the professional and academic geographer was bound up with the U.S. 
government’s military and foreign policy institutions, and their attendant technologies; 
the NGS map is a reminder of the fluidity of cartographic knowledge. In one 
comprehensive map resides a host of interweaving interests, institutions, and assumptions 
compressed (in the words of its editors) into one visual package. These references are 
also important because they represent the increasing power (and heroism) of cartographic 
science. More so than journalistic maps that simply serve the function of the 
accompanying story, an NGS map must make its presence known as a National 
Geographic product; its professional and academic connections to the geographic 
discipline make the production of cartography just as important a subject on the map as 
what the map actually depicts. This host of interests and technologies triangulate into a 
portable document that permeated Cold War culture, as the editors proudly point out that 
the NGS map has been “distributed to 160 countries to schools, library, and government 
agencies.”14 The actual finished map circulates and becomes embedded into various 
contexts for various audiences. 
The NGS map is a fitting introduction into how the tensions and tenets that 
emerged from the discourse of air-age prophets like Richard Edes Harrison and 
government cartographic policymakers like S.W. Boggs gave way to the cartographic 
bipolarities of Cold War mapping.15 Air-age flexibility in the maps that emerged from 




alarmingly fluid. Throughout the 1950s, much of the popular and government mapping 
based around U.S. foreign policy typically accounted for the world in terms of how to 
“place” American power against the Soviet Union. In other words, maps helped commit 
the U.S. to its ideological conflict with the Soviet Union during the early years of the 
Cold War. Maps offered compelling ways for policymakers, military strategists, 
newspaper and magazine cartographers, and citizens to partition and “carve” out the 
international landscape.  
Cartographic Constructions of the Cold War: Mapping the Bipolar 1950s 
 
 This chapter highlights the functionality of maps in the early Cold War—how 
they were used and circulated as active forces in the waging of an ideological (and 
material) conflict. I proceed first by briefly discussing, with representative cartographic 
examples, two major contextual uses of maps during the solidification of the early Cold 
War period of the 1950s. The first use concerns how maps provided images of 
commitment, whereby the various pacts and bloc alliances constructed out of Cold War 
hostilities and friendships became important spatial markers in popular and institutional 
maps. Such maps “placed” the Soviet Union in relation to the United States in specific 
ways, drawing and bounding how Americans were oriented to Cold War space. Second, 
the maps of the evolving Cold War were increasingly used as evidentiary weapons. In 
other words, they were materially drawn into diplomatic exchanges and embedded into 
government reports as evidence of the capacities and potentialities that the Cold War 
superpowers possessed. After discussing these broad themes, I discuss one particular map 




by the American Federation of Labor and sponsored and distributed by the Department of 
State.  
 While mapping during this period covers an inexhaustible amount of different 
purposes, contexts, and visual techniques, I limit the discussion here to international 
political maps produced in the United States, and those that specifically posit particular 
spatial relationships between America and the Soviet Union. In these discussions, the 
theme of “placement” recurs in that both the rhetoric of a map’s visual display (and its 
various uses) is constrained by cartography’s unique ability to use art and science to 
locate political power and edify it on the flat page. If the cases of actors like Harrison and 
Boggs show how an “interpretive ground” for the Cold War was laid, then this chapter 
shows how these interpretations were made, disseminated, and circulated. 
Images of Commitment: Journalistic Maps and Cold War Internationalism 
 
 The emerging modern, liberal internationalism at the base of Cold War ideology 
increasingly involved the symbolic perception of power as critical to the enactment of 
foreign policy and the cultivation of public opinion.16 The entire globe was more flexible 
and “readable” as a text. With this flexibility came anxiety; America’s standing as world 
power relied on its ability to manage such perceptions. Maps provided a compelling 
vehicle, making spatial sense out of a rapidly changing and potentially volatile 
international landscape. In particular, political maps accounted for America’s 
commitments in the United Nations and NATO, and the anxieties over such 
responsibilities often cleaved the United States to an image of bipolarity that would help 




 The journalistic cartography of the early Cold War best encapsulated these 
notions of maps as images of commitment. Following in the wake of popular 
cartographers like Richard Edes Harrison, magazines and newspapers began to develop 
their own graphic styles that subverted cartographic tradition in order to account for the 
new global reach of America. As geographer Mark Monmonier writes, “the news media 
are society’s most significant cartographic gatekeeper and its most influential geographic 
educator”—they performed a key public opinion function in shaping the Cold War 
geographic imagination.17 Walter Ristow noted how the journalistic maps of the era 
suggest a dynamic and active conflict because of their greater likelihood for 
experimentation with symbolization.18 Because of their embeddedness into particular 
stories and their unique abilities to focus on strategic problems, journalistic maps were 
prime “placers” in creating Cold War spatial relationships between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. 
 For example, the Associated Press “Background Maps” series that ran from the 
late 1940s well into the 1960s provides a compelling visual history of America’s 
increasing responsibilities on the world stage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. After 
establishing their innovative wire photo service in 1928, AP artists also began to supply 
maps and other graphic drawings, and such products became particularly important in 
placing the spatial relationships of World War II onto newspaper pages all over 
America.19 The service became the AP Newsfeatures during the 1940s. AP mailed 
member newspapers two maps every week, together with a 600-word article, a service 
that continued throughout the 1950s.20 The “Background Maps” syndicated series maps 




extremely pictorial in style, simplifying typical “scientific” cartographic expectations of 
shape and size, and converting nation-states into emblematic units. This style made the 
AP maps particularly useful at projecting international political relationships between 
Cold War powers, in often provocative ways. With their simple black and white line 
drawings and uses of shading, they created “political shorthand” for displaying American 
commitments across the globe and offering stark constructions of the Soviet Union’s 
political space.  
AP Cold War–era maps often centered on the United States and cast the nation 
anxiously into a world of burgeoning skirmishes and entangling alliances. “The Sun 
Never Sets on World’s Problems,” from 1947, offers a standard, Mercator-style 
projection centered almost exactly on New York City as the “United Nations Capital,” 
while the rest of the map uses iconic badges with letters on them to indicate where crises 
are taking place (e.g., “P” for political disputes, “I” for internal conflicts, “C” for colonial 
struggles), accompanied by terse, bolded explanations on placards near major Cold War 
hot spots (e.g., “TENSION: between U.S. and Soviet Union finds expression in U.N. 
dispute over atomic arms control”).21 America is visually projected as the eye in a 
swirling mass of entanglements. Other typical AP maps in this series followed events at 
the United Nations by continually placing America as the central leader and the focus of 
the viewer’s eye. For example, “The United Nations Lends a Hand” again centers on the 
United Nations, and a series of arrows protrudes outward to connote an almost 
overwhelming over-extension across the globe.22 In such maps, the United Nations 
becomes synonymous with the interests of the United States, thus posing America as the 




whether America should lead the United Nations. In 1953’s “The U.S. Foots the Biggest 
Bill,” the familiar map logo of the United Nations provides the center of the map, with its 
branches of peace surrounding a polar-projected globe.24 But the peace logo of the United 
Nations is subverted, and next to the United States in the center is a number reading 
“35.12%,” indicating how much America contributes financially to the organization. 
Along the outer margins of the globe are the much smaller percentages of the various 
member contributions (e.g., “U.S.S.R.: 12.28%”; “Mexico: .70%”). Such a map 
repurposes recognized cartographic icons in order to question the potential burden of 
America’s economic commitments across the globe. 
AP also used its signature pictorial style to cover the emergence of the “bloc” 
spatial logic between NATO and the Soviet satellites, helping to create the classic Cold 
War propaganda image of world bipolarity. “Lineup for Two Worlds” from 1949, for 
example, shows two rounded tops of a globe: on one is the Western Hemisphere, centered 
on the United States, and on the other the Soviet Union is at the center.25 Both globes 
simply indicate which are NATO countries, and which are “Soviet Union & Satellites”; a 
small info-graphic next to the maps indicates that the area and population of all the 
countries in the Soviet Union’s camp outweigh the area and population of all the 
countries in the NATO realm. Nowhere in either map does the viewer see the real 
existence of a southern hemisphere; thus the two essential worlds are cast as resolutely 
northern in character. 
Other AP maps focus specifically on the extension of the Soviet Union onto the 
international landscape. The 1950 map, “Russia Thrusts Out From the Center,” plants an 




tentacles) that stretch toward Australia and Oceania, to the bottom tip of Africa, and 
through Europe over North America and to the bottom of South America.26 The map 
disorients the viewer by placing Australia as the northern point on the map, Africa as the 
East, and so on, such that the globe appears helpless at the hands of the arrows. 
Essentially, the entire globe is covered by what the map calls the Soviet’s “supposed 
routes of past migrations,” suggesting a natural, historical expansiveness in the Russian 
people.27 The thrust metaphor would be a continual cartographic trope, especially through 
the use of arrows that transcend political borders and traverse bounded spaces. Other 
maps depicting Soviet aims broke away from the strictly cartographic, and integrated 
cartoon caricatures and other unconventional elements: in 1953’s “Are the West’s 
Defenses Against Communism Weakening?,” a map of Europe is crossed by a long, 
winding iron wall, and a cartoon Vyacheslav Molotov (the Soviet Foreign Minister) 
behind the wall, with his feet up at his desk.28 Of course, such fluid relationships between 
cartoon graphics and mapping have long relegated these styles to the status of 
“propaganda maps,” since the interpretation of the mapmaker is overtly foregrounded. 
Unfortunately, the “propaganda” label distracts from the fact that these widely circulated 
newspaper maps were an important part of spatializing the Cold War for citizens and 
committing American power and responsibility to particular places on the globe.  
The AP’s maps were constrained by the limitations of the newspaper production 
processes, while the popular newsmagazines of the time had more freedom for elaborate 
design in color and iconography. In particular, Henry Luce’s journalistic empire at Time, 
Life, and Fortune created some of the most indelible images of the Cold War.29 Richard 




War II heyday, and another crop of cartographers and graphic designers would also take 
up his mantle. With the increasing commitments of America in the Cold War, their 
newsmagazine maps became especially important in communicating particular 
constructions of the Soviet Union. 
At Time, for example, house cartographer Robert M. Chapin developed a 
signature style that was embedded into the magazine’s Cold War offensives. While 
Harrison used more innovative projections and perspectives, Chapin’s novel contribution 
was his stylistic airbrush techniques. Publisher Luce called Chapin’s airbrush “a sort of 
highpower atomizer with which he sprays paint over his maps in an infinite number of 
shadings.”30 In addition, Chapin used two large floating globes suspended from the 
ceiling by pulleys so that they could be photographed from any angle and “strategy can 
then be traced from the photos,” as well as a “library of celluloid stencils—bomb 
splashes, flags, jeeps, sinking ships” to create a standardized style.31 But what most 
marked Time’s cartography was the use of bright, bold reds for lettering and symbols, 
layered over the black outlines of continents and borders. The red motif became 
ubiquitous in Time: in countless Chapin maps (and others by graphic artist Vincent 
Puglisi), the color becomes a stand-in for militant infiltration and expansion.32 In 1951’s 
“Paths to Power,” a bright red Soviet Union is depicted at the top of the frame, while 
seeping ribbons of red flow through Syria, Iraq, and Iran.33 In “Red Rash (After 
Treatment)” from 1949, the coverage of the Greek civil war shows a grey and white 
Greece landscape covered in irregularly shaped, blood-red splotches.34 The reliance on 
red as a universal symbol of Cold War hostility gave the journalistic maps of the era a 




conflicts into a cohesive argument against Communist ideology: particularly in these 
newsmagazine maps, the power of the reader to absorb complex international issues in 
one visual glance was pivotal. 
The red theme also speaks to the increasing militancy of journalistic cartography 
in committing America to its place in the Cold War. Cartographers like Chapin also 
covered World War II strategic fronts and battles and carried over many of those themes 
into maps documenting Cold War skirmishes. This militarization could be especially seen 
through a frequent trope of Cold War journalistic maps: the use of simple visual 
metaphor to reduce the spatial information in the map to one striking idea or argument.35 
In covering the Korean War, for example, a 1950 Time map used the image of a large c-
clamp over a map of the Korean landscape to show the enormous constraints facing 
forces in the South; in “Korea’s Waistland,” a red belt crosses the land, to connote a 
“waist” that is about to burst.36 Maps like the “Eleventh Hour” placed a large clock over 
the whole of Manchuria with hammers as the hands of the clock, and “Eurasian Heartland” 
used two sickles facing each other as a kind of eye-glass to focus on the Soviet Union’s 
recent conquests and current battlefields.37 “Clearing & Colder” from 1948 uses an 
elaborate weather metaphor for the entire Cold War itself, showing the “Russian High” 
versus the “Western High” with red thunder and lightning in Berlin, steady red drizzle in 
Greece, and a cartoon red Stalin blowing “cold easterly winds” onto Finland.38  
While Time’s signature red and grey style provided a consistent cartographic 
image of new international commitments into the 1960s, the other major newsmagazines 
of the era also made important contributions to Cold War visual culture. Many of the 




as Life, Fortune, and Newsweek, and a commitment to a bipolar international framework 
remained. For example, Life’s “Nation’s Commitments All Around the Earth” detailed an 
overextended America bound by scores of international treaties and constrained by Cold 
War alliances.39 The use of visual metaphors was also a continuing trend. Newsweek’s 
“Western Defense: Where and What NATO Links are in Danger” dramatically strings a 
metal chain across the center of Europe with a series of broken links to demonstrate 
serious breaks with America in Cold War foreign policy.40 “Red Web: Return of the 
Refugees” from 1956 places an ominous black hammer-and-sickle at the center of a giant 
spider web spreading across Europe. Arrows all over the map point out the numbers of 
refugees that have been sent back to the Soviet Union’s “spider” from various countries 
such as Austria, Italy, and Greece.41  
One of the Cold War’s most striking metaphor maps is Life’s “How Strategic 
Material Circulates,” from 1953.42 Here, a large curious hybrid between an industrial 
pump and an octopus, rendered in flame red, hovers over Europe (a hybrid that 
geographers Cyndy Hendershot and Antony Oldknow call an “impossibly surreal 
combination”).43 The octo-pump sits over Antwerp, as a defining symbol of the “West,” 
and the pump proceeds to feed icons of bombs, missiles, and other types of arms over a 
barbed wire fencing running through the center of the continent. Behind the fence lie 
graphics of factories in East Germany alongside tanks, and small silhouettes of men in 
trench coats and fedoras next to a cartoon of two shady males whispering. Through this 
depiction of clandestine East-West relationships and arms smuggling, the map is able to 
instantiate Cold War fears by warning the reader that capitalist gain is contributing to 




infiltration of European space is part of a machine-like system involving Western consent, 
rather than simply a monstrous, alien-like octopus.  
As the Cold War wore on, these newsmagazines also used cartography to make 
future predictions of nuclear stand-offs with the Soviet Union, going beyond maps’ 
propensities to show space merely “as is,” and venturing into the realm of “what could 
be.” Life’s multimap spread “How Could Soviet Attack Come?” continues the 
politicization of the air from 1940s air-age globalist maps but now projects the ways in 
which the Soviet Union would descend upon America and the rest of the world by bomb-
carriers in the air.44 The main map is a spherical, orthographic projection with criss-
crossing air routes emanating from the Soviet Union in all directions, and inset maps 
covering particular regions prime for Soviet infiltration.45 Newsweek maps like “Turning 
the Tables” also looked to the future with a polar projection of a black Soviet Union 
hovering over the United States with a series of red arrows thrusting toward cities like 
New York, Chicago, and Seattle and quantifying the miles it would take to reach and 
destroy them.46 Such future-oriented, predictive projections went both ways, and later 
magazine maps would visualize America’s ability to penetrate the Soviet Union. 
Newsweek’s 1954 “Striking Back” map optimistically graphs the ability of American 
planes to head straight to the industrial centers of the Soviet Union.47 Maps in Fortune, 
by the innovative technical designer Max Gschwind, also project the potential 
vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union in the face of a future U.S. attack: “Massive 
Retaliatory Power,” for example, is an intricate and provocative map that places a large 
Red Soviet Union in the center, overwhelmed by an army of arrows.48 The arrows 




surrounding the Soviet Union where the U.S.–led Strategic Air Command could attack it. 
Gschwind, thus, plays with a map’s inherent abstractions and reduces world space to one 
overwhelming field of nuclear arms. Altogether, the importance of these future-oriented 
magazine maps lies in how America was navigating Cold War anxieties in trying to 
“place” its knowledge of the Soviet Union’s increasing capacities (and its own) into a 
manageable visual field. 
My discussion here only hints at the massive amount of popular, journalistic maps 
that framed the Cold War for millions of American readers during the late 1940s and 
1950s.49 Newspapers and newsmagazines could break out of the technical, formal 
expectations of cartographic science and geographic objectivity, yet still borrow from the 
historical authority of the map to place “true” relationships on the page.50 Because of 
their graphic simplicity and reductionistic view of space as equal to pacts, blocs, alliances, 
and ideologies, they lent themselves well to the bipolar constructions of Cold War 
discourse. Despite the fact that these maps helped to edify a tense, two-world universe, 
they were, above all, active and restless, and they dispute that mapping was somehow a 
static medium that simply “represented” on-the-ground realities.51 The sum total of these 
“images of commitment” in newspaper and magazine maps connotes an America 
continually adapting and envisioning its place in the abstract spaces of international 
conflict. 
Cartography as Evidence: Maps and the Depiction of Cold War Capacities  
 
From their journalistic platform and context, maps were important reflectors of 
Cold War spatial anxieties. Additionally, such maps helped to actually shape Cold War 




more serious role in the waging of foreign policy than it had previously. As the Cold War 
commenced, the conflict was marked by a kind of material ubiquity in maps that went 
beyond their use in popular newspapers and magazines, as they were also frequently 
embedded into committee reports, used as testimonial support, and invoked as mediators 
in diplomatic exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. In these various 
uses, Cold War cartography functioned as evidential weaponry: a piece of visual 
evidence marshaled for the strategic purposes of Cold War actors.  
The Congressional Serial Set maps provide a representative example of 
cartography’s increasing embeddedness into Cold War policymaking.52 Historically, 
maps were a frequent presence in House and Senate reports since the founding of the 
Republic, as evidence for districting, population, land use, and a host of other pertinent 
spatial relationships. In the Cold War, given the pervasiveness of the new 
internationalism, many foreign policy maps were also circulating in their attachment to 
various bills, treaties, and committee reports. These foreign policy maps were produced 
and appropriated from a host of different sources: many were produced in-house by the 
Library of Congress’ Legislative Reference Service, others were imported from the 
Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, still others were brought in 
from the New York Times and entered into the record, or even produced by private 
commercial entities like the Research Institute of America. Congressional reports became 
a unique medium for the diversity of Cold War mapping; these maps were divorced from 
their original contexts and producers, and were re-appropriated and streamlined as 




Congressional maps were especially noteworthy for projecting the capacities of 
America’s commitments in the Cold War. For example, one of the Cold War’s essential 
policy initiatives, the 1951 Mutual Security Act (renewed every year until 1961), which 
replaced the Marshall Plan and provided billions of dollars in technical, military, and 
monetary aid to Cold War allies, contained a host of maps in its annual reports to 
Congress throughout the 1950s. These maps were more technical in style than their 
contemporary journalistic counterparts but no less provocative in their ability to reduce 
“places” all over the globe into directional spaces for American economic and military 
power. Cartographic conventions were used, then, to symbolically assess the full scope of 
where the United States was committed. Maps like “Regional Security” from 1949 
portray a treaty-carved world with pacts like the Rio Treaty that partitioned entire 
continents, reducing international space to individual security agreements with the United 
States.53 The New York Times map embedded into the 1949 Mutual Defense Assistance 
Act takes this notion further: the entire “Atlantic Pact Area” and “Rio Pact Area” is 
indicated by lines and shadings that form a kind of force field against the Soviet Union 
and its satellites. With a host of bolded “M” icons to indicate Marshall Plan recipients, 
the Soviet Union appears almost encircled by a united world solidified by pacts.54 A map 
that recurs multiple times in the Mutual Security Act reports of the 1950s is “United 
States Collective Defense Arrangements” (fig. 3.1), designed by Robert Bostick at the 
Legislative Reference Center at the Library of Congress.55 The defense arrangement map 
extends the partitioning theme of the earlier maps and sketches the ultimate spatial 
argument for containment: circular placards with the name of each major world treaty are 




                   
 
 
Figure 3.1. Robert L. Bostick, “United States Collective Defense Arrangements,” Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Studies on Review of United Nations Charter, 1954 
effect shows a world that creates a perimeter of alliances to isolate the Soviet Union from 
the rest of the world. While each treaty (NATO, Rio, Southeast Asia, ANZUS) has 
different members for different reasons, the map reduces all of the U.S. collective defense 
agreements into one, bipolar Cold War purpose: keep the Soviet Union in its place. 
These Congressional Serial Set maps not only partitioned the world into pacts and  
alliances that could be more easily managed, but they also detailed the nature of aid the 
United States was providing, and the accompanying anxieties of overextension. The “U.S. 
Postwar Foreign Aid” map centers on the United States, with the statistic “$35.6 Billion” 
filling the nation’s midsection and arrows directing the viewer to all continents with 
proportional-sized circles, indicating how much military and economic/technical aid each 




frequently used map in the Mutual Security Act reports was the “Cost Per Soldier” 
graphic (fig. 3.2). The background is a conventional Mercator-style world map, with no 
political boundaries. But superimposed onto the international landscape is a line of 
silhouetted black soldier icons holding guns.57 Like Russian nesting dolls, the line of 
soldiers goes from tallest to shortest, the last soldier icon being almost too minuscule to 
discern. The tallest soldier represents the United States, with the cost-per-soldier at more 
than $3800, dwarfing the next soldier icon of the United Kingdom at $1800, all the way 
down to Korea at $390, and Taiwan at $167. “Cost Per Soldier” starkly arranges America 
as the towering world military power. At the same time, it connotes a lonely, ambivalent 
power—asking implicitly, “at what cost do we maintain the stewardship of the world?”—
a sentiment that was often raised in the Mutual Security debates in Congress at the time. 
The simple juxtaposition of a soldier icon over a flatland of empty continents is a 
         
 




powerful Cold War visual symbol; certainly, the ominous placement of the American 
soldier over Indochina was an eerie representation of the ensuing overextension that 
would haunt Congress in the years to come.  
 Finally, Congress also marshaled maps to visually render arguments about how 
the Soviets were planning an aggressive global-sized war, both militarily and 
ideologically. The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) released the 
Soviet Total War report in 1956, and its substantial collection of maps includes simple 
location sketches of Communist-influenced regions to show international boundaries 
(produced by the State Department), as well as more elaborate maps arguing that the 
Soviet Union was becoming “uncontainable.”58 “How Communists Menace Vital 
Materials” (fig. 3.3), for example, is a quintessential use of the map as an evidentiary 
weapon: produced by the Research Institute of America, HUAC used this map to offer  
      
 
 
Figure 3.3. Research Institute of America, “How Communists Menace Vital Materials,” House Committee on 




the ultimate penetration/thrust metaphor.59 A black sickle hovers over Moscow, with 
militant arrows reaching each continent. Each arrow corresponds to a number in the 
legend, which indicates “Techniques Being Used in Each Red ‘Thrust’,” and how the 
Soviet Union is contaminating valuable resources across the globe. Other maps in 
HUAC’s report point to an increasing anxiety over the so-called “Third World” spaces, 
going beyond the European focus of many of the earlier Congressional maps and looking 
increasingly at infiltration into Africa and Southeast Asia.60 
Altogether, the medium of the “report” itself is significant to the way Cold War 
Congressional maps were interpreted as evidence. The flat surface limitations, and their 
mostly conventional projections, are important to their strategic uses. To be effective as 
evidence, the map had to conform to the expectations of its users—rather than challenge 
members of Congress with novel perspectives, these maps needed to provide simple 
spatial relationships and arguments about capacity that could be absorbed in quick, visual 
glances. The world, as seen through Congressional reports, thus, is often shown as a field 
of simple surfaces that render foreign policy a process of abstract management. 
While the Congressional Serial Set maps demonstrate how cartography was used 
to measure government capacities for waging the Cold War, what becomes perhaps even 
more interesting is how cartographic evidence was marshaled in the realm of diplomacy. 
The map often functioned as supplementary evidence in well-publicized exchanges 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both sides certainly deferred to the 
map’s use as a political weapon. In such cases, the map was employed more as a kind of 
weapon for provocation and response—a way to perform the Cold War with the map as a 




In 1948, for example, Andrei Vyshinsky, the Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, held in his hands a map he saw as proof that America was a plotting belligerent. 
During a UN General Assembly speech, he said:  
The map published by the Esso Company of New York is of…insolently arrogant 
and war-inciting nature…It is called, quite provocatively “The Map of the Third 
World War”…They are handing them out to motorists. This map, with 
provocatively militant appeals, carries the heading: “Pacific Theater of Military 
Operations.” The map is an example of malicious war propaganda against the 
Soviet Union…62   
Time ridicules Vyshinsky’s accusations, pointing out that the map he saw as pernicious 
war-mongering was actually based on a research mistake: the map he referred to was an 
Esso Map of Pacific operations in World War II, available at local gas stations. The map 
was the third in a series of World War II historical maps for collectors but was 
mistakenly appropriated or mistranslated as a map of an American-conceived World War 
Three in the backyard of the Soviet Union. Time, of course, called the incident a “prize 
boner” and used it to trivialize Vyshinsky’s concerns about the violations of international 
space.63 More than simply a Cold War diplomatic joke, the strategic use of a seemingly 
inconsequential road map in an international assembly speaks to the real fears in this era 
of a map’s ability to project and spatialize commitment. The map has a power to locate 
the values and interests of both its makers and users and cast them across a field of 
relationships on the flat page. In the Cold War, maps became evidentiary locators of 
commitments to an ideological cause. Vyshinksy was, however misguidedly, responding 




Vyshinky’s map gaffe in an international speech is laughable, but these anxieties 
over the mapping of international space by the enemy had more serious connotations. A 
compelling demonstration of cartography’s higher stakes as diplomatic evidence came in 
July 1960. In New York, the U.S Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, 
testified to the UN Security Council in response to the Soviet destruction of an American 
RB-47 aircraft that had supposedly crossed into Soviet airspace.65 Particularly remarkable 
is how Lodge employed cartography to prove his point that the United States was not 
violating international air space and that the Soviets, in fact, tried to lead the plane off 
course so that it could be shot down. The Hearst-owned newsreel News of the Day 
covered the speech, and shows one of Lodge’s aides pulling out a large poster-sized map, 
with Lodge proceeding to take the audience through the spaces of the map.66 As the 
newsreel narrator points out, “Mr. Lodge dramatically produces two maps to show that 
the plane engaged on a peaceful scientific mission for mapping magnetic fields in the 
Arctic was shot down over international waters.”  
More noteworthy than how these fairly straightforward and technical topographic 
maps actually look (fig. 3.4) is the striking way that Lodge’s use of the maps aesthetically 
dramatizes the cartographic form as a vehicle for accuracy and an emblem of technology 
for Cold War purposes.67 The whole reason Lodge can dispute the Soviet Union’s claims 
is because of the sophistication of American science. The RB-47, as Lodge points out, 
“was equipped with the most sensitive available radar to tell them—with the degree of 
accuracy only possible through electronic means—how near they were to any land 
mass.”68 Lodge’s maps and their abilities to trace the Soviets’ “astonishing and criminal” 




   
 
Figure 3.4. Map Used by Ambassador Lodge in U.N. Speech, July 1960, “USSR Electromagnetic Reconnaissance 
Flights,” 1960 (Geography & Map Division, Title Collection, Library of Congress) 
simply a visual aid for Lodge’s accusations, it is the accusation. Here, the United States 
argues that the act of producing knowledge about Soviet actions and being able to 
commit that knowledge spatially to the page is a powerful weapon; to chart the upper 
reaches of the Soviet Union with technological sophistication is to anchor and place 
“truth” on the flat page. The supremacy of technology to fight the Cold War thus is 
upheld. And the incident politicizes the act of mapping itself as a peculiarly Cold War 
action: here, the Soviet interpretation of what the United States called a “peaceful” 
mapping mission has deadly material consequences: some members of the flight crew are 




What Lodge’s use of map evidence as a response to “aggression” does, then, is 
validate America’s capacity to cross into forbidden spaces; his maps affirm America’s 
very ability to trace Soviet actions with absolute precision. In addition, the incident 
reaffirms the politicization of the air (and cartography itself), which had been a factor in 
maps since at least World War II.69 The air becomes a contested space in a tense war of 
perceptions. In this way, the volley between the United States and the Soviet Union could 
be seen cartographically as attempts to place and define the world with authority before 
the other side could. Beyond merely sitting in a committee report, in the hands of actors 
like Lodge, maps were brought into active duty and performed in the contested spaces of 
the Cold War. 
Altogether, during the heightening of Cold War tensions, cartography visualized 
the commitment of the United States to the Cold War by offering international visions of 
new alliances, partitions, and entanglements. At the same time, maps were also marshaled 
as evidence into both popular media and diplomatic circles, and were relied on to classify 
and order what was known (and not known) about the Soviet Union. I now will examine 
a specific case of one map’s entry into Cold War culture, amidst all of these swirling 
contexts of journalistic, diplomatic, and military uses of cartography. The story of this 
particular collaboration between private and government institutions provides an 
opportunity to see how maps were used to produce knowledge about the Soviet Union for 
a variety of different audiences, committing particular relationships between the United 
States and the Soviet Union to the spatial consciousness of the Cold War, and acting as 
evidential weapons in public diplomacy. In addition, the case shows the circulation of 




“Gulag—Slavery, Inc.”: The Power of Place  
and the Rhetorical Life of a Cold War Map  
 
Time’s September 17th, 1951, issue featured a peculiar and striking image over a 
two-page spread in its “News in Pictures” section—a map of the sprawling Soviet 
Union.70 On first glance, this map may not have caught the attention of an undiscerning 
reader. After all, early Cold War popular magazines were filled with journalistic 
cartography documenting the conflict, especially maps that showed the essential 
bipolarity of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. But a 
closer look reveals a network of red circles, shaded areas, and pink hammer-and-sickle 
icons dotted all over the topography of a stark grey and white Soviet landscape. The red 
dots indicate the location of government-administered “Gulag” system prison camps and 
the hammer-and-sickle icons represent those camps that were under control of local 
authorities. At the bottom center of the map, entitled “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” (fig. 3.5) sit 
three photos of emaciated bodies, with the caption “‘Gulag’ Children” labeling the 
pictures. The short accompanying text tells how the map provoked an ideological volley 
between the United States and the Soviet Union—at the 1951 San Francisco conference 
to inaugurate a Japanese peace treaty, “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” became a cartographic 
weapon:  
Would the Soviet delegate to the San Francisco conference like to see a map of 
Russia? “I’d be delighted,” said Gromyko. Unfolding the map, Missouri’s 
Congressman O.K. Armstrong helpfully explained: “It happens to contain an 
accurate portrayal of every slave labor camp in the Soviet Union.” Gromyko 
blinked at the map, mumbled “No comment,” and handed it to an aide who tossed 




          
 
Figure 3.5. American Federation of Labor Free Trade Union Committee, “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.,” 1951 
(Graphics Collection, George Meany Archives) 
Indeed, below the imposing map are before/after-style photos of the “incident”—on the 
left is Republican Representative Armstrong unfolding the map before a sitting Andrei 
Gromyko, the Soviet deputy minister of foreign affairs and representative of the U.S.S.R. 
to the United Nations; on the right is a stone-faced Gromyko staring ahead, as the map 
sits beside him on the floor of the conference room.72 The combination of map, labor 
camp photos, text, and pictures of the conference on the two-page magazine spread 
makes for a rich display of intertextual relationships and appeals, enveloping the reader in 
its Cold War bipolar narrative with both word and image. 
Of course, the Armstrong-Gromyko exchange can be added to a long list of the 
minor anecdotes in the history of chilly Cold War diplomatic relations. The map in 




waged by both sides. A deeper exploration of the active rhetorical life of this map, 
however, arguably makes a compelling case about both the strategic and ideological 
functions of mapping during the Cold War. Before the map became a kind of diplomatic 
prank in the hands of Congressman Armstrong, it began as a collaboration in a global 
labor research project between the AFL-CIO and the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council, authored by a Russian emigrant ghostwriting journalist and underwritten 
by the Department of State and a nascent CIA. After the map’s publication in Time, 
Voice of America broadcasts publicized it internationally, leading to frequent requests for 
reprints from across the world. The map would later be used as a training case in 
psychological warfare for army personnel. The Gulag map also circulated in different 
versions, sometimes with its camp bodies omitted, sometimes with photocopies of 
inmates’ “official” release certificates to the margins, and often including different 
iterations of accompanying captions and interpretive text. The many uses and 
appropriations of the piece allowed one commentator to note that this map was “one of 
the most widely circulated pieces of anti-Communist literature.”73 
The story of “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” goes well beyond the borders of the map’s 
frames or its inclusion in a magazine article, as it represents a nexus of institutional 
interests, audience values, and multimediated usages that adds texture to the actual 
display of the map itself. In addition, the story offers an opportunity to assess the 
rhetorical choices of selection and omission, and revelation and concealment, in the 
production and presentation of cartographic evidence.74 With this, the Gulag map has 
important rhetorical implications beyond what it actually contains on the flat page. 




her study of FSA photographs in the 1930s, Cara Finnegan points to the “eventfulness” of 
images, which involves consideration of “their specificity as rhetorical documents, while 
accounting for circulation asks us to pay attention to their fluidity as material traces of 
history.”75 Attending to the specificity and fluidity of images, I believe, is also essential 
to critically assess the meaning-making process of a map such as “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” 
The Gulag map is not merely a map, but a network of relationships between cartographic 
forms, accompanying text, photographs, and the map’s “embeddedness” into the medium 
in which it appears, whether an AFL-CIO pamphlet, a radio broadcast, an army manual, 
or a Time article. “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.,” then, deserves both a close analysis of its 
visual display and an assessment of its circulatory power. 
Doreen Massey argues that the act of establishing a fixed place is always an 
attempt “to stabilize the meaning of particular envelopes of space-time” and is 
“constantly the site of social contest, battles over the power to label space-time, to impose 
the meaning to be attributed to a space…”76 In this sense, the Gulag map evidences the 
locatory power of place in the Cold War, as an attempt by its various producers and 
circulators to give America the power to label, and thus control, Cold War space.77 This 
ability to “locate” with authority is an extension of the map’s function of providing an 
image of commitment. The mere act of affixing the specific location of a forced labor 
camp to a map is a powerful political act.78 In the increasingly abstract space of the 
U.S./Soviet conflict, with its missile trajectories and pacts and blocs, each side struggled 
to marshal “authentic” knowledge of the other’s potentialities.79 In this struggle, the 
power to place came at a high premium. For the United States, maps were a mode of 




global spaces. Historian Susan Carruthers invokes the phrase “transatlantic politics of 
knowledge” to characterize how the Gulag came to be a subject of discussion in public 
opinion and policy circles.80 Here, I would appropriate this term to more broadly include 
Cold War cartography itself: knowledge of where the Cold War was happening, not 
simply what was happening, was a politicized process involving the creation, display, 
consumption, and circulation of maps.  
In this process, the Gulag map reveals less about the plight of camp victims and 
more about America’s anxieties around its ability to strategically use its knowledge of the 
enemy. Cartographic forms and technologies were marshaled as evidence by various 
Cold War institutions to contain Soviet power—and this involved visualizing and 
spatializing the capacities of that power so that it could be better classified and managed. 
Because of this, a map of the Soviet Union could say just as much (if not more) about the 
placement of America on the global stage as it could about the place of Soviet labor 
camps across Eurasia. Like many of the journalistic, diplomatic, and Congressional maps 
of the era, the Gulag map served to both (re)commit the United States to the Cold War 
and provide evidential power for particular American constructions of Soviet space. The 
Gulag map, then, is a rich example of how “place” was used in this era to say “we know 
what you’re doing over there,” and how the increasing importance of cartographic 
accuracy and authenticity came to dominate that knowledge process. A few months after 
embarrassing Minister Gromyko, it was Congressman Armstrong, speaking at a keynote 
in front of the Conference on Psychological Strategy in the Cold War, who pointed out 




How the Gulag map became a weapon of truth is best understood through its 
origins, production, and strategically mediated uses in popular, government, military, and 
academic settings. The map also manifests the tensions between the internal codes of the 
map (its colors, icons, choice of projection, etc.) and the accompanying texts, photos, and 
other supporting evidence. In these ways, “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” evokes “place” in more 
than one sense—certainly, in how America “placed” its knowledge of the Soviet Union to 
make sense of its own placement as a fully emerged global power; but also in how a map 
becomes an active document “placed” by various powers into a variety of strategic 
contexts. Thus the map’s material and discursive dimensions must be held in suspension 
together. Altogether, this section uses the Gulag map case as a site for exploring the 
larger project’s focus on how the Cold War constrained both the cartographic product 
and its modes of production, and conversely, how the products and processes of 
cartography constrained the ways the Cold War was visualized. 
The Origins and Production of “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” 
 
To read “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” is, in a sense, to also read the Cold War culture in 
which it circulated. Such an approach is consonant with Robert Hariman and John 
Lucaites’s “sense in which visual images are complex and unstable articulations, 
particularly as they circulate across topics, media, and texts, and thus are open to 
successive reconstitution by and on behalf of varied political interests, including a public 
interest.”82 While Hariman and Lucaites were concerned specifically with the role of 
photojournalistic images, a map shares this complex ambivalence because it can visually 
represent political crises and motivate publics, yet still be determined by media and 




works differently than a photograph in both its internal architecture and in its external 
circulatory movement. Both the map and the photograph share tensions with their 
expectations to present “reality,” but a map is more obviously an abstract creation, an 
information graphic used to place aggregate information about the earth into a 
recognizably compressed and simplified emblem of what the world looks like (the 
familiar shapes of coastlines, political borders, and area capacities that make the world 
register to us visually as “the world”).84  
Denis Wood and John Fels’ approach to map criticism attends to these unique 
qualities of maps: the map continually advertises itself as authoritative, and becomes, 
thus, a paramap. The paramap is a construction that goes beyond the map itself and 
includes all of “the verbal and other productions that surround and extend” a map’s 
presentation (dedications, inscriptions, epigraphs, prefaces, notes, illustrations, etc.).85 In 
addition, the paramap includes all of the elements not just appended to the map, but 
circulating in the social space around the map (advertisements for the map, reviews, 
production information). Thus, full engagement with the “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” map 
must take into account these functions of the paramap: looking at the full display of the 
map itself but also the ways it was presented in various contexts and for various 
audiences, and the ways it was received and commented on in its Cold War context. With 
this in mind, I begin by exploring the map’s origins and production.  
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago made the word “gulag” a global 
household term upon the book’s sensational 1973 publication.86 But twenty-six years 
before its popularization, Russian émigré turned crusading anti-Communist journalist 




had left Russia as a young boy before World War I and became a prominent name at the 
New York Tribune as the leading correspondent on the Revolution. He is credited with 
publishing the first book on the subject in English. Levine would go on to pen some of 
the earliest biographies of Lenin and Stalin, while also traveling back to Russia to cover 
the Civil War for the Chicago Daily News syndicate. In the late 1930s, Levine 
collaborated with the famed defector Walter Krivitsky, the Soviet general and chief of 
military intelligence in Western Europe, ghostwriting a series of Krivitsky’s stories about 
his escape in the Saturday Evening Post.87 Perhaps most famously, Levine introduced 
Whittaker Chambers’ story of Communist infiltration to the world, bringing him to a 
meeting with Adolf Berle, the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of security in 1939, 
and setting off a chain reaction of events that would reach their full effect in the Hiss 
trials that set the tone for the early Cold War.88 Isaac Don Levine, arguably then, was the 
exposé extraordinaire for anti-Communism—a celebrity journalist with government 
contacts who helped make the “reveal” a staple of popular literature on Communism, 
calling himself “an inveterate truth seeker…in the fleeting show we call history.”89 
According to Shawn J. Parry-Giles, the use of defector credibility and journalistic “truth” 
about communism was consonant with the move toward “doctrinal warfare” in the 
informational weapons of the Truman era’s strategic propaganda.90   
For the purposes of this project, though, it is Levine’s editorship of the 
anticommunist magazine Plain Talk from 1945 to 1950 where cartography becomes a 
factor in this “revelation” project. Journalist Eugene Methvin makes the claim that 
Levine “published for the first time in English the word gulag.”91 In the May 1947 issue 




more simply titled “The First Comprehensive Map of Slave Camps in U.S.S.R.”92 The 
left-hand margin attributes the cartographic design to “Sigman-Ward,” a technical 
illustration and architectural firm in New York City; yet the copyright is attributed to 
Levine, thus giving him a kind of authorship over the map. The agency of the actual 
cartographers themselves is, then, downplayed here in favor of Levine’s journalistic 
purposes. Levine’s text refers to (and promotes) it as a “Docu-Map” that “is one of the 
most remarkable compilations of our day, and affords a graphic insight into what has 
been until now the most carefully guarded secret of current life in Soviet Russia.”93 The 
labeling as “Docu-Map” is also a pointed rhetorical choice, heightening the focus on 
authenticity, as if the map was simply but dutifully bearing witness to secret atrocities 
across a vast continent. Rather than the human eyewitness that a photograph can provide, 
the map more closely resembles the expert witness, called for an impartial opinion that 
studiously manages facts for the prosecutorial argument at hand. In this sense, the map 
packages itself as an evidentiary instrument for fighting the Cold War, a role it would 
play often in the duration of the conflict.  
1947 was the same year that David Dallin and Boris Nicolaevsky released the 
influential Forced Labor in Soviet Russia. The forced labor issue had certainly permeated 
foreign policy circles, Congress, and some popular literature even before the outbreak of 
World War II, but Dallin and Nicolaevsky’s book was one of the first extended 
offensives in the English language against the Soviet Union’s prison system.94 Like 
Levine, David Dallin was a Russian émigré, journalist, and frequent government 
consultant, and would be a constant force in America’s strategic revelations of the gulag 




were much barer in execution than Levine’s map, with simple line drawings of the Soviet 
landscape featuring black and white dots and place names, without positioning of the 
Soviet Union within the larger Eurasian continent. Unlike Levine, Dallin also uses a 
progression of several maps to show the growth of the camp system, with maps of the 
system in 1930, 1936, 1942, and 1947.96 Yet, the act of naming each camp was just as 
important here as in Levine’s map, as the placards next to each dot-symbol became the 
prominent focus. The locatory function of place, then, takes the central stage and 
becomes a driving theme.  
It is difficult to say whether Dallin or Levine influenced each other’s maps, or if 
they were working from the same set of sources, but it is clear that both are based around 
the map in the 1945 volume La Justice Sovietique by two Polish military officers, 
Sylvester Mora and Pierre Zwierniak. La Justice Sovietique was one of the first books to 
bring in firsthand accounts by prisoners and featured some of the first attempts at 
quantifying slave labor.97 Their map was a stylized red, black, and white rendering of 
camp locations, with a tiny margin made of prisoner release certificates, but without the 
photos and captioning that would mark “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.”98 The appearance of both 
Dallin’s and Levine’s adaptations around the same time, and the attendant popular 
response to them, marks concerted efforts to put the gulag onto the map of American 
consciousness with convincing specificity and, above all, dramatic authenticity. A New 
York Times review of Forced Labor noted that “facts are sometimes fearful things,” and 
thus praised Dallin’s courage in itemizing “the conditions which many deluded men insist 
on ignoring at the price of their own intellectual honesty” and warned that “the inevitable 




‘slave state’ is not mere abuse, but a precisely accurate description.”99 This last point 
about a “slave state” is particularly important, as both Levine and Dallin make a crucial 
(re)labeling of Soviet forced labor as “slavery,” a frame that took on more and more 
significance and dramatic weight as the Cold War progressed (and which the American 
Federation of Labor would emphasize even more overtly).100 As the architects of NSC-68 
famously put it in 1950,  
The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom 
has placed the great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the 
present polarization of power the quality of crisis…The antipathy of slavery to 
freedom explains the iron curtain, the isolation, the autarchy of the society whose 
end is absolute power….The idea of slavery can only be overcome by the timely 
and persistent demonstration of the superiority of the idea of freedom.101 
The Gulag map provides an important instantiation in this institutional commitment to the 
Cold War’s rhetoric of slavery. It served to uniquely organize slavery into a cartographic 
spatial system that transmitted the kind of precision that the New York Times, for example, 
valued. In addition, it offered a visual salvo in the freedom offensive that NSC-68 edified 
into policy. “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.,” then, proved beneficial to a host of Cold War 
government and popular institutions, as it had the power to disquiet the isolation that the 
iron curtain created and could effectively infiltrate those spaces that had usually been 
shrouded in darkness. The Gulag map also implicitly argues that a slave system is always 
seeking to expand itself to stay alive; the camps contained within Russia’s borders could 
become, in only a matter of time, a reality in the Eastern Europe satellites and wherever 




The potential of this map to participate in such an ideological contest quickly 
became apparent, as Levine’s map spread out from its Plain Talk origins shortly after its 
publication. The leftist UK Tribune magazine placed it prominently on its back cover in 
October of 1947.103 Next, a November editorial in the Chicago Tribune noted the map’s 
appearance overseas and praised its circulation, as it “exposed more perfectly than a 
million words could do the essential character of the rulers of Russia and the creed which 
they espouse.”104 By comparing the use of maps to language, the editors were connecting 
cartography’s function as a stand-in for a traditional argument that is able to compress 
political issues into one comprehensive visual field. The editors were thus pointing out a 
map’s complex ability to locate ideologies and values—the camp icons on the map come 
to self-evidently “place” the values of Soviet leadership for various audiences to absorb 
as part of the display. In addition, the Tribune editorial valorizes the authentic production 
process of the map, highlighting that the Plain Talk editors “based their study on nearly 
14,000 affidavits and other documentary material obtained from liberated slaves.”105 
Finally, the editorial also sustains the “slavery” label of Dallin and Levine, ensuring that 
the theme of “human material” continued to frame the issue, as well as reminding the 
audience of the Soviet Union’s profit from such a system. Altogether, the Chicago 
editorial represents the main themes that would be highlighted throughout the rhetorical 
life of the Gulag map, situating it in a powerful narrative about visuality, authenticity, 
bipolarity, and placement, which all could be seen as necessary tools in the war against 
Soviet ideology. What they hide, we are able to display and to locate—a powerful claim 




With these rumblings about the specific location of labor camps, the issue began 
to gather greater attention. It was also in November of 1947 that the American Federation 
of Labor made a formal proposal to the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(UNESCO), in hopes that the Council would begin an international investigation of 
forced labor.106 For a full year before that, the AFL had been issuing various manifestos 
and editorials protesting Soviet labor camps at its various conferences and in several of 
its publications, also working on a controversial “International Bill of Rights” for the 
United Nations to outlaw involuntary servitude and concentration camps all over the 
globe.107 In early 1949, at the UNESCO convention in Chile, the AFL’s Toni Sender 
made the official presentation of the AFL’s case against the U.S.S.R., claiming to have 
volumes of testimony from escapees and evidence that “some of these labor camps are 
reported to be grouped together in huge clusters, with hundreds of thousands of 
inmates.”108  
Later that year, the AFL collected its various publications and testimonies into a 
full-length volume called Slave Labor in Russia. It contained firsthand testimonies of 
camp victims alongside statements from UN debates where Soviet officials denied the 
scope of the AFL allegations as a “desire to slander” and to interfere in internal Soviet 
affairs. AFL President William Green’s introduction to the volume affirms the values of 
the AFL’s work, noting that it “arous[es] world opinion to the growing danger of slave 
labor.”109 He went on to argue that such statements by Soviet leaders are included 
because they show that the Soviet Union never actually answered the accusation that “the 
Soviet system is based on human slavery,” which is backed up by “detailed and 




authenticity of evidence as well as the systemic nature of slave labor. In addition, the 
notion that the impact of such arguments against forced labor could be measured by the 
Soviet response (or lack thereof) would become an especially prevalent rhetorical theme 
as the AFL turned to cartography to make its case. The map was appropriated in various 
ways as a weapon designed to provoke these comments and responses, and thus 
“Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” began to take on its dual function as it circulated: 1) to display 
the extent of forced labor in the Soviet Union, and 2) to be used as a strategic instrument 
in Cold War diplomacy and international and domestic public opinion. 
Ultimately, while the AFL’s UNESCO project garnered much attention, months 
passed and no official report or response came.111 The AFL began to then reform its 
efforts away from strictly persuading the United Nations to launch a full investigation. 
Instead, through their Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), the union decided to wage a 
specific campaign galvanizing both domestic and international public opinion in a more 
innovative way, and the Gulag map offered that kind of innovation.112 The FTUC was 
covertly funded by the CIA, according to historian Russell Bartley, as a “cold war foreign 
relations arm of the AFL used by successive U.S. administrations to combat communist 
influence in the international labor movement.”113 The AFL’s head of the FTUC, Jay 
Lovestone (whose biographer said was playing “a board game on the map of the world 
that made him one of the masterminds of the Cold War”), had been a CIA operative since 
1948, and was specifically using agency money to fund the research for the map.114 
Around this same time, the State Department’s ongoing campaign since the end of World 
War II to combat Soviet forced labor converged with the AFL’s, and behind the scenes, 




To downplay these official government interests became an important part of the map’s 
strategic influence. As Young points out in his case study of the Gulag map as 
psychological warfare, the public authorship of the AFL, despite its connections to 
official American information channels, was central to the map’s circulation:  
[T]he authority of the AFL in many ways would probably outweigh the name of 
the US government, should it have attached its name to the document. It might 
then have been shrugged off as just another round in the propaganda battle 
between two governments. But here is a free trade union, the recognized 
spokesman for millions of American workingmen and associated internationally 
with many foreign labor organizations, presenting the laboring man’s case against 
the nation that presents itself as the sole international champion of labor.116 
Outwardly, then, the labeling of the Gulag map as a labor project provided powerful 
symbolic weight and credibility. That label also allowed the map to have a more fluid 
movement through the culture, divorced from the top-down elite objectives of overtly 
government-sponsored propaganda. 
With State Department support, the actual production and distribution of the 
map’s new edition began in earnest. Throughout 1950, Jay Lovestone (and FTUC 
coordinator and AFL executive Matthew Woll) corresponded with Isaac Don Levine, and 
paid him to commission a new and improved update of “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.”117 The 
new edition included current information and statistics from the New York Association of 
Former Political Prisoners of Soviet Labor Camps, as well as new testimony originating 
through the AFL’s UNESCO research. The map was finished in early 1951, and was first 




text advertised that copies of the map could be distributed on a request basis. A version of 
the map was also featured in an AFL pamphlet that began to circulate around this same 
time.  
Altogether, then, the origins of the Gulag map reveal an image-text breaking out 
of the contextual confines of magazine cartography and becoming part of a productive 
rapprochement between private institutional goals, government objectives, and the public 
opinion function of Cold War popular media. The interests and conventions of each of 
these sources found their way into the lines of the map, and constrained the powerful 
ways in which the map employed the concept of place. 
Power and Placement: Reading “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” 
 
The power of “Gulag—Slavery, Inc” lies in its use of placement to anchor the 
existence of slave labor camps into Cold War consciousness. To borrow from Wood and 
Fels, a map has spatial authority because of its use of “postings,” or “the fundamental 
cartographic proposition that this is there.”118 The map becomes an index of signs, then, 
that makes existence claims and asks for validation and social assent from its users. The 
Gulag map is an especially potent example of the power of posting: to be able to infiltrate 
enemy Soviet spaces and claim that “this is there” carries an immense weight. The ability 
to “place,” in a sense, becomes a way of vying for control through the use of spatial 
knowledge. The very spatiality of this campaign against forced labor was fundamental. 
As Carruthers writes, “Bound tightly to new geopolitical exigencies, awareness of the 
Soviet camp system expanded during the early 1950s, encouraged by a state keen to 
spectacularize knowledge production through dramatic trials, witness testimony, and 




name for this activity, as the map provided the appropriate aesthetic drama to the 
statistical information being presented.120  
The most obvious visual theme to note in “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” is simply the 
choice to fill the entire frame of the map with the whole Soviet Union. What impresses 
the viewer on first viewing is, perhaps, the sprawling nature of the landmass. Levine’s 
early version and the stand-alone second edition that the AFL sent out for distribution 
feature the Soviet Union and its connection to Eastern Europe and Asia, thus offering the 
viewer the context of the Soviet Union’s placement within the eastern hemisphere. The 
forced labor problem is drawn on the map as spilling over into the spaces of Poland, 
contributing to the popular Cold War cartographic argument that the Soviet Union is a 
continually expanding power. The Soviet landmass is slightly rounded so that the country 
appears uncontainable and, in Levine’s early version, even spilling off the left side of the 
frame. The overall effect contrasts the stretch of the Soviet Union with the networks of 
the camps inside, coalescing together in various sizes on the map. Labor camps as far 
north as Franz Joseph Land in the Arctic, bordering in the south on Iran and Afghanistan, 
penetrating into the Mongolian Republic, and stretching all the way to the Chukotsk 
Peninsula where Alaska juts into the frame are all featured. As Levine explained in Plain 
Talk, “The boundaries of the slave labor regions have been drawn here with a view to 
understatement. All the territory controlled by GULAG, if consolidated, would make a 
submerged empire exceeding in area the boundaries of Western Europe.”121 Such a 
comparison showcases the enormity of the forced labor system and hints that the Soviet 
Union is potentially about to spill into the spaces of Western Europe, among other areas. 




which divorces the camps from their often perceived isolation in the wastelands of 
Siberia and instead places the camps right inside the highly populated West. This makes 
the implicit argument that forced labor was a holistic phenomenon and one waged in the 
so-called civilized spaces of the European side of Russia.  
In addition, the Gulag map is not just about the “dots,” but also about where the 
dots are not. In other words, part of the power of the presentation is in the white blank 
spaces where there are no camps. The first version of Levine’s map has a caption to 
reinforce this, noting: “A number of new projects are known to have been launched by 
GULAG since the end of the war…the locations of which have not been verified by 
documentary evidence…For this reason we have omitted them from the Docu-Map. It 
usually takes some years to authenticate the existence of a slave labor area behind the 
triple iron curtain shielding GULAG operations.”122 Thus, this map makes provocative 
use out of its “silences,” arguing implicitly to the reader that the map is only as good as 
its ability to authenticate sources, and that those empty spaces could very well be filled 
by camps (and other unspeakable activities) about which there is no “produced 
knowledge.”123 
 A State Department memorandum from Sovietologist Bertram Wolfe sums up 
the importance of involving the Soviet Union as a whole entity on the map. As Wolfe 
commented to the State Department’s Walter Kotschnig, “The entire propaganda appeal 
of Soviet Communism vanishes if we can show that ‘The Worker’s Paradise’ is really a 
vast forced labor camp…If this can be proved with human, graphic and statistical 
evidence—and it can—then the hypocrisy of all the claims…of the Kremlin become self-




map-as-logo in Benedict Anderson’s terms and associate all of Russia and Soviet Eastern 
Europe as one emblematic camp.125 A map has the ability to abstractly iconize statistics 
and “fill” a nation’s territory with that symbolic power. The sheer scope of the forced 
labor problem, by way of using the familiar shape and size of the Soviet Union becomes 
a defining character in the visual presentation.  
This kind of choice to frame the Soviet Union as the focal center in maps relates 
to the larger Cold War foreign policy problem of how to visually depict space. 
International relations scholar Alan K. Henrikson’s characterization of the inherent 
spatial anxieties of the “containment” turn in Cold War foreign policy is important here. 
As Henrikson writes, “by focusing on the outer margin of the Soviet bloc rather than on 
the Western sphere, American officials might shift the ‘center’ to Moscow, leaving the 
West ‘centerless.’.…This perceptual switch has its counterpart in the ideological realm: 
The ‘Free World’ becomes a mere anti-‘Slave World,” much as ‘America’ had once been 
a mere anti-‘Europe.’”126 The Gulag map becomes a literal representation of this “slave 
world,” and thus, even though the map makes a strident argument against forced labor, it 
also affirms the essential negativity of the containment policy and speaks to the anxieties 
that faced American power in its new global reach.  
In addition to these themes of size and scope, the use of iconography across the 
spread of the landmass marks an important rhetorical choice. Particularly noteworthy is 
the evolution of the use of icons and colors through different versions of the Gulag map. 
For example, Levine’s early map in Plain Talk noticeably differs in some pivotal ways 
from the AFL edition that would gain wider circulation in 1951. Levine’s version focuses 




Levine’s map uses larger, darker circles to associate certain networks of administrative 
camps together. The hammer-and-sickle icons are conspicuously absent, as only standard, 
colored dots are used to “place” the camps. Arguably, the hammer-and-sickle icons are 
used in the later AFL map to more appropriately “nationalize” the Soviet gulag as a state 
system. Levine’s map almost suggests the camps as more localized by area 
administrations, cohering together in more isolated systems. But with the AFL map, the 
map user lets the camp “stand in” for the nation by mediating it with an iconic Cold War 
symbol.127 By the 1951 second edition, with its updated information, the AFL map is 
substantially more “filled” with dots and sickles, making an argument through the 
cartographic frame that forced labor is continuing to grow; with maps often serving as 
vehicles for “density,” the case is made rhetorically that if this map were to be updated 
the next year, there would be a continuing proliferation of “dots” filling the landscape. 
The pink and red colors pockmarking the gray background connote a potential rash, 
compounded by the sickness displayed in the photographs of the Gulag children.  
The overall presentation uses such simple color contrasts and icon shapes and 
shadings to create a kind of artificiality in the Gulag map that is critical to its visual 
arguments. The camps are not represented as naturally occurring, but are visualized as 
imposed by Soviet power on the land. The stark color contrast featuring the bold and 
bright red on the grays and whites contributes to the wider claim that the Soviets have an 
unnatural kind of ideology. Also, one of the most important subtle differences between 
Levine’s early version and the more widely circulated AFL version is that the AFL map 
emboldens railroad lines in deep black, with the dotted camps adhering in a formation to 




subtly emphasizing the industrial system that relies on forced labor to perpetuate it. In a 
sense, these choices represent an American attack on Soviet ideology as a top-down 
project that forces itself onto a natural landscape. The emphasis on the systemic nature of 
forced labor in the title “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” itself thus finds visual parallel on the page.  
In addition, the choices and placement of accompanying text support these themes 
of artificiality. In Levine’s Plain Talk version, for example, the captions feature facts 
about the types of industries and products that individual camps produce: Sorokski 
produces light metal from nearby mines, Ussolski contributes to war industries and 
“construction of underground airfields,” Yakutsk’s output is in the timber industry, 
fisheries, and canneries, etc.128 The inclusion of these details about slave labor’s 
industrial products serves, in a way, as a parody of a typical geographic map (and 
accompanying text) of industries and natural resources. A typical map would conceal the 
sources of production for such resources, but the Gulag map subverts those kinds of 
expectations with its revelation that it is slave labor that motors these engines of industry. 
The proximity of camp victims’ photographs to these words and the contrast to the staid 
description of the camp products contributes to the ideological style of the map. Parody 
often works visually as a double-voiced discourse that adheres to the formal conventions 
of the original text while offering simultaneous, pointed social comment on that 
original.129 Here, the Gulag map’s use of parody reveals cartographic form as almost 
inhuman—that the effects of these places (camps) all over the map is the prizing of 
communist ideology over real, human cost. 
Despite these subversions of form, what the Gulag map demands most from its 




sprawling Soviet Union beg for an acceptance of accuracy and precision—that these 
abstract dots will correspond to real camps on the ground. Thus, the map producers, like 
Levine and the AFL, are promoting their very ability to map such places. A map’s 
relationship with authenticity, then, is complex: it clearly does not look at all like the 
space it renders, as it is a reduction, quantification, and abstraction of lived and felt 
places.130 Its propositional power of place, however, allows the viewer to accept that the 
information constituting the map must be authentic and verifiable. But the producers of 
“Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” are careful not to arrange their facts in a way that is overly 
scientistic—there is an essential crudeness here that makes it different than most 
government and institutional maps of the era. The map’s hand-drawn place names, the 
simple use of icons, and its lack of other geographic information about the Soviet Union, 
along with the use of photos and camp documents in the margins, mean that the overall 
presentation lacks the emphasis on cartographic technique and technology found, for 
instance, in the National Geographic’s Cold War–era maps. Levine’s early version, for 
example, adorns some of the camp areas with the title “Camps of Complete Isolation,” in 
a sense suggesting an amateur mapmaker lacked the proper place names and had to 
improvise. In fact, the professional origins of the map are concealed; it looks almost as if 
it had been produced by a camp survivor. In this way, the collection of information is 
made to appear more experiential in its production, rather than a project compiled by 
government and labor institutions with large financial resources and state-of-the-art 
cartographic technologies. Thus, “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” appears as an authentically grim 




The map especially supports these arguments for authenticity through its use of the 
passports, photographs, and the captions in the marginalia. “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” 
cannot simply rely on its abstract rendering of Russia and the camp icons—it must fill its 
margins with reinforcements to create a viable image of a forced labor network. Medieval 
maps used to feature fantastical sea monsters and allegorical references in the margins; 
here, the Gulag map builds an architecture around the frame of the map that attempts to 
affirm the material “truth” of forced labor. Thus, the map’s production itself becomes a 
subject of the presentation. The Gulag map actually reveals the apparatus of evidence that 
allowed the map to be made. Particular versions of the map emphasize this connection 
even more overtly. For example, the AFL widely distributed a pamphlet in 1951, Slave 
Labor in the Soviet World, featuring a pitch black cover with red writing and a stark 
barbed wire graphic running throughout the pages. A version of the Gulag map provided 
the centerpiece of the pamphlet (fig. 3.6); yet unlike the full, stand-alone version that was 
being distributed to schools and labor halls, this version pitted the map of the Soviet 
Union against a black background, divorcing it from its placement in the wider world.131 
In addition, the photos of the camp children are absent from the display. Here the main 
focus resides on the “passports” of the survivors—three of these certificates are 
connected by black lines to where they came from on the landscape. The focus shifts in 
this pamphlet from sheer scale and the numbers of camps and instead foregrounds the 
authenticity of the evidence that produced the map. This version of the Gulag map, 
especially, is arguing for belief from a wide audience—the use of cartographic placement 
to actualize and specify forbidden knowledge. This focus is consonant with the AFL’s 






Figure 3.6. American Federation of Labor, “Location of Forced-Labor Camps in the Soviet Union,” Slave Labor 
in the Soviet Union, 1951 
addressed to scholars alone. They are addressed to the conscience of the free world. This 
time the world must believe.”132 That bareness, simplicity, and starkness in the form of 
the map’s design becomes the map’s content itself: the pernicious nature of Soviet 
ideology is a stark, self-evident truth.  
In the most widely distributed version of the AFL map, there are photostatic 
copies of twelve passports that provide a kind of border to the map.133 While individual 
details on each passport are difficult to make out, the documents work together as a 
whole to make claims of existence—that these official state documents have been 
acquired at great peril and contribute the knowledge of what the Soviets are doing. The 





A typical ‘passport’ in the center of the upper left section is of the Sorokski 
Administration, adjoining northern Finland. It reads: ‘USSR—People’s 
Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD)—Administration of Railroad 
Construction and Sorokski Correctional Labor Camp—December 15, 1951—
number 4/58024/16—City of Belomorsk.’ The seals and signatures of the 
commanders, Kliuchkov and Georgeyev, are appended. 
These mundane details of state bureaucracy on the release certificates are strategically 
used not only to once again support the authentic, material existence of Soviet forced 
labor, but also to contribute to the map’s arguments about the autocratic nature of Soviet 
state power. Highlighting commander signatures, for example, assigns ownership of 
forced labor to the Soviet leaders. Once again, the very existence of these documents, and 
their placement into American readers’ hands, affirms that the iron curtain can be broken 
through and places the United States in the position of being able to infiltrate Soviet 
space with the power of precise and accurate knowledge itself. 
The other striking piece of marginalia, of course, is the use of the photos of camp 
children, which adds yet another dimension of authenticity. In most editions of the Gulag 
map, the viewer sees a half-circle marked by a thick red line, containing three pie-slice 
shaped photographs of what look to be camp prisoners, with the simple title “‘GULAG’ 
Children” above the center photo.134 That central photo features the face of an emaciated 
child staring straight at the viewer, and the child is wearing a crucifix. The surrounding 
two photos feature similarly emaciated children. In very small print below the photos is a 
caption with more information about the photo’s young subjects: “The photographs in the 




upon their release from Soviet concentration camps. Left to right: Barbara Sliwinska, 
aged 2; Jan Gorski, 14; Monek Finkelstein, 12.” The choice of children is particularly 
important: these are not men who could have been encamped for political purposes or for 
petty crimes—they are innocents who are potentially still free of Soviet ideology, which 
eases American users’ ability, in particular, to identify with their victimage. The focal 
point of the crucifix buttresses this identification, infiltrating an identifiable religious 
symbol into what is seen as an atheistic space. Once again, the subversion of map form is 
important: the uncomfortable corporeality of the photos disrupts the expected clean and 
abstract lines of the map. 
The choice of where to place these photographs in the display of the map, though, 
is also a central piece of rhetorical selection. The half-circle of photos sits within the map 
itself, but outside the confines of the Soviet Union, slightly below center and to the right. 
In this way, the images do not distract from the map’s main focus in making an aggregate 
placement of the camps; yet, the photos are so striking that they cannot be merely 
supporting evidence. Thus the map and the photos strike a tense interplay. With the 
caption featuring the names of each child so small, the photos become more of a general 
symbol of oppression. In fact, many of the circulated versions of “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.,” 
such as the one published in Time, simply omitted the caption about the photos altogether, 
with the photos standing alone in the display of the map. The Gulag map, then, argues 
that these bodies can be located anywhere in this landscape, thus equating the entire 
Soviet landmass with the anonymous, oppressed bodies. While the photos add specificity 
and a human connection to the layout, at the same time, they are providing evidence for 




The real power in these photos is how they draw on the capacities of atrocity 
images to employ the culture’s collective memories. Collective memory, if viewed in the 
tradition of sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, is a social process built on a shared 
consciousness of the past that is being (re)presented for a present agenda.135 Barbie 
Zelizer has written that,  
Unlike personal memory, whose authority fades with time, the authority of 
collective memories increases as time passes, taking on new complications, 
nuances, and interests. Collective memories allow for the fabrication, 
rearrangement, elaboration, and omission of details about the past, often pushing 
aside accuracy and authenticity so as to accommodate broader issues of identity 
formation, power and authority, and political affiliation.136  
Certainly, “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” employs the truth-value of a photograph to document 
and provide witness, but it also complicates this value by politicizing the very recent 
collective memories of Holocaust visuality for Cold War purposes.  
As Levine has pointed out, most of the data for the map’s compilation came from 
the affidavit testimonies of Polish prisoners upon their discharge from the camps in late 
1941.137 This “Polishness” of both the map’s data and the bodies of the children in the 
photographs draws on recent World War II memories that link the Polish nationality with 
genocide’s enactment, as depicted in the popular photographs that permeated domestic 
and international media. In both production and presentation, “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” 
uses temporal authority to unite the Nazi camp system with the Soviet gulags.138 This 
transposition of the two wars in the map is an important argument, since the collective 




heroism in World War II weighed so heavily in the development of Cold War discourse. 
The juxtaposition of the photos with the map’s system of camps suggests that the horrors 
of World War II are still ongoing: the enemies may have changed, but there is still an 
enemy.139  
Ultimately, this perpetuation of a wartime mentality is a central part of the whole 
presentation of the map. In many ways, all of these sign indexes in the map and its 
marshaling of multimediated sources together in one package create an argument about 
America’s own anxieties around its abilities to “invade” Soviet space and produce 
knowledge of what happens behind the iron curtain, in order to move toward ultimate 
victory. Parry-Giles’ rhetorical analysis of Cold War propaganda in the Truman and 
Eisenhower administrations notes a shift from a journalistic paradigm, where propaganda 
is posited as “news,” toward a centralized, militaristic paradigm, where propaganda is 
waged in the visual and linguistic frames of military crisis with the Soviet Union.140 The 
Gulag map provides an interesting cartographic extension of this paradigm shift. The 
producers of the map have worked hard to present the map as a journalistic “eye-witness” 
to the reality of forced labor, and the painstaking detail of its claims to authenticity 
support this rhetorical work. At the same time, the Gulag map’s power of place to cross 
and invade the Soviet borders to map the “unmappable” marks, however subtly, a more 
militant infiltration of Soviet space. Additionally, the powerful use of emaciated bodies in 
the photographs serves a symbolic function—employing Holocaust memory to present 
them as wartime victims and the end results of Soviet aggression. The map goes beyond 
the “reveal” function of news propaganda and engages in a more militarized discourse. 




but its attempts to go beyond visualizing a mere containment of Soviet space mark it as a 
noteworthy transitional piece of propaganda.141 
Finally, what compounds these connections between the elements of photographs, 
documentary evidence, and the captions is a foundational piece of the “paramap”: the 
centered bolded statement at the bottom of the 1951 edition of the map, which reads: “A 
Reward of $1,000 Will Be Paid by the Free Trade Union Committee for Evidence 
Disproving the Authenticity of the Soviet Documents Here Reproduced.”142 The “reward” 
notice, in a sense, redirects the map away from the merely informational and gives it a 
more overt propositional power. In other words, the map now demands a response and a 
challenge to engage with its claims of authenticity. The map-using audience is asked for 
its involvement, and this request, this interpellation, strengthens the map’s instrumental 
function as an arbiter of public opinion. Still, because of the map’s bounded 
completeness and claims to authority and knowledge, the engagement with public 
opinion is less about interactivity, and more about consensus and social assent.143 The 
large amount of the reward, combined with the authoritative authenticity of the map’s 
postings that “this is there,” remind the viewer that this visual display is essentially 
inarguable. Altogether, the complex visual presentation of “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” creates 
a kind of weapon function for the map, wherein it could be used in a variety of contexts 
to fight Cold War skirmishes.  
The Circulation of “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” 
 
While an interpretive reading of the Gulag map can assess its ideological values 
and visual codes, to stop there is to fall prey to the age-old conception of maps as mere 




writes, “the whole map is a study in suggestion, in which cartographic techniques are 
used to depict a particular situation in such a way that both the intrinsic meaning and the 
suggested meaning resonate with other texts and images beyond [the] single map.”144 
Maps are processes of meaning-making that are “discursively embedded within broader 
contexts of social action and power” and constrained by their relationships with other 
texts.145 “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” is an outstanding example of cartography as this kind of 
living medium, reaching a wide array of audiences and molded and marshaled for a host 
of uses.  
Initially, the finished second edition of the Gulag map by Levine for the AFL was 
promoted through union channels to provide information about Soviet forced labor to 
members. After newspapers like the Minneapolis Star Tribune and the Baltimore Sun 
began to feature it prominently, the demand for the map, and the diversity of that demand, 
grew heavily.146 Particularly in these early appearances of the map, the “Gulag—Slavery, 
Inc.” title was often subsumed beneath headlines like “Russia’s Slave Labor Camps Hold 
14 Million.”147 These strategic uses of the map accentuated the vastness and sheer 
numbers in the scale in the slave labor system; text and visual combined together to 
communicate a sense of capacity and volume, thus consolidating the map’s ability to 
abstractly project statistics across a provocative aesthetic image.148 In addition, 
publications like the Christian Science Monitor or the NEA Daily News would take the 
basic Gulag map and then reproduce it in their own particular graphic style. For instance, 
the NEA “newspaperizes” the map into simple dots, lines, and gradient shading in order 
to fit the conventions and constraints of its format.149 In this, “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” was 




adaptable and contestable depending on the form and content requirements of its 
producers and circulators. 
Of course, the circulation of the map reached its zenith after Time’s publication of 
the map alongside the sensational reports of the showdown between Congressman 
Armstrong and Andrei Gromyko at the San Francisco conference. The Los Angeles Times 
features an even more detailed photograph than Time magazine of the incident, with 
Armstrong shaking Gromyko’s hand, and the map held in the other.150 The use of photos 
of the Gromyko-Armstrong exchange in venues like Time and the Los Angeles Times 
suggests that the map not only was making a pointed argument for American readers 
about the existence of Soviet camps, but it also had concrete effects in the “real” relations 
of the Cold War. In addition, publications like the New York Times would also 
prominently highlight Gromyko’s verbal response, quoted as “It would be interesting to 
know what capitalist slave is the author of this map,” adding new complications to the 
slave theme.151 These uses of the map speak once again to its instrumental uses as a Cold 
War weapon, designed to provoke response and counter-responses, thus re-circulating the 
map and perpetuating its powerful ability to infiltrate multiple contexts and media.  
The domestic response to “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” wildly exceeded expectations. 
The AFL was inundated with requests for reprinted maps from a wide variety of 
institutions—particularly labor unions, high schools, universities, and churches, but also 
government and military affiliations like the diplomatic mission in the Netherlands, the 
U.S. Air Defense Command, and even the mayor of Atlanta.152 The superintendent of the 
Minneapolis Public Schools pointed out to the AFL that the map “would be used and 




Flemington, Pennsylvania, requested the map “to use it with several study groups in the 
local church as we study the evils and dangers of communism to our way of life.”154 A 
Massachusetts high school debate club wrote to the AFL asking to use “Gulag—Slavery, 
Inc.” in building their negative case on “Wartime Citizen Conscription.”155 Even 
individual citizens requested maps: Martin Berach of Barberton, Ohio, wrote that “my 
interest in it is to show it to some of my friends who argue that such a thing does not exist 
in Soviet Russia”; A.D. Kuzow of Los Angeles asked politely of the AFL, “Would you 
kindly send me your map of slave labor camps of the atheistic Soviet Union?”; and 
William Chamberlain of Dayton justified that “I would like very much to have a copy for 
several reasons; one of the best of these is that it is a very clever way of building up 
American patriotism.”156  
This diverse array of requests posed a new role for “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.”—an 
emblem for Cold War citizenship. The educational and civic functions of the Gulag map 
emerged from these different audiences’ appropriations of the map into their own 
conceptions of the Cold War, as many of these requests reiterated the Gulag map’s status 
as a revealer of stark truths in a necessarily bipolar world. Engaging with the map, then, 
was seen as a public duty by many to spread awareness of where exactly oppressive 
Soviet ideology was making itself apparent. For example, the 1951 AFL pamphlet Slave 
Labor in Soviet Russia, which was continually requested specifically by schools and civic 
groups, activated the map as a living document that was meant to be passed around and 
displayed. The pamphlet urged the reader to “show this pamphlet to your friends, 
especially to those who are not aware of the existence of slave-labor camps” and “show 




Soviet ‘socialism.’”157 Once again, this involved the map’s ability to showcase the 
knowledge production that was central to the Cold War—to know (and to quantify) the 
spaces of the enemy in the Cold War is to be a consenting participant in that conflict. 
These various uses of the map suggest that mere knowledge production was not enough; 
the map’s arguments actually needed to be understood, taught, and disseminated by 
citizens themselves in meaningful social exchanges. 
Adding texture to the map’s strategic function as a Cold War weapon was its 
growing utility as an international instrument. Not only would it find use in “official” 
diplomacy between actors like Armstrong and Gromyko, the Gulag map also became a 
representative example of “public diplomacy,” defined by Nicholas Cull as “an 
international actor’s attempt to conduct its foreign policy by engaging with foreign 
publics” and characterized especially in the Cold War as “a top-down dynamic whereby 
governments distributed information to foreign publics using capital-intensive methods 
such as international radio, exhibitions, and libraries.”158 For example, Voice of America 
broadcasts picked up the Gromyko story and proceeded to describe the map to viewers on 
the air and offer to mail it out by request. The VOA story of the map circulated widely in 
Latin America and received 400 air-mail requests in the first 24-hour period alone after 
the broadcast. The Government Printing Office then printed thousands of Spanish-
language versions for distribution through U.S. Information Service offices.159 As a 
Chilean miner wrote to the VOA, “Please send me the map you offered so that I may 
show it to my co-workers, who, unfortunately, are influenced by the poison of 




America by creating the appearance of a public service function offered by the radio 
broadcasts.161   
The map also served such purposes throughout Cold War Europe. The 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels, on organization covertly 
subsidized by the Central Intelligence Agency, produced a 100-page booklet for 
distribution entitled Stalin’s Slave Camps: An Indictment of Modern Slavery, which used 
the Gulag map as its cover.162 In West Berlin, the map was plastered strategically so that 
it could be seen by people crossing the zonal boundary during a Communist youth 
festival.163 The AFL contracted for German translations, and 5,000 were specifically 
pressed in Germany, through the Department of State, to be posted on factory bulletin 
boards.164 A French language version was also produced for distribution (fig. 3.7), and 
the Swiss weekly Die Nation published the map.165 In May 1951, the president of the 
Danish Federation of Labor, Eiler Jensen, gave a radio speech about the scourge of slave 
labor in Eastern Europe, describing the map to the audience and decrying especially the 
plight of the Polish “skeletons” depicted in the map’s margins.166 A commissioner for the 
U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration’s (ECA) Special Mission in Iceland was 
“anxious to use this [map] as information for propaganda in that country where there has 
been communistic activity” and commented editorially that “personally I think the whole 
thing is the best piece of propaganda against communism that I have seen.”167 The ECA’s 
Office of the Special Representative in Europe also referred to the map in a widely 
circulated report asking “Are There Slave Camps In Eastern Europe?” This government 
study reinforced an important part of the visual display in  “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.”—that 




                                     
 
   
Figure 3.7. American Federation of Labor Free Trade Union Committee, Carte De L'Esclavage En U.R.S.S., 
1951 (George Meany Memorial Archives) 
into nations such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, bringing it right to the border of 
Western Europe.168 Behind the iron curtain, groups like the Hungarian National Council 
requested thousands of reprints, and the Yugoslav Trade Unionists sought copies as well, 
although they had to make their request clandestinely through the Norwegian Federation 
of Trade Unions out of fear of police action.169 
Soviet reaction of the map’s spread throughout Europe rose to a new level of 
intensity shortly after the Gromyko incident. In October 1951, Soviet military police 
seized 500,000 copies of the map, which were printed through USIS channels in Vienna 
for the German language paper Wiener Kurier.170 Officials reportedly called the map a 




Donnelly, the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria, who argued for the map’s “prompt 
release” and called the Soviet response “an uncultured piece of sophistry.”171 
Interestingly enough, the contracted printer for the USIS lived in the U.S. sector of 
Vienna but sent it across town to be finished by a binder and his wife, who lived in the 
10th district of the Soviet sector. The ability of the map to penetrate Soviet space was 
more literalized here; the map makes its visual arguments, but it also exists as a material 
force, as the processes of its production and even its printing become part of a Cold War 
offensive.172 A New York Times editorial about the Vienna incident spoke to this strategic 
use of “placement” in the circulation of the map to engineer a Soviet response: invoking 
the Gromyko affair in San Francisco, the editors point out that up to now “there has been 
no effort at refutation, no denial of the map’s accuracy, no invitation to foreigners or U.N. 
observers to visit these places and check for themselves.”173 With the seizure in Vienna, 
that original silence now was disrupted by the “brute force of police,” which was, as the 
New York Times argues, “the most eloquent proof that the map was irrefutable with logic 
or with facts.”174 Thus, not only was the premium on authenticity drawn into the frames 
of the map, it was part of the map’s ability to circulate and infiltrate spaces it was 
supposedly prohibited from entering. The binders’ subsequent arrest (and the ensuing 
confiscation of the half million copies across the city) prompted a letter from AFL’s 
Matthew Woll directly to Dean Acheson at the State Department to protest the unfair 
treatment of international workers and the suppression of free speech.175 Such an 
exchange demonstrates the map’s role in complicating relationships between the 




propaganda’s increasingly militaristic usages in the early 1950s, the map was being 
mobilized in more systematic efforts to combat the Soviet Union.176  
As if the map had not penetrated enough various foreign policy initiatives and 
international incidents, there were even attempts to take the map’s mediated reach further. 
The AFL Weekly News Service reported in October that a Hollywood motion picture 
studio was preparing a short film on the map to be released in commercial houses 
nationally.177 In addition, the public relations director for the American Federation of 
Musicians actually proposed to the AFL a project run jointly with Voice of America to 
record an album of Russian “slave labor songs” to raise awareness of the issue, complete 
with the suggestion that the “album should carry the famous AFL slave labor map, as a 
background.”178 The AFL would continue to internally draw on the map as a testament to 
its members that the union deserved their loyalty and patronage; by the end of 1951, the 
standard fundraising letter for the Free Trade Union Committee contained the reminder: 
“And, of course, you know that it is the Free Trade Union Committee’s Slave Labor Map 
of Russia which has won world-wide acclaim for the A.F. of L. as the initiator and 
dynamic leader of the international struggle against forced labor.”179 Finally, it was 
reported that copies of the map were being used by the AFL Amalgamated Meat Cutters 
and Butcher Workmen in Bakersfield, California, to organize a drive against the 
supposedly Communist-led International Longshoremen’s Union, which was headed by 
the controversial labor activist Harry Bridges.180 “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.”, then, was used 
not just in a battle against an “alien” Soviet ideology, but against what AFL leaders saw 
as a homegrown problem in the labor movement, thus representing how a map could be 




The public engagement with the Gulag map died down by early 1953, but the 
forced labor issue continued to be a frequent public and government concern during the 
Cold War, sparking a series of reports and hearings.181 Education and civic groups 
continued to highlight the issue, with some even creating their own adaptations of the 
Gulag map.182 The AFL also used maps in its ensuing campaign against forced labor in 
China, drawing on the style of “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.,” but not reaching the same kind of 
international attention.183 Still, the map itself continued to leave traces long after its initial 
remarkable circulation. The U.S. Army included the map in its periodical “surveys of 
literature” in training its officers about the Soviet Union, even into the 1970s, and it was 
also used by academics to teach effective methods in psychological warfare.184 After 
winning the Nobel prize, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn toured Washington, DC, in June 1975, 
and his famed speech brought “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” back into public memory: “In 1947, 
when liberal thinkers and wise men of the West, who had forgotten the meaning of the 
word ‘liberty,’ were swearing that there were no concentration camps in the Soviet Union 
at all, the American Federation of Labor, published a map of our concentration camps, 
and on behalf of all of the prisoners of those times, I want to thank the American workers’ 
movement for this.”185 Here, Solzhenitsyn’s gratitude recasts and re-remembers the map 
as a protest document from “brothers in labor,” dissociating the hand of American state 
power that sanctioned the map. Isaac Don Levine himself would continue to take 
ownership and pride in his connection to the map; Methvin’s interviews with Levine 
before his death in the late 1970s revealed that he “kept a copy of that map hanging on 




distinguished visitors who came to enjoy his company and hospitality and 
conversation.”186 
Finally, as the so-called Second Cold War ignited in the early 1980s, with 
renewed institutional focus and rhetorical sharpening by the U.S. government against the 
Soviet Union, “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” would continue its flow through Cold War culture. 
In 1982, the U.S. Senate adopted Resolution #449, which expressed fears that human 
rights violations were being committed in the construction of the trans-Siberian pipeline, 
and sanctioned the State Department to conduct a study of these violations.187 The 
November report by the State Department included a map detailing the extent of the 
camps in the Soviet Union; that original ideological zeal of the Levine and AFL maps 
was subdued and subverted into the familiar State Department cartographic style, 
resulting in a more staid, “scientific” political map of the Soviet Union (fig. 3.8). The 
report also featured an aerial perspective blueprint style map of the inside of a forced 
labor camp (fig. 3.9). Thus in the evolution of the Gulag map, the State Department could 
now dramatically hyper-focus on infiltrating Soviet space with more sophisticated and 
precise technologies. The map could now envelop the audience in its depiction of the 
camp, a stark departure from the crude but effective hammer-and-sickle propaganda of 
the old AFL map. The AFL-CIO’s Free Trade Union News from November 1982 
devoted its full issue to the State Department report, reprinting both the State Department 
map of Russia with the location of the camps and the layout map of the typical camp. 
Coming full circle, the AFL-CIO also devoted a spread to its old classic “Gulag—Slavery, 
Inc.,” reprinting the map and reminding its readers that “American Labor was first to 




                                  
Figure 3.8. United States Department of State, “Soviet Union Forced Labor Camps and Selected Pipelines,” 
1982 (Reprinted in AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News, George Meany Memorial Archives) 
 
Figure 3.9. United States Department of State, “Typical Forced Labor Camp,” 1982  (Reprinted in AFL-CIO 





appearances, then, the Gulag map was appropriated for a new purpose, not dissimilar to 
Solzhenitsyn’s 1975 tribute—writing the mapping efforts of the AFL into history as a 
prime locator and placer of global forced labor in the Cold War.189 The AFL reclaims the 
map as part of its institutional memory, and the map becomes evidence not just of the 
existence of Soviet camps, but of the existence (and remembrance) of institutional labor’s 
role in waging Cold War.190 
Conclusion 
 
Ultimately, the story of “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” is a heightened representation of 
maps as tense, often contradictory visual containers of both hard, spatial “truths” and 
flexible arguments, contingent on the medium in which the map is serving, and marked 
by intertextual relationships among a host of Cold War institutions. But it is the “footnote 
status” of “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” that makes it a compelling case. The map has long 
been buried as a curio in the cultural propaganda exchange between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. A revisiting of the often-overlooked map, however, allows an entry 
into the everyday flow of Cold War culture. In a sense, it is this culture that actually 
draws the map and gives it meaning beyond what the map simply displays on the page. 
The State Department could use the Gulag map as a material, diplomatic weapon in its 
mission to cultivate international opinion, the AFL could use it as evidence of its 
commitment to anti-Communism around the world (and in its own ranks), while citizens 
and civic groups could use it as a frame for Cold War citizenship. To paraphrase 
Finnegan, the Gulag map was an “eventful image,” materially working its way through a 
multitude of contexts and being marshaled into Cold War skirmishes both public and 




as both product and process—that tension is what gives mapping an explosive dimension 
in a highly spatialized conflict such as the Cold War.  
“Why a map?” remains a viable question in this case. In other words, if the focus 
is on having the authentic evidence to prove the existence of forced labor camps, then 
why not make the camp photographs or the release certificates the main subject of the 
display? A plausible answer lies in this competition for the locatory power of placement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union in this era. The photos and the release 
certificates need the map to anchor them in a particular spatial network—that act of 
mapping commits the existence of forced labor, as authenticated through photos and 
documents, into the international, bipolar geopolitics of the Cold War. What were 
propagandistic rumors were now frozen into a cartographic image, and in an era when an 
ideological conflict between two nuclear superpowers became so heightened, the need for 
scientific abstraction and management grew as well. A map, arguably, could manage 
facts with efficiency and cleanliness in ways that photographs could not, and could “place” 
its information through the use of aggregate forms. William Young, a consultant for the 
Operations Research Office (a civilian military research center at Johns Hopkins and 
founded by the U.S. Army), wrote in 1958 of the Gulag map’s utility in presenting a 
persuasive case:  
[The map] contains no vigorous and generalized indictment, no direct call for 
righteous indignation, no appeal to forswear communism or close one’s ears to 
the siren call of the Soviet. Instead, it is largely almost placidly informative. The 




system. Thus it is not surprising that the Gulag map has been one of the most 
widely circulated pieces of anti-Communist literature.192  
Young, thus, directly attributes the map’s commitment to measured authenticity as 
fundamental to its circulation. The Gulag map’s power of placement in making an 
incendiary argument necessarily draws on cartography’s own perpetual story of itself as a 
self-evident reflection of truths about the world. As Wood and Fels write, “The most 
fundamental cartographic claim is to be a system of facts, and its history has most often 
been written as the story of its ability to present those facts with ever increasing 
accuracy.”193 Particularly in a Cold War context, America set cartographic accuracy as a 
high-stakes priority. The Gulag map case is an early representation of that premium on 
accuracy. The dots, sickles, and other elements of the map go beyond merely representing 
labor camps and become an instantiation of Cold War ideology to absorb in one visual 
glance.194 In the end, what this approach seeks to prove is that a map is never just a map, 
but a confluence of social forces that cohere to constrain a culture’s sense of its space, for 
as Wood and Fels point out, “ultimately it is the interaction between map and paramap 
that propels the map into action.”195 
The Gulag map’s representation of the anxieties around America’s production of 
knowledge about the Soviet Union, and its ability to place that knowledge with authority, 
is arguably its most enduring contribution. America is nowhere to be seen on this map, 
but outside the margins, the map’s content, its production, and its circulation very much 
concern the placement of American values in the Cold War—the power of knowledge in 
the where of the Cold War. The Gulag map (and its various versions) starkly reveals what 




this way, the map attempts to spatially infiltrate the usually impenetrable landscape of the 
Soviet Union. The archetypal Cold War map of the early 1950s, often found in magazines 
such as Time, Life, and Newsweek, shows an expanding Soviet Union with arrows (or, 
infamously, tentacles) tracing its “reach” across the earth. Typically, the Soviet Union is 
presented in these maps as one homogenous mass, with legends and captions admitting 
that there exists a lack of knowledge in what its borders contain. The Gulag map, instead, 
subverts this homogenization by locating the Cold War within the borders of the Soviet 
Union, and this marks a kind of rhetorical coup for the United States.  
Still, this subversion can only go so far. Geographer Sanjay Chaturvedi points out 
that in Cold War geopolitics, often “the singular attributes of a particular place were 
subordinated to its perceived position in the abstract spaces of the Cold War.”196 The 
Gulag map remains an interesting case because while it emphasizes the placement of 
particular camps and even includes the human connection to those places (e.g., children’s 
bodies, signatures on passports), it still serves the abstract objectives of the Cold War, 
allowing the Soviet Union to become “pure negative space” on the map, and blunting its 
ability to socially protest against forced labor. Despite its provocative arguments, the map 
is still structured by a cartographic grammar that conforms to the map’s formal 
expectations to reveal spatial “truth.” Much of cartography’s service during the Cold War 
was for strategic management of increasingly abstract and technologized international 
spaces, and the Gulag map was inextricable from this context. “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” 
might poignantly protest the plight of prisoners, but the map is equally situated as a tool 




This chapter has explored the active natures of Cold War maps in a variety of 
contexts, particularly in how cartography evolved from the air-age globalism of World 
War II into a more anxious and bipolar internationalism, driven by a partitioned world 
full of blocs, pacts, and commitments. Cartography was strategically hailed to manage 
these new anxieties, whether in a newsmagazine, a Congressional report, an Air Force 
manual, or a Voice of America broadcast. The need for America to possess the power of 
placement in abstract spaces—the stabilization of meaning that Massey defined—would 
become even more crucial as the contested, unstable spatial concept of the “Third World” 
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PLACING THE THIRD WORLD:  
AMERICAN VISIONS OF “THE SOUTH” AND  
THE CARTOGRAPHY OF DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION 
 
In 1885, a Scottish evangelist minister of the “Sunday School movement,” James 
Gall, published a short treatise on map projections, buried in an issue of the Royal 
Scottish Geographical Magazine.1 For thirty years, Reverend Gall moonlighted as a map 
dilettante and “gentleman scientist” in addition to his missionary work.2 The 1885 
magazine piece was the first publication of his new, peculiar projections—but one, in 
particular, stood out. Called the Orthographic projection, Gall offered this map as an 
equal-area projection that rectified latitude lines at the 45th parallel and was ideal for 
statistical distribution. He commented that this was “a valuable map for showing the 
comparative area occupied by different subjects, such as land and water, as well as many 
other scientific and statistical facts.”3 Indeed, the map startles with its stretched shapes—
Europe is now significantly smaller than in its prominent treatment in the Mercator, and 
Africa and South America become elongated, with Africa, in particular, becoming a 
defining center of vision (fig. 4.1). The so-called South all of a sudden takes a visual lead 
over a shrunken North. 
 Almost one hundred years later, in May 1973, a West German historian named 
Arno Peters called a press conference in Bonn in order to introduce a world map that bore 
eerie similarity to the stretched shapes found in Gall’s nineteenth-century projection (fig. 
4.2).4 Peters assembled a group of 300-plus academics, government and NGO 
representatives, and journalists to unveil what he and his publishers would later tout as 




             
Figure 4.1. Reverend James Gall, "Gall's Orthographic Projection," Scottish Geographical Magazine, 1885          
           




Morris, reporting for the Guardian, Peters stated bluntly at the conference that, “Mercator 
presents a fully false picture, particularly regarding the non-white-peopled lands. It over-
values the white man and distorts the picture of the world to the advantage of the colonial 
masters of the time.”6 Peters ambitiously attempted to reach beyond mere 
academic/technical innovation, and instead change the way a global audience envisioned 
their place within the world, by using an explosive mixture of ideology, science, and 
social advocacy.7 
The Politics of Long Underwear:  
The Peters Projection and the Iconization of Development 
 
While Gall’s evangelism never sparked any serious debate (in fact, his 
contribution was so forgotten that Peters apparently had never even heard of it when he 
began to promote his almost exact replica), Peters’ brand of evangelism set off a 
firestorm of twenty-plus years of cartographic debate and re-circulation of the map by 
academics, Third World development groups, journalists, churches, governments, and 
international organizations.8 While academic cartographers hurled around epithets like 
“worthless,” “illogical,” “cloudy,” “pernicious,” “inappropriate,” and “absurd” at his map, 
the “Peters projection,” as it came to be known, took on an active rhetorical life and had a 
staying power that even the relentlessly self-promoting Peters could not have 
anticipated.9 Religious and charitable organizations appropriated the map in their 
international missions; economic development organizations circulated the map in a host 
of projects and campaigns; and elementary schools, universities, and curriculum 
development organizations employed the map as a new corrective for its educational 
possibilities.10 By 2002, at least 83 million copies of the map were in international 




map in the world, excepting only the Mercator.”12 With its wide international reach to 
various audiences, the Peters map was unique in its ability to incite equal vitriol and 
praise: for example, it was the kind of map that was condemned in the United Nation’s 
Secretariat News (“…it is not advisable for the United Nations to adopt the Peters map 
for any publication, let alone endorse it”), while simultaneously printed and distributed 
by the UN Development Programme in its 115 international offices.13 Peters himself 
commented to Ward Kaiser, his publisher at Friendship Press, that “public discussion was 
such as had not been known in the history of cartography. I attribute this to the fact that 
the debate over my map was in reality not a struggle about a projection as such but over a 
world picture. Clearly, ideology had entered the struggle.”14  
The central conceit of the Peters projection is the rhetorical choice to emphasize 
the accurate area of the world’s continents over the accuracy of their shape. Perhaps the 
most infamous critique of the Peters projection came from de facto dean of American 
cartography, Arthur Robinson, who pointed out that, “On the ‘Peters projection’ the 
landmasses are somewhat reminiscent of wet, ragged, long, winter underwear hung out to 
dry on the Arctic circle.”15 Certainly, the first noticeable visual effect of the Peters map is 
the elongation of the areas in the middle, which Peters manages by relegating the equator 
to the exact middle of the map. As Alan Henrikson writes, “On most Mercator maps, the 
Equator is located well below the middle, resulting in a kind of global pituitary problem: 
North America and Eurasia are giant-sized, South America and Africa are dwarfed.”16 By 
contrast, in Peters’ map, the continents of South America and Africa, as well as the 
region of Southeast Asia dominate the visual field. For Peters, this corrective gives the 




more industrialized northern areas.17 In terms of Cold War geopolitics, the air-age 
globalism of the 1940s posited the airplane’s shrinking of distance as the new 
measurement standard on the map; here, it is the sheer scale and population power of the 
equatorial masses that serves as the new standard.18  
In that way, the map hints at the explosive potential of a Third World to surpass 
the First (and Second) World.19 The crucial link made here by Peters is that the 
redistribution of area alters the way equality is visualized.20 For example, part of Peters’ 
claim to cartographic equality is his insistence that all of his topographic maps in the 
Peters Atlas are on the same scale: each map uses an equal area scale, rather than one 
simply based on distance—one square centimeter on the map equals 6,000 square 
kilometers in reality.21 In the topographic section, for example, Madagascar is depicted as 
surprisingly larger in area than Britain, thus challenging the reader’s expectations of 
shape and area.22 In this way, Peters sought to minimize the propensity for 
misrepresentation and distortion. In representing countries and continents at the same 
scale, Peters claimed that “their size and position in the world can therefore be 
immediately recognized from the map.”23  
In addition, Peters used his projection (as did many of his supporters) not just for 
topography, but for the vast diversity of social, economic, and political life on a global 
scale, from information and communications, to nutrition, sports, energy, even 
prostitution and child labor. Peters’ style emphasized the form of equality by simplifying 
each of these topics into an easily understood political message: no symbols or icons are 
used in any of the maps; shading and coloring are alone used to show frequency and 




relegates certain color “families” to particular continents: Europe gets shades of roses and 
pinks, Asia gets lavenders and deeper purples, Africa receives golds and pale yellows, 
and then both North and South America are colored in lime and olive greens.25 The color 
scheme speaks to the context of decolonization and the rapid pace of self-determination: 
by choosing to give each state its own shade of the color family, Peters’ map reifies the 
power of the nation-state in the Cold War context—each political unit has its own voice 
but is still part of a “bloc” of similar voices.26 Altogether, then, these choices of scale, 
projection, and color are appropriated strategically to accentuate the Peters projection’s 
politicization of the concept of area.27 
To make these arguments, Peters also required the Mercator map as a constant 
referent, as his projection is almost always consistently drawn (and debated) in reference 
to the Mercator.28 In the UN Development Programme version, for instance, the margin 
of the main world map is filled with a series of insets—these constitute a group of 
comparatives that indict the falsities of the Mercator.29 For example, one inset offers a 
comparison of “Soviet Union, 8.7 million square miles – Africa, 11.6 million square 
miles” with both these areas in black, while the rest of the world is in gray; the caption 
reads, “The traditional map is skewed to the advantage of the northern hemisphere, where 
whites have traditionally lived. The Soviet Union appears to be more than double the size 
of Africa, in spite of the fact that Africa is actually much larger.”30 In another inset, the 
top half of the world above Mexico and Asia is colored in black, while the rest is colored 
in gray, captioned by the staggering statistic that the “North” is 18.9 million square miles, 
while the “South” is 38.6 million square miles.31 Visually, this black and white bipolar 




Peters map.32 By sacrificing the familiar shape of the world in place of accurate area, the 
map is engaging with both the geography and history of colonialism; in a kind of 
cartographic before/after relationship, the Mercator stands in for a colonial past, and now 
the enlarged South represents the international space of the future. The viewer sees the 
growth of the Third World and the shrinking of the First and Second right on the flat 
map.33  
These kinds of novel visual appeals helped turn the Peters projection into a 
development icon. In 1980, for example, the Independent Commission on International 
Development Issues (comprising representatives from more than 20 countries) released 
the influential report North-South: A Programme For Survival, which outlined a 
humanitarian and economic system of world development and a reemphasis on 
North/South relations.34 Begun as an idea by Robert McNamara in 1977 under his 
leadership at the World Bank, the group was convened and led by West German 
Chancellor Willy Brandt, internationally known for Ostpolitik and the thawing of 
East/West relations in Germany. The publicity and circulation of the report were 
extensive.35 And the Peters projection became its defining symbol, used as both the cover 
of the report and a frequent backdrop in the ensuing media campaign. Over a 
cartographic grid, Peters’ version of the world is rendered simply in red, with a stark, 
thick black line running over Mexico, over the tip of Africa up through China, and then 
dramatically dipping below Australia. In the late 1970s, with the re-heating of the Cold 
War (and its performance on a host of different “Third World” fronts) and the dramatic 




its ability to provide a symbolic token for an alternative world order and to represent 
distributive justice.36                                 
As the Peters projection became a new Cold War development emblem, other 
international organizations, governments, and social movements took up the projection as 
a banner.37 The influence of the map also went beyond “development” as merely related 
to economic aid or international trade, as it circulated widely in international education 
and religious organizations. The General Board of Global Ministries of the United 
Methodist Church had a Peters world map six feet high etched in glass at the entrance of 
its New York offices.38 Testimonials from officials at the Lutheran Church pronounced 
that: “The Peters map appears to be the best education tool for showing us our place on 
earth. The values and purposes of this map coincide well with the teachings of the Bible 
and the church.”39 Coordinators at the Development Education Association, an 
international consortium of educators, raved about the map’s ability to teach the values of 
the South to children in order to create “global citizens.”40 An eighth-grade math teacher 
from a Chicago Mexican immigrant community even used it to teach his students how to 
critically read the world, with one of his students reporting that, “doing this project has 
opened my eyes in different ways. I am learning how small details like maps have a lot to 
do with racism and power.”41  
The Peters projection became, in geographer Denis Cosgrove’s words, a kind of 
“totalizing discourse,” offering itself as political shorthand for an alternative 
interpretation of Cold War space.42 As Peters himself understood, “My projection has 
ceased to be just a piece of mathematics or cartography—it is now a symbol.”43 Through 




of development became a uniting, common theme.44 The New Internationalist pointed 
out, “Indeed it is now almost de rigueur for the Peters map to be used if your intention is 
to express solidarity with the Third World.”45 The use of the map as an iconic emblem 
allowed it to transcend its technical or geographic origins, and it instead was appropriated 
to represent, above all, a collection of values—a kind of logo for an internationalist 
identity.46 The presentation of the South in the Peters projection is made into a 
commonsense, rational logic; the emergence of the Third World becomes inevitable.47 
The Peters image as icon, thus, existed within the tense relationship between nationalism 
and internationalism—purporting to provide a voice for the South, while having to 
downplay the realities of self-determination and nationhood that mark the process of 
decolonization.48 
The Peters projection was a prominent example of how the vision and perception 
of the so-called Third World was taking on increasing importance, and the sheer impact 
of this map offers an entry point into considering new Cold War shifts in perspective 
toward the South. During the 1970s, America’s standing as the leading world power and 
arbiter of world space was suffering; it is no coincidence that a map decentering 
America’s Western strongholds and recalibrating the sheer scale of the United States’ and 
Europe’s power would ascend. Peters’ map first appeared in the early 1970s, after years 
of Cold War cartography’s partitioning into blocs and units, depictions of bipolar 
alliances, area studies, regional surveillance, and increasingly state-classified uses of 
sophisticated mapping technology. Within these developments, the so-called Third World 
had arguably been a central spatial battleground for decades.49 Peters was simply 




North and the South that had been capturing the geographic imagination since the Cold 
War’s inception. America responded cartographically to such tensions in a variety of 
compelling ways, and this chapter offers a discussion of these new perspectives that 
challenged familiar East/West geopolitical binaries. 
I argue here that in the Cold War, well before Peters, American maps served as 
both technical conduits and rhetorical symbols for international development. Not only 
did maps reflect changes in spatial worldviews during the decolonization and rise of the 
Third World, but the very act of mapping, and all of its processes, were bound up in the 
way an array of institutions and actors approached and constructed an increasingly 
powerful South. As I have noted, the bipolarity of America’s placement of the Soviet 
Union and its capabilities became evident through the ways in which cartography 
functioned as both images of commitment and evidentiary weapons for waging (and 
circulating the ideologies of) the Cold War. This chapter builds on these frameworks by 
exploring, from a U.S. perspective, how maps accounted for the expansion of the Cold 
War into the so-called Third World, and how cartography itself was a mode by which 
development could be envisioned and practiced. The kind of East/West commitments 
suggested by maps like “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” were increasingly constrained by 
North/South relationships, where the Third World became a contested field on the map 
by which to understand, envision, and wage Cold War. The volatility, however, of these 
relationships ensured that challenges would come to the familiar ways of charting the 
world—despite the progressive narratives of development imposed by particular 




To explore these relationships, I first examine the etymology and rhetorical 
implications of the Third World’s emergence as a contested, international concept of 
world space in the Cold War. Next, I discuss how America placed itself vis-à-vis the 
emergent South, and how America used cartography as an instrument of development 
and modernization to further both its security and economic interests. In particular, I 
highlight the U.S. cartographic collaborations with the United Nations and the multi-
institutional medical cartography initiatives to map Third World disease as representative 
examples of the developing geopolitical tensions between North and South. In these cases, 
America attempted to make itself a model of modernization on the world map, while it 
also surveyed the world for geographic knowledge that would protect its global 
interests—during a time when decolonization reached its peak and Cold War 
antagonisms between the United States and the Soviet Union reached greater intensity. A 
phenomenon such as the Peters projection did not arise out of a vacuum, and this chapter 
charts the contexts that brought about such a cartographic protest. 
Sketching the Contours of the Third World: Origins and Approaches 
The “Third World” is both a fundamentally spatial and Cold War–centric concept. 
From its conception, it was continually contested and redefined, and it operated as a 
classification serving a variety of interests.50 The term itself has been attributed to French 
economist Alfred Sauvy in 1952 when he used it to demarcate “developing countries” in 
contrast to the two major Cold War power blocs.51 The idea, of course, of 
developed/undeveloped nations was not new. But in the early Cold War, the existence of 




became a geopolitically significant, abstract space where the United States and the Soviet 
Union vied for influence.52  
Sauvy originally used the term tiers monde to mean a kind of “Third Force,” 
emphasizing the “third way” of nonalignment rather than underdevelopment.53 Certainly, 
after the famed 1955 conference at Bandung, Indonesia, the idea of an international 
movement using “Third World” status as a kind of organizing, resistant banner became 
more and more viable.54 From the early etymological origins of the Third World, then, 
the idea “served as both a hegemonic conceptualization of the world, and of struggles 
against that hegemony” for both “the paradigms of capitalist modernity” and by “radical 
advocates of liberation from Euro-American colonialism.”55  According to Carl Pletsch’s 
work defining the complex geopolitics of Third World development, the phrase the 
“Third World” itself thus became a kind of “abbreviated ideology” that could represent 
both state power and its resistance.56  
Whether the actual term “Third World” was used as a tool of state power or 
protest, there existed a marked, three-tiered geopolitical framework that powerfully 
organized Cold War discourse.57 In Pletsch’s estimation “the very thought of three worlds 
on one planet constrained even those who were opponents of the Cold War or partisans of 
the third world to do work that contributed both to the strategies of containment and to 
the exploitation of the third world.”58 Especially from the standpoint of Western elites, 
the three worlds idea was inextricable from the modernization doctrines of Cold War 
social science and public policy. Modernization represented a lineage of development 
that leads from tradition to modernity; as a discourse, modernization argued that with the 




themselves.59 In this way, the three worlds concept folded space into time, partitioning 
the “one-world” of 1940s globalism into a continental hierarchy where certain spaces are 
frozen onto the map as always “arriving.”60 In this process, as Arturo Escobar points out, 
“to represent the Third World as ‘underdeveloped’ is less a statement about ‘facts’ than 
setting up a regime of truth through which the Third World is inevitably known, 
intervened on, and managed.”61 This management of knowledge defined Third World 
space by what it “lacked” (whether in money, political stability, health—even in 
developing nations’ abilities to properly map themselves).62 In turn, the First World and 
the Second World would define themselves and each other around the ways they could 
meet this lack.  
Despite the ways that the Third World was defined as underdeveloped and 
backward, it is important to note how the South became a powerful geopolitical trope.63 
While this “mass” South was often presented as a passive repository of Cold War 
interests, it was just as often appropriated (and feared) for its potential strength and 
threat.64 As geographer Donald W. Meinig wondered aloud as early as 1956, “Is it not 
ironic that in this era…of unprecedented concentration of military power in the hands of 
two powerful nations…the small nation, the obscure culture group, the wholly non-
industrialized people, are able to exert far greater force upon the complexion of events 
than in the past?”65 Indeed, historians such as David Painter and Odd Arne Westad made 
clear that the influence of the South on the actions of the so-called North was not merely 
about security and economic influence—it was genuinely an ideological contest around 
deeply held beliefs.66 The depth of such beliefs helps explain the massive scale on which 




often accompanied them). In addition, the internationalist identity of the map’s 
appropriation became a necessarily unstable one in the context of Cold War geopolitics.67  
The tumult of decolonization and the ensuing work by nation-states and global 
actors to define a postcolonial identity constrained the new spaces of the so-called North 
and South during the 1950s and 1960s. As postcolonial theorist Edward Said revealed, 
new “imaginative geographies” had to be devised to account for these new relationships 
and to envision a role for the emergent South. For example, in defining the spatial 
relationships between an essentialized East and West, Said noted a “distribution of 
geopolitical awareness” that resulted in:  
an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up 
of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of 
‘interests’ [that] is, rather than expresses, a certain will of intention to understand, 
in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly 
different (or alternative and novel) world.68 
 With the politicization of the equatorial masses in the Cold War, the North was 
cultivating a new geopolitical awareness that involved this will to incorporate and control 
the Third World by producing massive amounts of knowledge about it.69 The 
replacement of East/West with North/South set up new “processes of subjectification,” in 
Homi Bhabha’s terms, where there were constant attempts to “fix” the developing nations’ 
places in the world.70 What makes the Cold War in the Third World compelling and 
explosive is that this stability was never reached, and the North/South relationship, just 
like East/West, was always in flux.71 For example, the “Third World” and “development” 




development had the optimistic connotation of providing materials and technical 
knowledge for developing nations to maintain themselves; in the 1960s, as decolonization 
spread, though, development became more about building stable nations and 
infrastructures that could withstand communist influence. Soon, development was 
(re)appropriated by Third World intellectuals and elites who were challenging Cold War 
internationalism with homegrown nationalisms.72  
Geographic knowledge, and its extension in cartography especially, provides one 
entry point into exploring these competing imaginaries, especially the ways the South 
was envisioned (and bounded) by the North.73 The rise of geography as a quantitative 
social science that could aid in political, economic, and social global development during 
the Cold War is integral to understanding the contextual forces that brought the Third 
World into view.74 Cartography had the peculiar position of still being largely seen as the 
technical, applied arm of the geographic discipline. The social implication of mapping 
was often downplayed, since a map was frequently seen as an instrument, or a confluence 
of scientific laws. At the same time, mapping was certainly implicated into the race to 
chart and classify the immense social upheaval of a decolonizing world. In a review of 
the major cartographic advances in the years 1950–1975, for example, cartographer 
Arthur Robinson cited the explosion of thematic mapping, in response to the 
overwhelming amount of new social phenomena that both could be mapped by new 
technologies and was increasingly thought should be mapped.75 From popular maps to 
institutional maps to alternative maps of protest, the content of cartography was 
expanding exponentially into covering a wider range of social and political topics, while 




between form and content would mark the U.S. approach to mapping the Third World 
throughout the Cold War. 
Bringing Up the South: 
Maps, Scientific Internationalism, and U.S. Global Interests 
 
The era of decolonization during the Cold War was a busy time for the 
Department of State’s Office of the Geographer. Beginning in 1961, the Office 
commenced a series of intra-agency publications called the Geographic Bulletin and 
Geographic Notes for circulation to foreign policy specialists, staff researchers, and area 
specialists in the department.76 Essentially, these were memo-length updates on volatile 
or changing world geographic situations, accompanied by a map of the area in question. 
What was remarkable about the circulation of the Notes and Bulletins was not the 
cartography itself (mostly, these were simple political maps of particular nation-states 
and their major administrative divisions—and the text provided basic geographic, 
political, and demographic information about that state), but rather the sheer pace at 
which decolonization was taking place, and the ensuing response that this required in 
terms of producing geographic knowledge. A new Notes would appear any time a state 
declared its independence, or its boundaries and administrative divisions were 
reconfigured: in 1966 came Guyana (the fifty-seventh state to announce its independence 
since World War II), Botswana, and Barbados; in 1968 came Swaziland; 1970 saw Tonga 
and Fiji; 1971 saw Qatar and Bahrain; 1972 Bangladesh.77 By December of 1975, as the 
Geographic Notes captioned with its map, Angola marked the eightieth newly 
independent state since 1943.78 
 With this running tally on each map, it was as if the State Department was 




Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (and supervisor of the Geographer’s 
Office) Thomas L. Hughes said at a 1965 lecture at Hamilton College,  
already this week we have corporately encompassed about 120 old nations, 
discovered two new ones, estimated three elections, cast bets on the composition 
of two cabinets, fretted over one unilateral declaration of independence and 
another mutiny, noted the decline of two emerging forces and the resurgence of 
one old established force, and discounted three abortive plots erroneously 
attributed to the CIA.79 
 In addition to these notes on individual countries, the State Department was 
continually issuing revisions of its “Newly Independent States of the World” map, a 
world map on a Miller projection that simply colored in gray the states that had become 
independent since 1943. Side-by-side, for example, the 1963, 1964, and 1965 “Newly 
Independent States” maps show a growing mass of grays around the equator, almost 
covering the entire African continent, and filling in Southeast Asia from Pakistan to 
Indonesia (fig. 4.3).80 Visually, the gray creates a kind of dividing line between the states 
of the North and the states of the South, bringing the world’s focus into a kind of 
top/bottom relationship—and giving an uneasy identity to those considered “Newly 
Independent.” The accompanying memorandum spoke of the need for continual, reliable 
geographic facts, noting the value of “constant monitoring” to define the ever-changing 
patterns of the world’s states, and pointing out that “political changes superimposed upon 
the geography of the globe alter the structure of the international community of nations, 
in name or by dimension, and they…must be reflected in pertinent official maps and 






Figure 4.3. United States Department of State, Newly Independent States of the World, 1965 (Department of State, 
Cartographic & Architectural Records, National Archives, College Park) 
A 1968 Bulletin explored Africa’s “Patterns of Sovereignty” in a map series that 
attempted to make sense on the flat page of the complex histories of European influence 
while accounting for the sequence of how 36 African countries gained independence over 
the course of 25 years. The new world order had new dependencies and new shapes and 
the “puzzle pieces” of nation-states were not what they used to be. At the same time, the 
Geographer’s Office was continually revising its International Boundary Study (a project 
since the days of S.W. Boggs) to reflect the international hotspots for political border 
controversies, a seemingly impossible and interminable task in a world where a new 
nation-state was defining and redefining itself every week (fig. 4.4).82  
The State Department’s geographic approach is just one example of a variety of 





Figure 4.4. United States Department of State, Index to International Boundary Series, 1974 (Department of State, 
Cartographic & Architectural Records, National Archives, College Park) 
massive uncertainty and disruption. While the researchers at the State Department may 
have merely been tracking the changes wrought by decolonization in order for 
policymakers to have better information at their fingertips, cartography actually played a 
broader role than mere knowledge production. Those white versus gray relationships on 
the NIS maps from the Department of State constructed new and curious kinds of spatial 
differences—those gray spots indicated that there were places all over the map that had 
just arrived and had not quite reached the level of the white spaces. The temporal 
relationships created by these continually changing cartographic images are telling—part 




developing, requiring the constant recalculation and repositioning of geographic 
knowledge.  
Popular U.S. mapping institutions also responded to and adapted to these 
reorientations. The Associated Press, for example, throughout the 1960s mapped the 
impact of decolonization on U.S. foreign policy. AP Newsfeature Background Series 
maps like 1960’s “Influx of Neutralist Members Changing Structure of UN,” 1964’s 
“The Non-Aligned,” and 1968’s “UN Membership” tracked the rapid pace of influence 
that the southern nations were gaining.83 Not only was a certain anxiety reflected in the 
sheer size and number of new states but there was an even greater anxiety about what 
kind of international presence and allegiances these states would have. Neutrality and 
nonalignment take on a foreboding presence and are given a substantial power, 
destabilizing the familiar U.S./Soviet binary that marked the Cold War. In “Influx,” for 
example, the so-called “Asian-African” bloc is shaded in dark gray on the map and is 
centered with a placard indicating that the bloc has gained 41 seats. The paramap is 
compounded by three pie charts overlaying the main map, which indicate the immensity 
of changes in Asian-African influence between 1945, 1957, and 1960. The 1960 pie chart 
shows the Asian-African bloc dwarfing the Western, Latin American, and Soviet 
alliances in numbers; together with the map, the temporal/spatial connections of new 
southern influence are made to overwhelm the reader. The stylized world map in “The 
Non-Aligned” simply removes North America, Europe, and the Soviet Union altogether, 
in order to show an equatorial world detached from familiar Cold War antagonisms, and 
united in solidarity (even if this was actually a gross simplification). The displacement of 




maps suggest that the momentous choice of “with us” or “against us” was not as clear-cut 
and self-evident on the map as it may have once been. 
 At the same time, AP maps like 1962’s “Food For Peace Is American Success 
Story” and 1966’s “Peace Corps—A Hit, and Growing” also show the promise of 
modernization on the international landscape, and offer a sense of benevolent paternalism 
in bringing the Third World up to the standards of the First.84 “Food For Peace” 
spatializes the hunger of the Third World using U.S. Department of Agriculture data. 
Most of Africa and South Asia (and parts of South America) are colored in stark black to 
indicate which are “diet deficit countries,” while the rest of the world is lightly outlined 
to recede into the map’s background. In the margins are grossly stereotypical sketches of 
“racial types”—an Asian man eating from a bowl of rice, an Arab holding a shepherd’s 
staff, and an African male with a crude rendering of a village hut behind him. The 
“othering” of the Third World is explicit here: it is the exotic, foreign elements far away 
that are suffering in terms of diet and hunger, thus putting the “underdeveloped” in their 
proper place. So, while the map connotes crisis, the implicit argument is that 
organizations like Food For Peace are working with benevolent goals to improve the 
health of the less fortunate, thus placing American aid as the real subject of the map. In 
“The Peace Corps,” a conventional world map is simply covered with numbers that 
correspond to a legend indicating how many volunteers are serving in a particular country. 
What anchors the focus of the map, though, are drawings of two young white peace corps 
volunteers (one female, one male) in the bottom left corner of the map, gazing out over 
the landscape of the map and looking slightly upward toward Africa and Asia. In both AP 




“civilization.” Visually, the tiers are created between North and South, and place the First 
World as both the surveyor and model for the Third. Such maps speak to a strong 
ambivalence about the rise of the South—a wariness of neutrality and an anxious 
anticipation exists around what choice developing nations would make to join the “right 
bloc,” but there also is a hope that with the proper U.S. stewardship, international space 
could be stabilized again. 
At even the earliest stages of the Cold War, the highest halls of American 
leadership were formulating, with missionary zeal, a spatially conscious global push to 
modernize the Third World.85 As a new corollary to the European Marshall Plan, 
President Harry S. Truman outlined what became to be known as the “Point Four 
Program” (so named because it was the fourth plank in his inaugural address on January 
20, 1949), which set out to bring “scientific advances and industrial progress” to the 
world’s underdeveloped areas.86 As Truman offered:  
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching 
misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life 
is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them 
and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the 
knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. The United States 
is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific 
techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for the assistance 
of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical 




Truman’s Point Four Program, which morphed into the State Department’s Technical 
Cooperation Administration, was concerned with an interventionism of ideas and 
knowledge production. Its establishment also demonstrated that from a point early in the 
Cold War, the stark East/West binaries were filled out and re-colored by the complex, 
multilayered South. For example, a 1952 map series produced by the State Department to 
promote the Point Four Program focused on the darkened countries in Central America, 
South America, North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia (fig. 4.5).88 Black banners 
cover the United States and the Soviet Union so that the eye focuses squarely on the 
equatorial nations. A line traces from each darkened country to a circle in the banner, 
which contains the letters A, H, E, and X to indicate whether the Point 4 intervention was 
in Agriculture, Health & Sanitation, Education, or “X” for Resource Development &  
 
Figure 4.5. United States Department of State, Technical Cooperation Administration, Point 4 Around the World, 




Other Technical Services. The visual combined with the text of the icons makes for a 
display in which the countries in dark blue are framed as “arriving” or “in process” 
relative to the rest of the world.89 
Truman’s push for a program to spread U.S. knowledge across the globe was 
linked with the rise of modernization theory, which became a major part of the 
collaboration between the U.S. government and the social sciences in the Cold War. For 
example, “area studies” programs were a large collaborative focus between 
government/military interests and academic institutions, think-tanks, and commercial 
research foundations, designed to create massive interdisciplinary knowledge (especially 
in the social sciences) of particular regions—specifically as catalysts for development 
projects in strategic spaces.90 Out of collaborations like these came works such as Walt 
Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth, which was the Cold War hallmark “non-
communist manifesto” for modernization.91 To respond to the Soviet’s own brand of 
modernization, social scientists like Rostow were looking for a logic and a lexicon that 
expressed U.S. plans for the increasingly southern focus of the Cold War—the push to 
standardize technical knowledge of and for the “places” of U.S. influence around the 
world became the answer.92  
Of course, this move toward abstract knowledge necessarily involved a rupture 
and denial of individual Third World nations’ pasts and differences.93 As Kimber Charles 
Pearce concluded, theories like Rostow’s made development a progressive, linear process 
with an anti-Communist pretext “whose argument that all nations pass naturally through 
the same phases of development convinced U.S. policy makers to homogenize their 




evolution of liberal democratic capitalism tended to mask conflict and emphasize the 
continuities of the development process.”94 This emphasis on continuities also fit with 
what critical geographers like Simon Dalby referred to as a Cold War narrative where 
contentious political and social issues are reduced to technical considerations that can be 
continually improved by better knowledge and instruments.95 Importantly, though, as 
Cold War historian Odd Arne Westad argues, Washington’s objectives to modernize the 
Third World “were not exploitation or subjection, but control and improvement,” thus 
representing a “genuine and deeply held ideological” social consciousness.96 It is 
tempting to label the Cold War as simply a realist game of power politics, framed by the 
calculus of security. But the integration of social science into the waging of the Cold War 
evidences the driving belief in a liberal modernism that could develop the world to both 
further American interests and actually improve the lives of the great masses of the 
globe.97 
Cartography played an interesting role in America’s drive to modernize and 
develop the Third World—to be able to both survey and improve needed quantification 
and visualization, which maps uniquely provided. Cartography reflected new U.S. roles 
in the developing world by shaping and constraining the very ways the developing world 
was becoming a Cold War space. In both process and product, maps constructed 
particular visions of the South in relation to American interests, while also emphasizing 
the premium on cartographic knowledge for developing nations. Two particular U.S. 
cartographic projects are highlighted here to demonstrate these new perspectives: one 
encompasses the U.S. academic and government collaboration in the mapping of world 




second is the “scientific internationalism” of the American cartographic role in the United 
Nations.  
Medical cartography provides a compelling example of how internationalism and 
modernization were spatialized on the flat page, and how the needs for cartography were 
expanding in this era. In addition, the UN case highlights the ways in which U.S. 
policymakers and technicians transmitted and taught cartographic principles and 
techniques through UN leadership and other projects. All the while, particular attention is 
paid to the various interests that drive the uses of this knowledge in a Cold War context.   
Diagnosing the Third World: America’s Mapping of World Health in the Cold War 
One of America’s most ambitious cartographic endeavors in terms of Third World 
development came through the medical geography movement that gained momentum in 
the 1950s. The relationship of disease to physical location and region was not a new line 
of inquiry, of course: the writings of Hippocrates in On Airs, Waters, and Places 
established this connection.98 But the systematic study of disease from a geographic point 
of view did not become prominent until the 19th century, when Prussian medical officers 
introduced the term “medical geography” and “sought to demonstrate a connection 
between the geographical location of disease and the prevailing physical, social, and 
cultural features of the surrounding environment.”99 In America, studies of disease 
(particularly alcoholism) and geography in the early frontier West appeared in public 
discourse, and U.S. census data was used to produce “Sanitary Maps” of preventable 
diseases in areas such as Louisiana and Texas.100 During the Civil War, early work in 
medical geography was published discussing the relationship of disease and race to 




Still, U.S. efforts at an international program of study in medical geography and 
cartography did not really take place until the push toward globalism in the 1940s. In 
1944, Dr. Richard Light proposed, at an American Geographical Society (AGS) 
conference (with geographers, medical scientists, military medical officers, and 
influential government public health officials in attendance) that the AGS board should 
produce a comprehensive Atlas of Diseases.102 A pilot project was started, and by 1948, it 
reached full steam. Dr. Jacques May, a French surgeon (and World War II Resistance 
agent) who had taught surgery and practiced in Hanoi, was chosen by Light and the AGS 
to take over the project.103 With funding from the Office of U.S. Naval Research and with 
grants from pharmaceutical companies, May was able to establish a Medical Geography 
Department based out of the AGS’s New York office, in order to create the atlas.104 The 
full color map plates began to appear periodically in the Geographical Review and were 
distributed to various U.S. government institutions throughout the 1950s; 17 maps (out of 
a proposed 22) would appear by 1955.105  
May was especially innovative in his work that connected the cultural aspects of 
particular regions to the outbreaks of disease—going beyond merely pointing out where 
such outbreaks were taking place. For example, a 1954 Newsweek profile of May, which 
referred to him as “The Map Doctor,” highlighted his disease maps and their ability to 
make connections between disease and “soil, air, water, foodstuffs, modes of living, and 
religious customs and habits that contribute to these ailments.”106 The specific examples 
used in the article are direct connections between sickness and religious beliefs: “The 
daily ablutions of Moslem rites are usually performed in polluted water, causing infection. 




and skin diseases. In Asia, pilgrims are frequently the carriers of cholera and plague.”107 
May’s work examining the prevalence of disease in North Vietnam due to cultural factors 
of land tenure laws and house-building materials makes a similar case.108 Indeed, in 
historian of medicine Felix Marti-Ibanez’s 1958 introduction to May’s AGS-sponsored 
book, The Ecology of Human Disease, culture is emphasized as a constraining factor: 
“culture could influence disease by uniting or separating, whichever the case may be, the 
‘challenges’ of the environment, which would then change and so would the host 
population” with the solution being to “change the disease-producing environment in 
which man lives.”109 The AGS mapping project evidenced that one integral way to 
change “cultures” is through the accumulation of scientific, medical knowledge on a 
global scale. 
While May’s background and credentials gave the project an international flair, it 
was resolutely American in its concerns about security and economic modernization. 
Historical geographers Tim Brown and Graham Moon use May’s background as a 
physician during Indochina’s last vestiges of colonialism to show his approach to medical 
geography as a benevolent, triumphalist spin on an “imperial history that views the 
unfolding of events from the perspective of the dominant culture,” and a celebration of 
the “victories of civilization over barbarism.”110 At the same time, though, this brand of 
imperialism was marked by a more “rational, scientific view of disease causality.”111 
Certainly, this paralleled the evolution of cartography in the postwar era toward a more 
scientific, quantitative foundation and also as a strategic instrument used by America to 
assess truly global problems. The focus on culture in these maps of world disease is 




in Third World countries, as seen in Truman’s Point Four initiatives. As international 
relations scholar Roxanne Doty notes, these foreign aid discourses “suggest that the 
danger was not in poverty itself, but in the identities of those who were impoverished, 
those who could not take a long-range view of their situations.”112 Similarly, in 
combating world health issues, sickness would be equated not only with particular world 
regions, but with the people who filled those regions. Cartography provided the means to 
visually edify these dangers—the way by which the “long-range view” could be taken.  
The military applications of May’s project were also a driving force. Not only did 
U.S. Naval Research underwrite the work, but May also forged key collaborations with 
the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army, suggesting that medical geography had 
strategic potential. According to one military official, who was a major supporter of the 
project “knowledge of the medical topography and medical geography of a region or a 
country is just as important as that of its physical geography in the planning and conduct 
of a military operation.”113 May was a central figure in the production of this type of 
knowledge in the Cold War. For example, one of his main projects in the Atlas of 
Diseases was mapping the various forms of viral encephalitis, particularly in response to 
the hemorrhagic encephalitis epidemic that ravaged U.S. troops in the Korean War.114 In 
addition, after completing his tenure at AGS, May worked under contract with the U.S. 
Army’s Quartermaster Research Division and conducted a massive series of country-by-
country surveys on the geography of malnutrition (complete with maps), starting with the 
Far and Near East in 1961; moving onto Africa, Central and Southeastern Europe, and 
Central America; and ending with South America in 1974.115 Thus, the Atlas of Disease 




during the Cold War. It motivated the charting of poverty and food shortage trouble spots 
as well as environmental facts for the U.S. armed forces that “would help in global 
military encounters.”116 It is no wonder, then, that Jacques May was appointed in 1961 as 
the Chief Medical Education Adviser to the U.S. Operations Mission in Vietnam. His 
intimate medical and geographic knowledge of the Third World would thus be 
appropriated and militarized into the conflicts of the Cold War.117 
The Atlas of Disease style is colorful and packed with a “paramap” full of 
information. For example, the Disease map of the tropical skin diseases Yaws, Pinta, and 
Bejel features a world map focused on Africa, where splotches of brilliant red and orange 
mark outbreaks of the affliction (fig. 4.6).118 Since Europe has almost no incidence of 
them, the map simply covers that continent with a closer inset of South America, and  
     
Figure 4.6. American Geographical Society, "World Distribution of Spirochetal Diseases: 1. Yaws, Pinta, Bejel," 




displays several provocative photos of what looks to be African children with skin lesions 
who function as symbolic stand-ins for an entire “diseased” continent. Surrounding the 
frame of the world map are insets of countries like Haiti and Thailand that display their 
infection rates relative to vegetation, soil, etc. On this global scale, the combination of 
world map, photos, and regional insets overwhelms the map user with the graphics of 
infection—particularly, the varying shades of bright color connote infiltration of southern, 
foreign spaces by sicknesses that call for intervention. The white spaces of either so-
called healthy spots or those with “no data” stand in stark contrast with those that are 
affected, as the map plays temporally with the idea that it is only a matter of time before 
more color seeps into these spaces. In May’s cartographic study of cholera epidemics, 
these temporal relationships are even more important—a main world map uses different 
colored lines to depict the worldwide spread of the disease during different eras of the 
19th-century, while the insets show how cholera was isolated to the Middle East and India 
by 1950. Over the map spread, then, the viewer sees a worldwide pandemic slowly 
becoming a specifically Third World concern in the postwar era; the spaces of the North 
had “progressed” beyond it.119 Other Disease maps highlight Africa and South Asia as 
being tick-, worm-, and louse-ridden in terms of disease transmission.120 The overall 
effect of these displays is the empowerment of America’s medical expertise as a form of 
knowledge and visuality. Cartography’s historical power of linking entire territories with 
particular traits and relating them in total to other territories with those same traits is 
especially powerful when the subject is sickness, epidemics, and plagues. The map’s 
ability to partition world spaces creates a kind of quarantine effect, seeking to isolate 




Compounding this rhetorical display is the important political choice of projection 
that the Atlas of Disease uses. May’s maps were drawn by the American Geographical 
Society’s Senior Cartographer William Briesemeister, who invented a special projection 
specifically for the Disease maps.121 First developed in 1948, the Briesemeister 
projection was a notably prominent representation of the increasingly popular use of 
equal-area on world maps in the postwar era—and one especially built for the 
complications of a Cold War. Briesemeister himself billed it as a “world equal-area 
projection for the future…most suitable…for the purpose of plotting worldwide statistics 
in this present day of super speed, jet planes and intercontinental missiles.”122 The overall 
display of the Briesemeister projection is odd and compelling—the full spread uses an 
elliptical egg-shape, and in the top center of the map, the entire North Pole can be seen, 
with Alaska and the Bering Strait region of the Soviet Union forming the northern-most 
point.123 Importantly, except for Antarctica, the continents are grouped without being cut; 
thus, the map has a fluidity and “one-world” quality.124 Most striking is the prominence 
of Africa and South America, and the two continents’ large area in comparison to North 
America, Europe, and the Soviet Union. Using the Briesemeister projection, Atlas of 
Disease maps like “Distribution of Helminthiases” make particularly prominent use of 
Africa as the focal point, where the comparatively few other instances of this parasitical 
disease stand in contrast to the deep colors and thick, bold criss-crossed lines plaguing 
the African landscape.125 Africa’s visualization as the least distorted of all continents in 
Briesemeister’s projection contributes to the effect of the visual field “clearing up” 
around Africa, and creating the impression that Africa is a sick continent. For Cold War 




themselves well to statistical distribution. In the process, the Third World spaces 
increased in size and centrality; shapes may have been slightly distorted, but 
cartographers and policymakers placed a higher premium on accuracy to pinpoint areas 
for economic and social development in the emerging nations. Even small innovations 
like the Briesemeister show an increasing visual acceptance of North/South as a defining 
characteristic of world relationships in terms of bringing politics, the military, and 
academic social science together.  
The ensuing appropriation and adaptation of the Atlas of Disease reveals that the 
U.S. government’s interest in this global mapping project was inseparable from its 
interests in world economic development. The Mutual Security Act of 1958, originally 
enacted in 1948, set forth a policy plank stating:  
The Congress of the United States, recognizing that the diseases of mankind, 
because of their widespread prevalence, debilitating effects, and heavy toll in 
human life, constitute a major deterrent to the efforts of many peoples to develop 
their economic resources and productive capacities, and to improve their living 
conditions, declares it to be the policy of the United States to continue and 
strengthen mutual efforts among the nations for research against diseases.126 
The issue of world disease is rhetorically situated under the umbrella of America’s 
conception of mutual security in the Cold War, as well as the drive toward modernization 
and development in the Third World. To supplement this policy, in 1959, the Committee 
on Government Operations in the Senate, headed by Senator Hubert Humphrey, produced 
a report called The Status of World Health, which included more than 30 maps and charts, 




remainder were from the World Health Organization and the United Nations. 
Humphrey’s introduction to the report makes special reference to the need for a “big 
picture” approach to medicine “rather than piecemeal views of world health, such as may 
have been seen in times past” and “requires a total, not a segmented view,” as “U.S. 
responsibilities under world health programs continue to mount.”127  
Maps, appropriately, served as the main instruments of vision for Humphrey’s 
proposed big-picture approach, able to capture a total snapshot of world health. Using 
world regions as the basis of study, world maps of issues such as life expectancy at birth 
and the ratio of population to physicians sketched the stark contours of an unequal 
world.128 To make this case succinctly and unequivocally, the adaptations of the AGS 
maps are made much simpler than their referents. For example, the layers of colors and 
shades that distinguished the Atlas of Disease maps are replaced by the simple black, 
white, and gray dots of the typical Congressional report, a constraint of its printing and 
distribution requirements. More literally, then, world health and the Western response to 
it, was depicted as a black-and-white issue. In this way, the diseases stand in for the 
regions on these maps (India equals smallpox; Egypt equals low life expectancy) (figs. 
4.7 and 4.8). In other words, a black area on the landscape fills in the lines of an entire 
nation, discerned through the contrast to the nations in white that are un- afflicted.129 In 
page after page of maps, whether depicting hookworm, yellow fever, or leprosy, the 
darkest-colored areas of the world are concentrated underneath a kind of invisible 
horizontal line drawn just north of Mexico, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and North 
Vietnam.130 North of this line, the map is mostly marked by empty white spaces and 




      
Figure 4.7. "Smallpox Endemicity," Senate Committee on Government Operations, Status of World Health, 1959 
      





areas reside. To accentuate this line, The Status of World Health actually foregoes the 
innovative, Third World–centric projections like the AGS’s Briesemeister projection for 
the more conventional Mercator projection. Despite the fact that most of the thematic 
maps in the study show higher incidences of disease and lack of health resources in South 
America, Africa, and South and East Asia, the use of the Mercator still privileges an 
enlarged Soviet Union, United States, and Europe. With the audience for this report 
limited mostly to other U.S. lawmakers and government health officials, the form of the 
map’s projection eschewed statistical accuracy and scientific innovation in order to 
support the more officially sanctioned view of the world during the Cold War of the 
East/West bipolar superpower relationship. Thus, the North/South divisions are 
constrained by the East/West ones, and The Status of World Health situates world health 
from the global perspective of American security interests. While the intent of mappers 
like May might not have been to advance a crude cultural and environmental determinism 
of geographic area to disease and poverty, in the appropriation of them by the Senate, the 
overall effect of the maps sets up a deep boundary between the “above” world and the 
“under” world.  
A few of the maps in the Senate report, though, notably go beyond the Mercator 
and use some novel cartographic forms to show certain key shifts in world geographic 
relationships. For example, the “Disease of the World” map uses “cartograms,” where a 
chosen theme or trait is used as the basis of scale, rather than area (fig. 4.9).131 Here, 
China and India engulf the visual focus of the map, bloated beyond recognition to denote 
their populations compared to areas such as the United States and the Soviet Union, while 




                     
Figure 4.9. "Disease in the World," Senate Committee on Government Operations, Status of World Health, 1959 
swelling, amorphous shapes connote an overstuffed quality to these areas, as if they are 
ready to burst. Considered intertextually with the other maps of the report, which trace 
the failing health of many of these regions, America’s Cold War anxiety around place 
becomes evident. Without surveillance, containment, and management, these volatile 
areas could spread beyond their current boundaries and dis-place the centrality of the 
United States and its allies.  
Importantly, then, the Status of World Health report showcases that the ability to 
map world health is only as good as the availability of data, and this fact is used in the 
report to make a distinction between the First World and the Second and Third World. As 
Humphrey points out, the main conclusion of the report is that “more statistics are 
needed…Regrettably, an analysis of the world health situation is difficult due to the lack 
of accurate, current statistical data, particularly from the less developed countries.”132 
Instead of specific conclusions as to what can be done with such statistical information to 




of world health is enough, that knowledge of these problems is the real goal. Cartography 
becomes a fitting central vehicle for such knowledge—drawing world spaces as abstract 
containers that can be filled in with information in endless configurations, and with lines 
that can draw the “over” and “under” distinctions that are needed to advance arguments 
of development. In that way, channeling Doty, disease is not the enemy—it is the lack of 
knowledge about such diseases in foreign areas that becomes the enemy. 
In fact, Ibanez’s introduction to May’s work comments on the perceived value of 
medical cartography as a tool of development and knowledge production:  
Every human race, however, just like every human being, carries within its 
primitive soul an image of the ideal, which it endeavors to fit within the 
surrounding geographic environment…Man throughout the centuries has fought 
against hunger, war, and disease, the three great threats that incessantly tend to 
change the map of humanity, just as medicine tends to shrink the empire of 
disease. Man’s passionate craving for immortality has compelled him to fight 
incessantly against the forces that condemn him to the oblivion that is death.133 
 The Cold War project to map the extent of human disease strove for an idealized 
image by pointedly making a deliberately global approach, on a scale that had not been 
attempted before. May’s combination of the “pathogen” (the sickness) with the “geogen” 
(the geographic factor that facilitates the sickness) was not just a scientifically significant 
connection, but a rhetorical one as well—the world on the flat page, through the bounded 
lines of the map, could now be “diagnosed” and its weak spots and sicknesses absorbed 
portrayed in one visual field.134 The visual charting of health (or lack thereof) of 




expansion of the Cold War. Cartography provided the necessary abstraction of individual 
human suffering from disease, so that health could be aggregated as both a regional and 
global phenomenon—a strategic world problem to be solved through economic and 
cultural development by powerful, intervening world actors.  
Developing and Decolonizing the Map: The United States, the United Nations, and 
the Transmissions of Cartographic Knowledge in the Third World 
 
While projects like medical cartography helped to spatially define particular 
world problems, there was also continual emphasis on the use of cartography as a Cold 
War teaching medium to help newly developing nations achieve self-sufficiency, as a key 
step in the progressive move toward development and modernization. For example, the 
postwar push to dramatically increase the amount and accuracy of topographic maps of 
the earth required collaborations with “friendly countries all over the world,” and resulted 
in projects like the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Inter-American Geodetic Survey 
(IAGS), which drew on State Department, Army, and Navy support to work with various 
Latin American countries to map the entire continent. Out of this collaboration came the 
Alaska-to-Chile line, the longest measured line in the world, “an arc of triangulation 
[that] will eventually lock the maps of North and South America into a unified whole.”135 
As Colonel Robert R. Robertson of the Army Corps of Engineers remarked in a 1956 Life 
profile, “An important thing to remember about the IAGS is that we are not mapping 
Latin America. We’re helping the Latin Americans do it themselves. It’s their 
program…You can see what a terrific thing it is for inter-American relations.”136 
Cartography was framed as both a way to protect national security (having the most 
accurate survey of the Western Hemisphere possible) and a symbol of self-determination 




Congress on Surveying and Mapping, offered in 1954, institutions like the Corps of 
Engineers had mapping agreements with practically every country outside the Iron 
Curtain since “aside from their military importance, adequate maps provide the 
information required for the rapid economic and industrial development required by the 
free world today.”137 In this way, cartography was posited as a facilitating force for 
global development that went beyond military applications and could be drafted into the 
economic ideology of the Cold War’s Three Worlds framework. With U.S. technical 
expertise, the world could be made more easily in America’s image.138  
The United Nations was one prominent vehicle through which this could be done. 
The United Nations’ attempt to centralize international mapping projects in the late 1940s 
marked the first major attempt to systematically define cartography for its capacity to aid 
international development efforts.139 A U.N. Economic and Social Council resolution of 
1948 stated that “accurate maps are a prerequisite to the proper development of the world 
resources which in many cases lie in relatively unexplored regions.”140 This resolution set 
the tone for the official start of a comprehensive international cartography program for 
the United Nations (through UNESCO) at a two-week conference in March of 1949.141 
Department of State actors like S.W. Boggs (who would attend and play a major role in 
the conference), had lobbied for an international cartographic organization through U.S. 
institutional channels for years. Finally, the participants at the 1949 conference were able 
to agree on a galvanizing direction: a specific U.N. branch for cartography that would 1) 
further stimulate national programs of surveying and mapping by promoting the 




of the United Nations and specialized agencies in the field of cartography; and 3) develop 
close cooperation with cartographic services between interested member governments.142  
In addition, the resolution broke the world down into six cartographic regions 
(Asia and the Far East, Central and South Africa, the Middle East, Western Europe and 
the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and the Americas—a typical geographic partitioning 
during the Cold War). Out of these six regions, government representatives that shared a 
community of interests in mapping that area would hold periodic meetings for each 
region, supervised and supported by the United Nations. Despite the idealist overtones of 
its calls for global cartographic cooperation, the resolution was not without its partisan 
controversies. The delegations of the Soviet Union and Poland opposed joining the 
resolution on the grounds that it would lead to “the establishment of international 
cartographic standards and therefore to the eventual modification, through a difficult and 
costly process, of laboriously built up national cartographic systems which were designed 
to satisfy specific national needs.”143 In addition, France fought unsuccessfully to 
separate Western Europe from the Mediterranean in the regional breakdown and make all 
of Africa one region, instead of splitting North Africa amongst the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East.144 Thus, the Cold War tensions between national interests and 
internationalism (Soviet Union) and the difficulty of defining regions during post-
colonial transitions (France) were bound up in the ways maps were situated in the 
postwar landscape. 
 From the outset of the U.N. cartographic program, the focus on economic and 
social advancement through mapping was critical. The delegates to this first map 




an era of a rapidly shifting political and economic landscape. For one, they noted how 
decolonization was changing and expanding cartography’s role. While topographic maps 
may remain a responsibility of national governments, “we are now living in a period 
when the principle of absolute national sovereignty is losing some of its strength, a 
political development which may be considered as the hallmark of our time,” the 
document concluded.145 Thus, maps had to meet more fluid needs that required 
international efforts. The report also attacked the lack of exchange of carto-information, 
particularly between more highly developed countries and lesser developed countries, 
noting that, “In an advancing civilization there is increasing and urgent need for more 
power, more food, and better communications. The means of producing these essentials 
are various, but in every case they can be produced more cheaply and more quickly with 
adequate maps than without them.”146 Maps were supposed to speed the pace of 
development and equalize the playing field—and governments had an actual duty to serve 
their publics by producing them. More than merely technical instruments, they were 
foundational for international progress. As the conference delegates’ recommendations 
note,  
Not only is cartographic service a tool to the United Nations and its specialized 
agencies but, in the broad sense used here, cartographic knowledge is the basis for 
any program for social and economic development…Human history, especially 
the recent records and particularly in the more highly developed nations, is full of 
examples of things that have been done, large structures intended for human 
betterment, which have completely or partly failed for lack of ordinary 




the consideration of social values to protect peoples and communities from 
unconsidered—or not sufficiently considered—economic developmental 
projects.147  
Maps, in other words, can also visually reveal where development can go wrong, 
thus serving as a protective device for communities that are in upheaval—in turn, the U.N. 
cartographic branch was offering an interpretive function in its services, helping nations 
to not only get the right tools, but to “read” maps better. In 1955, the same year as the 
summit at Bandung, the United Nations held its first regional cartographic conference for 
Asia and the Far East in Mussoorie, India. The conference’s inaugural address by popular 
Indian politician (and former member of India’s Non-Cooperation movement) Dr 
Sampurnanand upheld the idea that a lack of adequate mapping was a sign of global 
inequality that required rectification, reminding the delegates that “Fairly accurate maps 
showing political sub-divisions and the positions of the principal seas, rivers and 
mountains are still luxuries in certain parts of the civilized world.”148 The age-old 
connection of maps to “civilization” was especially heightened here in a Cold War 
context—to participate in the new global world order, a nation had to know itself; maps, 
thus, were not just important for their geographic information, but for their utility as a 
development symbol. The very act of mapping allowed nations’ entry into a global 
conversation. This spirit of development would carry forward into the United Nation’s 
regional cartographic conferences held every couple of years, begun in 1955 and 
continuing into the 1980s, for areas such as Africa and the Near East. 
 U.N. cartography also provided a visual representation of the organization’s 




development for territories (either from former League of Nations mandates or areas 
derived from defeated nations in World War II) on the path to independence. Every year, 
the United Nations would issue updates of its Trusteeship maps, which marked areas of 
the world that were full members of the United Nations, and those that were trustee-
dependent nations (mostly located in Africa and Oceania). The U.N.’s annual yearbook 
from the late 1940s into the 1960s, for example, published these maps in attempts to 
show the progressive effects of development that brought nation-states into membership 
in a larger world community.149 In this way, the U.N. maps made political partitioning 
into a kind of paternalism that blocked off nations that were being “parented” toward full 
adulthood in the world of the United Nations. The problem is that such maps of political 
bordering and agreements could not account for the other inequalities that still existed 
between these nations and their move into adulthood. So while the gradual decline in the 
amount of trustee states was indicated as a U.N. triumph on these maps, the silences on 
the map still spoke loudly as well. 
The U.S. role in this cartographic program of the United Nations especially 
provides some unique insight into the discursive role of mapping on an international scale, 
and what development meant in terms of U.S. global interests. For one, it was noted 
frequently that the viability of the U.N.’s program for international cartographic 
cooperation was inspired by the success of the U.S.-led Commission on Cartography of 
the Pan American Institute of Geography and History, which united U.S. technical 
cartographic advice with Latin American governments, and the IAGS project with the 
Army Corps of Engineers.150 These became the kind of go-to examples for how a spirit of 




dominant role in setting the tone for the collaborative mapping of the entire world. This 
internationalism was in play, for example, in the report of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. 
Regional Cartographic Conference for Asia and the Far East, where State Department 
Geographer G. Etzel Pearcy (S.W. Boggs’ successor and a former airline executive) 
pointed out that “National developmental organizations must rely on the surveyor and 
cartographer for support in order to discover, evaluate, and utilize resources, and to foster 
the economic and social developments of the region.”151 Such development was also 
increasingly tied to developing states’ access to better mapping technologies. As Pearcy 
notes,  
The increased demands to exploit our resources to meet man’s needs make it 
mandatory to develop improved cartographic production techniques. Emerging 
states, however, should not wait for the utopia computer, but arrange their data 
and plan their programming techniques for today’s computers. Consideration 
should be made by affluent nations to include the emerging countries as recipients 
of computers and automatic systems suitable for their applications.152 
Mapping was clearly an activity, then, to be brought into the tide of modernization—the 
notion that with the right instruments from the established North, the South had a chance 
to catch up. At a U.N. Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa, a report to Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk by Delegate H. Arnold Karo (from the U.S. Coastal Survey) proposed 
that any kind of successful “rational economic development” in Africa depended on the 
credibility of technical specialists that could come in and help standardize the continent’s 
disparate mapping methods.153 Karo bemoaned how aerial photography needed for 




aerial photography in the New Africa states has been provided by the British and French 
governments through commercial contracts or government-owned survey air-craft. As the 
influence of these governments on the new countries wanes, the support for aerial 
mapping and surveying will diminish in like proportion.”154 In a peculiar way, 
decolonization here is framed as inciting chaos that invites a kind of re-colonization, 
except this time due to the former colonies’ perceived need for better technical 
knowledge.  
While the report depicts the United States as a benevolent provider of technical 
assistance, the specter of Cold War competition for influence lingered not far behind. For 
example, Karo’s version of the conference notes that “the African nations displayed 
much interest in the U.S. [geodetic] system and discussed it at considerable length,” but 
also observed that “the mapping system proposed by the Soviet Union…could have a 
strong appeal to the African nations which are desperately seeking ways and means for 
mapping and survey assistance. Technically, however, the Soviet system entails 
cumbersome methods” and “could in effect only be operated and maintained by a large 
contingent of Soviet technical specialists.”155 In this way, the actual presence of Soviet 
cartographers to run this equipment connoted an infiltration of African areas that could 
prove dangerous for American interests. Responding to the anxieties, Karo’s final 
recommendations to Rusk indicated that the United States needed to take the lead in 
providing mapping and geodetic/aerial photographic support for Africa, as “these same 
maps and data are necessary for the security of individual property rights, to the security 
of an individual nation, and the collective security of the region” as well as “worldwide 




accessible cartographic intelligence on a worldwide scale is a necessary part of our 
national policy.”156 The individual mapping data systems for African nations were drawn 
into the complex East/West antagonisms of a U.S. Cold War internationalism 
increasingly constrained by the South. 
 These examples speak to a continual conundrum in the American approach to 
development in the Third World. According to Westad, for American Cold War ideology, 
decolonization provoked two very different kinds of responses:  
On the one hand, American elites welcomed the breakup of the European colonial 
empires because it meant opportunities for extending US ideas of political and 
economic liberties…On the other hand, however, decolonization increased the 
threat of collectivist ideologies getting the upper hand in the Third World…If that 
was the case, then a covert strategy for influence would make more sense than 
open attempts at gaining friends through aid and trade.157  
The dualism between opportunities for open exchange and the need for covert secrecy 
found its way into the development of cartography and the production of geographic 
knowledge in the era. Extraordinarily fluid lines appeared between economic/social 
development and militarization. For example, the push toward development and 
modernization encompassed the efforts of the United States to lead UN initiatives to 
provide technical knowledge to Third World nations all over the earth. Promotional maps 
of the Peace Corps’ missions around the world, for example (fig. 4.10), showed a kind of 
benevolent intervention across the globe that idealized America’s development spirit.158 
At the same time, the most prodigious and vigorous mapping of the Third World during 





Figure 4.10. U.S. Peace Corps, "Peace Corps Around the World," 1966 (Geography & Map Division, Title 
Collection, Library of Congress) 
Intelligence Agency (while most of the CIA mapping was topographical, figs. 4.11 and 
4.12 show representative examples of a CIA political map series tracking the history of 
decolonization in the Third World).159 Also, the rise of area studies, funded by U.S. 
intelligence agencies and major foundations, saw the Third World mapped into particular 
regions that minimized local differences in the face of finding larger trends.160 As 
geographer Jim Glassman said, this kind of area expertise tended to “otherize” regions 
like Southeast Asia and helped to legitimize interventions in such areas.161 A strange 
relationship thus developed between cartography and what Frank Ninkovich has called 
the symbolic interventionism of the domino-theory era: maps served as the symbol of 
technical expertise that aided in lifting allies out of poverty and backwardness, while 
simultaneously serving as tools of surveillance that monitored Third World sites for their 
strategic placement in the potential for global skirmishes and new fronts.162 Historical 





Figure 4.11. Central Intelligence Agency, "Changing Face of Europe and Colonial Tension, Late 1945," 1968 
(Geography & Map Division, Library of Congress) 
 
Figure 4.12. Central Intelligence Agency, "Collapse of Colonial System, 1953-68," 1968 (Geography & Map 





where the map serves not just as a tool of state power, but also to perpetuate a progressive 
narrative about the worth of cartography as a practice.163 
A quintessential example of this dualism in terms of U.S. Cold War cartography 
specifically depicting the Third World came through the use of maps in the infamous 
Strategic Hamlets program in Vietnam.164 The Hamlets program was, arguably, 
modernization theory’s ultimate project, where, according to James C. Scott, social 
science blended seamlessly into military science.165 The program, which essentially 
involved removal and relocation of Vietnamese families from their villages to get them 
away from Communist propaganda and to cut down on civilian casualties, even saw 
Robert McNamara defending it as an opportunity for community building for rural 
Vietnamese.166 The program used a system of map overlays that evaluated population and 
area to determine the stability of particular strategic areas for relocating villages. Because 
of the task’s scope, the military outsourced some of this cartographic work to the civilian 
United States Geological Survey (USGS). In the process, USGS cartographers were 
given classified CORONA aerial satellite photographs to make their maps but were not 
notified that they were classified or where they came from. An interview with USGS 
director Roy Mullen, by historian John Cloud, reveals that: 
USGS was commissioned by the State Department to prepare civilian land 
reallocation maps for South Vietnam, and we were commissioned by Army Map 
Service to prepare battle maps of North Vietnam. They were the same maps. They 
were the same maps!167 
In Cloud’s terms, “the spatial relationships, the geographic ‘truth’ between hamlets was 




to literally ‘target’ the populations were quite distinct.”168 The fact that the same 
cartographic data was literally being used to both save and destroy Vietnamese 
communities speaks to the ultimate tension between Cold War military prerogatives and 
social science.  
Such tensions inspired a movement of “countergeopolitics.” In 1972, for example, 
French geographer Yves Lacoste, visiting North Vietnam on a commission to investigate 
war crimes, wrote a piece (eventually published in the Nation and expanded for the 
radical geography journal Antipode) about the systematic, premeditated bombing by the 
U.S. of the irrigation system on the dikes of the Red River Delta—a bombing (and 
ensuing public relations disaster in America) that flooded the homes and crops of tens of 
millions, an effect tantamount to a hydrogen bomb.169 Strategic geographic knowledge of 
mass projects like an irrigation system to modernize and aid local populations could also 
be conversely used as a weapon to drown and starve them. As Lacoste wrote,  
Today, more than ever, one has to become aware of the political and military 
function which geography has always had since its inception. In our time this 
function has assumed greater magnitude, and takes on new forms because of 
increased information, more technically-sophisticated means of destructions, and 
also because of progress in scientific knowledge. The title of an article in 
Newsweek: “When the landscape is the Enemy” is indeed significant.170 
There was, during this period, then, an ambivalence and complexity that 
accompanied U.S. cartographic constructions of the developing world, both in terms of 
its ongoing competition with the Soviet Union, but also in its processes of geographic 




minds” through the teaching of cartography to help nations develop, and the use of 
classified mapping technologies to capture hard data that may be used for the potential 
destruction of terrain. Geographer D.W. Meinig in 1956 decried the oversimplified view 
of the world that was arising during the dissolution of colonialism: “While we sincerely 
promoted the general ideal of political freedom and economic well-being for all 
mankind—and a marvelous and powerful ideal it is—we have ignored the inevitable 
corollary that that freedom and development would not find a singular, uniform pattern of 
expression.”171  
Conclusion 
It was perhaps not surprising, then, that around the same time that Vietnam was 
shattering these dreams of modernization, and while nations were still decolonizing in 
significant numbers, the Arno Peters projection was able to capture a changing global 
geographic narrative that critiqued the Euro-centric worldview and attempted to displace 
the superpower as the focus of the map. The Third World was by no means a stable 
entity—it was continually contested, redefined and remapped by superpower nation-
states, international mediators like the United Nations, and challengers like Arno Peters. 
As demonstrated in this chapter in particular, the developing world and the cartographic 
South were a force in Cold War geopolitics since the conflict’s inception in the late 1940s. 
The notions of development and modernization went hand in hand with the way America 
placed itself into the emerging international framework: the United States defined itself 
(and its security) in terms of its ability to expand its influence. Mapping not only 
reflected these changes, but cartography itself was “hailed” into the rhetorical 




method of bringing the Third World up to the standards of the First, as an attempt to 
validate not only the capitalist system but American ideology as a whole. Thus, the 
content of the maps in this era not only changed to include a massive diversity of social 
issues such as health (hunger and disease) and economics, but the form of vision in the 
maps was altering as well, introducing a host of new projections and perspectives. 
Overall, the imaginative geographies of North and South evolved, adapted, and 
were contested throughout the course of the Cold War, making for profound tensions on 
the map between internationalism and nationalism, shape and area, and developed and 
undeveloped. The volatility of spatial concepts like the Third World anchored the spatial 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also opened up the 
possibilities of radical challenges to those relations. Walter Mignolo has written of 
“cosmopolitanism” as one global objective during the Cold War era, where international 
spatial relationships were redefined by Western elites in terms of interdependency, and 
human rights were redefined through the “master discourse” of political economy.172 In 
this move to interdependency among global actors, the “language of developing under-
developed nations as an alternative to communism” became integral. The problem, 
though, was that during the Cold War’s Three World system, “human rights were caught 
in the middle of the transformation of liberal into neoliberal democratic projects” while 
“decolonized countries were striving for a nation-state, at the same time that the 
ideologues of the new world order no longer believed in them.”173 Thus, the ways the 
North was envisioning the South on the flat page were profoundly at odds with the ways 




In this way, the Arno Peters map has wider implications for considering the 
visuality of Cold War culture, and how the geopolitics of internationalism was reflected 
in the projection’s construction and circulation. Jeremy Crampton has written that “maps 
have to be centred and projected somewhere, but the choice itself is not just an internal 
one, because the kind of map that seems acceptable is affected by the political, social and 
technological context in which that choice is made.”174 Considering each of these 
contexts is necessary to understanding how a map is used historically and rhetorically as 
a symbolic image to stand in for the identities of millions and millions of people. In 
addition, attending to the geopolitical contexts of Cold War development through maps 
helps explain how concepts of North/South and East/West are both challenged and reified 
by the internal choices of the mapmaker as well as the external ways in which the map is 
appropriated, circulated, and debated.  
More importantly, for this project, the Peters projection is a reminder of the 
cracks in America’s familiar spatial definitions of Cold War space. The anxieties of 
losing the binary between the United States and the Soviet Union helped fuel the use of 
cartography to both modernize potential allies and offer a stable place on the map for an 
American state, whose role as superpower was being challenged more than ever before. 
In response to the kind of social scientific modernization schemes that worked hand in 
hand with military strategic planning and weapons development, a homegrown U.S. 
movement of radical geographers and cartographers, influenced by Vietnam and the civil 
rights movement, would not only protest state power but also challenge the scientific 
sanctity of the “map” itself. This movement would advance well beyond Peters in its 




cartographic discipline as a whole. As had happened so often in the Cold War, the map 
was being contested in both form and content.  
While these debates around the placement of the Third World raged on in the 
1970s and 1980s, one particular radical critique that came out of this critical geography 
movement reached special notoriety: the challenge of “nuclear geography.” Here was a 
terrifying kind of internationalism, where distinctions between North and South, East and 
West, were flattened by the power of the nuclear missile to obliterate international space. 
The face of 1940s air-age globalism, where the world became closer on the map, was 
now mangled by the prospect of cartography to map the volume of nuclear arms and its 
capacity for destruction. Particularly as the so-called Second Cold War ignited in the late 
1970s, the resurgence of a nuclear arms race saw both a heightening of U.S. and Soviet 
needs for mapping, as well as the ensuing response by a movement of radical 
geographers and oppositional voices. The intersection between these two cartographic 
forces made for an explosive discourse around what constituted place in a potentially 
placeless world. How maps would envision the potential “end of geography” becomes the 


















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
Notes: Chapter Four 
1 Rev. James Gall, “Use of Cylindrical Projections for Geographical, 
Astronomical, and Scientific Purposes,” Scottish Geographical Magazine 1 (1885): 119–
23. 
2 Gall was notable for periodically speaking at academic societies and publishing 
works like The Science of Missions and An Easy Guide to the Constellations. In 1855, 
Gall had proposed a series of new map projections to the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science, which, according to geographer Jeremy Crampton, was 
symbolic of a movement in Enlightenment cartography (and science as a whole) wherein 
the “twin disciplines of measurement and accuracy” became more integral to evidence 
man’s control over natural spaces in order to progressively “enlarge and elevate” minds. 
Jeremy Crampton, “Cartography’s Defining Moment: The Peters Projection Controversy, 
1974–1990,” Cartographica 31 (1994): 20. 
3 Gall, “Use of Cylindrical Projections,” 121. 
4 Peters’ background speaks to the nature of his approach, and how his numerous 
critics conceived of his image. For example, many of those assessing Peters’s legacy 
bring up his 1952 publication of a world history (translated as Universal History), which 
was labeled as a “scandal” by Der Spiegel magazine. Apparently, Peters was hired by the 
regional government of Lower Saxony (with distribution support from the Educational 
Department of the U.S. Military Government in Germany) to create a school textbook; 
Peters decided to write a book that would be acceptable to both East and West Germany. 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
hated by his government employers for being too leftist, and they sued Peters and sent 
thousands of copies back to the publisher. It was not until Peters began working on an 
atlas volume to his Universal History during the 1950s that he drew cartography into his 
equalizing project. Crampton speculates that Peters started drafting on what became his 
signature world map in the early 1960s while serving as editor of the socialist magazine 
Periodikum, another detail that was drawn by his fellow cartographers into the analysis of 
his maps. He went on to reach notoriety as the founding director of the private Institute 
for Universal History in Bremen, where he first unveiled the map to the public. See Denis 
Wood and John Fels, The Natures of Maps: Cartographic Constructions of the Natural 
World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 9; Peter Vujakovic, “Arno Peters: 
The Man and His Map,” Cartographic Journal 40 (2003): 51; Mark Monmonier, Rhumb 
Lines and Map Wars: A Social History of the Mercator Projection (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2004), 147; Phil Porter and Voxland, “Distortion in Maps: The Peters 
Projection and Other Devilments,” Focus (1986), 28; Arthur H. Robinson, “Arno Peters 
and His New Cartography,” The American Cartographer 12 (1985): 110; Crampton, 
“Cartography’s Defining Moment,” 22–23, 31; Ward L. Kaiser and Denis Wood, “Arno 
Peters—The Man, The Map, The Message,” The Cartographic Journal 40 (2003): 53; 
“Professor Arno Peters: Obituary,” The New Internationalist, January/February 2003), 
http://www.newint.org/; Peter Vujakovic, “Arno Peters’ Cult of the ‘New Cartography’: 
From Concept to World Atlas,” Bulletin for the Society of University Cartographers 22 
(1988): 1. Also, for critical discussions of geographers and cartographers as “authors,” 
see Trevor J. Barnes and James S. Duncan, eds., Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Arno Peters, The New Cartography, trans. Ward Kaiser, D.G. Smith, and Heinz 
Wohlers (New York: Friendship Press, 1983). 
6 Defending his choice to use a familiar rectangular frame for his map, rather than 
a spherical projection or an ellipsis, Peters proclaimed that the public would not accept 
such novelties: “We live in a four cornered world. The television tube we sit in front of is 
perhaps the best symbol of it.” Joe Alex Morris, “Dr. Peters’ Brave New World,” The 
Guardian, June 5, 1973, 15. 
7 After a highly publicized lecture for the German Cartographic Society in 1974, 
the projection and Peters’s accompanying polemic text were published in a glossy, 
elaborately designed brochure, cumbersomely titled Der Europa-Zentrische Charakter 
Unseres Geographischen Weltblides Und Seine Uberwindung (or The Europe-Centered 
Character of Our Geographical View of the World and Its Correction). Arno Peters, Der 
Europa-Zentrische Charakter Unseres Geographischen Weltblides Und Seine 
Uberwindung (Dortmund, Germany: W. Grosschen-Verlag, 1976). 
8 Gall was often used as a kind of “gotcha” technique by critics to show Peters’ 
apparent unoriginality. It is unclear who first made the connection between Gall’s 
projection and Peters’ identical copy, but in terms of publication, it could be from Iain 
Bain’s article in the Geographical Magazine, where Gall’s projection is included in a 
diagram next to the maps of Peters, Mercator, Mollweide, and Winkel. See Iain Bain, 
“Will Arno Peters Take Over the World?” Geographical Magazine 56 (1984): 342–43; 
There is also a footnote in Arthur Robinson’s scathing 1985 review of the Peters’ 
controversy, where he writes that “John P. Snyder has called to my attention that this 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
projections he devised…He stated that he hoped that, if it were used, it would be called 
‘Gall’s Orthographic Projection of the World.’” See Robinson, “Arno Peters and His 
New Cartography,” 110. 
9 Peters was not a member of the cartographic and geographic disciplines: as such, 
his grand claims and his abandonment (or some would say ignorance) of scientific 
conventions rankled the mapping community—the extent of the ire is almost amusing. 
Canadian geographer Thomas Wray wrote in 1978 that the projection and its campaign 
were a collection of “half-truths based on muddy thinking,” while the German 
Cartographic Society issued an official edict against the Peters map, deciding that it 
“completely fails to convey the manifold global, economic and political relationships of 
our times.” Monmonier would rail against news outlets, who he claimed were “as 
ignorant as the general public of how maps work,” and “covered the story as if he 
[Peters] were a courageous innovator challenging a cartel of racist fuddy-duddies.” 
Perhaps the apex, though, of the Peters debate came when the American Congress on 
Surveying and Mapping simply had enough and declared all rectangular world maps 
obsolete and dangerous. The Wall Street Journal printed an ACSM press release in June 
of 1989, with the headline, “Drawing the Line,” noting that the “American Congress on 
Surveying and Mapping, Falls Church, VA, adopts a sternly worded resolution 
condemning such maps for ‘showing the round earth as having straight edges and sharp 
corners.’” Of course, Peters sympathizers like Wood and Fels referred to this declaration 
as a “preposterous (and wholly ineffectual) resolution,” but used it as an example of just 
how deeply the projection had shaken the discipline. See Thomas Wray, “Contrary View: 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Cartographical Society, “The So-Called Peters Projection,” The Cartographic Journal 22 
(1985): 110; Peter Vujakovic, “Damn or Be Damned: Arno Peters and the Struggle for 
the ‘New Cartography’,” Cartographic Journal 40 (2003): 61; Monmonier, cited in 
Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, “Long Underwear on a Line? The Peters Projection and 
Thirty Years of Carto-Controversy,” Geography 88 (2003): 241; “Drawing the Line,” 
Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1989, 1; Arthur H. Robinson, “Rectangular World Maps—
No!” Professional Geographer 42 (1990): 101–4; Denis Wood and John Fels, The 
Natures of Maps: Cartographic Constructions of the Natural World (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2008), 11. 
10 See D.H. Maling, “Personal Projections,” Geographical Magazine 46 (1974): 
599; John Loxton, “The Peters Phenomenon,” The Cartographic Journal 22 (1985): 108. 
For more information on the circulation of the map, see Robinson, “Arno Peters”; “The 
New Flat Earth,” The New Internationalist, May 1983, http://www.newint.org/; Leslie 
Wolf-Phillips, “Why Third World?” Third World Quarterly 1 (1979): 114–15; Kaiser and 
Wood, “Arno Peters—The Man, The Map, The Message,” 53–54; Bernie Ashmore, 
“Arno Peters Changed the World! Development Education and the Peters’ Projection,” 
The Cartographic Journal 40 (2003): 57–59; Peter Vujakovic, “The Extent of Adoption 
of the Peters Projection by ‘Third World’ Organizations in the UK,” Bulletin of the 
Society of University Cartographers 21 (1987): 11–16; Porter and Voxland, “Distortion 
in Maps”; Ward L. Kaiser, A New View of the World: A Handbook to the World Map, 
Peters Projection (New York: Friendship Press, 1987). 
11 Sriskandarajah, “Long Underwear on a Line?,” 237. 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Robinson, “Arno Peters,” 110–11. Letter to the Editor, Paul Boyd, UN 
Secretariat News, Feburary 28, 1985, 2; Miklos Pinther, “The View of the World,” UN 
Secretariat News, January 31, 1985, 5–7. 
14 Kaiser, A New View, 2. 
15 Robinson, “Arno Peters,” 104. Upon Peters’s death in 2002, British geographer 
Peter Vujakovic even eulogized him with a large cartoon of Peters dutifully standing in 
front of a clothesline putting out the world’s continents to air. Vujakovic, “The Man and 
His Map,” 51. 
16 Alan K. Henrikson, “All the World’s a Map,” The Wilson Quarterly 3 (1979): 
175. 
17 American geographers Porter and Voxland derided this “squeezed accordion” 
effect as only able to “give north and south” and thus useless in terms of calculating 
distance (a hallmark strength of the Mercator). Porter and Voxland, “Distortion in Maps,” 
27. 
18 For a critical discussion of contested notions of “scale” in political geography, 
see Richard Howitt, “Scale,” in A Companion to Political Geography, eds. John Agnew, 
Katharyne Mitchell, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 138–57. 
19 While the de-emphasis on Western Europe and America was central to the 
map’s arguments, the challenge to the areal dominance of the Second World was also 
made clear. The Soviet Union is stretched into a new, flatter and less imposing shape, and 
its more extreme placement in the upper North squashes the usually sprawling Soviet 
republics together. This created new spatial relationships for emerging Cold War 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nervous about the Chinese.” The recalculation of area articulated anxieties in the 
bipolarity of the Cold War and argued that there were potential vulnerabilities. Morris, 
“Brave New World,” 15. 
20 Of course, critics once again took Peters to task for his fidelity to equality at all 
costs. Peter Vujakovic, for example, points out that “Peters is effectively surrendering the 
flexibility of cartography to sustain his own ‘myth’ that his projection is universally 
applicable…His sin is not that he has questioned the bases of traditional cartography 
(correctly or not), but that he is seeking to replace it with his own dogmatic cult of the 
‘new cartography.’” Once again, Peters was indicted for the unfettered promotion of his 
projection and worldview, seen by certain critics as taking precedence over his proper use 
of the medium of cartography (and its advantages) to showcase world problems with 
fidelity and precision. Vujakovic, “Arno Peters’ Cult,” 5. 
21 Terry Hardaker, one of Peters’ collaborating cartographers, notes in his 
introduction to the Peters atlas, “We have come to accept as ‘natural’ a representation of 
the world that devotes disproportionate space to large scale maps of areas perceived as 
important, while consigning other areas to small-scale general maps. And it is because 
our image of the world has become thus conditioned, that we have for so long failed to 
recognize the distortion for what it is—the equivalent of peering at Europe and North 
America through a magnifying glass and then surveying the rest of the world through the 
wrong end of a telescope.” Terry Hardaker, “Introduction,” in Peters Atlas of the World, 
by Arno Peters (New York: Harper & Row, 1990). 
22 This was often a point of contention with critics; Monmonier wrote, for 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to all acres.’” Mark Monmonier, Drawing the Line: Tales of Maps and Controversy (New 
York: Henry Holt, 1995), 39. 
23 Arno Peters, Peters Atlas of the World, preface. 
24 In Hardaker’s terms, “This way all the thematic maps can be understood at a 
glance without the necessity for complicated symbols or explanations.” Hardaker, 
“Introduction.” 
25 “World Map in Equal Presentation,” UN Development Programme Version, 
1987, Geography & Map Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. The New 
Internationalist, publishing the first English-language edition, highlighted this use of 
color as an innovation: “One of the most potent symbols of the dissolution of the British 
Empire, for those old enough to remember it, has been the disappearance of those 
splashes of red around the world. Indeed since the 1960s there has been relatively little 
need for political maps which give the same colour to countries under the same 
administration – since most are now independent Peters suggests that we start again and, 
instead of emphasizing the difference between countries, we should highlight the growing 
links between nations in the same region.” The New Internationalist, 1983. Ward 
Kaiser’s “guide” to using the Peters also notes this importance of color: “Regional and 
national identities more and more take precedence over a relationship that owes its origin 
and its continuation to forcible conquest and foreign domination. Therefore Peters 
conceived the idea of showing a whole region in one dominant color-family, with each 
nation having its own variant. Thus the ‘family connections’ as well as the separateness 
of each country can be shown. To my knowledge, there is no other world map…that 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 An important discussion of color as a discourse is made by semioticians 
Gunther Kress and Theo Van Leeuwen, who make useful distinctions around “associative 
values” of color. In particular, their discussions of the “complex and composite meaning 
potential” of color in areas such as value, saturation, purity, modulation, differentiation, 
and hue have not only influenced my reading of the Peters map, but of my reading of 
color in maps in general. See Gunther Kress and Theo Van Leeuwen, “Colour as a 
Semiotic Mode: Notes for a Grammar of Colour,” Visual Communication 1 (2002): 343–
68. 
27 The potential problem, though, is that in spite of its focus on equality and 
distribution, the most circulated version of the Peters map retains a partitioned world of 
distinct landmasses as an enduring feature of a global geographic imagination, what 
Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen call the problematic “myth of continents.” This 
myth advances, in this case through the visualization of a map, that there are somehow 
significant cultural groupings denoted by these divisions and that continents are still 
useful units of analysis. According to Lewis and Wigen, particularly in the international 
relations of the Cold War, the continental framework may conveniently “structure our 
perceptions of the human community” but “does injustice to the complexities of global 
geography, and it leads to faulty comparisons. When used by those who wield political 
power, its consequences can be truly tragic.” Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen, The 
Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997), 1. 
28 Many of those participating in the Peters debates would suggest alternatives to 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
distortion and crudeness that they saw in Peters. These suggestions, though, often served 
to downplay the ideological point and the political nature of the Peters project. For 
example, Porter and Voxland, writing for the American Geographic Society, offer 
another famous Cold War geographic image as a better substitute: the Apollo VIII 
photographs of the earth from 1972. This is the best image, they write, “if we require an 
image to confirm the oneness of humankind—the earth as our only home, our global 
interdependencies” and proclaim, then, that the “Peters projection is as inappropriate an 
image of our earthly oneness as is the Mercator.” Porter and Voxland, “Distortion in 
Maps,” 23. Also see Cosgrove’s discussion of the Apollo photographs and the discourse 
of “one-world” in Denis Cosgrove, “Contested Global Visions: One-World, Whole-Earth, 
and the Apollo Space Photographs,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 
84 (1994): 270–94. 
29 Distortion was a continual issue in the Peters debate. As the American 
Cartographic Association declared in their booklet on map projections (in part, a response 
to the Peters flap), “A poorly chosen map projection can actually be harmful. We tend to 
believe what we see, and when fundamental geographical relationships, such as shapes, 
sizes, directions, and so on, are badly distorted, we are inclined to accept them as fact if 
we see them that way on maps.” John Noble Wilford, “The Impossible Quest for the 
Perfect Map,” New York Times, October 25, 1988. 
30 “World Map in Equal Presentation.” 
31 This map comes complete with captions noting that “the traditional map distorts 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
objectivity, which is required in a scientific age. ” See “World Map in Equal 
Presentation.”  
32 This notion of social change in maps is complex and ambivalent: ironically, in 
order to argue for cartographic transformation of the world, the visual depiction of that 
world still needs to be recognizable to the map-reading audience. In fact, Peters’ one real 
compliment to the Mercator is that “the principles of construction were so easy to 
understand and the grid system so easy to draw that the map was suitable for use by 
school children.” Peters, The New Cartography.  
33 “World Map in Equal Presentation.” On the UN version of the Peters map, the 
sidebar to the world map display asks the question “Why This New World Map?” The 
answer posed is “FAIRNESS TO ALL PEOPLES. By setting forth all countries in their 
true size and location, this map allows each one its actual position in the world.” Indeed, 
Peters’ sweeping version of history in his writings that accompany his atlases and 
pamphlets bear this out—in the New Cartography he refers to the end of “the work of 
cartographers of a bygone age—the age of European domination and exploitation,” an 
age being replaced, as he says in the Peters Atlas, by a “worldwide consciousness of 
solidarity.” Peters, The New Cartography, 7; Peters, Peters Atlas, preface. 
34 Independent Commission on International Development Issues, North-South: A 
Program For Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980). 
35 For some contemporary reports, see the interview with Brandt in Altaf Gauhar, 
“Willy Brandt,” Third World Quarterly 1 (1979): 7–19. Also see Gavin Williams, “The 
Brandt Report: A Critical Introduction,” Review of African Political Economy 19 (1980): 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Today 36 (1980): 463–68. Future reports by the Commission, such as Common Crisis in 
1983, would continue to use, and further circulate, the Peters motif. See Independent 
Commission on International Development Issues, Common Crisis North-South: 
Cooperation for World Recovery (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983). 
36 The inside flap of the report read, “This projection represents an important step 
away from the prevailing Eurocentric geographical and cultural concept of the 
world…the more densely settled earth zones, it is claimed, appear in proper proportion to 
each other.” North-South, inside cover flap. 
37 The World Development Movement used it in publications like their EEC and 
the Third World as a kind of a simplified logo. The U.N. Committee on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) used the Peters in its report on the least developed countries of 
the world; it was appropriated into U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) brochures, and 
newsletters for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Organization (GATT, the 
precursor to the World Trade Organization); and the international charity group Action 
Aid distilled the Peters into a logo for the masthead of its newspaper. See Overseas 
Development Institute, EEC and the Third World (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981). 
Robinson, “Arno Peters,” 109–11; Bain, “Will Arno Peters Take Over,” 343. Meanwhile, 
the Third World Quarterly, which became the premiere academic outlet for development 
theory and progressive international relations studies, introduced the Peters map in its 
1979 flagship issue accompanying Leslie Wolf-Phillips’ foundational “Why Third 
World?” article. By the early 1980s, the UK’s New Internationalist, a development 
magazine, issued a foldout Peters’ map to every new subscriber, a service it still provides 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Kaiser, A New View, 23. 
39 Kaiser, A New View, 26. In addition, the Vatican touted the benefits of the 
Peters in some of its literature, and it would also be used by the Catholic Fund for 
Overseas Development. Kaiser, A New View, 23; Porter and Voxland, “Distortion in 
Maps,” 28. 
40 Ashmore, “Arno Peters Changed the World!” 57–58. 
41 Ashmore, “Arno Peters Changed the World!” 58. In addition, nonprofit groups 
like Broader Perspectives secured acceptance by the State Board of Education in Texas to 
integrate the Peters map into curricula since, they argued, it “demonstrates more accurate 
and objective perceptions of the significance of nations in both hemispheres.” 
Testimonials from academics in developing nations also became part of the Peters 
campaign. For example, the guide to the 1987 version of the map contained an 
endorsement from geographer Dr. Vernon Mulcasingh from the University of the West 
Indies, who commented that the map “represents a burst of brilliance that can be 
compared with any major breakthrough in the world of science.” Kaiser, A New View, 27, 
10. The education function of the Peters map was also parodied in a 2001 episode of the 
West Wing. During “Big Block of Cheese Day,” when staffers of the fictional President 
Josiah Bartlett are forced to hear proposals and entreaties from public interest groups 
about their ideas and concerns, one group called the Cartographers for Social Justice 
comes to lobby for legislation mandating for public schools to replace the Mercator map 
with the Peters projection. The staffers are shown a large projection of the map, 
prompting alarm from White House Press Secretary C.J. Cregg, who replies to the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with social equality?” by answering, “No, I’m wondering where France really is!” 
Reportedly, sales of the Peters maps multiplied after the airing of the episode. The West 
Wing, NBC, Season 2, Episode 16, 28 February 2001. The citation on sales is from 
Sriskandarajah, “Long Underwear,” 238. 
42 Cosgrove, “Contested Global Visions,” 287–88. Conversely, critical voices 
often were attempting to de-iconize the map—to reclaim the Peters map as a scientific 
document and a system of calculations, and to bring it back to the grid and debate its 
technical merits. On a 1983 NPR broadcast of “All Things Considered,” David Malpus 
interviewed Ward Kaiser, Peters’ main translator and promoter in Britain and the United 
States. When Malpus asked Kaiser why the Peters map does not show Africa in its 
normal shape, Kaiser answered, “Well, one needs to ask what is the normal shape of 
Africa? Without having seen Africa from outer space, I’m really not in a very good 
position, nor perhaps [is] any of us, to say how it actually looks.” Snyder’s criticism of 
Kaiser represents the kind of terms by which scientific cartographers were assessing the 
debate, as he protested, “But because we have navigators’ and surveyors’ mapping work 
applied to our globes, as well as the new evidence of photographs by astronauts, we know 
very well how Africa looks from space!” In Snyder’s terms, the trusted tools of 
cartographers and other scientists have already given us what we need to envision 
continental space with precision and accuracy; thus, the Peters projection is useless. John 
P. Snyder, “Social Consciousness and World Maps,” Christian Century, February 24, 
1988, 191–92. 
43 Andi Spicer, “Controversial Cartography,” Geographical Magazine 61 (1989): 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lucaites explain, “one reason images become iconic is that they coordinate a number of 
different patterns of identification within the social life of the audience…which together 
provide a public audience with sufficient means to comprehend potentially unmanageable 
events…Thus, the icon does not so much record an event or fix a particular meaning as it 
organizes a field of interpretations.” The way in which that icon organizes those 
interpretations can be powerful. As Catherine Palczewski notes, icons are always 
“referential forms” that can become “appeals to fix and stabilize” in “the face of social 
pressures of destabilization.” Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites, “Performing 
Civic Identity: The Iconic Photograph of the Flag Raising on Iwo Jima,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 88 (2002): 367; Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1997), 33; Catherine H. Palczewski, “The Male Madonna and the 
Feminine Uncle Sam: Visual Argument, Icons, and Ideographs in 1909 Anti-Woman 
Suffrage Postcards,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 91 (2005): 388. 
44 While the Peters map advanced a potentially incendiary argument that the 
South had a viable political identity, other cartographic icons of the era would go even 
further. The original OPEC logo of the 1970s featured an ellipse that centered on the 
Middle East and Africa, with the bottom half of Asia and South America rounding out the 
eastern and western sides of the map, and Europe, North America, and the Soviet Union 
completely omitted from the image. As a development icon, the Peters map still needed 
the North/South counterpoint and to have the two spaces visualized in relationship to one 
another (the South still needed the North); but the OPEC map argued that the northern 
half of the world was largely irrelevant to the political and economic advancement of the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Peter Stalker, “Map Wars,” New Internationalist, March 1989, 
http://www.newint.org/. 
46 Interestingly enough, the very first point in Brandt’s introduction to North-
South was telling, as he wrote, “In the summer of 1978, half a year after we had started 
our work, a friend and distinguished African leader sent me an encouraging message: our 
Commission, he said, could ‘contribute to the development of worldwide moral values.’” 
Critics saw the Peters projection as a mode, an instrument or vehicle of vision to see 
reality, while supporters saw the map as the moral vision itself. For example, surveying 
42 development-oriented NGOs on their perceptions and use of the Peters projection, 
Peter Vujakovic found that a large majority had adopted the projection for their purposes, 
even as his interpretation of the results found that they were doing so uncritically. As he 
concludes, “The decisions to adopt the Peters projection are probably based on very 
restricted knowledge of cartography and on intuition regarding the value of its distinctive 
‘image’. This is supported by the fact that very few of the organizations receive advice 
from professionals involved in cartography…It has become accepted as the ideologically 
correct map to use.” Willy Brandt, “An Introduction,” in North-South, 7. Vujakovic, 
“Extent of Adoption,” 14.  
47 The late 1940s air-age globalism of Richard Edes Harrison advanced the 
popularity of a “strategic perspective” in cartography, where the partiality of the viewer’s 
interest determined the map’s vision. Peters, however, used a more universal viewpoint 
by choosing the classic rectangular map, but altering its form. Peters’ map idealizes this 
“universal” function of the projection by focusing on the North/South dynamics. For 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
projections in Life from the 1940s that used a novel, “dymaxion world” projection to 
offer new perspectives on what is North and what is South. Kaiser noted that Peters and 
Fuller shared similar aims to shake things up but that “their purposes are divergent, 
however; Fuller was largely concerned with helping the United States achieve its 
potential, through the use of creative imagination and forward-looking technology; Peters 
is more clearly focused on justice for all people, recognizing the values and contributions 
that all nations and all cultures can bring to the emerging civilization.” Peters, The New 
Cartography, 147; Kaiser, A New View, 16; R. Buckminster Fuller, “Buckminster 
Fuller’s Dymaxion World,” Life, March 1, 1943. Also, an interesting (but small) amount 
of correspondence actually existed between Fuller and Richard Edes Harrison. See 
Richard Edes Harrison Collection, Correspondence Folders, Geography & Map Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 
48 Certainly, the appropriation of the Peters as a symbol of progressive economic 
development organizations and human rights groups has lent the Peters map a kind of 
cosmopolitanism to transcend Cold War antagonisms and argue for the new power of the 
Third World, but those appropriations by development organizations have been done 
from a largely Western perspective. While the Peters map visually allows 
nongovernmental development organizations to transcend the influence of particular 
nation-states like the United States or the United Kingdom for a more cosmopolitan, 
international image, the act of drawing developing nations as one united mass of southern 
protest against the North potentially re-bipolarizes the Cold War. As David Harvey has 
written, “Cosmopolitanism bereft of geographical specificity remains abstracted and 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sometimes explosively evil consequences. Geography uninspired by any cosmopolitan 
vision is either mere heterotopic description or a passive tool of power for dominating the 
weak.” David Harvey, “Cosmopolitanism and the Banality of Geographical Evils,” 
Public Culture 12 (2000): 557–58. 
49 See especially the thesis in Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third 
World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
50 For a critical discussion of the etymology of the uses of “Third World” as a 
term and a concept, see especially Vicky Randall, “Using and Abusing the Concept of the 
Third World: Geopolitics and the Comparative Political Study of Development and 
Underdevelopment,” Third World Quarterly 25 (2004): 41–53. 
51 Pletsch’s critical discussion of Sauvy’s use of the Third World in the context of 
Cold War social science is particularly important. See Carl E. Pletsch, “The Three 
Worlds, or the Division of Social Scientific Labor, Circa 1950-1975,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 23 (1981): 567–73. 
52 For a historical discussion of this, see Mark T. Berger, “The End of the ‘Third 
World’?,” Third World Quarterly 15 (1994): 257–75. 
53 Leslie Wolf-Phillips, “Why Third World?,” 105–6. 
54 For contemporary histories of the Bandung conference, see Richard Wright’s 
journalistic account (complete with a foreword by Gunnar Myrdal) in Richard Wright, 
The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference (New York: World Publishing, 
1956).  See also the more academic account by Kahin of the influential Southeast Asia 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Conference, Bandung Indonesia, April 1955 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 
1956). The 50th anniversary in 2005 also saw the publication of a consortium of 
international scholars on Bandung’s legacy. See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds., 
Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International 
Order (Singapore: Nus Press, 2008). In addition, for an account of Bandung’s 
relationship to U.S. policy, see Jason C. Parker, “Small Victory, Missed Chance: The 
Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Turning of the Cold War,” 
in The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold 
War, eds. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2006), 153–74. 
55 Arif Dirlik, “Spectres of the Third World: Global Modernity and the End of the 
Three Worlds,” Third World Quarterly 25 (2004): 133. 
56 Max Beloff, “The Third World and the Conflict of Ideologies,” in The Third 
World: Premises of U.S. Policy, ed. Scott Thompson (San Francisco: The Institute for 
Contemporary Studies, 1978), 12–13. Cite in Pletsch, “The Three Worlds,” 576. 
57 Tomlinson’s account covers a wide amount of ground succinctly on the impact 
of the Third World on Cold War discourse. See B.R. Tomlinson, “What Was the Third 
World?” Journal of Contemporary History 38 (2003): 307–21. 
58 Pletsch, “The Three Worlds,” 572. 
59 Pletsch, “The Three Worlds,” 571. 
60 John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-Envisioning World Politics (New York: 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Arturo Escobar, “Culture, Economics and Politics in Latin American Social 
Movements Theory and Research,” in The Making of Social Movements in Latin 
America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy, eds. A. Escobar and S.E. Alvarez (Boulder, 
CO: Westview, 1992), 62. 
62 David Slater, “Geopolitical Imaginations Across the North-South Divide: Issues 
of Difference, Development and Power,” Political Geography 16 (1997): 642. 
63 A representative example of scholarship reconfiguring the Cold War around 
notions of the South can be found in Richard Saull, “Locating the Global South in the 
Theorisation of the Cold War: Capitalist Development, Social Revolution and 
Geopolitical Conflict,” Third World Quarterly 26 (2005): 253–80. 
64 A revealing contemporary, left-wing account of the Third World by geographer 
Keith Buchanan draws on this duality between a passive and an influential Third World. 
Buchanan’s cartogram maps on a variety of development subjects related to developing 
nations are particularly fascinating. See Keith Buchanan, “Profiles of the Third World,” 
Pacific Viewpoint 5 (1964): 97–126. 
65 D.W. Meinig, “Culture Blocs and Political Blocs,” Western Humanities Review 
10 (1956): 220. 
66 See especially David S. Painter, “Explaining U.S. Relations With the Third 
World,” Diplomatic History 19 (1995): 525–48; Westad, The Global Cold War. 
67 A representative example of decolonization on the map from a popular 
perspective can be found in Hammond Inc., “Emerging Nations,” Map (Springfield, NJ: 
Hammond, 1966), World-International Relations Folder, Title Collection, Geography and 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978), 12. 
69 For a historical review on decolonization Cold War scholarship, see Jeremi Suri, 
“The Cold War, Decolonization, and Global Social Awakenings: Historical Intersections,” 
Cold War History 6 (2006): 353–63. 
70 Homi Bhabha, “The Other Question [1983],” in Contemporary Postcolonial 
Theory, ed. Padmini Mongia (London: Arnold, 1996), 37–38. 
71 For a discussion of the essentialization of North/South, particularly in terms of 
Cold War developmentalism, see Marcus Power, Rethinking Development Geographies 
(London: Routledge, 2003), 95–118. 
72 Slater, “Geopolitical Imaginations,” 643–44. 
73 As Ó Tuathail notes, “the struggle over geography is also a conflict between 
competing images and imaginings, a contest of power and resistance that involves not 
only struggles to represent the materiality of physical geographic objects and boundaries 
but also the equally powerful and, in a different manner, the equally material force of 
discursive borders between an idealized Self and a demonized Other, between us and 
them.” Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1996), 14–15. 
74 Robert McMaster and Susanna McMaster, “A History of Twentieth-Century 
American Academic Cartography,” Cartography and Geographic Information Science 29 
(2002): 305–21. 
75 Arthur H. Robinson, Joel L. Morrison, and Phillip C. Muehrcke, “Cartography 
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE “END OF GEOGRAPHY”: CARTOGRAPHIC 
CHANGE AND CONTROL DURING THE SECOND COLD WAR 
 
On February 27th, 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger made good on a 
promise to debate Marxist historian E.P. Thompson in front of the famed Oxford Union 
Debating Society.1 The resolution? “That there is no moral difference between the 
foreign policies of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.” This was one curious Cold War 
confrontation: the appearance of Weinberger, as a major, high-ranking U.S. official and 
the prominent face of deterrence and nuclear policy, opposite one of the most significant 
leaders of the anti-nuclear movement in Europe, was not only startling, but in some ways 
courageous.2 The U.S. Embassy in London, the State Department, and even members of 
his own Defense Department staff warned him that this trip was a fool’s errand, a debate 
that was unwinnable, and may even damage the Reagan administration’s “ability to hold 
anti-Communists together.”3 As Weinberger would later quip, “I had been on my feet in 
the Union only five minutes when I decided the Embassy was absolutely right.”4  
Former Oxford Union President (and fellow Weinberger debater) Laurence 
Grafstein noted in the New Republic, “Over drinks and dinner before the debate, 
Weinberger and Thompson eyed each other cautiously and exchanged a few forced 
pleasantries. They were both white with fear.”5 The visual contrast was almost 
humorously stark. Weinberger was nattily dressed in black tie and dinner jacket; 
Thompson in a professorial sports coat and sweater. “I mean no discourtesy,” apologized 
Thompson, “but some of us who were appalled by the first war and who subsequently 
fought in the 1939–1945 war made a pledge not to wear dinner jackets again. You see, 




always said it was the most democratic of all costumes because everybody wore exactly 
the same thing.” Thompson, it was said, “was not terribly amused” by Weinberger’s 
retort.7 Meanwhile, students from both the University and Oxford Polytechnic protested 
outside the Union, shouting “Weinberger warmonger, Britain out of NATO!”8 Colin 
Powell, a senior military assistant to Weinberger at the time and a member of the Oxford 
entourage, remarked that “the students in the packed house reminded me of Romans at 
the Colosseum waiting for a Christian to be thrown to the lions.”9  
Five hundred attendees voting on the motion crowded around the two debaters in 
their three-plus hour exchange, which was also broadcast live over BBC radio and 
eventually premiered in June across the United States.10 The clash of rhetorical styles was 
even more apparent than the dress code; Thompson’s impassioned and dramatic approach, 
representative of the notorious Oxford Union style, stood in contrast to Weinberger’s 
quiet, calm, even “dispassionate” demeanor, “almost as if…believing his argument was 
self-evident, [he] has decided not to extend himself.”11 Overall, a tense and 
confrontational atmosphere hung over the exchange; Thompson’s case posited the two 
superpowers as “towering terrorist states” and “mutually exacerbating military structures.” 
He singled out the United States, in particular, for its imperialistic nuclear occupation of 
Europe with Cruise and Pershing missiles as “symbols of menace, of ‘posture’.”12 
Thompson joked to loud applause, “When friends come to help us it’s fine for them to 
stay in the house for three or four days. When they stay for three weeks we get a little bit 
restive. But after 35 years…”13 Then, he upheld the peace movement as a revolution: “I 
think Americans will understand when I say that we are on the edge of a moment that 




Europe is meditating now a declaration of independence.”14 Weinberger’s case, in turn, 
offered the morality of American ideology as the key difference between the foreign 
outlook of the two superpowers:  
It is very simple. It’s all about freedom. Individual, personal, human freedom and 
whether we and our children will be allowed to exercise it...Who among the 
Soviets voted that they should invade Afghanistan? Maybe one, maybe five men 
in the Kremlin…Nobody else. And that is, I think, the height of 
immorality…You’ll make a choice and I rest my case on your liberty to walk out 
either door and not have anything happen thereafter. There will be no intimidation, 
no threats, no arrests. I ask you to consider whether in the other system you and 
your families could have been here…15 
At one moment, a student stood up and challenged Weinberger: “Do you think that an 
immoral act becomes less immoral because we have the choice to do it or not? Do the 
people who are tortured or killed by those regimes think it is a moral act because 
Congress approves it, rather than some general?”16 Over vehement hissing from the 
audience, Weinberger reiterated again that “whether you think an act is immoral or not, 
we have the ability to change it.”17 As a television critic at the New York Times observed, 
Weinberger occasionally had “the look of a man wondering what possessed him to go 
there in the first place.”18 
To much surprise, however, “Cap” Weinberger was declared the winner in a 
decisive (but modest) margin of 271 to 232. His simple “civics lesson” drew on a well of 
sympathy from the audience after Thompson’s brutal harangue; although, as the Wall 




distanced themselves from any support for Reagan’s specific policies.19 As Grafstein 
added, “it was the presence of about a hundred Americans in the debating chamber which 
proved decisive.”20 In Powell’s view, “Though his victory was clear-cut in our eyes, we 
had taken out a little insurance. The way the debate winner is determined at Oxford is by 
counting how many people leave via the ‘pro’ exit and how many by the ‘con.’ We made 
sure that every member of our security detail and every staffer and secretary left via the 
‘con’ exit.”21 Margaret Thatcher herself rung the sleeping Secretary of Defense (who did 
not yet know the outcome) the next morning with the greeting, “You know you won, 
don’t you?”; a telephone call that, Weinberger wrote, “I greatly treasured.”22  
 Forgotten in the novelty of the proceedings was the fact that Professor Thompson 
built his case on two peculiar visual aids—at one point during the debate, he brought 
forward two defense booklets, one produced by the U.S. Department of Defense (with a 
foreword by Weinberger), the other by the Soviet Union.23 The professor called the U.S. 
pamphlet, Soviet Military Power, a “Sears-Roebuck catalogue of all the deadly military 
equipment” possessed by the U.S.S.R., while the Soviet book, Whence the Threat to 
Peace, was filled with the “usual half-lies and propaganda statements.”24 Pointing to the 
books, Thompson argued, “They have even copied each other in maps. Here is a power 
projection in the United States catalogue, with a huge Soviet Union, with arrows going in 
every direction around the world. And in the Soviet catalogue, the Soviet Union is rather 
smaller and all the arrows are spreading out from the United States towards the five 
continents of the world” (figs. 5.1 and 5.2 display the two dueling maps to which 





Figure 5.1. "Soviet Global Power Projection," in Soviet Military Power, U.S. Department of Defense, 1981 
 
Figure 5.2. "Reinforcement of US Forward-Based Armed Forces," in Whence the Threat to Peace, U.S.S.R. 




Bind these two together and they make the most evil book known in the whole 
human record…an inventory of the matched evils of this accelerating system, a 
confession of absolute human failure. What moral difference is there between 
these two catalogues?...The first moral difference that will appear will be when 
either superpower makes an actual act of disarmament. Then we can start to talk 
about morality. Until that happens I rest my case on these two odious books…26 
Remarkably, the 500–plus members of the audience, and the millions tuning in across 
various media, were witnessing a radical socialist peace advocate directly lecturing a top 
U.S. leader about the moral evil of his maps in promoting a potential nuclear apocalypse.  
Weinberger’s very presence at the debate displayed the sizable investment of 
America’s foreign policymakers and defense strategists in international public opinion. 
But more than a minor public relations victory for the Reagan Administration’s defense 
of its nuclear arms policies, the Oxford event represented the increasingly moral terms of 
the nuclear arms debate. In press accounts and reviews, the question was often asked: 
why would the Secretary of Defense put himself at risk of humiliation in such a public 
forum? Was it hubris? Or was it idealist naiveté about America’s moral standing in the 
world? Either way, through his appearance at the Oxford debate and through his 
commissioning of literature such as Soviet Military Power, Weinberger was clearly 
reaching beyond the balance-of-power pragmatism of 1970s détente and offering a bold 
rationale for the deployment of new arms to maintain peace, a rationale that relied on 
perception and moral fortitude.  
G. Thomas Goodnight has noted the Reagan Administration’s rhetorical 




war.27 For example, in early policy-defining speeches such as “Zero Option” (1981), 
President Reagan argued that new nuclear missiles are needed not because they will 
correct the overall imbalance of power; rather, “the reality of force balances do not matter 
precisely because deterrence depends upon the ‘perceived ability of our forces to perform 
effectively.’”28 Nuclear weapons, then, are “symbols of commitment” and “all weapons 
deficits are construed as signs of appeasement, and the danger of appeasement in a 
nuclear age is attached to an infinite risk.”29 Thus, Reagan and his defense representatives 
like Weinberger emphasized the value of perception and each side’s ability to persuade 
the other of its strength—hence the need for exceeding the Soviet Union in nuclear 
capacities. In addition, this reformulation hearkened back to traditional definitions of war 
before 1945; the Soviet Union as an “Evil Empire” made the nuclear struggle an age-old 
moral battle between the forces of light and darkness. The realist Cold War strategies of 
containment and the asymmetrical development of counter-forces had posited the United 
States and the Soviet Union as two superpowers linked on the same road to doom, 
requiring, in Ira Chernus’ terms, a careful calibration of “apocalypse management.”30 The 
Reagan and Weinberger of the Second Cold War sought to go beyond mere management 
with the startling claim that nuclear war is winnable. Weinberger’s presence on the stage 
at Oxford (and his subsequent victory) affirmed the seriousness of conviction with which 
both morality and the perception of intentions informed the defense policies of the United 
States.  
 At the same time, Thompson’s presence on the stage was equally noteworthy. The 
rhetorical strategy of the Reagan Administration was in some ways an ingenious attempt 




fundamentally upon an adversary who abides by commitments of self-interest and the 
‘evil empire’ always operates by its own incontinent, perfidious code, any negotiated 
agreement is suspect and ultimately fraudulent. So, the administration could continue to 
offer arms agreements that fail, demonstrating undaunted good intentions and the 
persistence of evil.”31 In addition, by rhetorically presenting an element of hope in the 
face of nuclear destruction, the Administration could contrast their vision with the images 
of devastation used by nuclear freeze advocates. By discussing nuclear policies on moral 
terms, Weinberger was opening up a radical challenge for Thompson’s brand of moral 
outrage, and this allowed for Thompson’s damning depiction of the Soviet Union and the 
United States as the same evil face of destructive state power. The Wall Street Journal, in 
fact, scolded Weinberger on this point: “Western governments should not raise the 
credibility of ‘peace’ movement spokesmen by giving them the same status… 
Commitment to democratic values does imply tolerance and a civilized attitude toward 
one’s opponent—but it does not require that you act as his publicity agent.”32 Thompson, 
thus, was given a platform for moral dissent, and maps became an important plank in that 
platform.  
The improbable debate between Thompson and Weinberger points to, in a larger 
sense, how maps offered a compelling and contested mode of visual perception for the 
complex nuclear tensions of the Second Cold War and how questions of morality 
constrained such cartographic discourse. Certainly, the debate represents cartography’s 
continuing evidentiary power during the Cold War to spatially define and envision the 
world, as well as the importance of maps in the arena of public opinion. And “nuclear 




nuclear war—to project both a present world of state power armaments while also 
sketching a future world of potential destruction. In James Der Derian’s terms, nuclear 
weapons substantially changed notions of space in international relations by sparking a 
new emphasis on “rapidity and totality.”34 In a way, this focus on the immense speed of 
nuclear weaponry and the total miniaturization of the earth was the ultimate extension 
and outcome of the air-age globalism of the 1940s. Like the air-age global maps, nuclear 
cartography depicted a dramatically shrinking earth, where time had replaced distance 
(i.e., how fast a missile could reach a target) as the measure of power, but now the map 
foretold the total destruction of global space.  
Through considerations, then, of the speed and scale of nuclear war, I explore 
cartography in this chapter from the standpoint of both the expansion of armaments and 
the responding calls for disarmament. In terms of the expansion of armaments, I examine 
the volley of defense propaganda that incensed Professor Thompson and that Time 
referred to as the “Battle of the Booklets,” which supported arguments for a nuclear 
arsenal build-up.35 Each year throughout the 1980s, these map-laced pamphlets like the 
U.S. Soviet Military Power, the U.S.S.R.’s Whence the Threat to Peace and 
Disarmament: Who’s Against?, and even NATO’s NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force 
Comparisons, were updated, revised, and reprinted, providing a compelling visual record 
of the re-ignited Cold War and, more importantly, promoting a kind of hyper-
internationalism where missiles and defense technologies fill global space and every 
corner of the globe is a potential target.  
In terms of the visual arguments for disarmament, I examine the activist 




particular, I discuss the radical geographer William Bunge and his Nuclear War Atlas 
project, which supported the nuclear freeze movement with its graphic cartography of 
nuclear destruction and the moral bankruptcy of state power during the arms race of the 
early 1980s. These challenges to the cartography of official actors like Weinberger 
stridently pointed out how nuclear weapons reduced the globe to an abstract surface for 
missile trajectories and nuclear capacities, leaving in their wake a kind of placelessness. 
Writing in 1977, around the beginnings of the committed re-acceleration of the arms race 
in the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Paul Virilio argued that, “Territory has lost its 
significance in favor of the projectile. In fact, the strategic value of the non-place of 
speed has definitively supplanted that of place, and the question of possession of Time 
has revived that of territorial appropriation.”36 The radical disarmament cartography of 
the 1980s, then, envisioned the end of the Cold War by trying to reclaim this sense of 
place and subvert the abstraction of space by superpower forces. By heightening their 
own ideologies and moral values in the lines of the map, these radical cartographers 
defied the expectation that Cold War maps uphold standards of rationality and scienticity. 
At the same time, radical mapping was constrained by cartography’s continuing struggle 
between its formal expectations to present space “as is” and its traditional role of 
providing a means for state power and control. As political scientist Michael Shapiro 
writes,  
The alternative worlds destroyed and suppressed within modern cartography 
become available only when the global map is given historical depth and 
alternative practices are countenanced. In sum, although the dominant geopolitical 




moral geography, a set of silent ethical assertions that preorganize explicit 
ethicopolitical discourses.37  
The defense maps of works like Soviet Military Power and Whence the Threat to 
Peace organize the world through these dominant lenses, while the Nuclear War Atlas 
constitutes these “alternative practices” that attempt to graph the “silences” of these 
ethical assertions and expose their powerful assumptions. As Bryan C. Taylor writes, 
“Idealistic opponents have depicted the Bomb as a monstrous development whose 
impracticality and immorality warrant its elimination. Supporters of deterrence, in 
contrast, have viewed nuclear danger as a problem solved by harnessing nuclear weapons 
as a means of national security.”38 I argue in this chapter that, on both sides, nuclear 
cartography negotiates tensions between social change and social control, as well as 
between the realist concept of protecting security and the idealist notion that the world 
needs to be both morally and physically saved from nuclear devastation. 
“Battle of the Booklets:” Nuclear Armaments and (Late) Cold War State Power 
 
Soviet Military Power, the first half of what Thompson called “the most evil book 
of our time,” appeared in 1981, as part of an informational offensive that accompanied 
the Reagan Administration’s increasingly intense calls for nuclear expansion to achieve 
not simply parity, but actual missile superiority. These calls reached back to the 1970s 
anti-détente discourse of influential political lobby organizations like the Committee on 
Present Danger (CPD), who shared key members with CIA Director George H.W. Bush’s 
“Team B,” an independent group convened to advise President Gerald Ford on Soviet 
intelligence. Members included past Cold War luminaries like NSC-68 architect Paul 




members of the Reagan Administration such as Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and 
Jeanne Kirkpatrick.39 Once President Jimmy Carter took office, the group brought their 
strategic ideas to the public, producing manifestos and various publications (included in 
journals such as Foreign Affairs) constructing a dark picture of Soviet superiority in 
weapons and military technologies and calling for a change in international relations 
toward a much stronger security apparatus.40 This new, more militant security discourse 
was also marked by what Simon Dalby called a revival of geopolitical thinking. 
Intellectuals and policymakers attempted a “geo-graphing of the Soviet Union.” In other 
words, they constructed the threat of the U.S.S.R. in explicitly spatial terms, and 
publicized the potential effect of Soviet weapons on the global landscape.41 Zbigniew 
Brzezinski’s definition of security as a function of distance and proximity rang true here; 
a renewed hard line in Cold War discourse revolved around estimations and debates 
around how far and how fast.42 Coupled with the context of the perceived failure of 
SALT II and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, this discourse contributed to the Reagan 
administration’s resuscitation of a contentious, bipolar Cold War. In historian Fred 
Halliday’s estimation, Cold War II was defined by a “concerted and sustained attempt by 
the USA to subordinate the various dimensions of its foreign policy, and that of its allies, 
to confrontation with the USSR…In both internal and international issues, the postulation 
of an external threat was combined with alarm about the erosion of pre-existing values to 
foster mobilization for a new Cold War.”43 
Defense Department initiatives like Soviet Military Power, called a “slick analysis” 
by Time, had to first establish that the Soviet Union enjoyed a destructive advantage over 




perpetuates “crisis.”44 Weinberger’s introduction to the booklet constructs this crisis with 
a distinct spatial focus on how Soviet power has become uncontainable:  
There is nothing hypothetical about the Soviet military machine. Its expansion, 
modernization, and contribution to projection of power beyond Soviet boundaries 
are obvious. A clear understanding of Soviet Armed Forces, their doctrine, their 
capabilities, their strengths and their weaknesses is essential to the shaping and 
maintenance of effective U.S. and Allied Armed Forces.45  
Cartography serves as a central vehicle to transmit such projections. Importantly here, 
Weinberger underlines the premium on a “clear understanding,” thus setting up the self-
evident proposition that the visual displays presented in the booklet will correct any 
misperceptions. He then takes his readers through a comparative litany of Soviet Union’s 
numerical advantage in nuclear capabilities—in the 1983 edition, the Secretary of 
Defense pointedly referred to America’s disadvantage as heightened “by a decade of our 
neglect coupled with two decades of massive Soviet increases.”46 This implicit reference 
to the détente period of nuclear rollbacks set a line in the sand for the military posture of 
the Reagan administration. Of course, while such pamphlets served as an inventory of 
capacities, their public opinion function was equally important. The same data was 
available, for example, in the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report, but the booklets 
allowed the chance for high-tech visual persuasion to display and shape the new nuclear 
geopolitics. As Weinberger wrote of Soviet Military Power in his autobiography, “it 
helped us measure and adjust our own forces and capabilities in relation to the Soviets’—




most useful in persuading some of our allies that they needed to increase their defense 
efforts.”47 
 A Defense Department booklet about Soviet nuclear capacities would have 
generated little attention had the Soviet Union not responded in kind, a response that set 
off a back-and-forth exchange in the pamphlet series from 1981 until the beginning of the 
Cold War’s end in 1989. The Soviets’ first response came in 1982 with Whence the 
Threat to Peace, which was launched in conjunction with a news conference featuring 
Chief of Staff of Soviet Armed Forces General Valentin Varrennikov. The New York 
Times called the news conference “the first opportunity in years for foreign reporters to 
put questions directly to a member of the [Soviet] military hierarchy.” Varrennikov 
announced that “the Soviet Union has never sought and does not seek military superiority” 
but “we have to react to the military threat created by the United States.” The book, noted 
the General, would provide “objective factual material” on “who is responsible for the 
arms race.”48 The introduction to Whence the Threat is more confrontational, accusing 
Weinberger and the U.S. of a “campaign of slander” that was “directed to inciting 
military psychosis.” Conversely, the Soviet booklet promises that the “unprejudiced 
reader will find answers in it to the anti-Soviet intentions that abound in the propaganda 
pamphlets of the USA and NATO.”49 The public relations offensive resulted in wide 
distribution of the booklet in six languages and an extensive amount of American press 
coverage. Congressman Thomas J. Downey of Long Island commented to the New York 
Times: “For the ordinary person, it’s useful to see that the Soviets regard us with the same 
hostility we view them.”50 An Economist review reproduced one of the Soviet maps (a 




up in pamphlets too.”51 The Economist also noted the lavish four-color illustrations and 
maps as products of “Madisonsky Avenue” and the Times called it the “most 
sophisticated effort yet to persuade public opinion…that the Reagan Administration’s 
arms buildup is a threat to peace.” Time declared that while many of the claims are false, 
“the production represents a quantum leap in Moscow’s mastery of military 
propaganda.”52 While the first edition of Weinberger’s booklet contained only a few 
maps, the Soviets used cartography extensively. In response, the U.S. Department of 
Defense notably increased the number of maps used in future editions. Further reprints of 
Whence the Threat and other tracts like 1983’s Disarmament: Who’s Against? escalated 
this numbers-and-maps war between the two powers.  
Nuclear Geopolitics in the Second Cold War 
 
To understand the meaning-making process of these defense maps, it is essential 
to understand the context of how the Second Cold War was accompanied and sustained 
by an evolving “nuclear geopolitics.” Nuclear geopolitics rested on a complex 
conundrum, as its tenets simultaneously employed both an intensely spatial outlook, and 
a denial of space. As John Agnew writes, “the advent of the capacity to deliver nuclear 
weapons over great distances almost instantaneously both devalued the military 
importance of territorial space through a new emphasis on virtuality and yet reinforced 
the sense of being targeted because of where you happened to live.”53 The ascendance of 
Third World geography and cartography during the course of the Cold War was 
predicated on regional consciousness, continental imaginaries, and expertise on particular 
areas. At the same time, the development of nuclear cartography, at least from the 




other words, the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to reclaim the familiar 
security of superpower politics, trying to reassert East and West as the defining 
geopolitical framework over the increasing calls to reorient the world in terms of North 
and South.  
A revival of the superpower’s spatial dominance thus came back into play, 
allowing for recourse to more traditional geopolitical conceptions like those of turn-of-
the-century British theorist Halford Mackinder. As noted earlier, Mackinder foresaw a 
world of truly global relations where world space was fully closed, and nation-states had 
to consider the totality of their place in the world. In particular, Mackinder was famed for 
his thesis that the nation-state power that controlled the so-called “Heartland” (the central 
part of Eurasia) and Eastern Europe could, in turn, control the world.54 Air-age globalists 
such as Richard Edes Harrison and S.W. Boggs revived and revised Mackinder’s 
strategic geopolitics, and his conception of space and international relations became 
particularly useful to add geographical weight to theories of containment.55 While the 
world had changed drastically since the days of Mackinder and even the air-age 
globalism of World War II, some of the assumptions of his approach were resurfacing 
during the Second Cold War, particularly in what Paul Virilio called Mackinder’s 
“geostrategic homogenization of the globe.” There evolved a renewed reliance on such 
realist geopolitical modes of explanation, almost as if to make sense out of the 
irrationality of nuclear war.56 In Yves Lacoste’s view, Mackinder’s theories provided a 
grandiose and evocative historical narrative, and “although the theses lack scientific value, 




The sophistication and immensity of nuclear war, however, required new 
adaptations. The key change was that instead of Mackinder’s grand narrative of land and 
sea bridging together to create a playing field for the power politics of world conquest, 
the replacement narrative told of the shrinking of world space through the mastery of 
technical expertise and new modes of warfare that transcended the features of the land. 
As Ciro Zoppo notes, nuclear geopolitics revolves around the “intercontinental projection 
of nuclear firepower” and the “extension of land and sea space to atmospheric space and 
from the latter into the stratosphere and beyond.”58 In other words, it was now the 
trajectory of the missile and the purview of the satellite that determined who would “rule 
the World Island.” Mackinder, writing in World War I, was originally responding to the 
closed world of the British Empire reaching the ends of the earth and facing decline. 
However, the closed world of the Cold War, in Paul Edwards’ terms, was “a dome of 
global technological oversight…within which every event was interpreted as part of a 
titanic struggle between the superpowers,” a war of information management.59 The 
realist paradigm of foreign policy still retained its primacy—even with the revolutionary 
changes of the nuclear missile, a state of international conflict was still seen as natural 
and innate—but realism was nonetheless transformed by the speed and scale of 
technology. Der Derian notes, “Despite the best efforts of its earliest practitioners, 
realism was scrubbed clean of its original theologico-ethical rhetoric of tragedy and 
providence, justice and order, and neutralized by a nascent social science in search of a 
value-free discourse.”60 The metaphor of the “zero-sum” aided this discourse as an 





Importantly, the architects of nuclear geopolitics in the Second Cold War were 
part of a lineage running back to think tanks such as the RAND Corporation, which 
pioneered the techniques of systems analysis and game theory that transformed the notion 
of security as the Cold War developed. Edwards wrote of these developments as “the 
intricate interplay of equipment, logistics, strategy, tactics and costs. In the age of nuclear 
weapons and intercontinental bombers, the problem of how much was enough—how 
many men, how many bombs and planes, how much air defense, how much research and 
development—obsessed not only military planners but politicians wrestling with the 
constraints of still-balanced budgets.”62 Or in Philip Mirowski’s terms: “The entire Cold 
War military technological trajectory was based on simulations, from the psychology of 
the enlisted men turning the keys to the patterns of targeting of weapons to their physical 
explosion profile…to the behaviour of the opponents in the Kremlin to econometric 
models of a postnuclear world.”63 
Security discourse, then, became a world of theories, simulations, and models, a 
world where cartography fit in well. Since nuclear deterrence itself was a projection, the 
map provided a fitting vehicle for its visualization, allowing for the simple and reliable 
display of complex calculations and quantifications. By showing a flat world over which 
missiles could be projected, cartography allowed for the necessary detachment and 
abstraction of nuclear planning. As early as 1955, for example, a textbook manual on the 
“Principles of Guided Missile Design” produced by the Naval Research Laboratory 
assured its readers that,  
There is no question that, with presently available techniques, it would be possible 




and return to the starting point without the assistance of a human pilot in the 
aircraft…The practical question is: where do we start the automatic operations in 
the chain of offense or defense? The obvious answer is that when man becomes 
the weak link in the chain, for any reason, he must be replaced by a specialized 
automatic device.64  
Thus, Richard Edes Harrison’s imagined air-age pilot was replaced by a revival of the 
omniscient cartographic perspective—except now, the perspective was most often 
produced by machine.65 Cruise missiles, for example, contained special radars in their 
nose cones that allowed them to monitor the layout of the ground below them against the 
information from satellite maps that have been digitized and stored in a built-in 
computer.66 Not only did the content of such defense maps reflect this technological 
quantification, the actual form and production of the maps in this era were becoming 
increasingly automated.67 Over the course of the Cold War, the mapmaker became a 
technician managing data rather than the artistic interpreter that was still prevalent in the 
days of S.W. Boggs. By the time of the arms race’s rekindling, the detachment of missile 
warfare was matched by the detachment of cartographic methods as well.  
Scale and Speed: The Hyper-Internationalism of Defense Cartography 
 
The maps in the “Battle of the Booklets” draw on this detachment by reducing the 
conflict to a zero-sum game of numbers with the world as the playing board. Both sides 
in the pamphlet wars, as the New York Times points out, share the “same penchant for 
quantitative measurement” that came to especially characterize the defense discourse of 
the Second Cold War.68 Cartography clearly provided a clean method by which to project 




version of Soviet Military Power, entitled, “Soviet Military Forces,” uses an outline of the 
U.S.S.R. and fills the landscape with stark black icons (over a pink background) of 
missiles such as ICBMs, IRBMs, SLBMs, as well as the shapes of missile-delivering jets 
and battleships (fig. 5.3).69 In addition, the map represented ground forces with a 
silhouetted icon of a soldier—its resemblance to a toy soldier minimizes the human 
element and equates Soviet fighting men with the missiles and submarines surrounding 
them. Like the Gulag map of the early 1950s, it did not matter where the missile silos (or 
camps) were, it mattered that they had the ability to fill the space. Just as the Soviet 
Union became one emblematic labor camp, it also became one emblematic logo of a 
missile base—here the power of cartography draws on the recognizable lines of the 
Soviet Union’s shape and makes them synonymous with the equally recognizable shape 
of a nuclear missile. The map switches from merely emphasizing locatory power 
 




and instead emphasizes capacity and volume, measuring how many nuclear weapons and 
other military forces could fill (and overwhelm) one nation. In addition, the map divorces 
the Soviet Union from its relationship with the rest of the world—it is simply a large 
puzzle piece over a white background, abstracted from its contextual connections to 
world space. The outline of the Soviet Union is shaded in such a way that it appears to be 
a plateau coming off the page, making the U.S.S.R. appear to be even more of a detached, 
abstract surface on the page. Altogether, like the Gulag map, the “Soviet Military Forces” 
map spatializes the process of knowledge production around enemy spaces and serves as 
a militant brand of propaganda, while still making use of the map’s representational 
power to reliably showcase statistical truth. 
One particular map in Soviet Military Power extends this concept by alarmingly 
transposing Soviet space onto American space. The “Area of Nizhniy Tagil Tank Plant” 
map (fig. 5.4) uses an aerial view of the Washington, D.C., area, centered on the National 
Mall, and outlines in red the size of the Soviet tank plant at Nizhniy Tagil over the 
symbolically hallowed ground of the U.S. capital.70 The red outline dwarfs the entire 
landscape of downtown D.C., attempting to prove that Soviet military power is sprawling 
and imposing (two smaller black squares inside the red outline denote two much smaller 
U.S. tank plants in Ohio and Michigan in order to buttress the idea that the U.S. is much 
less advanced in its military technologies). In addition, the blueprint-style quality of the 
aerial map used in both displays connotes a sense that the Soviet Union can destroy the 
infrastructure of its American enemy with the sheer immensity of its military power. By 
placing a tank plant over the center of American power, the map argues that the Soviets 




                           
Figure 5.4. "Area of Tagil Tank Plant (Superimposed on Washington, DC)," in Soviet Military Power, U.S. 
Department of Defense, 1981 
buildings, and parks on the ground are also key to the map’s function: those streets of 
Washington, D.C., and their famous landmarks are now contained by the capacity of 
military power to essentially target them. Obviously, the map stops short of arguing that 
the Soviets are specifically targeting D.C., but the choice of using an aerial map 
(typically used to assess military targets from the air) inevitably makes that case 
implicitly, and the capital (the nexus of “freedom” and American power) becomes a kind 
of militarized zone.  
Not only does the map represent the increasing size of Soviet armaments, but it 
also suggests their power of placement. More so than the world maps included elsewhere 
in the pamphlet, this map is intensely localized, corresponding to a very specific and felt 




reproduce the exact same map scheme (fig. 5.5), but now use a large blue outline of the 
U.S.’s Detroit Tank Armory, superimposing it over the red Tagil plant to show how 
America dwarfs the Soviet Union in terms of military capacity.71 In the process, their 
map accuses the Americans of omission and concealment in their use of cartographic 
evidence. No small part of the “paramap” here is that the Soviets include a photograph of 
U.S. nuclear-fitted howitzers (large cannons mounted on wheeled motor vehicles, similar 
in look to a tank) across the page from their adaptation of the D.C. map, helping to 
concretize the abstract nature of the tank plant outlines. Both of these maps also speak to 
the techniques of “surveillance” that mark Cold War superpower technologies. As Der 
Derian has written, this surveillance regime defined a superpower contest wracked by 
“hyper-vigilance, intense distrust, rigid and judgmental thought processes, and projection  
           
Figure 5.5. "Detroit Industrial Complex Over Plan of Washington, DC," in Whence the Threat to Peace, U.S.S.R. 




of one’s own repressed beliefs and hostile impulses onto another.”72 The tank plant maps 
literally project the enemy’s hostility onto our own internal spaces. In addition, the use of 
the aerial map emphasizes once again, the complex form and production of the “view 
from above.” The problem is that this surveillance “normalizes relations by continuing 
both war and peace by other, technical means. The same satellite that monitors and helps 
us verify whether the Soviets are conforming to the INF treaty simultaneously maps the 
way for low-level, terrain-following cruise missiles.”73 The tank plant maps, similarly 
display the potentially peaceful technology of aerial mapping in D.C. and use it to show 
the awful and immense military apparatus of a tank plant. The choice of whether to use 
cartographic technology for good or evil is thus drawn into the lines of the map. 
Other U.S. maps in Soviet Military Power such as “Soviet Global Power 
Projection” do place the Soviet Union back into context with the rest of the world, using 
a conventional Mercator projection (thus exaggerating the size of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe), and demonstrating the global locations of Soviet treaties of friendship, 
major Cuban military presence abroad, and nuclear sub operating areas. These maps even 
use pistol icons to show where major Soviet arms clients can be found.74 Altogether, the 
map spread reveals an extensive network of Soviet influence. By contrast, the Soviet 
answer in Whence the Threat maps such as “Exports of US Weapons and Materiel” and 
“Reinforcement of US Forward-Based Armed Forces” (refer back to fig. 5.2) employ a 
projection (not dissimilar to the Peters projection) that shrinks the Soviet Union and 
increases the size of Africa and South Asia. To dramatize the reach of the United States, 
the maps also draw in Alaska twice on the map (both in the east and west margins of the 




power.75 Particularly in “Reinforcement,” a large brigade of penetrating arrows 
aggressively protrudes forth from the United States and besets the Eurasian heartland 
from all sides. The arrow had been a frequent theme in so-called propaganda cartography 
since at least World War II, able to suggest directionality and movement on the static 
page.76 Here, the presence of the arrows carrying various weapons of destruction 
connotes a feeling of constant, unending flow. The actual locations of where the forces 
are going are less vital than the message that this movement of arms from the United 
States all around the world against the Soviet Union will be continuous and relentless. In 
the introductory text to the 1984 edition of Whence the Threat, the Soviet Ministry of 
Defense even invokes an old Cold War cartographic standby, noting: “Like the tentacles 
of a gigantic octopus, American imperialism’s bases—springboards for aggression—
reach to all corners of the globe. The network of military bases and installations is being 
constantly extended to new regions…with the obvious intention of creating a palpable 
threat from all sides to the Soviet Union and its allies.”77 Elsewhere, maps like “Concept 
of Operations of US Strategic Offensive Forces on the Basis of Major Military Exercises” 
steal a page out of the U.S. journalistic cartography of the 1940s and 1950s. The map 
employs a polar projection anchored around the Arctic, except now the United States 
hovers above the pole and the U.S.S.R. sits below.78 A series of thick, imposing arrows 
filled with jet and missile icons descend over the pole and infiltrate the Soviet Union.  
The early Cold War cartographic motif of polar encirclement had come full circle 
into the nuclear age. As Alan Burnett concluded about nuclear cartographic propaganda 
in the Second Cold War, “the spatial distribution of nuclear installations is deliberately 




to matter more—in other words, the accuracy of a given missile target was an important 
function of early Cold War cartography. In the Second Cold War, however, it was less 
about the specificity of the target and more about the totality of coverage. Nuclear 
weaponry can be launched from any direction, as the natural geography of the earth is 
reduced to a simple flat plane that weapons can fly over; all space is rendered vulnerable. 
By bringing all of international space into a platform for a theoretical war, the scale is 
both infinitely large and small at the same time. The map no longer is abstracting “real” 
scenarios on the ground, but rather becomes an abstraction of nuclear war, an event that 
was always already a significant abstraction of warfare in itself. Therefore, this use of 
cartography aids a new foray into the hyper-international.80  
The themes of totality and hyper-internationalism are even more prevalent in 
other maps in the “Battle of the Booklets.” Particularly the maps of NATO’s Force 
Comparisons demonstrate how the representation of targets had evolved over the course 
of the Cold War. One map, for example (fig. 5.6), portrays a rounded globe that compares 
the coverage of Soviet SS-20 and NATO Pershing and GLCM missiles.81 The SS-20 
covers a gigantic expanse of the earth stretching all over Europe, Asia, the Northern half 
of Africa and parts of North America, while the NATO weapons are portrayed as barely 
penetrating into Eastern Europe and the Western half of Russia. Soviet military power 
thus becomes menacingly global and total.  
The inset maps of Europe that follow show the coverage and capacity of nuclear 
weapons in Europe no longer as directional targets, but as rays that expand out of the 
Soviet center (fig. 5.7).82 Thick pink bands are concentrically emitted over the entire 




                                       
Figure 5.6. "Target Coverage of Soviet SS-20 and Target Coverage of NATO Pershing II and GLCM," in NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons, NATO, 1984 
          
Figure 5.7. "Coverage of Europe From SS-20 Bases East of the Urals," in NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force 




than confined to specified military bases and strategic targets. In response, the Soviet 
pamphlets accused NATO of key omissions, as their maps attempted to show how 
NATO’s force capacities were much larger than they had previously revealed. For 
example, in “NATO Medium-Range Nuclear Weapons Coverage” (from Disarmament: 
Who’s Against?), Soviet cartographers focus on the capacity of NATO’s combination of 
U.S. forward-based nuclear systems, and those of the British and the French, to penetrate 
deep into the heart of the Soviet Union and its satellites (fig. 5.8). In addition, in bright 
yellow, the map showcases where new U.S. missiles (the Pershings and cruise missiles) 
will cover—and the capital of Moscow falls squarely into this new radius.83 The 
internationalism of the nuclear-based Second Cold War is thus built on radii, circles and 
waves, rather than lines and edges, and this marks a key shift in cartographic techniques.  
In addition, the maps of the early Cold War that used boundaries to partition  
                                      
Figure 5.8. "NATO Medium-Range Nuclear Weapons Coverage," in Disarmament: Who's Against?, U.S.S.R. 




NATO and Warsaw Pact countries became increasingly irrelevant when the trajectory of 
the nuclear missile came to encompass more and more ground. For example, in U.S. 
Defense Department maps of Soviet SS-20 missile sites in Europe, a pink shading covers 
all of Europe (even into Greenland) and the upper Atlantic Ocean, an ambit representing 
the full trajectory of their advanced nuclear strike capabilities (fig. 5.9).84 In a map of the 
Soviet Union’s missile detection and tracking system, a series of overlapping radar 
systems, including locations in outer space, cover the earth in searchlight-like streams 
that come from all directions and wrap around the continents (fig. 5.10).85 In both of 
these maps, the distinction between geographical features such as continental land and 
ocean is tangential—a kind of radar-like dome covers the sky and subsumes everything 
beneath. As Virilio wrote,  
 




                                        
Figure 5.10. "Coverage of Ballistic Missile Detection and Tracking Systems," in Soviet Military Power, U.S. 
Department of Defense, 1983 
in the ballistic progress of weapons, the curvature of the earth has not stopped 
shrinking. It is no longer the continents that become agglomerated, but the totality 
of the planet that is diminished…a world wide phenomenon of terrestrial and 
technological contraction that today makes us penetrate into an artificial 
topological universe: the direct encounter of every surface on the globe.86  
Weapons of Perception: Affirming the Superpower in the Second Cold War 
 
The cartographic form becomes, then, an ideal visual medium for the display of 
state power during a nuclear arms race because of its ability to reduce space and create 
the illusion of a manageable surface for weapons. Overall in this process of reduction, 
despite exceptions, there is a lack of place that accompanies these maps; the specifics and 




nuclear weapon. Writing around this same time, geographer Doreen Massey was 
concerned about these developments, particularly in the “turning of space into time, the 
sharp separation of local place from the space out there” and “another and less-
recognised aspect of this technology of power: that maps (current Western-type maps) 
give the impression that space is a surface—that it is the sphere of a completed 
horizontality.”87 Maps, in short, “precodify all surprises.”88 Massey’s worries are 
particularly important when considering how anti-nuclear activists would come to answer 
the arguments of the superpowers, particularly from a geographic and cartographic point 
of view. Much of the media coverage of the defense booklets, for example, notes that 
most of the actual data presented are relatively true; what makes them reflective of the 
official space of the Second Cold War, though, is how they direct perception.89 In this 
way, what the maps in the “Battle of the Booklets” do not do is suggest the potential of 
nuclear destruction; rather, they suggest the potential loss of national influence in an 
international arms race. The consequence of this escalating race is not death, but more of 
an abstract loss of security—a loss of perception, rather than an actual material loss.  
For nuclear critics, this emphasis on perception was a function of the Cold War’s 
always-developing technological advancements. As Der Derian notes, the technological 
premium on acceleration resulted in an “urgent need to accurately see and verify the 
destruction of the enemy at a distance.”90 Such a “collapse of distance” shifted the aim of 
battle “from territorial, economic, and material gains to immaterial, perceptual fields, 
where the war of spectacle begins to replace the spectacle of war.”91 The compulsion to 
perfect technological possibilities became a driving force in determining the contours of 




foreign policy problems suddenly amenable to purely technical solutions.”93 In this case, 
the exaggerations and spurious data sources of all the negative comparisons in the maps 
and diagrams of Soviet Military Power and Whence the Threat to Peace are, at least in 
this light, irrelevant. It is the form of perception that makes the argument, not the so-
called real disparities in arms between the two powers.94 Rachel Holloway, for example, 
has noted the extensive rhetorical use of the “technological sublime” in the Cold War, 
particularly in how actors like Reagan place a high value on the vision of military and 
scientific expertise, where nuclear force takes on an almost metaphysical overtone.95 
Likewise, Taylor notes how the nuclear weapon maintains a kind of mystery and 
secrecy—a “numinous aura” that allows “nuclear officials to claim authority over the 
future (and defend their exacerbation of its danger) by using hyper-rational, euphemistic 
codes.”96  
Massey’s concern about the spatial being converted into the temporal comes true 
in the Soviet and American maps that perpetuate nuclear war as “always becoming.” This 
abstract power of the state over the future is critical to the persuasive power of the map. 
With nuclear weaponry, citizens did not have the chance to test the claims of their 
leadership—and as Fischoff, Pidgeon, and Fiske note, “one must take it on faith that new 
arms systems will deter the Soviets from military adventures and work if they are ever 
tested in real conditions.”97 This power also allows the state to focus, in Taylor’s words, 
on the “continual refinement of means, but not to moral reflection about ends. The 
nuclear future is subsequently pursued as the practical realization of a historical telos that 
is attributed to the guiding terms of technological programs.”98 Overall, then, the validity 




citizens but to protect an abstract conception of power. Weinberger makes the point that 
“the greatest defense forces in the world are those of free people in free nations well 
informed as to the challenge they face, firmly united in their resolve to provide fully for 
the common defense, thereby deterring aggression and safeguarding the security of the 
world’s democracies.”99 Here, he emphasizes perception, defining nuclear deterrence and 
security in abstract terms, as a way to protect American democratic ideology—not 
necessarily the health and wellbeing of individual citizens. The forms of the maps inside 
these booklets visually support Weinberger’s definition of defense and his emphasis on 
perception. In Henri Lefebvre’s terms, space often represents “the epitome of rational 
abstraction…because it has already been occupied and used, and has already been the 
focus of past processes whose traces are not always evident in the landscape.”100 The map, 
then, can serve to hide those processes and thus use its picture of rationality as a means of 
social control.  
Altogether, the immense state power on visual display in Soviet Military Power 
and Whence the Threat to Peace is an important attempt by the Cold War superpowers to 
control the “identity and the interpretation of space.” As Shapiro writes,  
Insofar as it has maintained control over its space and the identities of its citizens, 
[the state] has done so through the continuous reproduction of its political identity. 
Among other things, its territorial map has been maintained with a series of 
containment strategies, which have ranged from force of arms to the literatures 
through which the territorial state has claimed coincidence with the nation it 




What the pamphlets ultimately do is affirm the need for superpowers at a time when the 
stability of such bipolar organization was collapsing; they reproduce the Cold War and 
uphold its values.  
Despite the anxieties of both superpowers about their respective rival’s capacity 
for violence, these maps and pamphlets validate the supremacy of the nation-state over 
the control of armaments and technoscience in the Cold War. Both the United States and 
the Soviet Union, while decrying the threat of the other, are conversely celebrating their 
own ability to use sophisticated technology to track and catalogue the spaces of their 
enemy. In the spirit of Robert Scott’s insight that “stopping short” is built into the very 
concept of the Cold War, these static maps ironically assure a kind of security in their 
suspension of crisis and conflict.102 As historian Norman Graebner has written of the 
Cold War, “The prodigious investment of human and physical resources assumed a 
fundamental international security, one that, despite the recurrence of limited aggression 
and war, permitted the evolution of the complex, dynamic, technology-driven 
civilization.”103 Even with their alarming depiction of potential aggression and 
antagonism, Weinberger’s maps assure that the Cold War could comfortably keep 
progressing as is. In this way, the maps’ management of state power capacities and 
numbers reify a static image of the Cold War that Dalby calls “a conceptualization of 
political affairs that is clearly hegemonic. It is accepted as inevitable, assumed to be 
commonsense, and naturalized in that it renders eternal a transitory political arrangement, 
that of modernity.”104 
The overall phenomenon of the pamphlet wars is especially compelling if viewed 




abstract universe of defense, as budgets and stockpiles fluctuated. Benjamin Bratton, 
following Virilio, wrote that “history progresses at the speed of its weapons 
systems…that is, at the speed of the competitive capacities to envision, draw, map, curtail, 
mobilize, contour, stabilize and police the polis.”105 Each re-printing and re-mapping of 
the progress of nuclear offense and defense systems in the 1980s can be seen as part of an 
attempt at stabilization by Cold War state power. Since the effect of nuclear weapons is 
often unfathomable, nuclear arms are frequently “discourse-defying,” according to Taylor, 
and thus can be used by the state as a means to suppress resistance and control public 
dialogue.106 This unfathomable nature of nuclear war is integral to the silences of the 
maps contained in the Department of Defense’s propaganda of the Second Cold War; in 
the clean lines and their focus on quantification, the weapons on display are treated as if 
they were any other type of conventional warfare. The maps are not necessarily scrubbed 
free of morality; it is simply that their moral questions are constructed as self-evident. 
The value of superiority in technoscience and the abstract notion of security become the 
moral architecture of the map. In the end, the claims to completeness and accuracy in the 
maps, and their reduction of the globe to a playing field for armaments, serve to suppress 
any challenges to the bipolar spatial framework of the Cold War.  
Cartographic challenges to this forty-plus-year standoff would indeed surface. 
While controversial projections like the Peters projection gained wide circulation 
concurrently with the rise of the Second Cold War, an even more radical strain of spatial 
activism came out of the diverse disarmament community. As if to echo the outrage of 
Professor Thompson, activists and scholars from a host of disciplines began to 




global apparatus of state power in the nuclear age, and to highlight the sense of moral and 
human cost that they saw hidden in the boundaries of works like Soviet Military Power 
and Whence the Threat to Peace. The complex power of maps that dared to assess the 
“end of geography” articulated the destruction of world space in the face of nuclear war; 
in the process, such cartographic activism also foresaw the end of the Cold War itself in 
compelling and challenging ways. 
“Missiles as Missives”: 
 William Bunge and the Radical Cartographic Challenge to the Second Cold War 
 
In 1982, around the same time that the U.S.S.R.’s Defense Ministry was 
producing its response to Weinberger and the U.S. Defense Department, expatriate 
geographer William Bunge was distributing, through his Canadian collective “The 
Society of Human Exploration,” a poster/pamphlet (fig. 5.11), containing 28 maps, called  
 





simply the Nuclear War Atlas (NWA).107 A project realized during the rise of the 
intercontinental nuclear freeze movement (and eventually published in 1988 as a full-
length book), “Wild Bill” Bunge’s angry salvo ambitiously set out to map the latitude and 
longitude of the potential for human suffering in the face of nuclear attack. Bunge was a 
longstanding radical geographic crusader, who had drawn the idea of the polemic into 
mappers’ imaginations ever since the upheaval of the late 1960s attracted geographers 
into a new socially active role. Perhaps his most ambitious polemic yet, the Nuclear War 
Atlas graphically charted a teetering apparatus of death in the hands of what he saw as a 
morally bankrupt state system. As Fraser Macdonald has written, “Bunge’s Atlas maps 
out a post-apocalyptic terrain, without any attempt to soften the theme of ‘unremitting 
and sense-numbing disaster.’ Few geographers have offered their readers such a bleak 
cartography.”108  
A cursory flip through the Nuclear War Atlas reveals, for example, a macabre 
map of Chicago with simple “emoticon” looking faces as icons that are melting from 
third-degree burns. Another map, entitled “The Sea of Cancer” features a rendering of the 
United States with lines of red across the vast majority of the page (and only a few white 
spaces) and a caption that reads, “In a full nuclear war, not only will most of the United 
States be washed in immediate radiation, but even the white areas on the map will be safe 
only in the sense that people in the open escape short-term damage but not long term. The 
cancer is everywhere.”109 The message of Bunge’s maps is both crude and devastating. 
Most of the maps are skeletal and simple in content, awash in black and blood-red dots 
and lines, and there seems to be more than a bit of subversion of the expectations of map 




understand, and the general public itself is gradually getting the idea, that we cannot 
sustain nuclear war. It is a geographical impossibility.”110  
Bunge himself embodies the tensions of postwar Cold War academic geography 
and its attempts to define itself and its role as it engages with various publics. On the one 
hand, Bunge is a member of the quantitative revolution that transformed geography into a 
science, one of the key figures in advancing cartography specifically as a mathematical 
practice, and a steadfast believer in using theoretical knowledge to produce hard, 
objective spatial prediction, generalization, and quantification. On the other hand, he was 
a vociferous critic of the loss of the human in geography, a radicalized, impassioned 
preacher for exploring the very specificity of particular regions and peoples. Bunge railed 
against “armchair academics” who did not use their tools and expertise to help improve 
the human condition. The so-called quantitative revolution, thus, was peculiar in that it 
aided the kind of increasingly automated and abstract military-academic cartography that 
supported the U.S. efforts against the Soviet Union, while also sparking a critical 
geography movement that would question the appropriation of spatial knowledge for the 
benefit of state power. The kind of Third World challenges issued by outsiders such as 
Arno Peters, as well as the wider interdisciplinary disillusionment of academics with 
Vietnam and civil rights policies, would aid this movement.111 Maps could now be 
conceived less as mere representational devices and more as both processes of power 
relations and logos of “imagined communities”—new arguments that would captivate 
many of those in the discipline during the 1970s and early 1980s, just as the Cold War 
was re-igniting. Scholars began to assert, thus, that maps did not necessarily reflect the 




even the most objective-seeming maps could escape questions about their ideological 
placement in a discourse of power and politics.  
The prospect of ever-more destructive nuclear armaments and their re-escalation 
during the 1980s would, however, raise the ultimate challenge to cartographers and 
geographers engaged in social activism. Situated as a kind of fiery, apocalyptic, visual 
tirade, the Nuclear War Atlas represents a synergy of form and content that transforms 
the typical bounded lines of nations into expanded notions of volume and surface, 
bringing nuclear missiles closer than they ever were. By arguing for a new visual 
language of what proximity comes to mean on the surface of maps, the Nuclear War 
Atlas uses the ultimate fear of annihilation ironically as a catalyst for social change. In 
particular, the maps struggle between presenting an ironic parody of traditional maps 
while simultaneously reaching for a sense of “The Real”—to give a kind of felt quality to 
the potential reality of nuclear war through lines and dots. What went hidden in the maps 
of the “Battle of the Booklets” is now put on display, accentuated, and made 
uncomfortably present, as Bunge deconstructs the very conventions that allowed figures 
like Caspar Weinberger to define Cold War space and place American power within such 
space. In Slavoj Žižek’s words, “the opposite of existence is not nonexistence, but 
insistence: that which does not exist, continues to insist, striving towards existence.”112 
William Bunge’s maps connote this insistence, creating a future geography of “place 
annihilation and post-nuclear landscapes” that advocates a “passion for the Real.”113.  
The ways in which the cartography of such projects as Bunge’s foregrounded the 
artifice of mapping exhibit how maps can then function simultaneously as a rhetoric of 




offers the possibility of problematizing generally accepted notions of progress’’ and 
opening ‘‘the politically charged question of social justice.”114 At the same time, as he 
also points out, the emancipatory function of cartography has its limits, as mapping is 
constrained by our desire to ‘‘explain, classify and organize space,” entailing a significant 
degree of control.115 Although maps with radical messages can participate in complex 
renderings of power, these messages contend with a cartographic impulse for convenient 
efficiency, simplicity, and objectivity. Maps still share the age-old conundrum of many 
rhetorical forms of social change: the difficulty of challenging a system while working 
from within it.  
 The Nuclear War Atlas, for example, highlights form as content, and thus calls into 
question the objective, scientific presentation of maps. Furthermore, by boldly advancing 
their ideological goals, William Bunge’s maps accentuate the politics of cartography. 
This embellishment, however, also calls attention to how these maps struggled against the 
potential to function as rhetorical control over spatial meaning, having ultimately to 
maintain some conventional assumptions and techniques in order to sustain a level of 
cartographic credibility. In the end, these maps of disarmament and nuclear destruction 
represented a uniquely explosive tension between cartographic form and content, as well 
as a snapshot in time of what challenges to the Second Cold War looked like. They thus 
manifest the tension between rhetorics of change and control.  
The Emergence of Radical Cartography and the Origins of the Nuclear War Atlas 
 
 Interestingly, the story of Bunge’s development mirrors the emergence of a new 
consciousness in post-war geography. Bunge was born in 1928 in Milwaukee to a family 




notes in the preface to the Nuclear War Atlas, “As a boy, my father would take me on 
business trips through southern Wisconsin and explain the region, the farming, the 
industry and all that we were passing through between calls on small-town banks. Both 
he and I thought he was teaching me his business, but it turned out that he was teaching 
me his geography.”116 For Bunge, growing up in the Depression-era Northern U.S., “the 
primary effect of the Depression was not hunger or fear, but loneliness from those who 
were hungry and fearful.”117 With that acute sense of isolated privilege in mind, Bunge’s 
ascent to the forefront of geographic social thought was accompanied by controversy, 
which he would continue to court throughout his career.  
As a student of William Garrison at the University of Washington, Bunge was at 
the forefront of the quantitative revolution in geography, a paradigm shift that marked the 
social sciences as a whole. His first major work, Theoretical Geography (the first edition 
completed in 1962), was a landmark move toward establishing geography as a spatial 
science above all else, conceiving of maps specifically as mathematical models.118 
According to Bill Macmillan’s tribute, Theoretical Geography appeared “on the cusp 
between the old world and the new, between the old analog world of crude, imprecise 
tools and the modern world of abundant data and powerful techniques of analysis, 
visualization, and simulation.”119 Bunge’s own work, for example, would go on to 
influence the applications of GIS technology that would come to revolutionize the field 
even further.120 According to Kevin Cox, after Bunge, “the spatial became the central 
organizing concept of the field,” as researchers aspired toward universal laws that united 
locations together; the premise of uniqueness of places that marked much of the first half 




generalizability.121 Bunge positioned his work in tandem with Waldo Tobler (who he 
called Ptobler because “he was the greatest cartographer since Ptolemy”), as he reflected 
later, to get at “the pure spatial essence of our trade – dimensions and nearness,” and his 
mathematical theories sought to sketch this out.122  
 This new world in the American academy, as Barnes points out, was inescapably 
tied to the state power interests of the Cold War, and this never quite sat well with Bunge. 
Out of the research universities’ contracts with the defense establishment came a focus on 
the increasing importance of the “spatial model.” These developments were directly 
inspired by the advent of the nuclear bomb, new “cyborg forms” of science that “offered 
through their rigour, analytical purchase, and generalizations, the means to exceed mere 
description. Models lay exactly between the worlds of high theory and empiricism,” 
serving as “mediators, and consequently seized upon…to achieve specific ends.”123 
Bunge’s advisor, Garrison, for example, was enlisted by the Washington State Highway 
Commission to use spatial models for highway planning, particularly with the Cold War 
objective of providing ways for Seattle citizens to exit the city in case of a nuclear 
emergency.124 Tobler, for his part, contributed to a RAND spinoff called the Systems 
Development Corporation in developing mapping technology for a computer-based early 
warning system for nuclear attack, called SAGE. In particular, Tobler’s innovative forays 
into “analytical cartography” (essentially computer maps) worried Bunge in their 
tendency toward encouraging detachment—as he admitted in 1966: “To see region 
construction, one of the last preserves of the non or anti-mathematical geographers, 
crumble away before the ever growing appetite of the computing machines is a little 




Not only was Bunge concerned about the loss of this kind of expertise, he also 
worried about the increasing compartmentalization and professionalization of Cold War 
geographers. He spent years, for example, trying to publish a tribute (that no one would 
touch) to Fred K. Schaeffer, a German expatriate geographer in America who was an 
early pioneer of quantitative geography, but also a radical followed by the FBI and dead 
from a heart attack by 1955.126 Commenting on this episode, Bunge wrote that,  
Most of my batch of intellectuals seem to pursue their personal careers with a 
fanaticism worthy of higher purpose…If McCarthyism is truly dead then why not 
a general rehabilitation of his academic and other victims? If this country is so 
free why is there not a single public Communist professor in the entire country? 
When I was a young boy we had a saying we used whenever we fell into dispute. 
“It’s a free country, ain’t it?” I never hear that expression anymore. Perhaps it is 
no longer true. The academic pretense is somehow more depressing to me than 
what I consider to be the obvious fact.127  
As the utility of geography as a spatial science grew, Bunge became disillusioned with 
the university system’s treatment of it. Like-minded contemporary David Smith wrote 
that  
numerical dexterity had been replaced by confessions of ignorance as the cardinal 
professional virtue. There were sessions in urban and economic geography which 
gave the clear impression that more than a decade of…running regression models, 
factor-analyzing census data, and the like, has done little to help us improve the 





Smith even used an example of a local university atlas that had “a section of thirty-four 
maps of the United States which includes dot maps of the location of turkeys, hogs, and 
chickens, but no maps of any human material or social conditions.”129 Bunge sought to 
bring the field closer to humanist concerns—to see quality of life more literally on maps. 
He especially hoped that the disciples who took up his theoretical geography would start 
moving beyond mere abstraction, and instead make spatial prediction more concrete.130 
In Bunge’s philosophy of scientific activism, “There exist objective ways to judge police 
states. Map them.”131  
Bunge became truly radicalized alongside the student protest movements outside 
his office doors, crediting Vietnam with forever taking him out of abstract work 
altogether and “headlong into peace work.”132 As Bunge has said about this immersion,  
Betty [his wife] and I are a couple of rich white kids no longer rich, certainly not 
kids and I’m not so white any more…Though we live modestly, at times 
extremely modestly, I know that our families will never let our children face real 
physical needs like hunger or lack of medical care…But when I confront the 
physical aspects of The Movement, my family’s money falls away and I find my 
ultimate legitimacy.133  
Denied tenure at Wayne State because of obscenity charges (swearing in lectures), he was 
released from teaching.134 In 1968, Bunge was one of 65 national names listed by the 
United States Anti-Subversive Committee not to speak on campuses—as Bunge notes, 
“To my eternal glory, I was alphabetically placed between H. Rap Brown and Stokely 
Carmichael and not far from philosopher Angela Davis.”135 John Pickles notes that 




moving from periods of unemployment to visiting lectureships to working with 
underground publishers and organizing on the streets.136  
At this time, Bunge became a proponent of a new kind of fieldwork, reviving the 
old-school geographic concept of the “expedition,” where he engaged deeply in “location” 
and traced intensely the spatial aspects of neighborhoods.137 He was a resident of a 
Detroit ghetto, Fitzgerald, and his most controversial project, outside of the Nuclear War 
Atlas, was his radical Fitzgerald: The Geography Revolution, published in 1971. 
Fitzgerald takes up the largely black Detroit community threatened by slum and shows 
how everyday community inhabitants were using geographical knowledge to take back 
the neighborhood. As Bunge noted in Fitzgerald’s introduction, “In this radioactive age, 
these are signs of Life itself.”138 According to Rich Heyman, the Detroit expedition, 
“represented a wholesale reconceptualization of the social role of geographical 
knowledge production” where “through the reciprocal interaction between theory and 
local knowledge, people begin to realize their relative position in society, which may in 
turn lead to more active agitation for change.”139  
Out of such projects, Bunge formed the “Society for Human Exploration” with his 
wife and a rotating cast of academics and locals. By the time Fitzgerald appeared, though, 
Bunge left Detroit for the landscapes of Canada, after “displeasing the national political 
police too severely to remain in other than a permanently horizontal and motionless 
position.”140 He took short-term positions at the University of Western Ontario and York 
University, teaching seminars that were well-received, but his anger with “the political 
positions of some of his colleagues made it impossible to renew his contract.”141 Typical 




their armchairs think and write junk, obfuscation, obscurantism, and endlessly convoluted 
self-referral to their literature in windowless libraries, they do not care about the human 
condition.”142 Bunge’s critics such as Donald Fryer would shoot back witheringly that 
Bunge’s work was “harsh, strident, and hectoring, more fit for the marketplace and the 
hustings than the pages of a serious academic journal” and “perhaps Professor Bunge 
believes that only a bludgeon can make an impression on the thick deposit of indurated 
bias and ignorance in our skulls.”143 Bunge ended up driving taxis while pursuing his 
projects independently. Over the years, his whereabouts were a mystery—he surfaced 
periodically, offering a book review or editorial in disciplinary journals, but mostly he 
served as a kind of activist specter over the field.144 He is still evading an arrest warrant 
from a 1986 disruption of an open meeting of the Wayne State University Board of 
Governors in Detroit.145 
The NWA was produced out of the tumult of Bunge’s long expatriate period, and 
it is important that its visual and verbal appeals be seen in this context. During this 
exodus, Bunge’s locational focus broadened significantly into the realm of the atomic, 
and he came to see the “nuclear question” as key to both his own development and the 
vitality of the discipline of geography as a whole. As he said in 1987 while promoting his 
atlas,  
Normally, socialism, nuclear war protest and academic freedom are not directly 
linked, so how did this happen in me? Each generation of geographers produces a 
few of us who walk off campus to serve the people, returning to our glorious field 
tradition of exploration in the process…I am a Martin Luther King American 




Wayne State University. I am fiercely loyal to my home, the Fitzgerald 
community in Detroit, a Dr. Martin Luther King community. I am a socialist by 
the classic definition of ‘holding the means of production in common’, but I do 
not prefer socialist H bombs to capitalist ones. I simply hate all H bombs 
implacably.146 
The kind of reclamation of place sought by the NWA in the abstract menace of nuclear 
war was informed by Bunge’s own concrete experience of displacement from his home. 
His longing to be immersed back in his community comes through in the NWA’s moral 
outrage at the destruction of space. This also points to a compelling conundrum that 
marked Bunge’s nuclear cartography: he was unabashedly positivist in his belief that 
geography could help save the world, but also very wary of the kind of expertise that 
positivist geographers claimed. For example, when asking himself the question, “so what 
is the state of geography today?,” his blunt answer was that: “It is in a mess – hyphenated, 
obfuscated, as confused as it is confusing. Why? Society is itself degenerating. The 
culture is coarse, vulgar, prostituted, chaotic, ‘dummied down.’ We are in desperate need 
of intellectual reinforcements, and geography can help some.”147 At the same time, 
Bunge maintained that geography was not the domain of geographers, any “more than 
medicine was the domain of doctors”; he argued that “people in their local places with 
local knowledge should collaborate with geographers to make their own geographies.”148  
  As the geographic “impossibility” of nuclear war became the driving focus in this 
nomadic period, Bunge immersed himself in these notions of place, and used both his 
background in mathematical modeling and urban exploration to fashion the NWA maps. 




antagonism with much smaller-scale renderings of cities and surrounding areas laid to 
waste by atomic blasts and waves of radiation. Bunge resurrected the works of early 
twentieth-century German geographer Walter Christaller, especially his “Central Place 
Theory,” which cast cities as settlements of hierarchical systems that, if attacked, would 
set off a kind of “chaining out” of destruction.149 In Bunge’s explanation, “When the 
major centres are destroyed, so are all skilled workers, the artists, the diamond cutters. If 
the ‘primate city’ – the city in each nation that tops the hierarchy – is destroyed, then all 
the national centres are destroyed, including the national theatre, ballet, government and 
finance. The nation is not only decimated, it is decapitated.”150 For Bunge, the identity of 
urban populations was a central way to personalize and truly place both the physical and 
moral consequences of nuclear weaponry into proper context. 
Bunge’s work in this vein was part of the larger push in the geography discipline, 
beginning in the early 1970s, to incorporate newfound interests and insights in social 
conditions, Marxist economics, and urban planning. This movement was centrally 
concerned with the privileged place of the geographer and how the nature of political 
upheaval all over the world begged the geographer to be actively involved. David 
Harvey’s 1973 landmark Social Justice and the City builds off Fitzgerald and accuses 
fellow geographers of being apologists for the status quo and calls for a revolution in 
geographic thought, in his case “to design a form of spatial organization which 
maximizes the prospects of the least fortunate region.”151 Harvey, like Bunge, challenged 
geographers to immerse themselves in advocacy for the people of the spaces they charted, 
railing against the expectations of geography to promote scientific measures of “effective 




“created space” that welcomes geography having ideological purpose.152 In Harvey’s 
wake, a cadre of radical geographers and theorists on space accepted this challenge 
against objective assumptions. Postmodern urban planner Edward Soja challenged the 
power of the nation-state as geographical unit and the obscuring of the nature of social 
identity, while Richard Peet attempted to establish radical geography as its own distinct 
sub-discipline and defined it as the “evolution of a non-destructive society.”153 In the 
NWA project, Bunge sought to recast geography as a science of survival, and thus he 
assumed these humanistic assumptions of his contemporaries.154 While Bunge upheld his 
projects as works of quantitative science, he explicitly often used the term “humanist 
geography” to describe his perspective, what he called the “steel-hard hammer of 
humanism.”155 His radical vision was uncompromising in its moral absolutism: “If the 
earth is finite and fragile, and geography clearly proves the destructibility of the human 
race, then one cannot be relative about all things…and still claim a humanism. If 
cockroaches and not humans survive the radioactivity, biologists might be interested, but 
geographers and other humanists are not…He must be singularly absolute about the 
species continuation.”156  
It was important, too, that prominent geographers were taking up the cause of 
anti-nuclearism and helping to define a potential atomic holocaust as a spatial problem, 
offering an integral context for Bunge’s contributions. For example, Gilbert White, 
arguably the most famous postwar environmental geographer in America, who 
contributed innovative flood-planning measures to the Johnson Administration, argued 
that nuclear disarmament was a public policy that demanded input and activism from 




Short of finding a way of forever suppressing the manufacture of nuclear bombs 
and fuels, the world is condemned to living with them. As long as the missiles are 
present and ready to launch in large numbers, there will remain the hazard, to 
which no probability is assigned, that their detonation would massively disturb 
atmospheric and biologic systems.”157  
In particular, nuclear disarmament movements in Britain and Canada, such as the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and Women Strike for Peace, drew heavily 
on activist geographers to support their public messages. 
One particular set of activist cartographies called The State of the World, for 
example, emerged out of a British disarmament and socialist collective of like-minded 
economists, geographers, and peace activists called the Pluto Press.158 Headed by radical 
Marxist economist Michael Kidron, the original State of the World Atlas appeared in 
1981 (co-written by anti-apartheid activist Ronald Segal), followed shortly by the War 
Atlas in 1983 (co-authored with CND mainstay Dan Smith), with others following in the 
series.159 The State of the World earned wide distribution (through Simon & Schuster) 
and acclaim, and its share of controversy, for presenting an uninhibited reading of the 
nature of oppression in the modern nation-state. With colorful, sometimes acidic wit in its 
visuals, combined with pithy, often outraged text, and map titles like “Funny Money,” 
“Slumland,” and “Bullets and Blackboards,” the authors shunned notions of objectivity 
and featured an angry, subjective geopolitical vision of the state of the world.160  
While nuclear warfare was only one subject among many covered in the atlases 
(they targeted the nation-state from a variety of angles), their treatment of weapons was 




the Second Cold War. For example, “The Nuclear Club” from the original State of the 
World, is a political map of the world featuring those nations that have nuclear capacities, 
and those who will likely join the “club” in the coming years. Over the United States and 
the Soviet Union are a mass of missile icons, air bombers, and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles.161 An inset map also reveals three maps of Hiroshima: one shows the 
three square mile radius of the 1945 bomb, the 50 square miles that a current U.S. ICBM 
would cover in the area in 1981, and then a 290 square mile radius for what these ICBMs 
are projected to cover by the end of the decade. In the first edition of the War Atlas, maps 
like “On the Ground,” “In the Air,” and “At Sea” cover the globe with a visual catalogue 
of tools of violence and destruction; the familiar outlines of world geography are barely 
visible, obscured by an almost ridiculous amount of armament statistics—the visual 
argument is that world space has been colonized and conquered by defense machinery.162 
The almost comically overstuffed maps, overwhelming the reader with weapon icons, 
represent a kind of absurdist version of the Defense pamphlets being released at the same 
time. The State of the World project also innovates through its full global perspective that 
goes beyond superpower armaments and reminds the reader that nuclear arms will only 
block out even more of the map in years to come. 
Other cartographers emerging out of this British movement took a more localized 
approach to disarmament activism. Stanley Openshaw, for example, charted and mapped 
the geography of hypothetical nuclear attacks on the British Isles and particular cities, 
using the kind of mathematical map modeling pioneered by Bunge and Tobler to predict 
the effects of this future geography. As Openshaw warned, “Some people may find it 




concerned with the prediction of ‘mega-deaths’ are even more distasteful,” but 
government figures in the throes of nuclear policy decisions needed to visualize the 
consequences of their actions.163 The discourse of geographers such as Openshaw, later 
expounded by Bunge, marked an important shift from emphasizing nuclear capacities 
(what defense mapping like the pamphlet wars suggests) toward a focus on spatial 
consequences. Similarly, Canadian geographers such as Kenneth Hewitt advanced the 
notion of “place annihilation,” accentuating the material attributes of places and railing 
against how nuclear extermination is “literally to kill by geography, not necessarily 
damaging an organism, but driving it beyond its bounds,” potentially turning nation-
states into non-places.164 A Cold War initiative such as civil defense, then, becomes “a 
token gesture, an abstract, statistical notion of survivability,” and state leaders divert 
publics with their “‘nuclear diplomacy’, a high-class and very secretive game….The 
posturing and rhetoric, the duplicity and failure to take real actions to outlaw aerial 
bombing of cities by powerful governments before World War II seem strangely like the 
nuclear disarmament fiasco since.”165 
Bunge especially challenged nuclear policy in terms of how it approached the 
notion of scale, and he would find that even some of his well-meaning colleagues 
underestimated the issue’s full import. “That the earth is too small to contain such a war,” 
wrote Bunge, “is invariably missed by most strategists, who nibble away at it by 
concentrating on issues such as…the capability of a civil defence programme. They look 
at the war at a scale below its true one – which is the planet itself; and they come up with 
conclusions that the human species will not be completely destroyed.”166 The military 




from the “life spaces” of Bunge’s cartography. Bunge also reached back to the precepts 
of his Theoretical Geography, particularly in its arguments about the three-
dimensionality of the human race, to “prove that the ‘zoning’ of the battlefield away from 
the nurseries of the world would be impossible. The battlefield is everywhere due to the 
collapse of topological space.”167 This three-dimensionality was developed by using ideas 
from his contemporary Ronald Horvath, who theorized the rise of “machine space” (or 
what Horvath frighteningly referred to as alienated spaces of death) in the Cold War, 
where the habitable space for humans became dramatically smaller based on the sheer 
amount of space that machines covered—including nuclear weapons and the industries 
that built them.168  
Not only could this development destroy space on the ground, but it took over the 
skies as well; the actual atmosphere of the earth in the days of the Second Cold War was 
now subsumed by dangerous machinery. In these ways, the shrinkage of the earth 
advanced by the air-age globalists in World War II, and furthered by the technological 
innovations of Cold War cartographic science, became distinctly nuclearized. Now, to 
Bunge, geography had to go smaller in the face of the most massive weapons of all, as he 
noted that “time is infinite; space is not…Geography, the study of the earth’s surface as 
the home of man, is a small thing, not the infinite…the hugely infinite universe of 
astronomy. Our planet is small. It is increasingly easy to poison the planet, making it 
uninhabitable.”169 Such contraction of the earth, for Bunge, also signaled a death of 
nationality, which contradicted the intensely nationalized mapping of the U.S./Soviet 
defense pamphlets. As he lamented, “Already, national sovereignty over the earth’s 




about what is happening in Canada than do the Canadians. Loss of sovereignty over the 
earth below would be the final destruction of geography…In geographical terms, this 
planet is not too small for peace but it is too small for war.”170  
The total combination of these strands of thought and discourses helped form the 
basis of Bunge’s nuclear opus, which he finally released in 1982, after working on the 
maps and texts for over ten years.171 Nowhere is it explicitly apparent that William Bunge 
ever felt comfortable with the abstract notions and theoretical extensions of 
postmodernism—as noted, Bunge’s activism was still mired in his modernist belief that 
“science, not policemen, has created what order man has achieved.”172 At the same time, 
the NWA is a clear example of bringing J.B. Harley’s more postmodern idea of 
cartographic “silence” to the forefront—what has not been mapped before, what others 
will not map, becomes Bunge’s currency.173 John Pickles, in fact, used Bunge as the 
quintessential example of the way the “discursive practices of modernist cartography are 
to be deconstructed and read differently.”174 I examine these practices in the NWA maps 
around four major aspects: 1) the NWA’s radicalized “proximity,” in how Bunge 
rhetorically constructs the “closeness” of nuclear weapons through shifting ideas of 
volume and surface on the maps, as well as through the strategic use of “place”; 2) the 
ways in which Bunge’s maps attempt to destabilize Cold War superpower binaries; 3) 
how the concept of “nuclear vision” is used to frame post-apocalyptic space, creating 
simultaneously a sense of fear and hope in the atlas’s advocacy for social change, 
representing the struggle that nuclear geography has in using lines and abstractions to 
depict a tangible future vision; and 4) the NWA’s use of a brand of pitch-black humor (in 




once termed Bunge’s style of cartography as “oughtness maps,” and thus, overall, I 
proceed in terms of how the NWA’s maps construct what the world ought to and ought 
not to look like.175 
Bringing Nuclear War Home: Radical Proximity in the NWA  
 
After the original broadsheet was distributed at peace rallies in 1982 and 1983, the 
NWA was expanded and eventually featured a total of 57 maps, 26 figures, and one table, 
interspersed amongst text under four sections (“The Introduction,” “The Weapons,” “Star 
Wars,” and “The Future”). While a perusal through the NWA may give a horrifically 
visceral first impression about the sheer enormity of nuclear warfare, its most lingering 
suggestion is the immediacy of the weaponry. Many of the maps inside do contain 
graphic depictions of the destructive power of atomic bombs, yet it is those that display 
the nearness and the speed at which they can reach the U.S. that challenge traditional 
cartographic notions of form. The map entitled, “The Closest Neighbours Ever – the 
Soviet Union and the United States” is a typical representation of Bunge’s outlook.176 
The projection is of a standard flat world map, but curiously the U.S.S.R. and the United 
States’ borders are missing on the map, while the rest of the world is filled in as normal. 
The simple, crude legend at the bottom of the map reads “National boundaries,” 
indicating that the border of the U.S.S.R. are three red diagonal lines, while those of the 
U.S. are three red diagonal lines going the other way. Over the map are criss-crossed red 
lines, displaying that the borders of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. intersect everywhere in the 
nuclear age, since, as Bunge claims, the two superpowers are volumetric powers that 
“cannot be contained by lines, but only by surface.”177 On the original NWA broadsheet, 




“‘containment’ has been a mathematically proven bankruptcy for almost twenty 
years.”178 By omitting the traditional borderlines, and by overlaying intersecting borders 
in bright red, not only does Bunge bring the proximity of the powers into close range, he 
overlaps them, essentially making them both sides of the same coin, sharing in 
destructive capability. The maps of Weinberger’s Defense Department and his Soviet 
counterparts sought to advance moral distinctions and inequities between the two powers; 
Bunge, however, following E.P. Thompson, erases any distinction between the two. In 
addition, the full removal of the two superpowers’ traditional political boundaries from 
the face of the map comments on the new placelessness created by the arms race. The 
militarization of all the skies above us has the potential to uproot us from our connections 
to our homes and felt places.179  
Similarly, containment is declared obsolete and distance rendered meaningless in 
maps like “Nuclear Proliferation.”180 On this world map, countries belonging to the 
“Nuclear Club” are marked in solid red, countries that could develop nuclear weapons in 
five years are striped in red, and countries that could develop them in ten years are 
marked by red dots; this leaves only a few white spaces on the map (those with no hope 
of nuclear development), most prominently in Africa and Central America. What draws 
the visual focus of the eye, though, are the oceans; rather than the typical ocean space on 
world maps being left empty or colored in blue, instead, here, wavy red lines cover the 
entire surface of the world’s oceans. These lines correspond to the legend as “aquatic 
launching pads,” with Bunge’s point being that, in the Second Cold War, “all the oceans 
are launching platforms: this constitutes two-thirds of the earth’s surface for a start.”181 




boundaries between oceans and continents, as the world is equalized as a nuclear launch 
site. Still, the map does include some specific references to places—noting the locations 
of famous nuclear detonation sites such as Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Alamagordo (NM), 
Eniwetok Atoll, and even Stagg Stadium in Chicago—and includes the dates of the 
explosions. Contrasting these iconic sites with the flattened surface of the entire world (as 
one nuclear launch pad) draws on the collective memory of those nuclear tests and 
projects them into a future where, Bunge suggests, even more detonations will dot the 
landscape. Altogether, the use of test dates and the suggestion of future nuclear 
developments in five-year increments mixes temporal and spatial appeals in complex and 
compelling ways on the map. In most of these world maps, for example, traditional 
arrows and distance lines are nowhere to be seen—the maps connote that nuclear 
weapons have already arrived at their destinations, and exist essentially everywhere. 
 In addition, as noted earlier, Bunge’s Second Cold War nuclear maps of proximity 
represent a key connection with early Cold War air-age globalism, except now the 
airplanes have become nuclear missiles. The NWA’s map, “Space: The Disputed Volume,” 
actually uses a Harrison style perspective map with a bird’s-eye view, although much 
more crude in design. Here, Bunge sketches a perspective of the Northern hemisphere, 
where we see a piece of the United States as well as the Soviet Union. Instead of seeing, 
say, mountains appearing three-dimensionally off the page, the map displays the red lines 
of a missile trajectory curving from both superpowers above the earth in the top space of 
the map. Surrounding this trajectory is a bevy of floating American and Soviet flags, 
again showcasing the idea that borders no longer exist now that warfare takes place in 




in the air, rather than lines on the ground. As Bunge explains in the caption about the 
worthlessness of borderlines, “You cannot hold water with sticks.”183 Relatedly, in “The 
Fences” map, Bunge illustrates his point that “While there may be no ‘one world’ on the 
earth’s surface, there certainly is above it.”184 On this map of North America, a grid-like 
“radar fence” lines the border between Canada and the U.S.—but the fence resembles a 
tennis net that only goes so high. The point Bunge makes here is that if nuclear bombs 
and spy satellites were to cross the border on the ground, there would be a major 
controversy—but send them 100 miles above the border in the sky, and no one notices, 
begging the question, “How high (in feet) is Canadian Sovereignty?”185  
The consequence of the nuclear-age “one-world,” then, is a loss of familiar 
national autonomies in the face of an unavoidable hyper-internationalism. The references 
to this transformed air-age globalism are even more overt when, at one point, Bunge even 
reproduces former State Department Geographer S.W. Boggs’ 1941 map of world 
transportation, which shows the new ease of movement in the progressive development 
of transport technologies.186 However, Bunge appropriates it for a more sinister 
purpose—to show how the nuclear missile has sped up transportation to such a radical 
degree that there essentially is no strategic distance anymore between warring powers. As 
Virilio noted, “without the violence of speed, that of weapons would not be so 
fearsome.”187 To argue for disarmament, then, is to decelerate “the speed of means of 
communicating destruction”; thus, for Bunge, the first step is revealing and putting those 
means on rhetorical display.188  
 In addition to the subversion of air-age globalism, the other textual evidence of 




locations in the prospects of nuclear war. Drawing on his trademark intensive immersion 
in the places being mapped, instead of simply relying on large-scale maps of Cold War 
superpowers, Bunge resurrects his Fitzgerald approach in certain maps by showing the 
effects of nuclear war on regions and real neighborhoods, namely his Northern and 
Midwest heritage grounds. His two “ring” maps “The Explosion” and “The Firestorm” 
use the space around Lake Michigan, with Chicago as the center, to show the effects of a 
20 megaton hydrogen bomb blast.189 By drawing a series of rings around Chicago, Bunge 
shows the extent in miles where people would become vaporized (4 miles), where most 
frame building and trees would collapse (14 miles), where extreme radiation would carry 
(20 miles), where second degree burns would occur (23 miles) and where incidences of 
blindness would occur (40 miles). A third ring map, “The New Chicago,” shows the new 
geography of the region after a nuclear firestorm, showing 20 miles of radioactive 
corpses and the migration patterns of “sick, maimed, and insane” survivors to outer areas, 
predicting starvation within the 60 mile radius of the New Chicago.190  
The depiction of miles on these maps radicalizes distance as a vehicle of 
destruction; after a nuclear blast, the migration from the core to the periphery is a trail of 
spreading radiation and sickness. In addition, Bunge’s rings serve as a kind of ironic 
comment on the use of the radius and concentric circles in Cold War urban planning for 
the purposes of civil defense against possible nuclear war and to decentralize urban 
blight.191 The rings of Cold War urban planning designed the center of the city as empty, 
only for transient use, whereas the inhabitants of the city would live in successive rings 
on the outer edges.192 Bunge’s rings had the ultimate in atomic activity at the city’s core, 




still filled with people, often poor and African-American. By taking this micro approach 
to supplement his world maps, Bunge localizes the suffering of a region he is intimately 
familiar with –the abstraction and theoretical nature of much nuclear cartography is made 
startlingly concrete by placing human symptoms and disease into the lines of the map. 
Starvation and poverty, in particular, become a theme in some of NWA’s other 
localized maps—a map of Detroit plots with red dots the instances of rat-bitten babies, 
while another Detroit map shows the major streets of the city, which strangely are lined 
with numbers of other countries’ infant mortality rates.193 Near the streets where the 
worst neighborhoods are, numbers for countries such as El Salvador, Bulgaria, and 
Guyana are displayed, indicating that American urban landscapes are comparable to 
Third World standards of health. Other maps branch out from the city/bomb focus and 
depict the effect of blasts on particular regions. Representative of this approach is a map 
like “Southern New England” where “zones of destruction” are marked by a rash of red 
inner circles surrounded by light pink circles dotting the landscapes of Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut.194 The small bits of white space untouched by this blast 
damage are glaring—such spaces of peace are few and far between, indicating no relief 
for potential survivors. The map employs proximity and absence to provoke a kind of 
claustrophobia where space is constantly being depleted. Because locations and places on 
earth could be seen as generalizable and theoretically similar to each other, the map of 
nuclear bombing in a place like New England, Chicago, or Detroit could be extrapolated 
to stand in for the destructive capacity of weapons in any space around the world. Thus, 
the NWA is able to operate in both larger and smaller venues to heighten proximity in 




All is Red: The Challenge to Cold-War Binaries in the Nuclear War Atlas 
 
Bunge’s heightening of air-age globalism’s intensity, as well as the contrast of 
intensive local hotspots, reveals how the NWA works to strip away at the binaries of the 
Cold War. Philip Wander argued that a prophetic dualism characterized Cold War 
rhetoric, which split the world into two moral camps.195 As a reaction to this dualism, 
many of Bunge’s maps point to the number of times nuclear arms can destroy the world 
over, making boundaries and sides in a dualism between red and red, white, and blue 
meaningless. Hugh Gusterson writes about a nuclear “orientalism” where the “differences 
are complex, ambiguous, and crosscutting in ways that are not captured by a simple 
binary division.”196 Similarly, Matthew Woods’ studies in international relations theory 
points to the rhetorical invention of the concept of constant proliferation as a way for 
nuclear states to maintain power over non-nuclear states.197 The Nuclear War Atlas turns 
proliferation and orientalism inside out—in the face of ultimate destruction, rather than a 
U.S.–Soviet divide, the whole world is put under the grip of nuclear machinery. The 
amount and targets of nuclear weaponry become irrelevant; all are implicated.  
In NWA maps, this stripping away of binaries is seen not just in the content of the 
maps, but also in the way their form subverts cartographic expectations. One example is 
of a Harrison-style map, entitled “Edge of Debris from the Fifth Chinese Nuclear 
Detonation,” which places the Arctic in the center. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. are pictured on 
the map, but the focus of the map is on a large red dot in China. A large red path circles 
out from the dot, around the Arctic through Europe, the U.S, Asia, and all the way back 
to the other side of the dot. As Bunge writes in the caption, “The northern mid-latitudes 




Chinese test shown in the map, to sail radiation around the planet to finally return 
home.”198 Bunge’s map is one of suicide, an argument that nuclear war cannot be reduced 
to a binary antagonism with helpless standbys, but a war which the mapped nations are 
waging on themselves. Similarly, in “Patriotic Poisoning,” Bunge shows a red wave of 
radiation originating from a 1965 cratering event in Nevada, with winds carrying it across 
the Northern United States. Bunge refers to this as the “radioactive poisoning of your 
own nation by its own patriotic generals,” accompanying the map with the adage of “we 
have met the enemy and he is us.”199 Another map of Europe (“Europe: The Walnut in 
the Nuclear Nutcracker”) uses a similar arrow-shaped wash of red, but is much more 
hopeful, arguing that Europe has the ability to rebel against being a “ping-pong ball 
swatted back and forth by giant nuclear paddles” in the midst of two giant red arrows 
targeting it from the United States and the Soviet Union.200 In terms of social change, 
Bunge uses this map presciently to pinpoint how defiance from European peoples could 
blow open the Cold War’s dualism—echoing the Oxford debate sentiments of E.P. 
Thompson. 
In addition, part of Bunge’s activism was not just concerned with nuclear 
disarmament, but with the destabilization of state power in general. In maps like 
“American Domino Theory,” for example, Bunge mocks the traditional Cold War 
geopolitics of the domino theory—a map of Eastern Asia and the Pacific shows an arrow 
moving in one direction from Moscow to Hawaii (representing Soviet aims), 
superimposed exactly over an arrow going in the opposite direction (representing 
American aims).201 The overall visual presentation not only accuses both sides of 




one no nobler than the other. On a larger scale, “Regions of Recent and Often Repeated 
Genocide” eliminates the Cold War binary and shows a whole world united in the act of 
genocide as “a universal final solution for one’s enemies.”202 The “victims” are in red, 
while the “victimizers” are in white—almost the entire world is awash in red, including 
both the U.S. and most of the U.S.S.R. as being victims at one time or another of 
genocide. The map blends a sense of outrage at the liquidation of enemies with an 
acknowledgement of identification with those lost; in other words, the spaces of 
victimage are simultaneously the spaces of victimizing, showing how the Manicheanism 
of the Cold War does not the fit the complicated histories and present realities of world 
violence.  
A final (and perhaps best) example of Bunge’s cartographic protest against 
binaries comes from “Moscington,” which is a map that combines the landmarks, medical 
centers, atomic energy research institutes, and government buildings of Moscow and 
Washington together, as if the two were united as one city.203 In “Moscington,” the White 
House is down the street from the KGB, while the CIA and the Kurchatov Atomic 
Energy Institute follow each other on the Potomac River. All in all, Bunge’s map reduces 
the Cold War binaries to one indistinguishable state, providing a perfect addendum to the 
“Tank Plant” maps in Soviet Military Power and Whence the Threat to Peace that 
compared the capacity for destruction over an aerial map of Washington, D.C. In Bunge’s 
perspective, by highlighting military, science, and government institutions in both 
capitals, the map also argues that these spaces are detached from the “everyday” lives and 
places of Soviet and American citizens. The world in this map is isolated only to state 




governments lack control of anything outside of these hermetic spaces. Furthermore, by 
blending these symbols of state power together, the map destabilizes each government’s 
uniqueness and ability to isolate themselves from the “other.” The United States and the 
Soviet Union could no longer define themselves in opposition to one another—the new, 
radical proximity has forever brought them together. 
Days After: The Use of Rhetorical Vision in the Nuclear War Atlas 
 
The themes of proximity and the subversion of binaries are part of an overall 
perspective on space/time in the NWA, and cohere as a rhetorical vision of nuclear war, 
one that inevitably has to look forward to the future. In his book Nuclear Fear, Spencer R. 
Weart commented that, “by the 1980s it was clear to all careful thinkers that nuclear 
policy had less to do with the physical weapons than with the images they aroused.”204 
Bunge’s atlas serves less as a representation of Cold War realities than it does as a bleak 
image of the nuclear future. A temporal aspect is integral here—a resonant rhetorical 
vision of nuclear war has to contrast the image of life now with the after-vision of a post-
atomic age.205 That vision has to conform to an acceptable narrative of what we expect 
nuclear war to look like. The conundrum for Bunge is the attempt to inject “The Real” 
into something utterly unimaginable. David Berg has written that: 
Media do not simply confront us with “real” events of which we might otherwise 
remain unaware; they also, through the means of pseudo-events, extend our 
awareness of reality beyond the range of normal perception…By similarly 
expanding our awareness of virtually every issue facing mankind, mass media 




Like other forms of media, maps that promote social change can heighten the sense of ill 
and doom foreshadowed by nuclear war.  
Conversely, in terms of presenting a reality, maps face the added conundrum of 
their inherent abstraction. Instead of photos of death, lines and symbols are displayed that 
serve as a surrogate for reality. In this process, iconography and color become two 
integral ways by which maps present meaning and vision. Sam Dragga and Dan Voss 
have called for “a humanistic ethic of visuals,” indicting technical graphics for their lack 
of attention to human elements. To Dragga and Voss, the typical “graphic isn’t so much 
deceptive, however, as it is plainly inhumane – insensitive or indifferent to the human 
condition it depicts.”207 Bunge’s choice of icons seems to almost over-exaggerate the 
sense of humanity and present a contrast with the dehumanization of weaponry. Faces 
with “X”s for eyes in “The Firestorm” map show the effects of blindness, alongside icons 
of jagged red lightning bolts to denote radiation; in “The Explosion” map, droplets melt 
from emoticon-style faces.208 Elsewhere the standard nuclear mushroom cloud is used; 
unlike the almost cartoonish looking faces in the other maps, “Nuclear Weapons 
Accidents in the United States” uses the realistic cloud to represent a more culturally 
familiar icon of nuclear war.209 The contrast between pointedly unreal icons and more 
realistic ones creates a connotation that Bunge is using both radically provocative images 
and images that are anchored in the collective memory as nuclear icons. In other maps, 
even mere dots provide iconic power to the NWA’s crude simplicity. The figure entitled 
“Nuclear Firepower” presents a grid of 121 boxes all filled with red dots, except for the 
center box, which only has one. The center dot represents all firepower used in World 




nuclear weapons.210 In this way, the iconography of maps can present spatial 
relationships that photographs, films, and other media cannot—the contrast between red 
dots is overwhelming visually, and invites a reading of the map’s provocative caption that 
three dots “represents the weapons on one Poseidon submarine. It is equal to the 
firepower of three world wars.”                              
In terms of color, the stark contrast between black and red are the staple of the 
atlas’s presentation of nuclear vision. Mark Monmonier has warned against the rampant 
misuse of color in maps, particularly against the notion of simultaneous contrast, or “the 
eye’s tendency to perceive a higher degree of contrast for juxtaposed colors.”211 When a 
light color is engulfed by dark color, the light seems lighter and the dark seems darker, 
and thus can draw deep and often dualistic distinctions between elements being mapped. 
Bunge employs such contrasts in almost every map—the red sears and burns through the 
pages to represent the destructive capability of state weapons. In the NWA, color is also 
tied to temporal concerns; red represents the “future hell,” while the isolated spots of 
green represent a “future heaven.” “The Native Plan For Toronto” map is one of the few 
without any red, representing an American Indian-style revision of Canada’s most 
famous city centering around parks and cultural centers rather than business and 
government, bringing in the cool greens as a respite from the red covering the rest of the 
maps.212 But these are isolated moments in NWA—Bunge’s skepticism is apparent in the 
sheer quantity of red bleeding on the pages of the NWA. Red in Cold War maps usually 
meant the spreading menace of Soviet communism, but in his explosion of binaries, 
Bunge awards red to all who exist in the nuclear age. In “Nuclear Poison Gas Cloud,” for 




importantly, the map uses the red to project a bleak vision of how the hope for peaceful 
uses of nuclear technology is a deceptive one. Here, black dots all over Europe indicate 
the places of nuclear power plants; as Bunge warns, “Nuclear war inevitably makes 
peaceful atomic power into a war weapon.”214 Bunge twists the vision that many Cold 
War-era policymakers and activists had for a future of clean nuclear energy and 
rhetorically subjugates the peaceful uses of nuclear technology to its militaristic ones.                   
To make the unreal, the unhappened, believable, Bunge falls back on the map’s 
privileged position as a frame of reality, even while he tries to subvert those very same 
conventions of reality. One of the key elements of Bunge’s “New Chicago” map is its 
horrific depiction of sickness and insanity, complete with arrows tracking “marauding 
zombies” and “invading zombies.”215 J. Michael Hogan was unsparing in his criticism of 
this kind of “rhetoric of doom” outlined by leaders and supporters of the nuclear freeze 
movement, where he chided freeze leaders for going so far as to paralyze (and ultimately 
stifle) debate through the use of “images, synoptic phrases, and fear appeals.”216 Hogan 
denigrated the privileged stance of experts who condescended to the public when 
presenting their nuclear visions—here, the use of an exaggerated pop-culture horror icon 
like a zombie risks that condescension by turning the potential loss of life and land into a 
mediated, voyeuristic fantasy. Bunge’s utter disregard for standards of cartographic taste 
allows him to destabilize the usually clean and scientific form of the map, but it also puts 
him in a tough spot. The lines of power inherent in maps give him a kind of detachment 
without responsibility for a solution, which is difficult to escape. Hogan asks a relevant 




Are we to presume the irrationality of the public and celebrate rhetoric that 
promotes hysterical fears while offering no solution to the nuclear dilemma? Or 
shall we presume the public capable of reasoned judgment, and demand that 
public advocates argue rationally, and employ sound evidence and reasoning?217 
On the other hand, Bryan C. Taylor defends the desire for a more radical aesthetic in 
nuclear activism—his thoughts suggest that Bunge’s maps have a certain open-endedness 
that invites a healthy ambiguity.218 Because the maps simultaneously indict the nuclear 
arms apparatus, while also showcasing a malleable, self-reflexive attitude about the 
objective truth of their making, a space is drawn for other readings and interpretations. 
This juxtaposition of expectations in both form and content as a strategy is best summed 
up through Karen Foss and Stephen Littlejohn’s conceptions of irony as nuclear vision. 
The NWA reflects a kind of horrified detachment from nuclear war, but detachment, 
according to Foss and Littlejohn, does not have to mean un-involvement. As they write, 
“irony works paradoxically: the superiority of detachment enables one to clearly own 
one’s involvement as a potential victim.”219 This irony brings into clearer focus the final 
major theme of Bunge’s atlas: the NWA’s subversive, absurdist use of humor. 
Wit and Weaponry: Postmodern Humor in the Nuclear War Atlas 
 
Bunge’s brand of nuclear cartographic righteousness takes it to an extreme level 
that exposes the apparatus of power behind mapping—his maps explicitly radiate with 
ideology, and thus call into question all other maps that mask their intentions. Derrida’s 
notion of the fabulously textual seems an appropriate lens by which to understand this 




extent that, for the moment, a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and 
write about it.”220 He goes even further, though, in his characterization: 
Nuclear war is not only fabulous because one can only talk about it, but because 
of the extraordinary sophistication of its technologies – which are also the 
technologies of delivery, sending, dispatching, of the missile in general, of 
mission, missive, emission, and transmission, like all techne – the extraordinary 
sophistication of these technologies coexists, cooperates in an essential way with 
sophistry, psycho-rhetoric, and the most cursory, the most archaic, the most 
crudely opinionated psychagogy [sic], the most vulgar psychology.221 
Bunge bases much of his impassioned polemic on this absurdity of nuclear technology—
and thus represents the nuances of Derrida’s observation that sophisticated arms are often 
coupled with crude rhetoric. As a kind of protest, Bunge’s rough, unsophisticated 
cartography is a protest against the massive and slick technical impressiveness of the 
subject it maps. The content of “Space: The Disputed Volume,” for example, serves to 
heighten the enormity and proximity of the nuclear weapons being exchanged between 
superpowers, but the form of the cartoon flags of the United States and the Soviet Union, 
scribbled onto the space of the page, deflates the importance of the state powers and 
renders their battle of missiles childish.222 Elsewhere, Bunge’s comically simple map of 
Reagan’s SDI program (“Nuclear Shields”) shows a world map with the famous three-
grid Star Wars shields. Simply imposed in red over the map, the grids look humorously 
flimsy and imprecise—the most sophisticated and complex military technology ever 
devised is constructed as an absurd, almost video game-like projection.223 Juxtaposed 




this map of Reagan technology emphasizes artificiality; the state is charged with being 
“unreal.” Again, though, in the tension between social change and social control, 
elements of the NWA both subvert and reify the urgency of nuclear war. Bunge’s lack of 
polish, then, can be seen as both liberating as well as possibly stifling to his activism. His 
own messiness exposes the crude, messy barbarism behind nuclear technology, but he 
also may be in danger of rendering that nuclear threat ridiculous, a potential that could 
undermine the radical message of the NWA. 
A way to see this tension played out in the maps themselves is by seeing this 
fabulous textuality on a level of postmodern humor (although of the darkest kind)—
particularly in terms of how Bunge’s maps function as a kind of parody of what an 
ordinary map might look like. His use of exaggerated cartoon-face icons to depict burns 
and insanity heighten the sense of humanity, hence parodying the normally staid pages of 
typical atlases, and placing the maps in a postmodern tradition where structures of 
ideology and power are accentuated. Typically, parody is a kind of ridiculing imitation 
that often mocks the form of an original source and draws ironic humor at the expense of 
the text being parodied. A more postmodern vision of parody advanced by literary critic 
Linda Hutcheon foregrounds the entire process of meaning making in the creation and 
reception of art, making parody a ‘‘double-voiced discourse’’ that points out the 
differences between itself and the original text.224 Unlike satire, though, parody does not 
have to be an aggressive rhetorical strategy; it exaggerates, but also conserves ‘‘an 
aesthetic impression of rationality.’’225 So, the NWA suggests that rational standards for 




simultaneously holds onto such standards so that readers will believe that nuclear war is a 
dangerous possibility.  
Despite the potential of parody to serve as a radical critique of form and content, 
its use in the NWA also suggests a possible problem. The parodic elements of the text 
work in tandem with the conventional elements while still trying to retain a critical 
distance from such elements, and this can limit a progressive drive toward change. The 
atlas cannot simply destabilize the process of mapping altogether; it has to uphold the 
traditional idea that the form of mapping can help recapture a more ideal political world 
and effect change, or Bunge could not advance the content of his message that the nuclear 
world needs mending. Robert Hariman highlights both the radical and conservative 
functions of parody’s rhetorical ‘‘doubling.’’ On the one hand, he notes the momentous 
political shift in parody’s dependence on a ‘‘prior conversion of some part of the world 
into an image.’’226 Once the parodic discourse is recognized as an image, the ‘‘weight of 
authority’’ of the original discourse is destabilized and more avenues of resistance are 
thus opened. On the other hand, the parodic double is immersed in the rituals of its source 
material, and as Hariman writes, ‘‘[e]verything is left as it was, because the original 
discourse is not itself subject to any change.’’227 In this case, Bunge’s cartography 
foregrounds the absurdity of, say, maps like those in Soviet Military Power, by 
converting cartography to an image, even as his work faces the conundrum of how to 









Like a cartographic samizdat, the Nuclear War Atlas was Bunge’s homemade 
attempt at propagating a movement. However, even though the atlas was written for both 
a lay audience and to effect policy change (Bunge’s introduction optimistically asks that 
“after the hour or two it takes to study this atlas, act for peace as if the lives of the 
children in your family, and your very own personal life too, depended upon it”) it is 
difficult to get a sense of the text’s reception or circulation beyond the academy.228 The 
NWA’s unapologetically extreme polemic drew different responses from these academic 
readers. Fryer excoriated Bunge for his inhumanity, writing that “survival in Bunge’s 
world is not likely to be pleasant,” while John Whitelegg believed “the sheer good 
common sense of Bunge make[s] a deep impression.”229 Overseas, researchers at the 
Geography Institute at the Soviet Academy of Sciences used the NWA as an exemplar for 
their own goals, commenting that “There is a recognition at the highest levels within the 
institute that geographers have much to contribute as scientists in the context of war and 
peace. Geographers can help to identify and publicise the impact of nuclear war, an 
approach exemplified by William Bunge’s Nuclear War Atlas.”230 Denis Wood referred 
to it as a “grim imperative” but somewhat lovingly as “an anti-atlas in the form of a 
Marxist tabloid, a document one could well imagine run off after hours on a hand-
cranked press and thrust at nervous yuppies on street corners, or nailed to a senator’s 
door.”231 In the same year of the NWA’s publishing, Susan Cutter made a call for 
geographers to band together and make more of a difference in nuclear policy, and she 
lauded the atlas for its intentions, “despite some failings.”232 Donald W. Meinig termed 




“firm discipline,” writing that, “[Bunge’s] self-righteous rhetoric and deep prejudices 
vitiate his argument, fail to convince the reader, and waste the worthiness of his 
cause.”233  
This ambivalence in the NWA’s reception is a microcosm of the tentative support 
cartographers and geographers have given their colleagues who make their maps overtly 
political—a tendency that was on display during the Peters map controversy as well. 
Bunge suffered no ambivalence, though, in the confidence of his science and his message, 
as he declared somewhat immodestly,  
Professional geographers deny the world of reality. There are important maps to 
be made about, for instance, the spatial realities of nuclear war and, by this token, 
the recently published Nuclear War Atlas is one of the most important geography 
works ever written, because it is about the most important subject ever addressed.  
The prospect of a war so terrible that it threatens to eliminate our species: “The 
war to end all wars”—at last…It is filled with terrible maps, horrific maps.234  
He would then implore the scholarly community to “Get The Nuclear War Atlas and feel 
proud of geography. Shed your inferiority complex. Drop your hyphens….We must 
resume our central and classical work, enhanced by our modern work, neither purging the 
other. We must explore and map.”235 
 But the conundrum presented in the pages of the NWA is: how do we “explore and 
map” the potential elimination of space and place as we know it? Maps, I argue, offer a 
uniquely visual abstraction in longitude and latitude of the forces that strategies of social 
control and social change exert on each other. Bunge’s Nuclear War Atlas and its brand 




the textual qualities of maps in a Cold War context. Bunge’s radical cartography defied 
conventions while still upholding them, and within that nexus of change and control is 
perhaps a place we can situate other maps of advocacy. In addition, nuclear war is the 
ultimate in fantastic rhetorical vision, and Bunge’s red and black lines, insistent and 
haunting, reveal an explosive intersection between art and science in the nuclear age. 
Denis Wood writes of activist maps in general: 
Their subversion of the power of [rhetoric] amounts to a bold proclamation of 
their rhetorical stance (cartographic nudism, cartographic streaking, cartographic 
punk), the very opposite of the position occupied by the United States Geological 
Survey, which…obscures its stance beneath a rhetorically orchestrated denial of 
rhetoric (dressing itself in the style of science).236 
Overall, such a radically revisionist message ultimately places Bunge in a new alternative 
cartographic tradition where structures of ideology and power are brought into the 
foreground. Not only do the maps speak through angry ideology about a new world order, 
they also reflexively question the function of maps as a whole. When Ben and Marthalee 
Barton advocated on behalf of a postmodern visual design for maps, they wrote: 
Although the map as a concrete graphic text is an act of enunciation with 
ideological dimensions, such an act takes place in a social context and the map is 
thus also both an act of production and an act of reception. The map, in other 
words, may be considered as process rather than product…237 
So, by heightening its ideological viewpoints in such visually evocative ways, the 




eliminate the fixed position of maps and puts them on a shifting and more contested 
ground. 
One larger question left unanswered in this chapter, however, regards the 
cartographic relationship between problem and solution. In representing space, this 
connection is tenuous. The nature of the form constrains the content. The social change 
map reduces the world to a particular temporal and spatial rendering and contains it; it 
cannot necessarily offer solutions to the problems it highlights—the map’s frame can 
only encapsulate the spatial relationships and the exigencies of the new political 
landscape. In addition, the complex mixture of militancy and moderation may lessen the 
overall coherence of the message, exhibiting the potential limits to the clarity and quality 
of advocacy that can be achieved cartographically. Thus, Hogan’s label of nuclear freeze 
rhetoric as “apocalyptic pornography,” predicated on the sensational and graphic nature 
of “day after” scenarios of nuclear war, must be taken into consideration here.238 
 These issues come back full circle to that night in Oxford when the morality of 
the Cold War and cartography as a practice was a subject for public debate. Overall, the 
contrast of the NWA with the “Battle of the Booklets” maps speaks not only to the 
complex geopolitical imagination of the Second Cold War, but also the dynamic between 
revelation and concealment in cartographic evidence that Lawrence Prelli highlighted.239 
While Bunge put both nuclear weapons and the mapmaking process on display, the 
Defense Department maps hid that process from view. According to Gordon Mitchell,  
Excessive secrecy locks in Cold War patterns of public discourse, where defense 
officials and industry representatives monopolize arguments, sealing their 




drift toward worst-case scenarios generated from simulation and speculation, 
rather than more sober appraisals…Military officials who see the idea of public 
debate as superfluous luxury skirt critical arguments, removing issues of grave 
national importance from arenas of democratic deliberation.240  
Perhaps what makes the Defense pamphlets most interesting, though, is how Weinberger 
was opening himself up to public debate, but was able to choose the terms of argument. 
His maps reveal what he deemed worthy of going unclassified—what was willing to be 
mapped and put on display. The map is expected to be reliable and all-encompassing, 
while the methods of production behind those maps can remain classified. Thus, the 
dynamic between what is revealed and concealed on the map is based here on what state 
representatives are willing to show, and the means by which that cartographic data is 
produced can remain silent and outside the margins of the map. Bunge has the tougher 
position of fighting these age-old conventions of the map. As Fischoff, Pidgeon, and 
Fiske write, “military proposals typically promise to solve specific narrow problems (e.g., 
defending a particular weapons system against a particular form of attack), whereas peace 
proposals stress more nebulous actions (e.g., having a more robust, resilient, and ethical 
society).”241 Bunge, thus, had to push at the very edges of what cartography as a medium 
could be expected to accomplish. 
Despite their differences, though, what both mapping projects share is what Barry 
Brummett has termed the “symbolic perfection” of nuclear discourse.242 Weinberger and 
his colleagues are attempting to perfect the technology, to progress toward greater control 
and mastery of the missiles and radars. Bunge, for his part, tries to perfect society and the 




more palatable and conventional, with missiles as game pieces in a progressive 
escalation; Bunge uses the maps as visions of how the world has progressed too fast and 
lost its moral bearing. Either way, the cartography of both remain part of the Cold War’s 
brand of liberal, modern internationalism—that in a shrinking world, we can use 
scientific expertise and the promise of better perception to improve the world. 
 In addition, both cartographies affirm the anxieties around place in the era. In 
1977, Virilio wrote that, “The danger of the nuclear weapon, and of the arms system it 
implies, is thus not so much that it will explode, but that it exists…”243 Maps provided a 
substantive medium for making these claims of existence; even though Bunge and 
Weinberger had significantly different visions, maps provided them with images of 
commitment that placed Cold War values into the realm of public opinion. For 
Weinberger, the danger of the nuclear weapon was a loss of the security of national place, 
and a blow against the power to control and define Cold War spaces before our 
ideological enemies could. For Bunge, the danger of the nuclear weapon was a loss of 
humanity’s material place in an increasingly abstract, technologized world. In a new era 
of revolutionary missile speed, the Second Cold War embodied a condition where “we 
see and hear the other, but imperfectly and partially below our rising expectations,” thus 
leading to an over-determined globe, a place of hyper-internationalism.244 The 
superpower defense pamphlets, and the radical disarmament challenge to them, provided 
compelling visualizations of how America placed itself in a rapidly changing world. 
Finally, while Bunge overtly prophesizes the “end of geography” in the nuclear 
future, both his maps and those of the defense pamphlet wars also foretell of the end of 




tenuousness of the spatial frameworks that had so long defined the Cold War, thus 
foreshadowing a future where the world system would have to be re-defined (unless it 
was destroyed first). At the same time, Weinberger’s maps (and the ensuing Soviet 
response) indicate a system out-quantifying and overextending itself, where the Cold War 
would be unsustainable and ideology outstrips the actual means by which either side 
could fight such a war. Sure enough, by the end of the 1980s, the Soviet system was 
unable to support itself under the weight of its arms economy. Thus, the “future 
cartography” of both projects reflects the cracks in Cold War space. It is perhaps fitting 
that E.P Thompson rested his debate case with this entreaty: “I ask Oxford to support this 
motion in the name of a universalism at its very foundation in the Middle Ages: a 
universalism of scholarship which owed its duty to the skills of communication and 
learning and not to those of the armed state.”245 In the Second Cold War, cartography 
uniquely framed the capacities of the armed state, while also offering a universal mode of 
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FROM GLOBALISM TO GLOBALIZATION: STATE POWER, 
CARTOGRAPHY, AND THE POLITICS OF (INTER)NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
On December 2nd and 3rd of 1989, the month in which Czechoslovakia followed 
many of its Eastern European neighbors by electing its own president for the first time in 
forty years, Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush held a summit meeting 
at Malta.1 As international relations scholar Alan K. Henrikson recounts, 
Gorbachev handed President George Bush a blue-and-white map allegedly 
showing the Soviet Union’s encirclement by US bases as well as American 
aircraft carriers and battleships….For a moment, according to a detailed account 
of this episode, President Bush was at a loss for words. President Gorbachev then 
said tartly: “I notice that you seem to have no response.” Bush, in response, 
pointed out to Gorbachev that the Soviet landmass was shown on the map as a 
giant, white, empty space, with no indication of the vast military complex that US 
forces were intended to deter. “Maybe you’d like me to fill in the blanks on this,” 
he said. “I’ll get the CIA to do a map of how things look to us. Then we’ll 
compare and see whose is more accurate.”2 
This curt exchange between two bickering superpowers encapsulates the contentious 
lines and boundaries of Cold War mapping.3 As the two cold warriors knew well, maps 
communicate volumes not just in what they include, but also in J.B. Harley’s notion of 
“silences”—what the maps choose to omit and obscure from view.4 While Gorbachev’s 
glaring white areas are uncluttered by any meaningful geographical information, they do 





 The conversation at Malta is not merely a tidy example of how cartography is 
bound by state power; it also represents well the core ideological problematic of how 
shifting global space was negotiated in a key historical moment. As late as December 
1989, Bush and Gorbachev were still committed to the clearly bounded Cold War system, 
typified by bipolar intelligence and defense maps that contained bases and battleships. As 
walls toppled, countries reunited, and borders ripped open, two of the most powerful 
world leaders still clung to the familiar cartographic shapes of their forty-five-year rivalry. 
The two leaders’ anxiety around blank space on the map was palpable, as if they were 
bracing for the unknown. Bush and Gorbachev intuitively understood the legacy of the 
map’s power during the half-century of Cold War as a mediator and vehicle of 
interpretive perception. They knew how maps could be marshaled as evidentiary 
weapons—that the power of the map was not simply in what it displayed but how it was 
materially used in discursive exchanges and circulated.  
But what was perhaps most revealing about this incident was the uncertainty 
around the notion of place. As I have attempted to trace in a variety of cartographic 
contexts throughout this project, the impulse to map is bound up in values and ideology. 
To be able to place lines and icons onto a map with certainty was also a bid for power 
and control—a kind of political stability. At the same time, maps had the propensity to 
introduce new perspectives and displace traditional spatial relationships, thus adapting to 
and reflecting processes of social change. In a sense, then, Bush and Gorbachev were 
reacting anxiously to the new spatial changes that faced them, hoping to stabilize their 
power by holding on to old cartographic Cold War fixities at a time when the world was 




here: as French cartographer Michel Foucher wrote of the challenges in mapping and 
charting a new Eastern Europe, “[w]hen history is in movement, places are 
transformed….The geographical approach must therefore take into account Europe in 
peacetime and Europe at war, the Europe to be developed and the Europe to which peace 
must be brought.”5 Foucher’s sentiments are applicable well beyond Europe’s 
boundaries: (Re)Placing America has viewed, through an American lens, how these 
international transformations call for particular spatial visions and perceptions 
(textualized in maps) that are informed by values of the past, present, and future. This 
project as a whole has revealed how cartography offered U.S. strategists and popular 
audiences ways of making meaning of state power on an international scale. In particular, 
this project has advanced that certain projections and mapping forms have constrained 
not only U.S. foreign policy, and our constructions of areas such as the Soviet Union and 
the Third World, but also America’s self-identity as a superpower in the second half of 
the twentieth century as a whole. In concluding, I briefly explore how maps accounted for 
the Cold War’s end and envisioned an uneasy globalization. Then, I implicate the 
products and processes of cartography as important to a rhetorical perspective of political 
culture, and explore why the tensions between space and place are fruitfully understood 
through mining material mapping artifacts in their historical contexts. 
Mapping a New World Order: The Pluto Press Atlases and the End of the Cold War 
It is an obvious statement that the Cold War view of international space did not 
cease being relevant once the Cold War as a political conflict ended. The Cold War still 
provided the overarching interpretive lens for perceiving world relations. Still, the events 




the Cold War did not erase or invalidate the state, it provided the spark that forced the 
international community to think in more profound geopolitical ways.6 As this project has 
traced, Cold War maps often comfortably represented and constituted the natural power 
of the state, depicting a clear division of “superpower rivalry, East/West Bloc formation,” 
and “ideological competition.”7 Once America was locked in an arms race with the 
Soviet Union, the states on the map were counted to see which ones were red and which 
ones were not, splitting the earth in strategic geopolitical ways and providing a kind of 
“doctrinal…color-coding for vital ideological difference.”8 In a sense, state boundaries 
came “to represent intellectual boundaries as well,” providing a frame of reference for 
economics, social life, and most importantly, national identity.9 With a new globalized 
economic integration in Europe as socialism transitioned into democracy, however, states 
constituted by the standard cartographic unit faced serious new threats and challenges 
against their dominance, an anxiety borne out by Bush and Gorbachev in their map 
exchange.10 The post-Cold War saw a historical reawakening of the need for self-
determination, making traditional boundaries and borders the crux of defining new states 
and new national identities.11 As Christer Jönsson, Sven Tägil, and Gunnar Törqvist point 
out, “[g]one are the days when cartographers did not have to worry about changing state 
boundaries, and when representing the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in 
different colours captured the essential political configuration of the continent.”12 A new 
“geopolitical game” was renewed by unfreezing the Soviets’ icy grip, heated by the 





Amidst the context of this post-Cold War landscape came the successive editions 
of the Pluto Press’ popular and widely distributed State of the World atlas series, a 
progressive project in the spirit of William Bunge’s radical style. The Pluto atlases 
produced at this time provide a fitting example of the opportunities and challenges that 
faced cartographers attempting to depict how a new post-Cold War space would be 
constituted, particularly the transitions in areas like Eastern Europe. The blank spaces of 
Gorbachev’s map resonate with the Pluto Press atlases: while Bush and Gorbachev 
wanted to fill that space with the conventional apparatuses of superpowers, the Pluto 
Project deconstructed the very conventions that allowed such leaders to define this space 
for the rest of the world. In particular, the Pluto Press’s 1991 editions of the New State of 
the World (NSTW) and the New State of War and Peace (NSWP) offer a striking example 
of how popular cartographers dealt with the end of a forty-year system.14 Especially in 
their depictions of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the Pluto Project 
characterizes the post-communist transition with an ambivalently critical eye. The activist 
maps create the image of a new world order, vulnerable and mired in uncertainty and 
fluidity—by both subverting and upholding traditional mapping forms, the Pluto Project 
represents not only a Europe (and world) in transition, but also a transition between the 
limitations and opportunities of cartography itself. 
Which Way is East? Challenging Cold War Dichotomies in Pluto Project Maps 
The creators of the Pluto Press atlases did very little to mask the ideological 
ambitions of their project, and the Press’s history bears out this progressive intent. The 
Pluto Press dates back to 1969, led by activist Richard Kuper as a publishing branch of 




Michael Kidron and his wife Nina in 1972, the Press became a center for left-wing 
publishing in England, but in order to stay commercially afloat, Kidron steered Pluto 
away from its overtly socialist origins. By 1979, Pluto had dropped its political affiliation 
altogether and became independent. The group, which self-proclaims that it “has always 
had a radical political agenda,” is still active today as one of the world’s leading 
progressive book publishers, with over 550 titles in print.15 It was the State of the World 
atlas, though, which appeared in 1981, that became the Pluto Press’s flagship success. 
Distributed widely in paperback by Simon & Schuster, the original atlas was a 
collaboration between the radical Marxist Kidron and the progressive South African-born 
historian and anti-apartheid activist Ronald Segal, whose expertise in third-world 
development politics led to works like The Anguish of India and Islam’s Black Slaves: 
The Other Black Diaspora, one of the first historical accounts of the Islamic slave trade.  
The two drew on the visually provocative potential of cartography to challenge the nature 
of nation-state power in a globalizing world. In fact, the ideological goals of the atlases 
are perhaps most vividly revealed in the headline for The Guardian’s 2003 obituary for 
Kidron: “Michael Kidron: publisher, writer and socialist whose life’s project was to 
understand, and help replace, capitalism.”16 The gamut of responses to the State of the 
World was wide, as the atlas was lauded for its “scope and originality” and challenged for 
its “raging polemic.”17 Despite the radical content, the atlas was a huge commercial 
success, the style being innovative and distinctive enough to make a pointed political 
message, but also simple and straightforward, packed with enough useful information to 
have educational potential. Successive editions of the State of the World appeared 




Kidron and Segal’s work also spawned a cartographic brand made up of like-minded, 
socially progressive researchers, expanding into a wide array of specialized atlases on 
women, the environment, global health, and war.18 In 1983, for example, Kidron 
collaborated with Dan Smith, a leader of Britain’s Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
and a prominent peace researcher (later the head of the International Peace Institute in 
Oslo), to produce The War Atlas, taking up the State of the World’s signature style to 
critique the arms economy of the late Cold War. 
By the time the 1991 editions of the State of the World and the War Atlas 
appeared (now titled The New State of the World and The New State of War and Peace), 
Kidron, Segal, and Smith were faced with the dissolution and transformation of many of 
the nation-states that they had begun challenging ten years before. The original atlases 
had attempted to destabilize state power through their angry, subjective geopolitical 
visions—now they would do the same for a new world order; the 1991 editions especially 
critique the entrenched lines between East and West that solidified during the Cold War, 
imagining how states would vie for and consolidate power without long-honored 
U.S./Soviet frameworks. The ideological battleground of Central and Eastern European 
became an especially important cartographic symbol for exploring these shifts. 
Similar in some ways to how Third World nations of the South in the 1960s and 
1970s sought to redefine their space as separate and distinct from East/West, the Central 
European nations of the so-called Velvet Revolutions in 1989 and 1990 were establishing 
their own identities. One Pluto map in particular represents the difficulties these states 
faced, stuck between East and West. Titled “The Uncommon European Home,” this map 




on Europe, depicting especially the conundrums that the emerging countries faced in 
trying to join the “supra-national economy” while they confronted increasing demands by 
ethnic and national groups.19 This map shows red ballot box icons depicting free elections, 
alongside icons of silhouetted soldiers holding guns behind what look like tiny explosions. 
The choice of the Pluto cartographers to highlight and omit specific iconic symbols is 
particularly telling in their strategy to critique the East/West problem in post-Cold War 
space. So, for example, on one level, “The Uncommon European Home” exhibits a 
traditional layout of graphs, charts, and insets with symbolic icons over geographic 
territories. The use of ballot box and toy soldier icons in itself is not subversive; rather, it 
is the spatial relationship created between the two icons that suggests an indictment of the 
mapping form. Placing the ballot box, a progressive symbol of voting in East and Central 
European countries where elections were charades for decades, next to a repressive 
symbol of an arms-wielding state soldier invites a strong ambivalence about the new 
changes in East/West relationships. The way the “Uncommon” map links the two actions 
of voting and military action together displays the sense in which the drive toward 
democracy occurs simultaneously with armed repression across the region. Implicit in 
these spatial relationships are the authors’ western assumptions that ballot boxes and 
membership in the European Community are the measures of democratic progress in the 
new states, while the clash for ethnic rights in the East is the measure of falling short of 
that progress.  
In addition, the coloring of the territories in “The Uncommon European Home” 
mirrors many of the imagined divisions existing among the countries trying to make a 




and sharp contrasts, operating outside of the conventional, subdued realm of traditional 
world maps, as the Pluto style over-amplifies the function of color and widens the 
contrast between light and dark. Membership in the EC is depicted in red, which includes 
Germany after its reunification. This red is in deep contrasts to the yellows of Poland, 
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, whose applications to join the union were postponed. In 
even deeper contrast stand the countries in brown (the Soviet Union, Romania, 
Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria), which are simply listed in the legend as “other states” with no 
connection, or any hopes of connection, to the EC at all. This map is a fitting depiction of 
the splintering of the post-Cold War world, with West Europe clearly depicted as its own 
unit (Germany once again accepted), and Central Europe grouped as having its own 
distinct identity alongside the West, while a Balkanized East still persists. Iconically, then, 
the loud cacophony and contrast of colors support the revisionist message that the 
immediate post-Cold War is a jarringly unequal clash of powers. 
 Another map from the NSWP atlas, “Before the Thaw,” also addresses these 
East/West tensions. “Before the Thaw” foregoes the traditional alignment of East/West 
prevalent in most of the other maps, and instead reaches back to the air-age global era for 
a projection anchored around the Arctic circle.20 This tectonic shift situates the reader in a 
topsy-turvy world where Europe is in the southern hemisphere, and the United States is 
off-center in the North, somewhat distant from its usually dominant place in the western 
hemisphere. However technically inaccurate, the map’s subversion of form utilizes an 
almost unrecognizable perspective of the world to demonstrate the argument that the 
relationship of East and West sustained during the Cold War is no longer viable; indeed, 




political alignment in the post-Cold War landscape. To further illustrate the new world of 
alignment, white dots are placed in a host of countries across the globe to denote 
membership in the “movement of non-aligned states,” showing in both color and icon 
how many states were choosing to opt out of the Soviet/American dichotomy. As the 
caption in “Before the Thaw” notes, “[i]t remains to be seen whether a system 
constructed in the name of East/West confrontation will be useful in the post-Cold War 
world.”21 
The map titled “Killing Power” goes even further in representing such tectonic 
shifts by using cartograms to chart the destructive capacity of nations other than the 
United States and the Soviet Union (who, the map points out in an inset, together have 98 
percent of the world’s weapons), making France bigger than China, and India 
dramatically diminished in size to that of the reunified Germany.22 Relatively large 
projections of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are cast in a beige hue that marks them as 
“states among the most lethal top 20.”23 These unusual projections create new spatial 
relationships that defy conventional, territorially bound approaches. The radical message 
is again one of ambivalence as the map emancipates Europe from the grip of East/West 
definitions, but does it to show how destructive non-superpowers can be where nations 
retain their arms. Still, even as they show the dramatic inequities between states’ 
capacities for violence, the authors fail to note that nuclear weapons are a grim equalizer 
(as Bunge knew); whether a state has more destructive capacity than another is irrelevant 
if just one nuclear weapon is used. The contradictions of tradition and innovation in these 
maps display a cartography in transition, mimicking the transitions that many of the states 




Running From the Border:  
Nationalism and Ethnic Identity in the Pluto Project’s New Europe  
 
Another issue in mapping the post-Cold War revolves around the great challenge 
for mapmakers and new states as a whole: determining how to represent borders and 
identities in the new world order. As Michel Foucher highlights, such borders exist on 
multiple levels, including the physical borders of the new states; the lines representing 
membership in different markets, coalitions, and multilateral institutions; the dividing 
lines between religions or “frontier[s] of faith”; and the lines between minority and 
majority populations.24 As the Pluto Project subversively notes, a rapid change in 
political and economic borders would not necessarily match the pace of the social and 
cultural sphere, a reminder of Kari Laitinen’s warning that “it takes time to ‘re-imagine’ 
the political space we live in.”25 As the 1990s unfolded, many of these borders became 
the wicks that lit the flames of interethnic conflict and nationalistic extremism, fanned by 
the shifting identities of the people living inside and outside those borders during political 
transition.  
The “End of Empire” map addresses these border issues through its focus on the 
crumbling Soviet Union and its constituent republics.26 Most other Pluto maps use states 
as their building blocks, but here, the map also mixes in competing nationalities, 
featuring small graph icons that detail the percentages of Russians versus the home 
populations in these territories, such as Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Moldavians, Byelorussians, 
etc. The overriding presentation of the map threatens to overwhelm the reader with color 
and graphic detail, mimicking the dangerous messiness of borders, as well as hinting at 
the meaninglessness of state lines in the face of ethnic conflict. A thick black line outlines 




silhouette that look like explosions, as if the border was literally crumbling. Such 
strategies advance the argument for the active nature of space, even as they work within 
the lines of a traditional map. The map also plays with temporal conventions that 
emphasize the active, changing immediacy of border conflicts. “End of Empire” projects 
impending disintegration by showing what were then present realities in the Soviet Union 
and connecting them to what the mapmakers saw as elements of its future downfall. The 
“End of Empire” map also contains an inset called “The Expanding Empire,” which 
depicts changes in the Russian Empire from 1462 to Stalin’s acquisitions in World War II 
in soft pastel colors, while right above is a second inset that depicts how the acquired 
territories have suffered economically, with incomes in some of the outlying republics as 
much as 50 percent below the Soviet average, shown in dark shades of green. The stark 
conflation of political conquests with economic ruin, through color and time-spanning 
graphics, is representative of the Pluto Project’s approach to the new European space: the 
map’s form is used to both heighten the temporal urgency of action and to chart visions 
of a painfully contrasting near future. 
 In his introduction to the New State of the World, Kidron states that the new 
edition supplements the previous one from 1987 with “a few cracks,” significantly 
referencing those of “nationalism, sub-nationalism and supra-nationalism beat[ing] 
against the state’s borders.”27 The forward-thinking image that the atlas works to portray 
is evident here, as Kidron charges, “as yet these are hairline cracks barely visible to the 
unpractised eye. They do not threaten to ground the world as we know it. But they 
indicate where the stresses are, and hint at what might happen if they are not dealt 




detecting new fault lines following the Cold War and to serve as a hermeneutic for future 
world events. This notion is evident in the NSTW’s first map, “The World of States,” 
which shows almost every state in bright red, denoting those “states with unresolved 
jurisdictional disputes,” in a sense reclaiming the menacing color of the Cold War for all 
nations with border problems in the post-Cold War era, including almost every country in 
East and Central Europe.29 In turn, “The World of States” serves as a parody of the Cold 
War: at first glance, the form looks like any traditional Cold War map, but instead of a 
dualistic split of states, it is clear that almost all states have the potential for violent 
clashes over borders, whether democratized or not.                        
 This concern with the ambivalence in borders is further apparent in “At the Turn 
of the Decade,” a map that appears at the end of NSWP, as it mixes a cautious optimism 
with biting ideological fury.30 At the time of its printing, the Soviet Union had not 
disbanded, yet the map’s graphic and linguistic elements pronounce the Cold War dead. 
In an inset of Eastern Europe, the states in which major changes were directly related to 
the end of the Cold War are colored in red, with orange and yellow icons indicating 
where border disputes were surfacing. These states are once again separated from the 
states of the larger European community, which are colorless. The tagline under the title 
supports the visual, starkly noting that “much of the news was good but not all. Some of 
it was very bad. The end of the Cold War was affecting a lot but not everything. There 
were fewer armed forces but still too many. Some wars ended, but new conflicts started 
and many old ones worsened.”31 The resignation of this quotation speaks again to the mix 
of optimism and alarm that marks the project’s characterization of a post-Cold War future. 




choices inherent in the maps: for example, while making Western Europe colorless in a 
map about eastern border disputes makes functional sense, the choice ignores the West’s 
contentious role in defining those borders and setting standards for democratic progress, 
for better or worse. By fading the West into the background, the map connotes the idea 
that these powerful nations’ role in restructuring and effecting change is minimal, despite 
the realities on the ground. 
 The authors of the Pluto Project maps also suggest that the worst conflicts to 
come for areas like Eastern Europe will happen within borders, not outside them. The 
“Human Rights” map in the NSTW bathes Yugoslavia, Albania, and the U.S.S.R. in 
vibrant reds, marking them as “terror states” that employ the strategies of “assassination, 
disappearance, torture.” Romania and Bulgaria are colored in dark gray, indicating a 
“repression state” that employs “arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; interference with 
privacy; excessive force; curtailment of freedom to express opinions, to associate, to 
worship, to travel, to change government.”32 These distinctions are also advanced in “See, 
Hear, Speak No Evil,” which places a padlock icon over the whole region in a larger 
argument about censorship around the world.33 Maps like “The Dogs of War” color 
Yugoslavia and Romania, as states at war with their own citizens, in bright orange, 
linking their hue to other states on the map like China, Pakistan, and Sudan. Along with 
bright yellow icons that look like exploding grenades, this map recalls the bloody realities 
behind the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, and features a sense of doom alongside a 






The Third Worlding of the Second World: Economic Development in Pluto Maps 
 Finally, a major function of the Pluto Project’s transitional cartographic rhetoric is 
its use of radical economics to show how the countries emerging from state socialism 
were economically dependent on richer and more powerful states. Maps that depict the 
end of the Cold War, and particularly the nation-states of Eastern Europe, faced the 
challenge of how to represent the integration of these new spaces into the burgeoning 
phenomenon of globalization. Thomas Kane has suggested that a rhetoric of “economic 
dualism” accompanied the end of the Cold War, leaving Eastern European countries 
scrambling to get on the right side of the dividing line, as membership in the European 
Union creates new spatial divisions.35 Those nations on the wrong side of the line risk 
being mapped within the Third World, affecting their self-identified shapes, and 
privileging a western binarism defined as being either in or out.36 
 The Pluto Project approaches these Third World depictions with its typical mix of 
optimism for peace and prosperity and alarmed anger at the inequities and ruin of state 
power. The new universe after 1989 portrayed in the Pluto atlases is both scary and 
intense, inundated with gas masks, skulls, tanks, dollar bills, fires, and missiles strewn 
across our globe. A bleak overall presentation, though, is supplemented by pockets of 
hope concerning how a less dualistic global society can achieve peace and stability. The 
very first map in the NSWP, for example, begins the atlas on a note of guarded optimism. 
Titled “The Dove of Peace,” the map includes an inset of a dark green-colored Eastern 
Europe set in contrast against a colorless Western Europe. According to the map’s legend, 
states colored in dark green were cutting back armed forces, hinting that the changes of 




walking away with a backpack on his back is also placed at different spots on the former 
Eastern Bloc nations, indicating a withdrawal of foreign bases by the Soviets in these 
states.37 The map that follows, “Talks and Treaties,” provides a similarly hopeful 
message for Eastern Europe by showing icons of heads around conference tables, a 
suggestion that implies the diplomatic successes of arms control talks.38 
Such optimism aside, the choices of captions and icons indicate the ambivalence 
of parody as a strategy for effecting social change. For one, as the Bush-Gorbachev 
summit reveals, a lot is hidden in the cartographic space drawn by superpowers, and there 
is no indication that the U.S. or NATO would withdraw its military presence from the 
region to match the U.S.S.R.’s retreat. This omission in the map obscures the sense in 
which democratization would come against the backdrop of weaponry and force. Also, 
the decision to show disembodied, silhouetted heads around a conference table across the 
region, rather than to use a graphic of two hands shaking, is a less than subtle reminder 
that sitting at a summit does not necessarily equal the radical drive toward peace the 
authors have in mind. The wording of the caption underscores the point: “If the world 
seemed to be getting safer at the end of the 1980s, some of the credit belongs to expanded 
diplomatic relations and three decades of arms control talks. The talking and treaty-
making continues.”39 The graphic fusion of the linguistic “talking” in the caption and the 
title of the map with what looks like heads talking over Eastern Europe leaves the reader 
wondering if talk is cheap, especially among the ensuing maps that show the extent of 
armed conflict and economic uncertainties in the region. 
 Other maps bear out this guarded optimism by depicting Eastern Europe still 




Superpowers” is filled with a host of icons, including power lines, satellite dishes, and 
clocks, all of which signify the extent of the surveillance and intelligence devices that the 
Soviet Union still held in the region.40 The map also links parts of Eastern Europe to 
nations more often considered to be developing, contributing to the possible othering of 
such new states. The association of these so-called Second World states with the Third 
World is also evident in the map “Psst!” where the clandestine arms trade is depicted, 
linking some Eastern European countries to the arms suppliers in Libya, Afghanistan, and 
Nicaragua through color and icons.41 The parodic humor of a title like “Psst!” with icons 
of money piles and spilling test tubes implies that the “talks and treaties” indicated by 
earlier maps in the atlas mask pernicious and dirty secrets. And to see “Afghan 
Mujaheddin” and “Nicaraguan Contras” placed as captions over Czechoslovakia and 
Poland reductively signifies and intertwines these countries’ fates together. 
Altogether, the Pluto Press atlases evidence a potentially important interlocking 
relationship between cartography and democratization. These maps of transition—
whether displaying the dichotomy between East and West, presenting shifting borders 
and identities, and accounting for economic development and multilateralism—ably 
express the ideological complexities of the supposed “end” of Cold War geopolitics. 
Their very ambiguity makes it difficult to see how the process of democratization can 
provide solutions to the ravages of socialism. Maps that appear in times of social change 
struggle with the notion of representation: how it is that abstract lines on the flat page 
come to denote sweeping, volatile change on the ground. The clean lines and blank 
spaces on maps (like Gorbachev’s) often mask the ideological messiness of state power, 




identified. What is striking, though, is how much the process of democratization in places 
like Eastern Europe is itself a struggle of representation, especially in deciding who 
merits the power to speak for and represent individuals that, for over four decades, were 
not allowed a public voice. Now, as the spaces for participation have opened, those 
involved in building democracy need to fill in those spaces with clear promises that life 
will be better than before, to project the image that the individual will now receive 
representation.  
In a sense, cartography and democratization after the Cold War share the problem 
of representation: both are expected to adapt to the changing geopolitical landscape and 
offer new, realistic visions. Part of questioning the objective, scientific standards of the 
map is subverting the form of the map itself; similarly, because of the fusion of the form 
and content, it would follow that indicting democratization would involve indicting the 
forms of democracy itself, of which mapping is an important part. For cartographies like 
the Pluto Project, however, this second challenge has proven to be more difficult. Their 
atlases clearly offer an ambivalence about both state socialism and the ensuing 
democratizations, more generally indicting all state power, but their efforts fail to offer a 
third way. The ills of power, whether democratic or socialist, in a changing world are 
vivid and stark in these pages, but the solutions, or the path to peace, less so. What makes 
the Pluto Project atlases from this time period so important as part of this larger project 
on Cold War space is how much the maps are challenged by the nexus between the 
formal, representational conventions of cartography and democratization, simultaneously 
challenging those conventions even as they hold on to enough of them to advance their 




 While the unique position of the Pluto Project houses a fragmented and 
sometimes incoherent collection of messages, they can generate new lines of argument in 
the way they defy convention, while also dramatizing and heightening the conditions of 
state power in the post-Cold War landscape. By questioning the function of cartography 
itself, the atlases show how challenging form is in itself an active critique of power—the 
Pluto Press authors re-examine the nature of state power by subverting the forms one of 
its own historical tools, namely, the map. Frank Lentricchia conceived of criticism as “the 
production of knowledge to the ends of power, and, maybe, of social change,” which 
“presupposes a critical theory of society and history—what human beings have made, 
they can and will unmake and then remake and remake again.”42 In the context of a 
collapsing Cold War, the Pluto maps arguably map themselves into this remaking process.  
Placing (Re)Placing America: Reflections on Cartography and U.S. Cold War Power 
The Pluto Project provides a fitting example of the difficulties of depicting a 
dissolving geopolitical framework that was deeply entrenched in the international 
imaginary. The maps signify that just like there was no Fukuyama-style “end of history,” 
there was also no accompanying “end of geography.”43 Notions of space and place, 
nation-state power, globalism (and later globalization) continued to play a contentious 
and influential role in international politics. Three years after Gorbachev and Bush 
debated a crumbling Cold War system on the map, former dissident turned 
Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel, dealing with his own dissolving country, spoke 
to the World Economic Forum in Davos in March 1992 about the challenges of an era’s 
end. Havel characterized the Cold War as “an era of systems, institutions, mechanisms 




an era in which the goal was to find a universal theory of the world, and thus a universal 
key to unlock its prosperity.”44 Havel’s worry, though, was that in the face of a new era, 
the leaders of the world were not learning their lessons: 
We are looking for new scientific recipes, new ideologies, new control systems, 
new institutions, new instruments to eliminate the dreadful consequences of our 
previous recipes, ideologies, control systems, institutions and instruments. We 
treat the fatal consequences of technology as though they were a technical defect 
that could be remedied by technology alone. We are looking for an objective way 
out of the crisis of objectivism.45 
To Havel, the Cold War was the ultimate modern project: two world systems united in 
the “proud belief that man, as the pinnacle of everything that exists, was capable of 
objectively describing, explaining and controlling everything that exists, and of 
possessing the one and only truth about the world.”46  
The Cold War’s end required a new mode of envisioning the world, and Havel 
worried aloud that the same familiar frameworks of superpowers and scientific control 
were being erected once again. A week after Havel spoke to the WEF, a Pentagon draft 
memorandum of the “Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994–1999” was 
leaked to the New York Times. The report presented an America coping with an uncertain 
international political landscape, offering prescriptives like: 
First, the U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new 
order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need 
not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their 




sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them 
from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political 
and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring 
potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global 
role…There are other potential nations or coalitions that could, in the further 
future, develop strategic aims and a defense posture of region-wide or global 
domination. Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any 
potential future global competitor.47  
The contrast between Havel’s new world vision and that of the Defense Planning Group 
could not have been starker. While Havel hoped for some kind of international pan-
humanistic collaboration of nation-states, America was still defining the world in terms 
of balances and competitors, forces and threats—all from an overtly geopolitical, 
strategic vantage point. The U.S. seemed to be clinging to the old Cold War map of 
superpower binaries. This notion was not lost on Harper’s editor Lewis Lapham, who 
wrote of the report: 
Within the Washington conference rooms where the strategic theorists decorate 
their maps with lines of force and arcs of crisis, the Pax Americana remains as it 
was in 1947, as permanent and serene as the dome on the Capitol or the stars in 
the flag…The Cold War imprisoned the nations of the earth in the attitudes of fear. 
It wasn’t only the threat implicit in the weapons, although the weapons were 





Ultimately, (Re)Placing America follows Lapham’s sentiments and interrogates 
how these abstract Cold War patterns of thought were materialized into the lines of maps 
and were hailed into the contexts and conflicts of an international standoff. My intent, 
however, was not to indict the practices of mapping as “agents of doom” in the service of 
evil superpowers; such a move would be as reductionistic as a map itself. Rather, I 
situated cartography as an alternative entry point into assessing America’s construction of 
the Cold War. A map remained a vibrant discursive formation by which America 
attempted to place itself, to stabilize its identity in the face of global-scale spatial change. 
Maps in this way, both in U.S. institutional and popular contexts, can be seen as 
management systems that reduce and universalize, flatten and make round, reveal and 
conceal. Havel wondered if the end of the Cold War meant the “end of the modern era” 
and tried to envision what a post-Cold War space would look like, while the Pentagon 
attempted to perpetuate the Cold War’s modern admixture of military objectives, science, 
and power politics in order to cope with an unfixed, unstable world landscape. Space, in 
short, matters—and the textual ways in which we produce and reproduce that space, and 
vie for control over the right to envision and chart that space, matters as well. 
Throughout (Re)Placing America, I make the connections between such 
competing world visions and the practices of mapping. The story of cartography in the 
second half of the twentieth century is a microcosm of the narrative of the Cold War 
itself: the anxieties around “progress,” the drive to incorporate and devise better and 
clearer perceptions of the world, the development of technologies that encompass more 
facts and wider spaces, the negativity of containment placed against the ideal of scientific 




how a high-level Defense Planning Group could grasp onto a fixed view of the world, 
while also helping to explain the scope of vision that an agent of change like Havel 
needed in order to alter such fixed views. And while Lapham may have mentioned the 
maps decorating defense office walls as a kind of literary device, this project has 
advanced that those map-covered walls have actual ramifications in helping to produce 
the U.S. imaginary of itself and the world. A map is not placed in a Congressional report 
thoughtlessly; the choice of a mapmaker to frame Africa in a particular way is not 
arbitrary. These maps were produced, displayed, and entered into exchanges and debates 
according to the dictates of the Cold War contexts surrounding the map and the dictates 
of the internal forms of the map as a medium (in its shapes, colors, icons, captions, and 
relationship to the information it may support). Cold War maps are, if anything, a fitting 
barometer of the modern era, gauging the climate for state progress, but also measuring 
the storms of state upheaval. The ambivalence and complexity of cartography as a 
medium, and its unique abilities to negotiate various tensions are what makes maps 
relevant both historically and rhetorically. Havel’s “crisis of objectivism” started well 
before the end of the Cold War; cartography was bound up in these conundrums of 
science, art, and ideology since the conflict’s beginning, with its synergy of form and 
content adapting and re-adapting to tumultuous changes.  
Altogether, I would argue that this study has made the following points of 
contribution in analyzing and tracing such changes: 1) the function of the map to both 
“fix” and “unfix” particular perceptions of the world is relevant to assessing how 
America sought to stabilize its place in a rapidly changing world; 2) the internationalism 




it; 3) the humanistic notion of a geographical imagination is central to understanding why 
particular Cold War agents and institutions continually drew on cartography to represent 
their interests; 4) combining an ideological approach to reading maps as articulators of 
contextual tensions and historical ideas with an instrumental approach to maps as 
material, strategic documents can best help to situate cartography as an ongoing process 
of production, circulation, and display. Such contributions place the study in a dynamic 
between “mapping forward” and “mapping back,” and show how considering Cold War 
cartography and history from a rhetorical perspective can help to critically assess future 
cartographic projects and visions of the world. 
Fixing and Unfixing: Maps as the “Immutable Mobile” 
For one, characterizing Cold War maps as an uneasy balance between fixing and 
unfixing helps create a better understanding of America’s recent cartographic history and 
potentially strengthens a sense of the contingencies of world space as we move further 
into the twenty-first century. In some ways, the cartographics of Soviet octopi and slave 
camps, the widely distributed educational maps showing America as the center of the 
world, the newspaper maps showing the promise of the Peace Corps, the Congressional 
and Defense reports filled with endless security projections of America’s power all over 
the globe, all seem like antiquated, historical curios. The mapping impulse and spatial 
assumptions of the Cold War, however, remain very much alive and relevant—the 
concept of closed, absolute spaces on the map, the continental framework of power lines 
between developed and underdeveloped, and the acceptance that the world is continually 
shrinking through rapidly changing technology and communication still hold sway. 




pervasive and powerful characteristic: not only to say (à la Denis Wood and John Fels) 
that this is there, but also that this is the world. The international landscape was not 
simply in flux during the Cold War; America was powerful enough that its definitions 
and its vision of world space was hegemonic and often immovably rigid. Thus, the maps 
of the Cold War have displayed the various ways by which, in Shapiro’s words, 
“dominant territorialities have daily helped to reproduce the international imaginary.”49 
Using maps as rhetorical texts that can show this process of reproduction is particularly 
important, as they help to critically assess how certain dominant views of the world 
become fixed and powerful. In the words of international relations theorist Kennan 
Ferguson, cartographic practices have:  
served as a sense-making machinery for the United States and other geopolitical 
entities in the form of the taxonomies that make placing the American self in the 
world possible…to map is to ‘do’ politics: to make political judgments, to place 
people in different worlds, to grant and deny opportunities—but also to attempt to 
depoliticize and naturalize these judgments.50  
I sought in this project, then, to foreground this politics of mapping in America’s recent 
history through compelling cases that displayed the visual politics of the Cold War. What 
makes maps important in this context is not just how the maps politicized space, but also 
how their power of scientific authority and authenticity removed politics from the map, 
often smoothing out the wrinkles of inequities and struggle that searching for place 
within an abstract space can create. 
On the other hand, while the bipolar image of the U.S./Soviet Union was (and in 




claim forty-plus years of a static geopolitical landscape. The maps of the Cold War era 
have demonstrated that this is far from true. Even as they were used to fix the world, 
maps were dynamic, continually contested, circulated and re-circulated, drawn and re-
drawn. They were created by a diversity of institutions and interests looking to define the 
world and fill abstract space with meaning and stability. Denis Cosgrove points out that a 
map is the very embodiment of what Bruno Latour called the “immutable mobile,” “a 
container of information gathered at specific locations, returned to a ‘centre of 
calculation’, and then placed once more into circulation as a vehicle and instrument of 
scientific knowledge.”51 Thus, the map freezes and commits particular relationships to 
the page, but then becomes a circulatory medium that has movement in the culture, as 
certain projections will be redesigned and refashioned or particular mapping projects 
designed for one purpose will be (re)appropriated for other uses. All the while, the map 
has to, in a sense, perform—to constantly promote itself as a credible expert witness to 
the world space it abstracts. Because of this, maps also have a recursive quality, referring 
back to themselves and their forms by pulling on past conventions, while arguing for 
future realities.”52  
To show the (re)placement of America is to conceptualize the Cold War and 
cartography itself working in tandem with one another as a continual process, with the 
United States (through its multitude of cartographic agents) renewing and re-envisioning 
itself in a dynamic between fixing and unfixing. The wide scope of (Re)Placing America 
overall is used to show this sense of movement. America emerged an undisputed world 
power from World War II, and out of that power built a massive strategic apparatus based 




These collaborations placed the nation uneasily as both an idealist, benevolent developer 
of the undeveloped, and a guarded, realist surveillance center of knowledge production 
and control. By the time of the Second Cold War, America was a shaken giant 
reaffirming its principles to both its technocratic and moral place of prominence on the 
international landscape. (Re)Placing America contributes a rhetorical perspective on 
maps as a process of fixing and stabilizing throughout these international shifts in the 
United States’ identity as a world power—in other words, how cartography managed the 
anxiety around what and where the place of America should be in the second half of the 
twentieth century during an era where two world systems vied for the ultimate locatory 
power of geopolitical influence.  
Cold War America and the Form of Internationalism  
 This project has primarily focused on world political maps that project American 
power (and its perceptions) across a global field, making internationalism a central theme. 
The Cold War introduced the tension between an acceptance that horizontal distance on 
the ground is no longer the primary measurement of space, and the fact that the horizontal, 
flat map still reigned supreme. These changes in distance had profound implications for 
the character of American internationalism and foreign relations. Some would argue that 
air-age globalism never really caught on—for example, a Richard Edes Harrison map 
today, still surprises with its novelty, its rolling landscapes and disorienting viewpoints. 
Whether those styles had a long legacy, though, is immaterial: Harrison (and the other 
early World War II and Cold War cartographic innovators) more importantly articulated 
the opportunities, limitations, and ambivalences in visually presenting America as a 




discourse—during World War II and the Cold War, cartographers and policymakers from 
a wide array of institutions accepted that maps could no longer be static, but had strategic 
properties. The rise of the air as a cartographic medium and the technological advances in 
missiles transcended familiar political boundaries, and maps documented these shifts at 
each turn. To cope with American power potentially losing its place in these changes, 
Cold War maps were especially successful at projecting the labyrinth of new 
commitments and framing the geopolitical reasoning behind blocs and pacts. For example, 
the State Department found itself using cartography as a catalogue of borders and 
political jurisdictions, attempting to keep pace with the immense changes in world 
politics. By the time of the Second Cold War, the world had shrunk on the map to the 
point of hyper-internationalism, where the U.S. and the Soviet Union overlapped so much 
in destructive power that international distance, at least in a horizontal sense, became 
meaningless. The power to draw borders and boundaries was still deeply important, as I 
have suggested; the fear that our familiar geographical methods of explaining the world 
were becoming obsolete was expressed in attempts to enforce and protect those methods. 
Hence, it is clear why the Weinberger defense maps of 1981, which catalogued a new 
arsenal of the most sophisticated weapons technology in American history, were 
projected on maps that could have come out of Time magazine in 1947, with their arrows 
of Soviet aggression and arguments for spatial containment.  
These issues lie at the heart of what makes Cold War mapping interesting: most 
mapmakers, policy analysts, defense representatives responded to the new strategic uses 
and malleability of mapping to represent America’s international interests, yet this was 




More often, any problems with the map were seen as technical—a map could be 
reconceived and redrawn to get a better perception, but there usually was not a question 
about maps themselves as a form of vision and what those implications might be. This 
conundrum explains why outsiders like Arno Peters were met with extreme reactions of 
hostility and adulation, and fringe academics like William Bunge both baffled and 
inspired audiences. The expectations that the forms of maps would fulfill a certain 
appetite were extremely powerful, making those violators of forms that much more novel. 
Altogether, the anxiety of the Cold War’s leap into internationalism made familiar and 
recognizable cartographic conventions even more important to maintain. The borders on 
the map were not simply legal-political lines and military barriers, they were powerful 
ways to maintain and defend a particular vision of the world, and a method of ordering 
and containing international chaos. 
Imagining and Re-Imagining: Humanistic Projection and the Question of 
Cartographic Agency 
 
While cartography was certainly prominent as a medium for scientific knowledge 
and management, this project also renders maps as part of a more artistic “imaginary” in 
Cold War visual culture. Cartography was drawn with particular value systems, setting 
spatial hierarchies and politicizing “place.” Maps, then, were contingent, situational, and, 
above all rhetorical. Despite their sophisticated technology and abstract qualities, maps 
are, in a sense, unfailingly human. The Cold War did see an unprecedented 
technologization of cartography and a transition of mapping into a highly sophisticated 
science, but it also saw an explosion of social-political issues and thematics that fell 




The human element still found its way into the map, and to find the tensions by which 
those themes made their way into the lines and borders, thus, becomes important. 
 I highlighted, for example, how agency remains an important character in 
analyzing maps, as the individual choices of cartographers and the interests of particular 
institutions bind and frame the map’s presentational power. The way in which a William 
Bunge comes of age during both the tumult of Vietnam and the rise of quantitative 
geography as a major disciplinary paradigm shift, or the function of Isaac Don Levine as 
defector journalist who chooses cartography as one medium of fighting communism, or 
S.W. Boggs becoming frustrated behind-the-scenes as America drops its commitments to 
international mapping collaborations—all speak to the business of cartography as a 
confluence of human forces, not simply byproducts that reflect history. Discerning the 
intent of these actors is difficult, even as it is possible to discern a network of interests 
and ideologies constrained by rhetorical choices and contextual changes that inform (and 
are informed by) the larger Cold War. These agents provided values systems for the map, 
while in turn, the map provided a value system back to its agent. All in all, whatever the 
intent may be, the map was chosen by these actors for its unique power to articulate and 
mediate the space of the Cold War. 
Related to these notions of cartographic agency is the function of a map’s 
circulation: the map is not just a rendering of its cartographer’s artistic vision or its 
institutional origins, but the map also accrues further political meaning and ideological 
value through its rhetorical life in circulating through various contexts and interpretations. 
Such an approach seeks to remove the map from its status as detached visual aid or a 




decades of robust scholarship in “critical cartography,” too often, fruitful conversations 
about the ideologies of mapping and the powerful interests behind maps ignore the actual 
maps themselves and treat them as simply side items. This good work misses the 
opportunity to bring forth the material cartographic evidence and re-create the heightened 
moments by which maps get hailed into active duty. Maps are points of human 
communicative action, not empty containers of ideology. To approach them in this way 
first involves unearthing the maps, engaging with them in their archival locations, 
treating them as complex textual fragments in their own rights, accentuating their 
embeddedness with other maps and material artifacts, piecing together (when possible) 
how the maps were appropriated for particular interests and strategies, and reading the 
actual maps for their internal grammars and their external ideologies—seeing the map 
and the “paramap” as working in tandem.  
The danger of doing a historical study of Cold War mapping is that it risks 
reducing, as has happened all too often, space to time. In other words, stringing together a 
narrative around cartography may create the appearance of a neat chronology, when there 
is really messiness and loose ends. Worse, it may suggest, once again, that maps simply 
serve as reflectors of historical circumstances. What I would advance, instead, is that 
what makes maps particularly interesting is their inherently fragmentary nature—that 
here and there they are embedded in a report for statistical evidence for capacity and 
projection of power, used as emblems for internationalist identities at other points, and 
circulate as provocative arguments elsewhere. They provide interesting ripples, and then 
go back under water again. Mapping, then, finds its way into some of the most 




(Re)Placing America does not, then, attempt a comprehensive history of Cold War 
cartography, but rather seeks out particular nodal points and thematics where maps 
consolidated and shaped changing shifts in perception, where cartographic fragments 
cohered around the defining moments, but also sometimes in the everyday politics of the 
Cold War. The performative drama of Henry Cabot Lodge hailing cartography into a 
direct confrontation with the Soviet Union at the United Nations needs to be placed 
alongside the routine recommendations buried in conference reports that American 
representatives made at UN cartographic summits about how U.S. mapping methods 
could be appropriated by developing nations. Both provide equally important 
representations of not only the strategic uses of mapping, but the way cartography was 
understood as a practice—and the more these are put in play with one another, the richer 
sense we may get of how Cold War space edified itself into U.S. government, academic, 
and popular identity.  
The intertextuality across Cold War maps in a host of different popular, academic, 
foreign policy, and defense venues is what gives them richer meaning: that Richard Edes 
Harrison was a State Department consultant, that the same specifications for International 
Map of the World maps were being used by the Army Map Service to chart foreign areas, 
that Dr. May’s maps of disease for the AGS were circulating in Congressional debates, 
that Peters’ socialist map projection was adopted by evangelical religious organizations 
all over the world. Maps, then, engage with other maps, creating a complex, often 






Vision and Strategy: Bringing Ideological and Instrumental Approaches Together 
Finally, this notion of intertextuality hints at one last implication of this project: 
the potentially fruitful blend of ideological and instrumental critiques. For example, 
beginning this particular narrative of Cold War cartography with Richard Edes Harrison 
is instructive because his two innovative articulations about the function of mapping—
vision and strategy—are central to the mapping process as a whole in the second half of 
the twentieth century. The ideology of vision, that perception and interpretation (in his 
case, the “bird’s eye view”) are key to seeing the world as a whole in terms of American 
interests and power, finds its way into the multitude of new uses for mapping in the era. 
At the same time, these users also understood mapping as strategic, that a map had an 
instrumental purpose and could be marshaled and circulated as evidential weapons 
against the U.S.S.R., or could be drawn into the U.S. project of developing a stable and 
democratizing Third World. “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.,” for example, provided the 
archetypal instantiation of these functions. The AFL’s map of slave labor constructed a 
powerful vision of America’s place vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, infiltrating its borders 
with “authentic” knowledge; yet, the map’s full influence is not seen until it is shown 
how “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” was instrumentalized as a strategic force by international 
labor unions, Congressional representatives, the CIA, even everyday citizens. Similarly, 
an analysis of the products of U.S. Third World cartography shows how maps anxiously 
framed an emergent South, but this analysis is richer when those products are considered 
alongside the processes by which State Department policymakers conceived cartography 
as a modernizing project that could “teach” de-colonized nation-states to be strategic 




making function of the internal system of maps and their external production/circulation 
are best held in suspension with one another.  
This relationship, then, between the ideologies of maps and their strategic, 
instrumental uses evidences the power of the map as an inventional resource, a unique 
force to be marshaled into America’s waging of international conflicts. President 
Roosevelt understood this when he ordered Americans to become World War II 
participants by tracing strategic routes on maps. Richard Edes Harrison understood this 
when he discussed the importance of “user requirements” when training Army personnel 
to absorb the importance of the new pilot perspectives. S.W. Boggs certainly responded 
to this power as he sent a new state-of-the-art globe to Secretary of State George 
Marshall as he blueprinted a vision of a postwar Europe. When O.K. Armstrong 
detonated the map as a public relations timebomb in the hands of Andrei Gromyko, he 
was drawing on that same inventional power, as was Henry Cabot Lodge showcasing the 
technical superiority of U.S. cartographic surveillance technology to embarrass the Soviet 
Union in an international forum. Even Hubert Humphrey distributing maps of world 
disease to members of Congress or Caspar Weinberger choosing cartography as a central 
medium to rekindle an arms race and propaganda war with the U.S.S.R.—both saw 
cartography as a rhetorical choice and a viable medium for arguing America’s role as 
both benevolent international steward and military exemplar. While all of these anecdotes 
may be small instances of Cold War antagonisms, their importance as illustrations, 
arguably, goes deeper. In each case, the actors understood, at least implicitly, the map’s 
importance as a potentially explosive source of invention—providing a writ of 




infiltrated its way into high-level summits and conferences, or stirred up overseas 
reactions. And, on the other hand, if maps are conceived as inventional resources, it is 
easier to understand why actors such as William Bunge and the Pluto Press provocateurs 
could choose the map, one of the most visible tokens of state power, to potentially 
undermine and destabilize that power. In all of these examples, maps provided such 
actors with a political vision of the world, but also one that was tangible, to be held in 
one’s hands, passed around, and argued about; and these functions of vision and strategy 
combined together to display America’s investment in grappling with and coming to 
terms with its place in the world.  
 The relationship between maps and the Cold War also compellingly documents 
how cartography was continually constrained by its complex history as an artistic 
technique and a scientific application of the geographic discipline. Academic 
cartographers were so often drafted into the foreign policy and military apparatus of the 
U.S. government, and in the process the search for disciplinary truth and scientific rigor 
both vied against and aided the defense needs and the programs of U.S. international 
relations. Particularly, the rise of social science as a modernizing force was inseparable 
from the geopolitical internationalism of Cold War security and foreign policy discourse. 
The discipline of geography (and cartography as its visual companion) reached 
prominence as a social science in this era, but was also continually haunted by its 
perceived status as an arm of government objectives. Relatedly, the notion that in the 
“shrinking world” the importance of geographical knowledge was in danger also 
provided an uneasy backdrop to the collaborations between academics and policymakers. 




information and knowledge that maps contained on the page was matched in importance 
by the tensions around what “cartographic knowledge” actually means and can achieve. 
For example, “Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” was just as notable for revealing the locations of 
Soviet labor camps as it was in offering proof that the United States had superior spatial 
knowledge to infiltrate the protected borders of the Soviet Union. From an oppositional 
perspective, this also follows that the Nuclear War Atlas is not only an example of 
nuclear protest, it is a culmination of anxieties around the shifting place of geographic 
and cartographic knowledge in both the academy and the U.S. government, and how that 
knowledge either aids or harms human beings on the ground. On the other hand, when 
popular cartographers were also hailed into the Cold War, government policymakers 
absorbed and recirculated the artistic perspectives, the reductionistic visual metaphors, 
and the appreciation of public opinion’s role in creating visions of the world. When 
Boggs brought Boris Artzybasheff of Time to render map graphics for State Department 
propaganda films, or representatives entered New York Times maps of Cold War 
international problems into the Congressional Record, these actors were reaching out to 
novel perspectives and signifying the importance of the “audience” as a factor in their use 
of cartography. Taken together, this melding of art and science made for maps as unique 
source of both authoritative expertise and visionary inspiration. In this way, the 
remarkable fluidity of maps crossing popular, academic, and institutional contexts 
remains one of the most enduring legacies of Cold War cartography. 
Mapping Back, Mapping Forward: Resituating Cold War Cartography 
On June 13, 2011, literary theorist Stanley Fish boldly titled his periodic column 




reviewed a new interdisciplinary volume called GeoHumanities: Art, History, Text at the 
Edge of Place, which shows that scholars can, Fish argues, “read events not merely 
historically, as the product of the events preceding them, but geologically, as the location 
of sedimented patterns of culture, economics, politics, agriculture. What is being 
attempted is a reorientation of perception, an alternative way of interpreting the world.”53 
This alternative interpretation advances, in Paul Smethurst’s words, that “space is not 
merely in the service of time, but has a poetics of its own, which reveals itself through a 
geographical or topological imagination rather than a historical one.”54 Such an approach 
is consonant with what historian Edward Ayers calls “deep contingency,” in his 
“Mapping Time” essay for GeoHumanities, where layers of reality interact and the 
passage of time can be seen in spatial units. In this way, as Ayers claims, if geography is 
“about patterns and structures; history is about motion; by integrating the two, we can see 
layers of events, layers of the consequences of unpredictability.”55 
(Re)Placing America is one contribution to this spatial turn in the humanities, 
where maps are used to see both the motion of Cold War history, while also showing the 
spatial patterns of the American imaginary of the globe. This kind of spatial inquiry 
remains a vital project, for as Fish states, “the division between empirical/descriptive 
disciplines and interpretive disciplines is itself a fiction and one that stands in the way of 
the production of knowledge.”56 In this way, a critical, humanistic perspective to maps 
can be part of this bridge, not only in producing knowledge, but perhaps more 
importantly, exploring the ways in which knowledge has been produced in the past. To 
use Peta Mitchell’s words, this perspective “demands a reader who is at once an 




stratification of history, memory, language, and landscape and who can read obliquely 
through their layers.”57 
 My approach to reading such stratification in (Re)Placing America is not just a 
way of looking back into distant history. Critically reaching into that history allows for 
the useful interpretation of uncertain, unfolding spaces (as well as the stabilizing forces of 
place) in the future. In March 2003, as the U.S. military prepared to enter Iraq, a military 
strategist at the U.S. Naval War College, Thomas P.M. Barnett, made waves with an 
article in Esquire, entitled “The Pentagon’s New Map.”58 Barnett sought to define a post-
Cold War, post-9/11 American geopolitics that finally faced the tides of globalization. In 
short, Barnett’s thesis is that in this new era, “disconnectedness defines danger”—those 
nations that are plugged into the globalizing capitalist networks are safe, while those 
states that stay outside of these networks are threats. Barnett wrote in Esquire: 
Show me where globalization is thick with network connectivity, financial 
transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security, and I will show you 
regions featuring stable governments, rising standards of living, and more deaths 
by suicide than murder…But show me where globalization is thinning or just 
plain absent, and I will show you regions plagued by politically repressive 
regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and—most 
important—the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global 
terrorists.59 
Included was a map (fig. 6.1) depicting a deeply divided world between the connected 
and the functioning (the “core”: the U.S., the E.U., parts of South America) and the 




Southeast Asia).60 Barnett’s bold map landed him a position as a special strategist for 
Donald Rumsfeld with the Department of Defense, and his multi-mediated PowerPoint 
presentation of the piece, entitled “The Brief,” was required viewing by all Air Force 
members who attained the rank of General, and was given hundreds of times to various 
private and public organizations. The project became a book (The Pentagon’s New Map 
in 2004), Barnett became a popular media pundit, parlayed his work into his 
“Globlogization” project on the Web, and his map was widely circulated as a new 
geopolitical vision for the twenty-first century.61  
Certainly, Barnett’s vision was different than that of the Defense Planning Group 
in 1992, which was still mired in a world of superpower politics. Rather than simply an  
  
 





arms-wielding power or world cop, the U.S. was posited by Barnett as a “systems 
administrator” helping manage the world towards peace through connectivity. As Simon 
Dalby pointed out, though, Barnett was assuming that globalization was a benevolent, 
U.S.-led process that all would want to partake in, and within Barnett’s vision was the 
age-old ideology of American exceptionalism and manifest destiny.62 In addition, 
Barnett’s geopolitical imaginary involved the legitimation of U.S. military intervention 
wherever it may be needed to ensure that the “gap” would shrink (“Show me a part of the 
world that is secure in its peace and I will show you a strong or growing ties between 
local militaries and the U.S. military”).63 So, while Barnett’s project defined itself as 
resolutely post-Cold War, it takes an understanding of the historical nuances of Cold War 
cartography and geopolitics to be able to interpret and assess such new geo-visions. 
Barnett’s own agency as strategist and cartographer mixed popular, academic, and 
government-defense assumptions in ways that Richard Edes Harrison and S.W. Boggs 
would understand. His geopolitical reasoning spoke to the kind of “world divided” that 
Mackinder’s World War I cartography inspired in the move toward containment and 
bipolarity that mapped American constructions of the Soviet Union. The multi-mediated 
circulation of Barnett’s maps may have been more sophisticated than the AFL’s Gulag 
labor map, but the importance of how a map is produced and circulated amidst 
institutional collaborations and support through a multitude of forms ring true in both 
cases. Barnett’s map also drew lines that (re)set notions of inside/outside, and 
center/periphery, and demarcated which nations had arrived and were arriving, in ways 
that resonate with the cartography of development and modernization during the Cold 




“shrinking world” bringing connectedness and peace, mixed with the realist calculus of 
security and counterforce, was a confluence of spatial values that marked America’s Cold 
War past. Ultimately, the “Pentagon’s New Map” phenomenon once again shows 
cartography being hailed as evidential weaponry into a global debate around America’s 
continually-shifting “place” in the world. To see the map forward, we have to see the 
map back as well. 
Finally, though, this same prescription holds true for considering the future of 
mapping as a form of resistance to these powerful geopolitical frames. Oppositional 
movements, for example, are “taking back” the map, attempting to reclaim a sense of 
place within the abstract world space. Urban geographers and social activists, in 
particular, are following in William Bunge’s legacy of radical immersion, but updating 
with new technologies: in Chicago, Daniel Makagon has been engaging in “sonic 
mapping,” combining cartography with audio documentaries, where neighborhood 
inhabitants tell their own stories of the urban landscape and take listeners along a sonic 
journey as they walk through parts of the city with their map, allowing citizens and 
tourists to piece together and collaborate in an alternative story of Chicago and 
participate together in urban life.64 Makagon’s work speaks back to the ways in which 
Bunge tried to rescue the urban neighborhood through cartography from the kind of Cold 
War urban planning maps that saw citizens moving away from city centers because of 
nuclear fears. Joan Faber McAlister recently studied how maps of shack settlements in 
South African Townships, commissioned out of government attempts to resettle the 
inhabitants, have been marked by repressive racial re-ordering that “marginalize the lived 




home.”65 In response, McAlister has been working with shack settlers to draw their own 
maps as resistance techniques to the resettlement plans. In looking back to the past, the 
collaborators of GeoHumanities are also revising history, using GIS technology 
(originally a highly guarded Cold War defense project) to remap each layer over time of 
particular Civil War-era areas and show what happened to African-American populations 
after emancipation.66 And Sorin Matei at Purdue University has piloted a series of 
projects bringing maps into conversation with cutting-edge social media—where, for 
example, users can interact with historical maps through their cellular phones.67 In each 
of these diverse projects, the fluid use of cartographic technologies with other media 
speak well to the benefits of the kind of “convergence culture” that Henry Jenkins wrote 
about; the kind of dynamic flexibility in mapping that was evidenced at points during the 
Cold War has now exploded in a variety of fruitful directions.68 Significantly, such 
oppositional cartographic projects capture the idea of “place” as an intensely felt and 
lived entity amidst the potentially corrosive abstract projects of state power and 
globalization, and advance the hope that cartography can become a more democratized 
activity where all can map. 
In addition, the Google Maps phenomenon has also fascinated and challenged 
many of these mapping activists. As critical cartographers and geographers have noted, 
Google Maps has revolutionized the experience of the map.69 The positionality and 
subjectivity of the user has transformed; the bird’s-eye perspective has evolved into an 
immersive perspective, where map users can put themselves inside virtual spaces. There 
is subversive potential in the map user now becoming the mapmaker; in this way, 




same satellite photography that revolutionized Cold War cartography for defense 
purposes has now altered subject positions. Places are not just military targets, but can be 
defined now in a host of different ways by the user, changing the way one can self-
identify in space. Amber Davisson’s investigation of the red state/blue state map in the 
2008 election shows how the interactivity and new subjectivity of Google Maps allowed 
voters to “create a custom rhetorical interpretation of the election” in an act of “digital 
citizenship” and rhetorical invention that challenged the news media and political 
campaigns’ typical power of interpretation in a political election.70  
Still, the technologies that allow for these changes are often backed by 
corporations and used to protect state power—and thus, the anxieties around the power of 
perspective and the surveillance function of such technologies that arose out of Cold War 
contexts still remains. When historian John Cloud was incensed that the same maps being 
used to help relocate and save Vietnamese families were the same base maps being used 
to bomb them, he was offering a reminder about the divergent pathways that mapping 
technology can take. What allows us to position ourselves on a virtual map so that our 
friends can find us at a crowded rally also resonates with the technology that allows for a 
drone strike to make an accurate target on a foreign landscape. As Cold War geography 
reminds us, the borders between war and peace are not often as clear-cut as the lines of 
the maps we use. 
 In the end, the cases and histories in (Re)Placing America also stand in for a 
larger reflection about how critics define political space and interpret cartographic 
imaginaries in a time of immense transition. In eras of global upheaval and change, critics 




and use of the rhetorical artifacts that imagine such spaces. If Michael Shapiro is correct 
that “the primary contestations in current global instabilities are over identity and spaces,” 
then the visual artifacts that shape and contain such identities and spaces must remain at 
the forefront of the debates and discussions, as well as being situated as continually 
relevant instruments of power and knowledge production.71 In particular, the properties 
and design of the map or globe that “read” this changing world can say much about the 
complexity of national identities and the power of the nation-state. As Michael Biggs has 
noted: “putting the state on the map meant knowing and imagining it as real—and, so, 
making it a reality.”72 The map simultaneously reveals and conceals its ideological 
commitments to the user, and that process of display is especially heightened in rhetorical 
intensity during times of global reorganization and changes in the nature of state power. 
Maps play an important role in fusing form and content together by becoming vehicles of 
perception for such power. In a world supposedly marked today by the fluid lines of 
globalization, there is a benefit from sharper critical vocabularies on the “producers” of 
space and the output of their production.  
In terms of situating U.S. placement within these vocabularies, the Cold War and 
its maps remain an explosive site of inquiry. For the Cold War was not simply a war of 
missile trajectories and political force treaties, it was a war of symbols; ensuring that 
maps are re-situated as integral articulations of this war of symbols remains a vital task. 
Ferguson’s conception of this idea is particularly eloquent, and thus I quote him at length: 
The United States’ imaginary in the twentieth century was conceivable primarily 
in reference to the communist ‘threat.’ A world was designed where the 




powerful map with both horizontal depth and interpretive depth, explaining what 
the world meant as well as how it looked. Mapping serves as a powerfully 
personal function, producing the world as understandable as its discursive 
productions provide guides for certain modes of travel and highlight sights and 
sites of importance. Mapping also serves a powerfully collective function, 
furnishing coherences that make people into a singular people…To map is to 
engage in a procedure of identity creation at the individual and group level; it is, 
bluntly, to produce the world.73  
In addition, according to Ferguson, for America “the instability of its own geographic 
identity, its plurality of history, and its character as a method of thought rather than an 
ideologically secure territory have long provoked a strong need to map. Yet 
simultaneously, these characteristics have allowed a plurality and an instability of 
mappings.”74 Coming full circle, the anxiety of Roald Dahl’s pilot anxiously traversing 
over the blank pages of an atlas represents that instability. As we look toward mapping 
the future, the trap is to fall into prescribing what will be good maps and what will be bad 
maps with the promise that we will make more accurate and responsible cartography. 
Such a trap would have us succumb to Boggs’ “cartohypnosis” that haunted the Cold War, 
and could risk replacing the world of 2011 with the world of 1947. Rather, I would argue 
that we can (and should) continue to interrogate the processes by which we see and 
envision our place in the world, and engage with the contentious cartographies that sketch 
such visions. In other words, we would do well to rewrite the histories of spaces at the 
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